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This thesis explores the relation between film noir and home in the 1940s. I view film noir as a traumatic 
category of films. Within film noir, home is a traumatic and often displaced object. Through home, this 
thesis analyses how history is lost in noir, and engages with noir’s conceptual impossibility and 
retroactivity. My approach is focused around a series of close readings of a selection of film noirs, 
including Stranger on the Third Floor, Double Indemnity, The Killers, Mildred Pierce, The Woman in the 
Window, Gilda, and others. These well-known films were selected due to the way in which the centrality 
of home is overlooked in noir criticism. Home is both completely central to understanding the ambiguity 
of noir, and largely absent. Complementing these readings, I explore the psychoanalytic logic of film noir 
— drawing on the work of Jacques Lacan, Sigmund Freud, as well as Mark Fisher and Slavoj Žižek — in 
order to articulate the function of ‘home’ in film noir. The primary goal of this thesis is to centre the films 
themselves and highlight their conceptual complexity in relation to broader historical and theoretical 
frameworks, such as the Second World War and its aftermath, as well as noir’s own retroactive conception 
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Figure i.1, Criss-Cross, dir. by Robert Siodmak (Universal Pictures, 1949) 
‘Almost Freudian’ — Approaches to Film Noir 
The loss of home in film noir is as paradoxical as the loss of film noir itself. Loss permeates all of 
noir, and nowhere is this more visible than noir’s lost homes. Indeed, it is through home’s palpable 
absence which noir’s frayed and obscured edges are rendered visible. In film noir criticism it is 
common practice to first acknowledge the field’s own contentious origins. There is typically some 
variation on the idea that noir does not function as other cinematic genres, principally because 
there is no clear consensus as to what properties identify a film as noir, or even how noir should 
[2] 
 
be classified. Should it be conceived as a genre, a mode, a metaphor, or something else? Indeed, 
as Raymond Durgnat inadvertently shows in his 1970 essay, ‘Paint it Black: The Family Tree of 
Film Noir’, film noir cannot be conceived as a genre.1 Durgnat offers various motifs or cycles, 
what he calls ‘inevitably imperfect schematizations for some main lines of force in the American 
film noir’, to help categorise the different aspects of crime or criminals in film noir.2 Durgnat views 
crime as the central concept which coheres film noir. The eleven motifs he offers are: ‘Crime as 
Social Criticism’, ‘Gangsters’, ‘On the Run’, ‘Private Eyes and Adventurers’, ‘Middle Class 
Murder’, ‘Portraits and Doubles’, ‘Sexual Pathology’, ‘Psychopaths’, ‘Hostages to Fortune’, 
‘Black and Reds’, ‘Guignol, Horror, Fantasy’.3 These disparate categories, and the tenuous 
connections between them, show the way in which categorising noir’s constituent components is 
both tedious and completely ineffectual in illuminating its construction. 
This, I would argue, is partly problematised by the retroactive categorisation of noir. Nino 
Frank first coined the term in 1947,4 Raymond Borde and Étienne Chaumeton built upon the 
conception of noir in 1955,5 but it is not until the 1970s that critics identified noir as an academic 
object of study. There is thus a significant delay in both the identification of noir and its academic 
legitimisation. This delay, I will later argue, is not accidental or perfunctory. In fact, it is crucial 
to understanding the implications of noir’s retroactive construction. It should be noted that the 
 
1 Raymond Durgnat, ‘Paint it Black: The Family Tree of Film Noir’, in Film Noir Reader, ed. by Alain Silver and 
James Urisini (New York: Limelight Edition, 1996 [1970]), pp. 37-51. 
2 Ibid, p. 39, [original emphasis]. 
3 Ibid. pp. 39-51. 
4 Nino Frank, ‘A New Kind of Police Drama: The Criminal Adventure’, in Film Noir Reader 2, ed. Alain Silver and 
James Ursini (New York: Limelight Editions, 1999 [1945]). 
5 Raymond Borde and Étienne Chaumeton, ‘Towards a Definition of Film Noir’, in Film Noir Reader, ed. by Alain 
Silver and James Urisini (New York: Limelight Edition, 1996 [1955]). 
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advent of film noir maps onto a broader history of film studies as a discipline. The tensions borne 
out of film noir criticism exist in film studies. 
In my view, noir criticism did not adopt a serious and credible critical view until after the 
1970s. More recent critical work on film noir includes Shades of Noir: A Reader in 1993,6 Kelly 
Oliver and Benigno Trigo’s Noir Anxiety in 2003,7 Edward Dimmendberg’s Film Noir and the 
Spaces of Modernity in 2004,8 James Naremore’s More Than Night: Film Noir in its Contexts in 
2008,9  and Wheeler Winston Dixon’s Film Noir the Cinema of Paranoia in 2009.10 Shades of 
Noir is a collection essays, edited by Joan Copjec, which examines noir from a largely 
psychoanalytic perspective. It often engages with noir’s ‘original’ critics, acknowledging that their 
contributions shaped what we commonly think of as noir. Noir Anxiety explores the structures of 
the anxious mood of noir, drawing on a detailed historical account of noir, as well as using the 
work of Julia Kristeva — particularly her concept of the ‘abject’ — and Homi K Bhabha’s theory 
of colonial discourse, a combination which, to my mind, is rather unique in noir discourse. Film 
Noir and the Spaces of Modernity examines the spaces of noir, and how the historical contexts of 
World War Two and modernism (as well as, later, postmodernism) enact a disappearance of space 
in noir, which Dimendberg relates to nostalgia in modernism. More than Night is a wide-reaching 
book, which, like Spaces of Modernity, highlights the prevalence of modernism in noir. Naremore 
understands noir to be a symptom of the politics of Hollywood’s censorship, as well as conceiving 
noir as a result of various other economic and cultural forces. Film Noir and the Cinema of 
Paranoia focuses more on the psychological aspects of noir, and how fear figures in film noir. 
 
6 Joan Copjec, Shades of Noir: A Reader (London: Verso, 1993). 
7 Kelly Oliver and Beningo Trigo, Noir Anxiety (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003). 
8 Edward Dimendberg, Film Noir and the Spaces of Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
9 James Naremore, More Than Night: Film Noir In Its Contexts (California: University of California Press, 2008). 
10 Wheeler Winston Dixon, Film Noir and the Cinema of Paranoia (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009). 
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Dixon’s book looks at noir from the 40s and continues through to the neo-noirs of the late 90s and 
early 2000s. 
An earlier yet instructive example can be seen in Borde and Chaumeton’s ‘Towards A 
Definition of Film Noir’ in 1955. Their breezy rhetorical style expresses itself as if it were a 
description lifted from the films themselves. Their essay shows the difficulties in noir’s 
conception, in particular their conclusion that the definition of noir is ‘simple’: ‘the moral 
ambivalence, the criminality, the complex contradictions in motives and events, all conspire to 
make the viewer co-experience the anguish and insecurity which are the true emotions of 
contemporary film noir.’11 Noir is apparently simple to define, but Borde and Chaumeton’s 
definition largely operates on an imaginative level. Despite lacking any real specificity, it is a 
definition which might feel convincing. They gesture towards ‘anguish and insecurity’ without 
defining what they mean within the context of noir. 
For early film noir critics, therefore, noir is marked by a certain instability. This instability 
is, I argue, both textual and critical. Noir is not strictly speaking a genre, that which excludes films 
that fail to meet its stringent criteria, but rather, as James Naremore argues, ‘transgeneric and 
polyvalent […] An ideological concept with a history all its own, it can be used to describe a 
period, a movement, and a recurrent style.’12 Defining genres involves a level of abstraction, but 
in noir these inconsistencies cause significant textual and critical tension. In short, the tensions and 
ambiguities of the problems of genre are borne out in noir’s anxiety. Therefore, rather than 
attempting to meticulously note every possible characteristic of noir, I argue that it can instead be 
understood as an open set. The approach of this thesis is to take the proposition of noir’s instability 
 
11 Borde and Chaumeton, ‘Towards a Definition of Film Noir’, p. 25 [original emphasis]. 
12 Naremore, More Than Night, p. 6. 
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seriously. I do not take noir’s instability as a historical or rhetorical framing device, but rather as 
an intrinsic part of my own criticism. I define film noir, in a broad sense, to be a category of films 
running from the mid–1930s to the late 1950s, typically, though not necessarily, marked by a 
certain anxious fascination in both its internal logic and spectatorial relations. What makes a film 
‘noir’, I will later argue, is largely that we call it ‘noir.’ The reason for this is not to simply bring 
every possible film under noir’s conceptual roof, but instead to highlight the arbitrariness of 
defining noir in the first place. 
Despite my own personal ambivalence towards critics such as Durgnat, Borde, and 
Chaumeton, we can still learn about noir through their omissions, that which they seemingly 
cannot communicate. Borde and Chaumeton, for instance, argue the noir critic must remain ‘as 
scientifically and objectively grounded as possible’, and that by doing so, noir will reveal itself 
through the identification of all the possible key characteristics of noir.13 If noir is not a genre, we 
might better characterise it as a mood, or mode, something which flows in and out of individual 
films. In this sense, the moody rhetorical style of certain noir critics begins to make sense.14 It is 
not merely enough, I believe, to state that noir is ambivalent only to present my own critical gaze 
as objective and omnipresent. If it is an apparent truism that you cannot write about film noir 
without first calling into question the efficacy of the subject matter, then I would suggest that this 
impulse is textually substantiated. Later in the thesis, I will connect this truism to the hesitations 
around and within noir. The critical interpretation of noir is, in a sense, embedded within the very 
texture of noir. This is just one methodological strategy of the thesis. 
 
13 Borde and Chaumeton, ‘Towards A Definition of Film Noir’, p. 19. 
14 See: Borde and Chaumeton, ‘Toward a Definition of Film Noir’; Charles Higham and Joel Greenberg, ‘Noir 
Cinema’; and Paul Schrader, ‘Notes on Film Noir’ in Film Noir Reader, ed. by Alain Silver and James Urisini (New 
York: Limelight Edition, 1996). 
[6] 
 
The thesis’ primary concern, however, is the representation of home in film noir. In the 
broadest sense, I take ‘home’ to mean both a domicile of permanent residence and a metonym for 
an idealised, pastoral past. In noir, home is a place through which various historical, political, 
ideological, and psychological forces enact themselves and are made visible. The question I wish 
to answer is: why is home, which has been so consistently overlooked in criticism, so central to 
film noir and yet forgotten within the films themselves? The gap seems especially apparent 
considering the sizeable amount of criticism dedicated to the semiotics of space and place in noir.15 
Some critics who centre the problem of home include Fred Pfeil and Vivian Sobchak. In his essay, 
‘Home Fires Burning: Family Noir in Blue Velvet and Terminator 2’, Pfeil argues that, ‘Film noir 
is […] indeed centred on, home and family, even as it decentres and problematises both.16 Sobchak 
instead takes a Bakhtinian approach in regard to noir’s spaces, writing that, 
In the decade that follows World War Two […] both wartime and the home front together 
come to form a re-membered idyllic national time-space of phenomenological integrity and 
plenitude. A mythological construction, this chronotope […] emerges in postwar culture 
itself and becomes the lost time and place of national purpose, cohesion, and fulfilment. 
Indeed, the chronotope of the idyllic wartime home front stands as this country's lost object 
of desire.17 
While Pfeil and Sobchak place their emphasis on home’s construction after World War Two 
(Pfeil’s focus is on the neo-noirs of the 1980s), I would instead propose that these ‘mythological’ 
 
15 See: Dimendberg, Film Noir and the Spaces of Modernity; Kelly Oliver and Beningo Trigo, Noir Anxiety; and, Janet 
Bergstrom, Warning Shadows: German Expressionism and American Film Noir’, in Film Noir, ed. by Homer B. 
Pettey and R. Barton Palmer, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014). 
16 Fred Pfeil, ‘Home Fires Burning: Family Noir in Blue Velvet and Terminator 2’, in Shades of Noir: A Reader, ed. 
by Joan Copjec (London: Verso, 1993), p. 231. 
17 Vivian Sobchak, ‘Lounge Time: Post-war Crises and the Chronotope of Film Noir’, in Refiguring American Film 
Genres: Theory and History, ed. by Nick Browne (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), p. 133. 
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constructions are retroactively ingrained into noirs produced before and during the war. Indeed, 
this thesis’ focus is specifically centred on film released in the 1940s, which shows that the 
historicisation and mythologization of home is always already occurring within the earlier noir 
films themselves. It is impossible to separate film noir into neat, historical categories — the films 
of the 1930s echo and are echoed in the films of the 1940s, and so on. In this way, noir is nostalgic 
because it dramatizes the ways in which home, as a lost object of desire, was always lost to begin 
with. 
To this end, I identify three major concerns of the construction of home in noir, all of which 
intertwine — political, historical, and psychological. First, home can be viewed as a political tool 
since it is it is useful in bringing together various ideological schisms during and after World War 
Two. The notion of ‘returning home’ in this political context translates into a return to the ‘way 
things were.’ The nostalgic dynamic of the political content of home is central to this thesis insofar 
as it considers the political utility of nostalgia, and the way in which noir’s resistance to nostalgia 
enacts itself. To an extent, we might think of noir as ahistorical and apolitical, not because there is 
an absence of history and politics in noir but because both are relegated to a purely symbolic level. 
Noir’s narratives, too, can often read as political allegories. 
One prominent example is The Blue Dahlia (1946), in which a trio of returning war 
veterans, Johnny, Buzz, and George, attempt to reintegrate themselves back into society. Johnny, 
the film’s protagonist, returns to discover his wife, Helen, is having an affair with casino owner 
Eddie Harwood. In addition to her infidelity, Helen confesses that her son with Johnny died in a 
car accident, not of illness, as Johnny previously believed. Later, Helen is murdered by Newell, a 
house detective, Johnny being subsequently blamed for her murder. The film ends with the rightful 
murderer being shot, and Johnny beginning a new relationship with Joyce, a former associate of 
[8] 
 
Eddie. Here, with the elements of noir’s anxiety surrounding home clearly on show, the political 
argument is perhaps tempting to make. Johnny, a war veteran, returns to find his home desecrated 
by his masculine absence. His absence, his retreat from work, led to his wife’s promiscuity to break 
up the home. Johnny’s role is to exonerate himself of any social guilt, while at the same time to 
reconstitute the home and family with Joyce, ‘as it always was.’ At the end of the film, Joyce 
comes to represent a replacement for Helen, a purification of Helen’s disruptive wartime activities. 
In this way, the film posits that if history and new political formations do not suit the noir 
protagonist, they can simply and paradoxically remember a new one, thus showing noir’s 
problematisation of the political sphere. Later in the thesis, however, I will argue why such simple 
political readings are problematic in noir because of the issue of metaphor itself in noir. While the 
thesis primarily stresses the importance of the historical and psychological dimensions of home, 
due in part to how noir and noir criticism centres and problematises both, a strictly political reading 
of home in noir is perhaps beyond the scope of this work. An already well-explored avenue in this 
respect involves a focus on the impact of Jewish émigrés on film noir.18 Instead, I wish to provide 
political readings in the context of the historical and psychological dimensions of home and noir. 
The second concern is historical, which is partly connected to the sphere of the political. I 
argue that there is a corollary between noir’s problematised critical history (that is, the way in 
which noir critics continually point to its ambiguous historical construction) and the twisted 
historicity within the films themselves. Therefore, I contend that noir is a nostalgic category, one 
marked by a totalising retroactivity. As Naremore argues, film noir is ‘an idea we have projected 
onto the past.’19 Furthermore, I would add noir does not exist within the films themselves as an 
 
18 For example, see: Vincent Brook, Driven to Darkness: Jewish Émigré Directors and the Rise of Film Noir (New 
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2009). 
19 Naremore, More Than Night, p. 11. 
[9] 
 
internal component. It is important to first recognise that noir and the interpretation of noir 
obfuscates the past rather than reveals it. When we watch noir, our imagination of it in noir’s 
‘original’ spectatorial context brings about a certain nostalgic melancholy. As Oliver Harris writes, 
this melancholy for a ‘lost past inspired in us by film noir has to reckon with these films' historical 
reception via their own internal logic.’20 The historical readings of noir thus stem from 
understanding noir’s historicity as a kind of ‘black hole’, an impossible and impenetrable centre 
which we nonetheless always fail to escape.  
Considering this, I argue that film noir is principally a traumatic category of films. The 
process by which knowledge is produced in noir follows the retroactive logic of trauma, as 
described by Freud’s famous case of the anxiety-dream of the ‘Wolf Man.’ I use Freud’s term of 
Nachträglichkeit, or afterwardness, to explain the way in which trauma retroactively enacts itself. 
As Ben Tyrer summarises, for the subject ‘the past is always implicated in the present, and the 
future in the past. An element in the past must wait to be understood, to find its meaning in the 
future, and so in the present the past becomes what it will always have been.’21 One argument of 
this thesis is that it is the very process of historicisation which obscures home as a historical object. 
This historicisation involves both noir’s narrative structures and approach to epistemological 
security, in addition to the procedure of critical interpretation. This process follows the 
investigative logic of many noir films, a logic borrowed from noir hard-boiled literature 
antecedents. 
 
20 Oliver Harris, ‘Film Noir Fascination: Outside History, but Historically so’, Cinema Journal, 43.1 (Autumn, 2003), 
p. 4. 
21 Ben Tyrer, ‘Film Noir as Point de Caption: Double Indemnity, Structure and Temporality’, Film-Philosophy, 17.1 
(2013), p. 99. 
[10] 
 
Figure i.2, The Stranger (1946) 
My approach is to look at noir’s traumatic structure through the lens of home. History, that 
is World War Two and its effects, is largely absent in film noir, despite noir’s so-called ‘realism.’22 
There are some notable exceptions, however, such as Orson Welles’ The Stranger (1946) which 
portrays a member of the United Nations War Crimes Commission, Mr. Wilson (Edward G. 
Robinson), hunting down a fleeing Nazi war criminal, Franz Kindler (Orson Welles). In the film, 
Wilson shows Mary, Kindler’s unsuspecting wife, footage of Nazi concentration camps to uncover 
the truth about her husband (Figure i.2). History, as a synecdoche for the truth, is here projected 
as cinema, the implication being that we can only know history through the cinema. Mr Wilson 
 
22 Schrader, ‘Notes on Film Noir’, p. 55. 
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then stands in front of the film projector, between it and Mary, as the footage is projected onto his 
face. Here, history is cinema, and cinema is history; it is projected onto the faces of its stars, 
implying that history in noir is something to be seen rather than understood. History, here, acts an 
affront to Nazism and the trauma of the Holocaust. History interjects and disrupts trauma and thus 
brings it into being. In the film, seeing is not enough to believe the truth. It is only through the 
personal and psychological spheres that history re-gains its meaning. At first, Mary believes that 
Wilson is trying to trick her into wrongfully arresting her husband and thus takes his side. It is only 
when she discovers that Kindler wants to murder her that she changes her mind. In this way, The 
Stranger demonstrates that restoring history to its rightful place is not enough in noir. History, 
again, acts an affront to the normal continuation of life; it must be reinserted into the film. The 
film, in this sense, is about the desecration of the idyllic town not by Kindler’s subversive Nazism 
(already prefiguring the McCarthyite concerns), but by history itself. Home, like history, must wait 
to be understood. This is testament to the way in which noir’s anxious mode is characterised by its 
various hesitations and stalling. Home’s meaning and significance are typically realised at the end 
of a film. Yet, as I will show in films such as Stranger on the Third Floor (1940) and Gilda (1946), 
the complexity of a noir film’s ending shows the structure of home’s retroactive construction. 
Home is thus at once central to meaning in noir’s narrative — insofar as its attainment ties the 
narrative’s loose ends — at the same time as eventually being unmasked as no more than a spectral 
force. 
The third concern is psychological. I emphasise the psychological dimensions of noir, as 
opposed to the physical instances of home. What concerns this thesis is not a taxonomy of how 
many homes appear prominently in noir, but rather how home manifests itself as a metaphor for 
other psychological concerns of noir’s characters. It is not only the physical manifestations of 
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home that are of importance, but also the traces left by home’s absence. I have already indicated 
one of the ways in which the psychological dimension of home and of history impact each other. 
This thesis’ principal theoretical framework is psychoanalysis, drawing specifically on the work 
of Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan. One reason for this choice is that psychoanalysis is ingrained 
in film noir criticism.23 Since I am also suggesting that on some level film noir criticism is 
inseparable from the films themselves then, in some sense, psychoanalysis always haunts noir. The 
popularisation of psychoanalysis in academic film studies occurs around the 1970s, at a similar 
time to a new wave of writing on film noir. 
Three famous examples of noir’s early critical writings can all be found in Alain Silver and 
James Ursini’s Film Noir Reader in 1996. First, in 1972, Paul Schrader writes his essay ‘Notes on 
Film Noir’, which is still prone to the same nebulous hesitations of earlier works on noir. He 
speaks, tellingly, of noir’s ‘almost Freudian attachment to water’, gesturing to but not engaging 
with psychoanalytic criticism.24 It is easy to criticise Schrader here — as I later do — but here, 
again, we must take his critical hesitations seriously, not as lapses in concentration but as revealing 
something about noir’s air of mystique. Even though Schrader does not apply a psychoanalytic 
framework, or even engage in a psychoanalytic discourse, he still notes that there certainly seems 
something inherently psychoanalytically suggestive about film noir. Precisely what Schrader 
means here is rather unclear. Schrader argues that noir’s attachment to water is ‘almost Freudian’, 
as if he is too embarrassed to admit that it really is Freudian.25 Schrader here exhibits a certain 
 
23 For example, of noir criticism which explicitly use a psychoanalytic framework, see: Joan Copjec, ‘The Phenomenal 
Nonphenomenal: Private Space in Film Noir’ in Shades of Noir: A Reader. ed. by Joan Copjec (London: Verso, 1993); 
Elizabeth Cowie, Representing the Woman: Cinema and Psychoanalysis (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 
1996); Janey Place, ‘Women in Film Noir’ in Women in Film Noir, ed. by E. Ann. Kaplan (London: BFI, 1980); 
Elizabeth Bronfen, ‘Femme Fatale: Negotiations of Tragic Desire’, New Literary History, 35.1, Rethinking Tragedy 
(Winter, 2004); and others. 




ambivalence regarding his own interpretations. Yet the ambivalence does not necessarily solely 
stem from Schrader’s criticism, but from noir itself. Schrader might not believe in his own 
assertions, but by being ‘almost Freudian’, his work, perhaps inadvertently, shows us that a 
psychoanalytic approach is often necessary in noir criticism. Psychoanalysis, in this respect, is 
useful because it questions what lies beneath the surface, as well as the nature of the surface itself 
and the ambiguity inspired by both. In noir, we see our critical eye reflected back at us, but as we 
see in work such as Schrader’s, often plunging our hand into the water to pull something out of 
noir results in a distortion of the text itself and therefore our interpretation. Noir’s protagonists are 
similarly gripped by this ambiguity of belief. Further, Schrader emphasises that noir’s attachment 
is to water. The implication here, and this is borne out in his tentativeness, is that noir is a text of 
competing desires and that it is a text that, in some sense, desires us. What seems to concern 
Schrader is not the symbolic position of water in film noir, but why noir is seemingly attached to 
water; the question concerns what noir desires. I return to Schrader’s quotation in Chapter One, 
and what his metaphor tells us about noir’s construction since water is both surface and depth. As 
I will explore later in the thesis, the dialectics of looking in noir is crucial in understanding its 
mode, and therefore precisely how home is constructed in it. 
Robert G. Porfirio’s ‘No Way Out: Existential Motifs in the Film Noir’26, published in 
1976, is another instructive example, which, on the one hand, recognises the alienation and 
loneliness of noir, but on the other, lapses into awkward generalities: 
 
26 I must note here the inconsistent conventions of how different critics write ‘film noir’. The variations are more 
extreme and noticeable in the earlier works of noir criticism. Porfirio here calls it ‘the film noir’ in the title of his 
essay. One of the least egregious early examples might be Borde and Chaumeton’s italicised film noir. Charles Higham 
and Joel Greenberg refer to noir as ‘black cinema’, or as ‘film noir’. James Damico, here in a field of his own, favours 
FN (an abbreviation of film noir) to save space. The italicisation present in some early works may be a result of the 
phrase being a French term, and is italicised for the same reason that, say, Latin is italicised. I opt to write film noir, 
without any scare quotes, italics, or abbreviations, since it is the common modern convention. 
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Even ostensibly happily married men become alienated from the comforts of home, usually 
for the sake of a beautiful woman. The homelessness of such characters as Harry Fabian in 
Night and the City or Ole Anderson in The Killers […] takes on almost cosmic 
dimensions.27 
Porfirio still exhibits the same rhetorical vagueness as other early noir critics. First, there is the 
assumption that home necessarily provides comfort to noir’s protagonists, a notion which this 
thesis fundamentally disputes. Noir’s mood of alienation is instead caused by the anxieties 
surrounding home. Porfirio’s reasoning, too, strays into rather negligent and sexist territory as he 
seems to lay the blame for noir’s existentialism at the feet of women. In a later chapter, I will 
correct the popular conception that noir’s troubles find their cause in the female characters, who 
are regularly coded as ‘femme fatales’. Moreover, Porfirio’s use of the word ‘homelessness’ is not 
instructive since it applies the fallacious logic that noir’s protagonists have had their home 
erroneously taken from them and that noir, similarly, has had its home taken from it. The implicit 
critical task I identify here is, as is the problem of history in noir, for the critic to return the object 
of home to noir. As we see in Edgar G. Ulmer’s Detour (1945), for instance, it is only Al who 
believes that he is doomed because of his involvement with Vera because all his fears and anxieties 
coalesce around Vera — she represents all his problems: a useful, hystericised scapegoat. Only by 
identifying with Al’s viewpoint could we reach a conclusion like Porfirio’s. Again, we can see 
how noir’s coded obscurity is reflected in much of its early criticism. Moreover, the same 
hesitation, the inability to really describe noir, is present in his writing: the existential 
homelessness in noir possesses ‘almost cosmic dimensions.’ In the end, Porfirio concludes that the 
 
27 Robert G. Porfirio, ‘No Way Out: Existential Motifs in the Film Noir’, in Film Noir Reader, ed. by Alain Silver and 
James Urisini (New York: Limelight Edition, 1996), p. 86. 
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only satisfactory explanation is that ‘randomness is central to the noir world.’28 I take this 
proposition, that there is something unknowable about noir, as a starting point, and interrogate 
noir’s ‘impossibility.’  
Finally, James Damico, in 1978, begins to show noir criticism’s turn to self-reflection. He 
explicitly laments the paucity of early noir criticism in his essay, ‘Film Noir: A Modest Proposal’. 
Damico’s principal problem with prior film noir criticism is its emphasis on the ‘thematic and 
stylistic consistencies’ of noir, rather than its ‘political and social causes.29 Specifically, Damico 
singles out Raymond Durgnat’s ‘unfortunately influential’ essay ‘Paint it Black: The Family Tree 
of Noir’, which attempts to create a taxonomy of noir, the elements that identify a film as noir.30 
Predictably, Durgnat’s effort is largely underwhelming and in the first chapter of this thesis, I shall 
outline precisely why. Yet Damico’s criticism can still be instructive as to how the problems of 
noir are contingent on the problems of noir criticism. Damico’s amusing — and perhaps 
unprofessional — labelling of Durgnat’s work as ‘Categorrhea’ demonstrates not only the 
inadequacy of taxonomies, but, more precisely, that the process of categorisation, of investigation, 
is doomed to fail in noir. The critic, in some sense, seems to possess (or at least be prone to 
possessing) the same desire as the noir protagonist. They treat noir like a crime scene, acting as 
the case’s lead investigator. However, assuming such a role requires the critic to first acknowledge 
that the mode of investigation in noir is, too, ultimately doomed to fail; we cannot perfectly 
reconstruct noir ‘as it always was’ because our presence alters the very substance of noir. We touch 
 
28 Porfirio, ‘No Way Out’, p. 89.  
29 Damico, ‘Film Noir’, p. 95. 
30 Ibid, p. 97.  
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the water without disturbing the surface, but without touching the water we cannot know what lies 
beneath. 
In this sense, a corollary exists between film noir and psychoanalysis. Both possess two 
seemingly contradictory conceptions in that their popular, cultural conception is widely known, 
but their academic definitions are complex. Psychoanalysis teaches us that the moment when we 
think we are in full possession and knowledge of our desires is precisely the point at which they 
take hold of us. The logic can be applied to the definition of film noir and its relation to noir’s 
production of knowledge: the moment when we think we have finally adopted a privileged position 
to view noir is precisely that the point at which it eludes our grasp. As Marc Vernet puts it in ‘Film 
Noir on the Edge of Doom’, 
what is completely strange in discourse on film noir is that the more elements of definition 
are advanced, the more objects and counter-examples are raised, the more precision is 
desired, the fuzzier the results become; the closer the object is approached, the more diluted 
it becomes.31 
For Vernet, a critic who does grapple with noir’s inescapable obscurity, noir is an object which 
reacts to our look, a condition which is replicated in the films themselves. One reason for this 
ambiguity can be found in one of the major advancements made by Freud in relation to his 
positioning of the unconscious as between the physical and the mental. For Freud, the unconscious 
is a mental process, but makes itself known through physical signals. One primary example is his 
notion of parapraxis, or what would be more commonly known as a ‘Freudian slip’; the utterances 
 
31 Marc Vernet, ‘Film Noir on the Edge of Doom’, in Shades of Noir: A Reader, ed. by Joan Copjec (London: Verso, 
1993), p. 4. 
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and signals that represent something which is repressed in the unconscious. He writes that these 
‘conscious acts remain incoherent and incomprehensible if we insist that everything occurring in 
our psyche must also be experienced through consciousness’. 32 Further, he argues, we cannot 
know of the unconscious through the conscious mind. Albert Shalom argues that the unconscious 
belongs to neither ‘the physical per se, nor to the mental per se’. Instead, it disrupts and shows the 
‘fundamental inadequacy of the Cartesian dichotomy between “body” and “mind.”’33 It is not 
enough, therefore, to simply say that noir functions on an ‘psychological level’. We might instead 
say that noir operates on an unconscious level, between body and mind, since the unconscious is, 
for Lacan, the discourse of the Other. It is in this sense that Porfirio’s mood of alienation and 
loneliness is best understood. 
The major theorists of this thesis include Freud, Lacan, and Vernet. Other influential 
theorists and critics in this thesis are Slavoj Žižek, Mark Fisher, Elizabeth Cowie, and Ben Tyrer. 
Žižek has contributed numerous works to both noir studies (a contribution which largely consists 
of his criticism surrounding the films of Alfred Hitchcock) and the popularisation of 
psychoanalysis in cultural criticism at large, and therefore has significant influence in noir studies. 
Likewise, if one wishes to approach art as symptom (in the psychoanalytic sense), then Žižek must 
be acknowledged.34 In addition, Žižek has produced numerous contributions to noir, so, as we will 
see, often his theoretical work arrives in the form of noir criticism, a rhetorical style which must 
be unpacked.35 In a similar vein, Mark Fisher’s work is particularly relevant to this thesis. His 
 
32 Sigmund Freud, ‘The Unconscious’, The Unconscious (London: Penguin Books, 2005 [1911]). 
33 Albert Shalom, ‘Psychoanalysis and Culture’, Review of Metaphysics, 39.4 (1986, June 1), p. 724. 
34 Yet, as Tim Dean writes, because in Žižek’s work ‘virtually anything can be considered a symptom’ which allows 
Žižek to ‘write about everything.’ His work, therefore, tends to be ‘variations on a single theme.’ See: Tim Dean, ‘Art 
as Symptom: Žižek and the Ethics of Psychoanalytic Criticism’, Diacritics, 32.2 (Summer 2002), p. 22. 
35 A prominent example, and one which appears frequently throughout this thesis, is Looking Awry: Jacques Lacan in 




work on hauntology (a concept borrowed from Jacques Derrida), capitalist realism and the weird 
and the eerie, are all used to show the disappearance of home and the ideological contestations of 
noir. I use Fisher’s work on hauntology to discuss how the femme fatale ‘haunts’ noir, and what 
this can tell us about the related spectre of home. Capitalist realism is used to help explain the 
pervasive ideological function of home in noir. Finally, the weird and the eerie are used to highlight 
the relationship between absences and presences in accordance to our expectations in noir. The 
weird and the eerie question either why a presence exists when it should not, and why there is 
absence when something should be present. 
In terms of noir specific criticism, Elizabeth Cowie, whose numerous works on feminist 
approaches to noir usefully refocus and disrupt the idea that noir is a typically ‘masculine’ category 
of films, are of importance. Her essay, ‘Film Noir and Women’ in Shades of Noir, confronts the 
problem of the ‘desire of the critic’ and aligns with the problematic conception of the femme fatale. 
She criticises several male critics for their vague and often eroticised descriptions of women in 
film noir and argues that their rhetoric falls into the same trap that the femme fatale sets up in the 
films themselves, notably, James Damico, who argues that noir’s plot structure is generated by a 
fascination with the femme fatale. In his book Film Noir: The Dark Side of the Screen, Foster 
Hirsch identifies the noir world as ‘filled with deceiving women’.36 Frank Krutnik and Richard 
Malty also both argue that film noir is principally a masculine genre. This is, I would argue, not to 
say that the femme fatale’s beauty and sexuality are real forces but rather fantasies. As Cowie 
argues, the femme fatale ‘is simply a catchphrase for the danger of sexual difference and the 
demands and risks desire poses for the man.’37 Ben Tyrer’s essays, ‘Film Noir Does Not Exist: A 
 
36 Foster Hirsch, Film Noir: The Dark Side of the Screen (New York: A. S. Barnes), p. 13. 




Lacanian Topology’38 and ‘Film Noir as Point de Capiton’,39 discuss how the retroactive 
construction of noir should be taken seriously as a theoretical and linguistic position. Tyrer argues 
that film noir does not exist in the same way that Lacan argues that the category of ‘woman’ does 
not exist, insofar as they are both defined as an open set, always open to the possibility of one more 
item being added to its set. Another key theoretical pillar of this thesis comes from Oliver Harris’ 
essay, ‘Film Noir Fascination: Outside History, but Historically So’, in which he argues that the 
structures of fascination within film noir (alongside its historical and critical fascination) render 
noir a fantasmatic construction, one which, through its ‘obscure coding of desire’ displaces history 
itself.40 I understand Harris and Tyrer’s work to be working towards similar ends and thus I apply 
them to my own conception of home. 
 
Why Noir, and Why Now?  
The films examined in this thesis are situated within the period from 1940 to 1950. Film noir, it 
should be noted, ‘begins’ (or at least has its antecedents) before 1940 and continues long after 
1950. There is no clear cut-off point in terms of when noir ‘begins’ or ‘ends.’ The details of the 
debate, moreover, do not particularly impact the argument of this thesis. The period has been 
chosen primarily because of the rapid shifting historical contexts regarding both American politics 
and culture and Western cinema itself. World War Two is already monolithic in noir, both a 
singularly dominating presence and curiously absent; it touches all of noir often without its 
presence being made known. The introduction of major historical postwar events such as the 
 
38 Ben Tyrer, ‘Film Noir Doesn’t Exist: A Lacanian Topology’ in Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society, ed. by David 
Henderson (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012). 
39 Ben Tyrer, ‘Film Noir as Point de Capiton: Double Indemnity, Structure and Temporality’. 
40 Harris, Oliver, ‘Outside History, but Historically so’, p. 5. 
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advent of the Cold War and the effects of McCarthyism on cinema, America’s involvement in the 
Korean War, Dwight Eisenhower’s presidency, the landmark Brown vs Board of Education ruling, 
the murder of Emmet Till and the Montgomery bus boycott, for example, would require detailed 
and critical examination which falls outside the remit of this thesis. Methodologically, widening 
the historical lens would require a greater emphasis on the political dimensions of home and noir. 
Much attention has already been paid to the political inclinations of noir. My contribution to the 
field lies within the combined theoretical definitions of home and noir. I take the critical 
proposition that noir’s definition is inseparable from, and indeed defined by, its critical appraisals, 
and map these theoretical concerns onto the problem of home in noir. Home is curiously absent, 
yet at the same is often the central, symbolic concern of noir. In order to ‘find’ home in noir, we 
must understand how our critical gaze distorts the image, and thus searching for noir’s lost homes 
involves perceiving its absences. Moreover, while the apparent disappearance of noir is certainly 
intriguing, it falls outside the bounds of this thesis. Further investigations arising from it might 
include more careful considerations as to why noir fell out of fashion. In a sense, I approach this 
debate by considering the ways in which, functionally, noir is always disappearing. Similarly, the 
same logic explains why this thesis does not engage with many neo-noir films or literature. Again, 
neo-noir exists within its own historical and critical context. It shares commonalities with noir but 
fundamentally requires a different analytic and historical framework.  
 In the thesis, I regard the following films as key texts: Stranger on the Third Floor (1940), 
The Maltese Falcon (1941), Shadow of a Doubt (1943), Double Indemnity (1944), The Woman in 
the Window (1944), The Lost Weekend (1945), Detour (1945), Scarlet Street (1945), Mildred 
Pierce (1945), The Postman Always Rings Twice (1946), The Big Sleep (1946), The Blue Dahlia 
(1946), The Killers (1946), Out of the Past (1946), Gilda (1946), Dark Passage (1947), Crossfire 
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(1947), The Secret Beyond the Door (1947), Criss Cross (1949), In a Lonely Place (1950). I have 
chosen these because they represent a broad cross-section of films from the decade. The films 
listed above are, I would hope, relatively well-known film noirs, selected because, in part, I wish 
to show that even in these much-discussed films, there are still elements — particularly the 
centrality of home — which are overlooked. My methodology is to draw connections between 
films non-temporally and non-hierarchically. That is, I do not trace the development of ideas in 
noir, or how meaning might change over the course of time, but instead present the films as an 
interconnected web, able to transmit meanings between each other, regardless of the date of their 
release. For example, a key question posed in the first chapter is: how is Stranger on the Third 
Floor influenced by the films that came after it? I do this precisely in response to the earlier 
proposition that noir is constructed retroactively by critics, and that therefore noirness is not an 
inherent property of the films, but something attributed by critics. 
 One problem raised by this approach and this admission, is that the number of noir films 
increases significantly. Perhaps the most significant major omissions include: Sunset Boulevard 
(1950), The Third Man (1949), The Big Heat (1953), The Lady From Shanghai (1946), Laura 
(1944), They Live By Night (1948), Kiss Me Deadly (1955), and Touch of Evil (1958), together 
with a number of the films of the films of Alfred Hitchcock from the 1940s, most notably Rebecca 
(1940), Saboteur (1942), and Spellbound (1945). While some of these films receive passing 
mentions, they are nevertheless not the primary focus of this thesis. Films such as The Big Heat, 
Kiss Me Deadly, and Touch of Evil all lie outside the period which the thesis focuses on. As I have 
previously stated, the time period for this thesis is precise because otherwise it may risk becoming 
too historically vague. As for the other films, they often cover similar ground to the films I do 
examine, and I opted to use those instead because of the ways they fit into my argument. There 
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are, of course, other omissions, too numerous to list, but I suggest here several films which, in my 
opinion, can be thought of as broadly belonging in the same field: The Red House (1947), the 
gothic noir Among the Living (1941), the crime drama The Enforcer (1951), The Seventh Victim 
(1943), Phantom Lady (1944), Strange Illusion (1945), and Lady in the Lake (1947). 
 
The Structure of the Thesis 
What follows is a brief overview of this thesis’ chapters. In the first chapter, ‘The First Ending: 
Genre and Stranger on the Third Floor (1940)’, I confront the temporal ambiguity of both the 
conception of noir and noir films themselves with reference to the work of Ben Tyrer and Marc 
Vernet. I begin by providing a more thorough definition of film noir by asking whether Stranger 
on the Third Floor is indeed the ‘first film noir’. I approach the question on a metaphorical and 
metatextual level in comparison to noir’s traumatic retroactive construction. I use the film to show 
how noir’s reflexive temporality renders the film both the first and last film noir, and how this is 
reflected in the film’s ending. In addition, I confront the assumptions regarding a hypothetical ‘first 
film noir’. With regard to the analysis of the film, I focus on its ending and how, through its very 
conformity, it attempts to retroactively redefine the prior events of the film, which I, in turn, read 
in a metatextual light. At the same time, however, it leaves excessive elements which render the 
ambiguity and inconsistencies visible. Thinking of the film as noir demands we reconsider our 
definitions and assumptions regarding noir itself. 
 Following on, the subsequent chapter, ‘The Metaphor of Blindness’, continues and 
develops the discussion of Stranger on the Third Floor, focusing on how blindness, not vision, is 
integral to understanding the production of meaning in noir. I discuss how blindness is enacted 
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through film’s ideological positions, primarily through the formation of the couple. As with the 
ending, the formation of the couple is intended to stitch together the meaning of home in film noir. 
I argue that the couple is often used as a synecdoche for home but brings with it a series of 
inconsistencies in terms of the depiction of gender in relation to home. In this way, I argue that 
seeing home, in noir, involves blindness. However, the formation of the couple and the apparent 
acquisition of home leaves affective excesses. I examine, too, how blindness is staged as an 
impenetrability within the voice, with reference to Michel Chion’s 1982 book, The Voice in 
Cinema. Finally, I discuss the political and narrative aspects of blindness and how they touch all 
of noir.  
 The third chapter forms a central theoretical pillar of the thesis, as it examines the 
mechanism behind noir’s hesitation surrounding home. I refer to Oliver Harris’ essay, ‘Outside 
History, But Historically So’ in conjunction with psychoanalytic theory concerning the objet petit 
a to argue that fascination is the central way in which meaning (and thus home) is obscured in 
noir. For example, Todd McGowan’s work on the gaze in film theory illustrates the problem of 
looking in noir and how it exemplifies fascination. It is through the look that fascination moves 
from a scopophilic problem to a historical one. Furthermore, I argue that much of noir’s critical 
work embodies this critical and textual fascination, an inability to properly discuss or interrogate 
noir without resorting to arguing that noir is, self-evidently, ‘fascinating’. I then discuss the logic 
and structures of the investigation in noir, what I refer to as ‘investigative desire’. Principally, I 
argue that the noir detectives (who, I would argue, constitute a majority of noir protagonists) are 
defined by their libidinal proximity to the crime. They do not have an objective distance to the 
crime, nor to their desire. This, I believe, speaks to the impossibility of desire: that to desire, one 
must get too close to the object of desire and thus render it incomprehensible. I also consider what 
[24] 
 
the crime itself represents in noir, what aberration it stands in for. Here, I discuss the falcon 
statuette in The Maltese Falcon as an object of fascination. I also examine the introduction of 
Phyllis Dietrichson in Double Indemnity and the nature of double entendres in the film, notably 
through Neff’s various hesitations and linguistic slippages, whereby his assumed mastery of 
language (and therefore desire) expose him to the Real of desire, and of home. 
The following chapter, ‘A Stranger in Someone Else’s House: Homesickness in Film Noir’, 
continues the discussion of fascination in noir and how it produces anxiety. It examines how desire 
and agency function in the home, primarily the apartment, taking The Lost Weekend as a case 
study. The chapter begins by looking at psychoanalytic addiction theory, using an essay on drug 
addiction’s relationship to capitalist desire by Ole Bjerg to argue that drugs allow the subject to 
bypass the circuit of desire and experience the Real of desire directly. I present the argument that 
Don’s alcohol addiction in the film fulfils this function and consider the ways in which alcohol 
operates as a metaphor for home. In doing so, I examine the extent to which noir involves the 
desire for home, and how this desire is turned back against the noir observer — thus building upon 
the work in the previous chapter. A central question of this chapter is how does the home desire 
noir’s protagonists? This relates to the broader question concerning what noir and home want from 
us. Here, I engage with W. J. T. Mitchell’s What Do Pictures Want?, published in 2005, asking 
what noir wants from us and progressing to a discussion of the relationship between subject and 
object. The chapter then uses Mark Fisher’s concept of capitalist realism to interrogate what is 
considered ideologically normative, or realist, in relation to home. I call into question the supposed 
‘realism’ of The Lost Weekend and of noir to highlight the political dimension of addiction. 
Subsequently, I apply Fisher’s definition of capitalist realism as a ‘pervasive atmosphere’ to the 
atmosphere of noir. I conclude by considering the workings of ideology and nostalgia in noir, and 
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how, in Weekend we might read the categories of ‘sober’ and ‘intoxicated’ as metaphors for 
ideological interpellation. I problematise the idea that addiction allows us to know our ‘true’ selves 
and how this revelation only shows the nothingness of desire. In this way, I argue, the desire for 
home is, strangely, the desire not to the desire. 
In Chapter Five, ‘Homes in Film Noir’, I contend that noir’s fascinated anxiety derives 
principally from its ambiguous spaces. I begin by examining how the detached, family home is 
constructed in Mildred Pierce and what this can reveal about noir’s disposition toward home more 
generally. I use Mark Fisher’s concept of the weird and the eerie to help explain the cultural anxiety 
surrounding the family home. More specifically, I interrogate how the weird, ‘the presence of that 
which does not belong’, and the eerie, ‘a failure of absence, or a failure of presence’, constitute 
themselves in noir, thus emphasising the gothic aspects of noir.41 Then, I move to a broader 
discussion on how the inner-city apartment differs from the familial home. This involves a 
historical reading of the (re)construction of public and private space, and how trauma is heightened 
through the compression of space in noir. Finally, in relation to space and home, I discuss the ways 
in which looking and desire are affected by the urbanisation of home, using Fritz Lang’s The 
Woman in the Window (1944), comparing it to the work of Edward Hopper, particularly his 
painting Nighthawks (1942), in order show how precisely noir treats space psychologically. 
The final chapter confronts the problem of the femme fatale in noir and its relation to home. 
Specifically, I consider the relation of the femme fatale to the conception of noir, especially the 
impact on home. I argue that, in a sense, femme fatales are film noir insofar as they are, like noir, 
imaginary constructions. Although there is a cultural perception about the abundance and power 
 
41 Mark Fisher, The Weird and The Eerie, (London: Repeater Books, 2016) [epub ebook], 14.2. 
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of the femme fatale, they are largely absent from noir. In this way, we can see the relation between 
critics and noir; there is an instability, an excess, regarding work on the femme fatale, as if 
replicating the same anxiety which mobilises their affect. Their effectiveness, their power, thus 
exists virtually. Therefore, I argue, the femme fatale is more noir than noir. Considering this, I 
examine how the femme fatale becomes synonymous with the absence of home. Taking Gilda as 
an example, I look at the ideological position of Gilda in the film, and within the context of noir 
itself, evaluating the way that she embodies fear and anxiety in the abstract, rather than standing 
in for any specific fear or anxiety. 
This thesis’ originality lies largely in its focus on home. In the context of noir, I read home 
as a meta-textual and spectral force. I read home as a metaphor for, and the source of, noir’s various 
anxieties and ambiguities. The project of confronting noir’s resistance to criticism must involve 
the centring of instability itself; I read noir’s instability not as an effect of some hidden force, but 
as central to noir’s network of meanings. Indeed, in this context, the thesis acknowledges that the 
instability of noir is substantiated by the spectral figure of the home in film noir. The absence of 
home is also indicative of a critical blind spot which I identify in noir criticism. I see the problem 
of blindness and vision as central to understanding noir, so the loss of home (which is, I argue, 
loss itself) is not only textually substantiated, but critically so. Noir’s instability is often understood 
as a generalisable ‘mood’ or is part of the hidden unconscious workings of noir. I do not use home 
to attempt to resolve noir’s inherent tensions, but rather as a reification of those tensions. However, 
the conception of home in noir does help cohere some disparate ideas surrounding noir itself and 
its own conception.  
We can view the home as a nostalgic object, perhaps the object of nostalgia. Svetlana 
Boym, in her book The Future of Nostalgia, describes nostalgia as a kind of virus, something 
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which spreads and infects our perception of the world and ourselves. This spread, she argues, is 
not only to do with ‘dislocation in space’, but also with a ‘changing conception of time’.42 This is 
a particularly useful definition for how nostalgia functions in noir. In noir, the dislocation in space 
is represented through the instability of home — in chapter four, for instance, I argue that Don’s 
alcohol addiction in The Lost Weekend makes the home a place of paranoia. Boym’s conception 
of nostalgia is particularly instructive for noir since she argues that modern ‘nostalgia is a 
mourning for the impossibility of mythical return, for the loss of an enchanted world with clear 
borders and values.’43 Nostalgia, in noir, is felt both personally and collectively. Indeed, as I argue 
later, the very structure and mode of noir is nostalgic. When combined with the feelings of spatial 
and narrative claustrophobia in noir, as well as the ‘changing conception of time’44 brought about 
by noir’s retroactivity, noir’s protagonists can be said to be trapped within nostalgia. This, too, 
describes noir’s approach to home aptly. In the first chapter, I investigate the mythical dimension 
of home in noir. Boym argues further that one of the features of nostalgia is a desire to experience 
an ‘edenic unity of time space before entry into history.’45 For noir, this experience is promised, 
but always denied. On one level, home is representative of the idealised version of the family and 
the safety the family provides. In this way, home is a space (or time) in which the subject does not 
have to desire; it is the absence of desire. On another, home represents ideological safety, a retreat 
from the messiness of the present. In noir’s narratives, the present always has difficulty sustaining 
itself; it cannot reconstruct its own past, nor can it even make sense of its own historicity. And, on 
 






a final level, home thus represents history itself. It remains inaccessible, but must be constantly 




The First Ending: Genre and Narrative in Stranger on the Third Floor (1940) 
Film noir does not belong to the history of cinema; it belongs as a notion to the history of film 
criticism, or, if one prefers, to the history of those who wanted to love the American cinema even 
in its middling production and to form an image of it. 
Marc Vernet, ‘Film Noir on the Edge of Doom’1 
 
The First Film Noir? 
In film noir, home is an impossible object to grasp. It is, as I will demonstrate, often the central, 
but nonetheless impossible, object of desire for noir and its protagonists. Home cannot even be 
remembered or imagined properly, nor can noir’s own contentious roots. The principal film 
analysed in this chapter is Boris Ingster’s Stranger on the Third Floor (1940).2 One reason for this 
is the implications of the film’s ending. The film ends as its two protagonists move into their home, 
but the unresolved question for two main characters, Michael and Jane (particularly the former), 
is one of cost, that something must be sacrificed for the home. It is not given to noir’s protagonists, 
but something which is either taken from them, or upon receiving it, they realise what they have 
lost in order to gain it. I will argue that this sense of loss is one of the primary mechanisms by 
which noir’s narratives are propelled. The unattainability and absence of home is therefore central 
to this chapter. I shall begin by considering the question of absence on a formal level: to what 
extent does ‘noirness,’ as vague as it is, affect the film’s meaning? Why does there seem to be a 
correlation between the unattainability of noirness and home? The introduction of noirness signals 
a certain formal ambiguity, a questioning of desire; it leads to a kind of death, not just of the self, 
 
1 Vernet, ‘Film Noir on the Edge of Doom’, p. 26 
2 Stranger on the Third Floor, dir. by Boris Ingster (RKO Radio Pictures, 1940). 
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but of the very thing which was desired in the first place. If home, noir, and desire are so dangerous 
and deadly, then this chapter will therefore begin by considering what, by contrast, Classical 
Hollywood cinema considers safe. I will therefore consider the notion of ‘safety’ in Hollywood’s 
cinematic spaces, and how noir often disrupts this spatial safety, and how the epistemological logic 
of noir and its narratives disrupts narrative safety too. The chapter moves on to examine the history 
of noir, both its cinematic and critical history, and how the conception of noir is shaped by its 
critics. Stranger on the Third Floor will be used as a case study in how noir’s own critical and 
formal ambiguity is mirrored in the films themselves. Then, the chapter will show how Stranger 
reflects the problem of simple historicisation of noir and its conception of home. 
Classical Hollywood cinema, a period which runs from around the 1910s to the 1960s, 
relies on providing spatial accessibility for the audience. Richard Maltby, for instance, claims that 
‘Hollywood space rewards us for looking at it by constantly addressing and satisfying our 
expectation in look.’3 For Maltby, therefore, Hollywood space is marked by its allusions to safety. 
Noir, on the other hand, disrupts this visual safety. This disruption is felt not only visually and 
spatially, but also historically. For Hollywood cinema, establishing safety requires the camera to 
appear transparent and subservient to the action and movement on screen. The camera masks cuts 
and edits so that each sequence, both between concurrent shots and across the film’s narrative, 
follows a linear and understandable progression. Continuity editing is the primary way in which 
space is constructed in Hollywood cinema, as it enables the creation of what Maltby calls a ‘safe 
space for the development of the story.’4 Thus, according to Maltby, spatial accessibility in 
Hollywood cinema facilitates narrative accessibility. Conversely, as Joel Dinerstein argues, noir’s 
 
3 Richard Maltby, Hollywood Cinema, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), p. 312. 
4 Ibid, p. 313. 
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retreat away from cinematic safety engenders a certain ‘nostalgia for stable spaces.’5 Noir’s visual 
spaces can therefore be characterised by their instability. 
Disruption of both these kinds of accessibility can be seen in many film noirs. Firstly, the 
flashback structures of films such as Out of the Past (1947)6 and The Killers (1946)7 involve a 
restructuring of linear narrative progression. Secondly, narrative accessibility can be destabilised 
through noir’s troubled protagonists, who denote a loss of moral certainty and accessibility, or 
through figures such as the femme fatale, an object of desire whose appearance involves deceiving 
the spectator. Spatial accessibility is affected by these devices and the editing and framing of noir 
reflects this. In Orson Welles’ The Lady From Shanghai (1947), the editing and mise-en-scène 
create a sense of unrest and unpredictability during its famous final sequence in the funhouse.8 
Another example of abnormal portrayals of space can be seen in Carol Reed’s The Third Man 
(1949), which frequently uses Dutch angles to twist and distort the image, placing our gaze in 
uncomfortable positions.9 Contrastingly, in Alfred Hitchcock’s Shadow of a Doubt (1943) the 
editing  structurally sutures the two main characters together, by crossing between space and time 
to bring them together.10 The film portrays an idyllic suburban family in Santa Rosa, California. 
The eldest daughter, Charlie, feels trapped in her pacified environment until her well-liked and 
respected Uncle Charles announces he is to return home from the city for some time. Later, Uncle 
Charles is revealed to harbour a sinister and murderous past. The film questions the peaceful nature 
of the American suburb. It does not quietly foster the American spirit, but rather produces 
 
5 Joel Dinerstein, ‘Emergent Noir: Film Noir and the Great Depression in High Sierra (1941) and This Gun For Hire 
(1942)’, Journal of American Studies, 42.3, Film and Popular Culture (Dec., 2008), p. 425. 
6 Out of the Past, dir. by Jacques Tourneur (RKO Radio Pictures, 1946). 
7 The Killers, dir. by Robert Siodmak (Universal Pictures, 1946). 
8 The Lady From Shanghai, dir. by Orson Welles (Columbia Pictures, 1947). 
9 The Third Man, dir. by Carol Reed (British Lion Film Corporation, 1949). 
10 Shadow of a Doubt, dir. by Alfred Hitchcock (Universal Pictures, 1943). 
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monsters. It is less the case that Uncle Charles represents a purely aberrant threat. When he is first 
introduced, for instance, he lies pale and motionless, evoking the iconography of a vampire. 
Instead, the monster is the supposedly idyllic suburb. A substantial part of the narrative is dedicated 
to connecting young Charlie and Uncle Charles and Hitchcock’s editing emphasises this horrific 
dimension.  
Figure 1.1, Shadow of a Doubt, dir. By Alfred Hitchcock (Universal Pictures, 1943) 
We are introduced to Uncle Charles first (Figure 1.1), then to young Charlie (Figure 1.2) 
as they lie in their respective beds. Through Hitchcock’s cutting, then, both are spatially and 
narratively linked. Their fates are linked through their similar name and hidden desire for each 
other; the innocent girl and the villainous killer are thus equated. This equating of both characters 
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expresses the film’s larger focus on how the American suburb, and the ideal home within it, is not 
a place of sanctity shielding the American citizen from other evil ideologies, but rather a place 
which actively fosters and protects malice. Charles is not so much an outside force of chaos seeking 
to disrupt the supposed cohesion of the idyllic Santa Rosa, as a product of that very environment. 
Young Charlie is equated with Charles because of their similarity, not because of their obvious 
difference.  
Figure 1.2, Shadow of a Doubt (1943) 
A similar disruption of spatial and narrative accessibility can be seen in Stranger on the 
Third Floor. The following section will examine the myriad problems in the conception and 
construction of film noir through questioning to what extent Stranger on the Third Floor can be 
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called ‘the first film noir’. The disruption of space and narrative exemplifies, on a metacinematic 
level, the troubled conception of noir. Designating the film as the ‘first noir’ is admittedly fairly 
arbitrary. Films such as Fritz Lang’s M (1931)11 and Michael Curtiz’s Private Detective 62 
(1933)12 all exhibit features of film noir and might thus be deemed early instances of noir. 
Similarly, gangster films of the 1930s such as Public Enemy (1931)13 and Scarface (1932)14 
demonstrate noir’s romanticisation of the criminal hero. Indeed, an overview of film noir’s critical 
literature reveals a propensity for simply summarising Stranger on the Third Floor as the ‘first 
noir’ without even citing who regards it as such. One of the earliest instances is in Robert G. 
Porfirio’s essay ‘No Way Out: Existential Motifs in Film Noir’, where he writes that film noir is, 
‘an extremely unwieldy period’, which lasted, at most, ‘no longer than twenty years: from 1940 
(Stranger on the Third Floor) roughly to 1960 (Odds Against Tomorrow).’15 Ian Brookes, in his 
introduction to the problem of categorising film noir, identifies a turn in noir criticism which sees 
Stranger on the Third Floor replacing The Maltese Falcon (1941) as the first noir in the eyes of 
‘many critics.’16 When and where this turn occurred is left unanswered. Similarly, Spencer Selby 
writes that Stranger on the Third Floor is ‘often referred to as the first true and total film noir.’17 
I would argue that this tendency is reflective of the arbitrariness of calling a film noir the ‘first’ 
rather than being an instance of any kind of mass critical lacuna. As this chapter will argue, the 
retroactive construction of film noir renders a linear taxonomy and classification of film 
unnecessary, and in some instances, unhelpful. Indeed, it will further argue that noir’s very 
imprecision means that to designate a film, noir, introduces ambiguity rather than removing it. The 
 
11 M, dir. by Fritz Lang (Nero-Film A.G., 1931). 
12 Private Detective 62, dir. by Michael Curtiz (Warner Bros. Pictures, 1933). 
13 Public Enemy, dir. by William A. Wellman (Warner Bros. Pictures, 1931). 
14 Scarface, dir. by Howard Hawks (The Caddo Company, 1932). 
15 Porfirio, ‘No Way Out’, p. 85. 
16 Ian Brookes, Film Noir: A Critical Introduction (New York: Bloomsbury, 2017), p. 15. 
17 Spencer Selby, Dark City: The Film Noir (London: St James Press, 1984), p. 183. 
[34] 
 
question which film noir is ‘first’ is not pertinent because of the arbitrary answer it yields. Instead, 
the posing of the question both reveals the inconsistency of the question and helps sharpen the 
focus of how noir is defined in the first place. 
In this chapter, I will consider the unique definitional problems that face noir, how its 
critical and textual retroactivity intertwine, and how this affects the problem of home, using 
Stranger on the Third Floor as a case study. It is necessary to connect the often-overlooked film 
to later and more established noirs within the canon to exemplify not only the possibilities of noir, 
but also the problems facing the critic when trying to categorise noir itself. The principal problem 
is one of retroactivity, not simply because of the fact that film noir was named in 1946 — well into 
its ‘first phase’ — but the fact that this retroactivity is reflected in the films themselves. With their 
complex flashback structures, there is a sense that, on a formal and structural level, film noir 
always arrives too late to its own construction. There is always some level of excess, some element 
which remains unreachable. Even those films that do not use flashback narratives involve a similar 
approach to epistemology — things are never what they seem, and their revelations and ‘solutions’ 
only seem to further complicate matters rather than resolve them. Stranger on the Third Flood has 
a largely linear narrative, save for an extended dream sequence in the middle of the film, which 
serves to retroactively reconfigure our existing knowledge, particularly in relation to Michael’s 
position as an empathetic protagonist. Yet the logic of the flashback structure is not only present 
in flashbacks, but in the very construction of knowledge in noir.  
To place the film within the historical, aesthetic, and narrative contexts of noir requires 
reference points, oddly, from the future, as it is somehow influenced by the film noirs that follow 
it. Such a proposition may sound bizarre, but its necessity, I believe, is testament to how film noir 
functions as a retroactive category informed by trauma. We must, however, take this proposal 
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seriously as it highlights the critical position in relation to noir, that films are imbued with 
‘noirness’ by critics rather than it being an inherent property of the film. Critics arrive to noir ‘too 
late’ because their ‘noirness’ is not an inherent property of the film. Rather than stabilising 
meaning by placing the film within a specific critical and historical framework, ‘noirness’ is 
instability itself. In this sense, defining noir always produces an excess, something within the film 
which eludes definition, brought about both by a certain anxiety by critics to homogenise these set 
of films and by the ambiguity of film noir itself.  
Hereafter, therefore, I use the term ‘noirness’ to both mean the content of film noir, as well 
as to suggest a general ‘feeling’ of noir, thus emphasising its ephemeral and spectral properties. 
As Maltby argues, film noir is a description which is itself a ‘metaphor’ because noir ‘is the only 
major category in the American cinema designated by critics rather than industrialists.’18 The 
difference between ‘critics’ and ‘industrialists’ can be summarised as the difference between the 
films themselves willingly being produced as noir. There is thus always a possibility, an 
unresolvable tension, that a film noir is not even a ‘film noir’; critics are potentially simultaneously 
seeing too much and too little. This, on the face of it, might not need be a major problem. For, as 
Tzvetan Todorov argues in his 1976 essay, ‘The Origins of Genres’, all genres arise through other 
genres and as such there is no point of origin for genre. ‘The question of origins’, he writes, ‘cannot 
be disassociated, historically, from the field of the genres themselves.’19 Noir is, in part, 
constructed out of other genres (the detective novel, the crime film, the gothic, the melodrama and 
so on), but what it lacks, in Todorov’s definition, is the ‘models of writing’, the historical schema 
 
18 Richard Maltby, ‘Film Noir: The Politics of the Maladjusted Text’, Journal of American Studies, 18.1 (April 1984), 
p. 51. 
19 Tzvetan Todorov, ‘The Origin of Genres’, New Literary History, 8.1, Readers and Spectators: Some Views and 
Reviews (Autumn, 1976), p. 161. 
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available to a text’s author, the framework by which authors ‘write as a function of […] the existing 
generic system’.20 This lack of a generic framework gives rise to a correlative lack of agency in 
noir. Approaching noir as if it were a genre with definable and quantifiable characteristics results 
in, as I will later demonstrate, a circular critical task, wherein the categorisation of noir overtakes 
the experience of the films themselves. Edward Dimendberg, for one, offers a succinct definition 
of noir, calling it a ‘bricolage’, an ‘amalgam of diverse historical and cultural elements’.21 This, of 
course, is not without its problems — it is perhaps too vague — but understanding noir, or 
‘noirness’, as a phenomenon which arises because of a connection between various cultural 
elements, historical contexts, as well as national and personal traumas, is at least a good start. 
It should be acknowledged, too, that the retroactive construction of noir is not unique to 
noir, but rather a product of genre criticism itself. As Steve Neale points out in Genre and 
Hollywood, ‘it was not until the late 1960s and 1970s that the study of genre and genres began to 
establish itself more fully in Britain and in the UA, in tandem with the establishment of Film 
Studies as a formal, academic discipline.’22 Moreover, Andrew Tudor, in his 1974 book Theories 
of Film, situates this problem in the context of the western and highlights the paradoxical nature 
of genre criticism. He writes, ‘To take a genre such as the western, analyse it, and list its principal 
characteristics is to beg the question that we must first isolate the body of films that are western.’23 
Tudor, however, identifies that genre is a more of a cultural signifier than a textual one. To speak 
of ‘the western’ he argues, is to ‘appeal to a common set of meanings in our culture’.24 Genre is 
still, for Tudor, present in the films, but their classification depends more on ‘the particular culture 
 
20 Ibid, p. 162. 
21 Dimendberg, Film Noir and the Spaces of Modernity, p. 3. 
22 Steve Neale, Genre and Hollywood (London: Routledge, 2000), p 8. 
23 Andrew Tudor, Theories of Film (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1974), p. 135. 
24 Ibid, p. 39. 
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with which we are operating.’25 It is no secret, then, that genre criticism is a problematic area. 
Where noir differs, I argue, is that its very meaning in popular culture is both deeply ambiguous 
and at odds with its academic definition. There is a clear idea about what noir is in the cultural 
imagination — evidenced in myriad popular descriptions of noir, and in the influence of noir’s 
visual style and narrative tropes on modern cinema26  — but this loose definition works to 
complicate any formal definition. 
It was Nino Frank, an Italian born French critic, who in 1946 first identified — or first used 
the term — film noir, or ‘film “noirs”’.27 As John Belton identifies, film noir was notable, in the 
eyes of French critics, for its ‘essential difference from earlier American films.’28 In one sense, we 
might read Belton’s judgement as meaning that noir can be identified through its points of 
divergence from other, more ‘mainstream’ Hollywood films. But in another, what this perception 
reveals about noir is that it opens up the space for difference, which is the essence of ‘noirness’. 
With regards to Frank, 1946 occurred, of course, after many of the classics of film noir (for 
example, The Maltese Falcon,29 Double Indemnity, 30 and Murder My Sweet31). The idea of ‘noir’, 
then, for these films (and thus potentially for the category as a whole) is something which was 
neither consciously nor wholly produced by the films themselves, nor was it an intended effect. 
As Thomas Elsaesser has suggested, ‘essentially, film noir has no essence, its most stable 
characteristic is its “absent-centredness.”’32 And, as Billy Wilder is credited with saying after the 
 
25 Ibid. 
26 Frank Miller’s Sin City (1995), a series of graphic novels, is particularly illustrative example because of the way 
in which Miller’s art style specifically evokes and heightens noir’s high-contrast, chiaroscuro lighting. 
27 Frank, ‘A New Kind of Police Drama: The Criminal Adventure’, p. 14. 
28 John Belton, American Cinema, American Culture (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), p. 190. 
29 The Maltese Falcon, dir. by John Huston (Warner Bros., 1941). 
30 Double Indemnity, dir. by Billy Wilder (Paramount Pictures, 1944). 
31 Murder, My Sweet, dir. by Edward Dmytryk (RKO Radio Pictures, 1944). 
32 Thomas Elsaesser, Weimar Cinema and After: Germany’s Historical Imaginary (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 423. 
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production of Double Indemnity: ‘Film noir!...I never heard that expression in those days.’33 If it 
is the case that noirness is created by the critic rather than by the film, how is it possible to produce 
a coherent chronology of film noir? That is, is it possible to call any film ‘the first film noir’, even 
an early film such as Stranger on the Third Floor? As Jason Holt writes in his 2007 essay ‘A 
Darker Shade’, Stranger on the Third Floor is ‘little known’ but nevertheless constitutes the 
‘inception of the classic period’ of noir.34 Curiously, as Gene Phillips argues in his 2011book Out 
of the Shadows: Expanding the Canon of Classic Film Noir — an otherwise welcome exploration 
of the ways in which noir’s boundaries are constantly in flux — Stranger on the Third Floor 
acquiesces its position of being the ‘first’ film noir to The Maltese Falcon because of the latter’s 
larger influence on film noir. The Maltese Falcon, for Phillips, ‘remains the “official” beginning 
of the film noir cycle.’35 However, noir can only be seen as ‘absent-centred,’36 seen as what it 
lacks, or what is lost when we call a film ‘noir.’ The question of the ‘first’ film noir should not 
therefore be decided by which film has (or had) the most influence on the films that preceded it. 
Instead, the question should be understood in an ironic sense. The answer to the question does not 
have any real bearing on the formation of noir but attempting to answering it reveals the logic of 
noir’s formal and textual retroactive construction. The next section will examine film noir’s 
production of the visual image and its construction of narrative structures. It will consider a 
metatextual reading of Stranger on the Third Floor’s ending, and what it might tell us about the 
construction of noir itself. Then, I will give my own definition of noir. 
 
33 Charlotte Chandler, Nobody's Perfect: Billy Wilder, A Personal Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 
p. 114. 
34 Jason Holt, ‘A Darker Shade: Realism in Neo-Noir’, in The Philosophy of Film Noir, ed. by Mark T. Conard 
(Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2007), p. 27. 
35 Gene D. Phillips, Out of the Shadows: Expanding the Canon of Classic Film Noir (London: Scarecrow Press, 
2011), p. 31. 
36 Elsaesser, Weimar Cinema and After, p. 423. 
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Out of the Aftermath: The Beginning and Ending of Film Noir 
Figure 1.3, Stranger on the Third Floor, Dir. Boris Ingster, (RKO Radio Pictures, 1940) 
The ending of Stranger on the Third Floor is a curious moment in the film. Michael is a journalist 
who finds himself as the key witness in a murder trial of a local café owner, Nick. Michael lays 
the blame on the wrong man (a taxi driver called Briggs) instead of the real murderer, a mysterious 
figure known only as the Stranger. The Stranger also murders Michael’s spying neighbour, Meng, 
for which Michael is later blamed. The Stranger seems to evade capture by Michael, and the latter’s 
innocence depends on the existence of the Stranger. That is, until the Stranger has a chance meeting 
with Jane, Michael’s fiancée, at a local butcher’s, whereupon Jane accuses the Stranger of being 
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the murderer. After a brief fight between Jane and the Stranger, Jane runs across the street, and the 
Stranger is hit by a passing truck. As he lays dying in the street, he confesses his crimes to Jane. 
The next scene involves Michael and Jane at a local diner (replicating the first scene of the film), 
where a cheerful Michael relays the news that they are to be taken to their new house together. 
They are able to do so because Michael receives a raise for his involvement in the murder trial. As 
they step outside, they hail a taxi, and the previously accused Briggs appears, cheerfully, and offers 
them a ride, waiving their fare, and the film ends. While it seems as if the narrative tension has 
been resolved by the Stranger’s death (the Stranger’s confession of his crimes exonerates Michael, 
Michael gets his raise and can afford a home with Jane, and Briggs is proven innocent), there 
nonetheless remains a rushed feeling, an unexplained excess, a simplification of the answers which 
we expect to see.37 It is the ending’s very neatness which renders it unsatisfying.  
Tonally, the ending appears to have arrived from a different film because it feels fictional 
and artificial. The Stranger’s death and confession is too convenient because there is no established 
reason as to why he would confess, aside from a vague and implied madness. The narrative tension 
is resolved through an accident, in the form of the speeding truck, rather than through an 
investigative exploration of the condition which led to the Stranger murdering Meng and Nick. 
Michael’s own ‘investigation’, which leads to his arrest as opposed to the Stranger’s, is hardly 
conclusive or rigorous and Jane’s concludes with a chance meeting with the Stranger. The reason 
the ending of the film feels unsatisfying is that it only resolves the tension for Michael. He is placed 
in an impossible situation, relying on the Stranger’s existence and testimony to exonerate him. Yet 
narrative tension still remains in the notion the Stranger’s existence can be read as a symptom of 
 
37 It should be noted that this ‘rushed’ feeling is borne out of the film’s short running time, which is itself a product 




Michael’s desire to kill Meng. In other words, it is not necessarily the Stranger who murdered 
Meng, but Michael’s desire. 
Artificiality permeates the ending of the film. The oddness of the ending emphasises the 
retroactivity involved in the construction of meaning in noir, which is important in distinguishing 
how the idea of home is constructed and reconstructed through noir. Briggs’ reappearance to offer 
Michael and Jane a free taxi ride acts to dislocate meaning, to make us aware of its strict adherence 
to Hollywood convention, which will be explored in greater detail later. It is the attempt to cohere 
and close the narrative that means it remains forever open (Figure 1.3). The last we saw of Briggs 
in reality — that is, outside Michael’s dream — was him was being dragged away from the court 
after his conviction. Briggs’ only interaction with Michael outside of the dream was when Michael 
said he was guilty of murder. However, in Michael’s dream, Briggs reappears as an embodiment 
of Michael’s guilt. There is a notable distinction between real-life Briggs and the Briggs who 
appears in Michael’s dream. If film noir were realistic, we would expect Briggs to be angry with 
Michael. Presumably, there is an omitted scene between the Stranger’s death and the final scene. 
This scene would be a reappearance of Briggs in court wherein he is found innocent because of 
the Stranger’s deathbed confession as opposed to Michael correcting his memory. In that case, 
Michael still has not done anything to rectify his mistake as it was merely coincidence which 
overturned Briggs’ conviction. Yet the exclusion of such a hypothetical scene leads us to falsely 
consider the Stranger’s death as the cause of the narrative resolution. The Stranger’s death is 
presented as something around which all the narrative tension can coalesce and thus be diffused. 
The uneasiness of the scene and the root of its artificiality cause it to appear as if the wrong 
Briggs has materialised. Indeed, there is a narrative need for a new Briggs to appear: the film no 
longer requires (nor is required to remember) the condemned man. Instead it simply needs 
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someone to deliver Michael and Jane to their new home. There is a dislocation between what we 
expect to see and what is shown. In other words, there is a slippage between signifier and signified. 
In linguistics, the signifier is a written word or sound pattern, the material form of an object, and 
the signified the concept of that word. The signifier for Briggs, then, is his existence in the court 
room. More precisely, his existence is contextualised in terms of his screams — ‘I didn’t do it!’38 
— that haunt the rest of the film and Michael’s unconscious. It suggests that Michael’s professional 
commitment to truth is imaginary, a mask for his personal desires. The outcome of the trial leading 
to Michael and Jane’s personal enfranchisement is coincidental only because Michael desires it. 
Although Briggs’ screams are an act of desperation, a plea to Michael’s conscience, Michael 
imagines them as piercing indictments of his desires. This version of Briggs sees right through 
Michael. Michael sees Briggs as the condemned man who knows Michael’s desires, perhaps better 
than Michael himself. The Briggs which emerges at the end of the film is totally harmless. Instead 
of interrogating Michael’s desires, he accepts his utterances at face value. And, as a working-class 
man, he is rendered inert: he no longer desires anything himself — only wishing to serve the now 
valiant Michael — and is reduced to a means for Michael and Jane to move into their new (and 
apparently deserved) home. It is, strangely, this version of Briggs, the least believable and most 
‘dream-like,’ who serves to conclude the film quickly and efficiently. 
Through Stranger on the Third Floor’s ending, we can see a microcosm of how meaning 
is constructed in noir, as well as how noir itself is created. The ending of the film, principally, 
shows three interrelated concepts which inform the construction of meaning and home in noir. The 
first is the instability of the ending. The formation of the couple at first appears a sensible outcome 
to the narrative because the tension within their relationship has been overcome. Yet because those 
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problems were identified within the Stranger himself, then their relationship’s stability is 
undermined. The formation of the couple, as I have argued, is the primary mechanism by which 
the traumatic meaning is sutured in Hollywood cinema. The second, which is closely aligned with 
the instability, is the excessiveness. The Stranger, I would argue, represents Michael’s excessive 
desire. Finally, the third concept is the traumatic dimension. The figure of the Stranger is the film 
itself, as represented in the confusing relation between the signifier ‘Stranger’ and the referent. 
The character of the Stranger is both the antagonist of the film and a totalising force on the film. 
The construction of plausible meaning in the film is based on a paradoxical formulation: all 
meaning in the film only begins to make sense once it comes into contact with the Stranger, but 
the Stranger himself represents the source of instability in the film.39 Next, I will offer my 
definition of film noir in light of a metatextual reading of Stranger on the Third Floor. I will 
consider what this shows us about the conception of noir and of home, through the mythologization 
of history itself. Noir is also constituted by instability, excessiveness, and trauma.  
With respect to the dislodgement between signifier and signified in noir, Lacan’s concept 
of the point de capiton can help illuminate our understanding of Briggs and his relation to the 
ending of the film, as well as film noir more generally. Lacan’s point de capiton stems from 
Freud’s concept of Nachträglichkeit, or afterwardness. Afterwardness is a way of understanding 
the relationship between cause and effect in relation to trauma. Here, the trauma of Stranger on 
the Third Floor is located within the figure of the Stranger himself. He represents that which is 
repressed. On the one hand, he exposes how Michael’s desire to move into a home with Jane is a 
 
39 When discussing the film, I am careful to not abbreviate the film solely to ‘Stranger’, so as not to confuse the reader 
with what I am discussing. Perhaps some extra meaning might be gleaned from a different and more ambiguous 
rhetorical strategy (showing my own work to embody the very instability of meaning present in noir), but here, I have 
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destructive one. To escape Meng’s incessant infantilisation of Michael through his denial of 
Michael’s sexual desires, Meng must be killed. On the other, the Stranger’s Othered position as an 
immigrant shows a certain cultural repression, something known of old and long forgotten.  
Noir, too, is also traumatic. Firstly, its retroactive categorisation closely resembles the 
designation of trauma. Secondly, the historical context of World War Two hangs heavily over noir. 
As Sheri Chinen Biesen argues in her book Blackout: World War II and the Origins of Film Noir 
in 2005, noir’s aesthetic sensibilities are partly a result of ‘wartime constraints on filmmaking 
practices’ such as the increased need to shoot films on small, enclosed sound stages.40 The 
‘psychological atmosphere’ in early noir films, she contends, ‘marked a response to an increasingly 
realistic and understandable anxiety’.41 On a broad level, noir is a response to trauma: one solution 
to the epistemological crises raised by trauma is to use investigative narrative structures to lay out 
a logical response. Though, as I demonstrate in Chapter Three, the logic of the investigative 
structure does not systemically reveal all. Instead it conceals and hides. Although noir is a response 
to trauma, it is also indicative of trauma.  Noir, I would argue, is a traumatic category of film.  
Returning to Freud, Nachträglichkeit is the way in which trauma ‘resurfaces’ and becomes 
diagnosable. For example, a child may experience a traumatic event — commonly referred to as 
the ‘primal scene’ — in their childhood but may not understand the significance of it at the time it 
was experienced. The experience that is stored in the unconscious may manifest itself in numerous 
ways, such as parapraxis. Unbeknown to them, some unknown stimuli may cause the child to recall 
the traumatic event, causing distress and possibly psychosis. This process does not necessarily 
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denote a remembrance of the traumatic event as such; instead, it reveals the event to be traumatic. 
Ordinarily, the relationship between cause and effect is considered to constitute a linear 
progression, but with Freud’s concept of Nachträglichkeit this relationship is reversed: the effect 
precedes the cause. Events are, as Ben Tyrer summarises, ‘retroactively determined as 
traumatic.’42 The meaning of Stranger on the Third Floor is thus determined by its whimsical 
ending. The story was simply about a misunderstanding on Michael’s part. After it has been neatly 
resolved, he and Jane can proceed to get married and move into their home together. Home’s 
meaning here is bound up with the traumatic retrospection that the film’s ending reflects. The 
trauma, up until the point is retroactively determined as such, is thus always spectral, always in 
the process of becoming traumatic. The traumatic event is paradoxically absent, insofar as it has 
yet to be realised, and it is at the same time present since it threatens to become real. A traumatic 
rupture, therefore, disrupts the linearity of time as the past is experienced within the present, since 
the presence of trauma is felt as an absence. The past is no longer safely in its place. Indeed, its 
very categorisation as the past is called into question. 
Following on, the point-de-capiton is a term which attempts to understand precisely why 
Nachträglichkeit disrupts the very structure of a subject’s experience of time and how the effect 
comes to precede its cause, as such a proposition seems counter-intuitive. Slavoj Žižek discusses 
the point de capiton in terms of a ‘nodal point’ which, in his words, ‘quilt’ signifiers without 
referents, or ‘floating signifiers’.43 A floating signifier does not point to any specific object and 
does not possess a universal meaning. The point de capiton ‘fixes’, or arrests, their meaning so 
that they ‘become parts of the structured network of meaning.’44 By introducing the point de 
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43 Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, p. 95. 
44 Ibid, p. 96. 
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capiton, these floating signifiers connect to other elements within the symbolic network, thus their 
meaning becomes fixed. The categorisation of film noir, as Ben Tyrer perceptively observes, can 
be understood in terms of the point de capiton.  
Film noir differs from other styles of cinema insofar as it is a resolutely retroactive 
category. During their production, the films we now call noir were not known explicitly as film 
noir and were determined to be so after the fact. Directors and studios may have been consciously 
producing films which resembled a cluster of abstract ‘feelings’ which we now recognise as noir, 
but they were not known as ‘film noir.’ Nor, too, is there any satisfactory way to verify that, during 
their production, the films were knowingly noir — such an endeavour would likely be tedious and 
inconclusive. This is because noir is not determined by a cluster of features. The designation of 
films as ‘noir’ functions as the point de capiton, arresting the meaning of the films and their 
specific content by aligning them with the signifier ‘noir’. In short, what most film noirs have in 
common is that they are known as film noir. Tyrer acknowledges that this designation of noir as a 
retroactive category is a symptom of the way in which knowledge is produced within the films 
themselves because the point de capiton denotes a restructuring of cause and effect, and thus how 
meaning is produced. The cause is acknowledging the signifier ‘noir’ and the films are its effects 
rather than the other way around. In this way, noir’s meaning (both of the category as a whole and 
within themselves) is predicated on the sensation of not knowing. 
In terms of a textual, filmic, dimension to the point de capiton, it is a point in which 
knowledge is produced ex post facto or retroactively. Nachträglichkeit demonstrates how 
knowledge can be produced in such a way. A common trope of noir which reinforces such a point 
is the flashback structure of certain films (some examples include, but are not limited to, Double 
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Indemnity (1944), Detour (1945)45, and The Killers (1946))46. The flashback structure often 
involves a restructuring of knowledge as certain signifiers are fixed into place. Yet I would not 
limit the logic of the flashback to films with such an explicit structure. Instead, I see the flashback 
structure in noir as an effect of noir’s traumatic relation to knowledge and history.  
Tyrer writes that ‘The final point confers meaning retroactively on the elements that 
preceded it’47, the final point in Stranger on the Third Floor being its ending. Through its very 
difference, the ending confers meaning back onto the rest of the film. With the introduction of the 
point de capiton, meaning can no longer be conceived of as linearly constructed but instead as 
something which is retroactively produced, as something which is added back in with the ‘final 
point.’ In fact, it is the only way that meaning is produced in noir. The fallacious signification of 
‘resolution’ in the Stranger’s death, as well as Briggs’ incarceration, is understood as having 
logical contingencies rather than being a product of fortune. Further, the point de capiton, Žižek 
argues, is ‘the word to which “things” themselves refer to recognise themselves in their unity.’48 
Thus, meaning in the film becomes centred around the ending. The ending-as-signifier 
retroactively reveals meaning in earlier parts of film, such as the Stranger's death: it escapes being 
an act of violent randomness because of the ending. Any discussion of meaning in the film is 
incomplete without reference to the ending because of its suspicious difference. 
There is an additional meta-textual dimension to the point de capiton and Nachträglichkeit 
in relation to Stranger on the Third Floor’s position as the ‘first film noir.’ Even within the 
 
45 Detour, dir. by Edgar G. Ulmer (Producers Releasing Corporation, 1945). 
46 The Killers, as will be noted later, does not necessarily have flashback structure in a technical sense. However, in 
the general sense that the film’s plot is communicated through the stories of characters within the film, it does share 
some resemblance to the flashback structures of the other two films. 
47 Tyrer, ‘Film Noir as Point de capiton’, p. 100. 
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established canon of noir, the film finds itself somewhat of an outsider. In the broader imagination 
of the public, John Huston's The Maltese Falcon (1941) is perhaps the 'first noir' proper because it 
is an adaptation of the hard-boiled detective novel by Dashiell Hammett. The Maltese Falcon 
exhibits many of the supposedly key characteristics of film noir: a morally grey, nihilistic detective 
narrative; a hard-boiled detective as the protagonist (and the inclusion of Humphrey Bogart 
himself, a figure who seems to represent the genre as a whole); a femme fatale; and so on. In short, 
it certainly seems as if it were a film noir, or perhaps the first ‘full realised’ noir. Instead, I would 
position Stranger on the Third Floor as the first film noir. I do so in an ironic sense, not to suggest 
that the film is the first noir, nor that it is the first film which offers a significant ‘blueprint’ with 
which we can better understand later noirs, but rather to stress the absurdity of such a proposition: 
there can be no first film noir, but the insistence on searching tells us something about both critical 
priorities and noir itself. Through its retroactivity, the ending of Stranger on the Third Floor acts 
as the beginning of film noir, insofar as it acts as an opening of the gate. Similarly, noir itself could 
be considered spectral because of the way in which, through the film, we experience the past in 
the present. Retroactively, the film is the first noir, or at least an early antecedent. However, there 
is a lingering sense that the noirness in the film is not entirely present.  
Noirness is not something which can only be denoted through the identification of formal 
and narrative features within particular sets of films. Stranger on the Third Floor’s distinctive 
lighting, pessimistic tone, ‘wrong man’ narrative,49 and so forth, do not themselves make it a noir.50 
It cannot be so definitively applied, since applying the term ‘noir’ to a film introduces an additional 
layer of ambiguity because it recontextualises other film noirs and the positions they inhabit. The 
 
49 Though, the film’s focus on Michael as the ‘wrong man’ ignores the false accusation against Briggs. 
50 Brookes, Film Noir, p. 50. 
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ambiguity in Stranger on the Third Floor arises partly because noir itself is so ambiguous and 
spectral, threatening to be coherent and therefore real. Much like the figure of the Stranger himself, 
his threatening presence is constituted by the threat of his existence. The Stranger nevertheless 
reveals the lack of control noir’s protagonists have over their desires; they exceed their grasp.  
The position of the Stranger in the film is, I argue, particularly instructive in grappling with 
the problems and debate over noir’s definition. What interests this thesis is less the specificities of 
the debate itself, but more what it tells us about noir and its depiction of home. I argue that 
designating Stranger on The Third Floor as the ‘first’ noir also confers its position as the ‘last’ 
noir. The attempt to impose order, to demythologise, to delimit noir’s instability, excessiveness, 
and trauma, exposes the frayed edges of noir. Indeed, we could identify noir as only constituting a 
border. It limits without ever defining its own internal constituents. Like the Stranger himself, then, 
noir is only made visible through glimpses of its fleeting borders; we only see noir through our 
blindness. This aspect of the Stranger is one of my major ways in which he problematises definition 
within the film itself. Next, I will examine the definition of noir more generally. 
As a generic or stylistic category, then, noir serves to multiply ambiguities in its texts rather 
than to codify them and render them coherent. On one level, the concern is that Stranger on the 
Third Floor might not be fully noir, that its noirness floats through it like a current, sporadically 
revealing itself, or that because of the film’s chronologically early position it is simply feigning 
noirness, or that what we see might differ in some way to a (also spectral) ‘real’ noirness. We 
might recall Paul Schrader’s declaration of noir’s ‘almost Freudian attachment to water’.51 Here, 
we can interpret Schrader’s words as metaphorical. Noir’s attachment to ‘water’ represents the 
 
51 Schrader, ‘Notes on Film Noir’, p. 57. 
[50] 
 
ephemeral properties of noirness. Noir is thus not attached to ‘water’, but it is the ‘water’ itself. 
Or, in light of Tyrer’s observation that the only thing that binds noir together is the signifier ‘noir’, 
noir is thus attached to itself. On another level, the concern is that noir is somehow not fully itself, 
that its presence simultaneously suggests its absence. The sporadic nature of noirness keeps it from 
being fully formed; it is only caught in glimpses, never in full view. In this respect, the Stranger is 
a personification of noirness. His desires are difficult to grasp yet are central to the network of 
meaning within the film. The same applies to noir’s critics: noir is not an object in itself which can 
be understood; it can only be grasped through the prism of individual films, thus making its 
meaning malleable. Noir’s retroactivity manifests itself here within the critical reappraisal of the 
film. The film’s experimental techniques, such as chiaroscuro lighting, the internal monologue, 
and the psychological themes it addresses set a precedent which later noir continues and expands 
upon. In relation to Stranger on the Third Floor specifically, its paranoid dream sequence is highly 
and overtly reminiscent of the techniques used in the German Expressionist films of the 1930s. 
Phillips notes the influence of cinematographer Nicholas Musuraca, particularly in how the 
‘strongly expressionistic dream sequence reflects the overt influence of German films like The 
Cabinet of Dr. Caligari on Musuraca’s work.’52 
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Figure 1.4, Stranger on the Third Floor (1940) 
Other elements, such as its gothic influence, are often overlooked.53 For instance, the 
Stranger’s first appearance, with his pointed out-stretched hand (Figure 1.4) is reminiscent of F. 
W. Murnau’s Nosferatu (1922)54 and the focus on Nosferatu’s hands as instruments of terror in 
themselves. This connection makes explicit an argument put forth by Marc Vernet that noir's 
distinctive lighting did not originate in noir, but can instead be found much earlier, in films from 
1915 by Cecil B. DeMille and Alvin Wickoff.55 So through a connection drawn between Stranger 
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on the Third Floor and its antecedents, we can see that noir’s distinctive and original aspects, are 
not distinctive and original in themselves. Nevertheless, the film’s demonstration of various noir 
techniques can help illuminate their position within other noir films. The dream sequence in the 
film is reminiscent, too, of Hitchcock’s Spellbound, which is induced by two doctors attempting 
to figure out John Ballatyne’s, the protagonist, affliction. The dream sequence in Stranger on the 
Third Floor can be read through such similar sequences like Spellbound’s. The dream’s function 
is to interrogate Michael’s desires, to shift the terrain of the investigation from the material to the 
psychological world. I will now consider how psychoanalysis figures within Stranger on the Third 
Floor and within noir’s contexts more broadly, as well as the way in which this thesis uses 
psychoanalysis as its conceptual framework.  
Perhaps the most influential aspect of the film is the way it approaches the unconscious 
and psychoanalysis in general. ‘The noir film’, as Maureen Turim argues, ‘avoids dramatizations 
of Freudian concepts and diagnoses; it inscribes them instead on an unconscious level for a 
symbolic reading.’56 Stranger on the Third Floor, therefore, should be not be read simply as a 
dramatization of Freudian concepts, but we should recognise how psychoanalysis and the 
unconscious are inscribed symbolically. For example, the Stranger acting as Michael’s 
doppelgänger is not merely an instance of the uncanny, but a sign that the way in which identity is 
constructed in relation to desire is itself uncanny. Moreover, there is a historical as well as textual 
basis for the use of psychoanalysis in film noir. The position of psychoanalysis in American culture 
cannot be ignored. The 1940s and 1950s, Frank Krutnik argues, marked the popularisation of 
Freudian psychoanalysis whereby Freud’s concepts, previously considered to be too ‘intellectual’ 
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and ‘European’ for Americans, became widely known.57 In particular, Freud’s work on the 
structure of psyche through the Id, Ego, and Super-ego became an example of how Freud 
demonstrated the instability of the self. Freud designated the mind as something which is 
constantly being internally torn apart. Indeed, in America, Ego psychology was the dominant 
school of psychoanalytic practice.58  
Freud's concept of the uncanny, a concept often associated with Gothic Studies, 
additionally finds its way into noir. More generally, Freud’s theories opened the possibility for 
understanding the unconscious drives of Hollywood’s characters and thus a way to see beyond the 
immediate and visible properties of Hollywood cinema. Psychoanalysis ‘cuts’ through 
Hollywood’s visual logic, most notably the emphasis on the objectivity of camera and the idea that 
the camera is ‘all seeing'. If the films are psychoanalytically inflected, that is they invite us to read 
them psychoanalytically, then how does the Hollywood camera ‘see’ desire or drives? In the case 
of Stranger on the Third Floor, this relationship to Hollywood is directly analogous to the plot of 
the film because it questions the authority of surface appearances in favour of deeper, inner desires. 
The psychology of the crime (and of the criminal) is more important than the actuality of the crime 
itself. We never actually see either of the two crimes and instead witness Michael’s inner 
interrogation and subsequent revelation of his desire to kill Meng and to experience punishment. 
If the Stranger is read, at least by Michael, as a kind of primordial force — a supernatural 
conjuration of Michael’s desires — rather than possessing any of his own (although, as noir often 
shows, are our desires ever really ours?), then the Stranger lacks any form of agency. Therefore, 
Michael’s desires lack agency; he is not in control of his desires. 
 




There is, of course, a noticeable difference between popular psychoanalysis and 
psychoanalysis proper. Whereas the former is exaggerated and often used for ‘imagistic 
vicariousness’,  the latter questions the solidity of appearances.59 There is a reason psychoanalysis 
appears so frequently in noir criticism: the two are intrinsically bound up. It is as if psychoanalysis 
is embedded within the text of a noir film itself, waiting to be discovered and realised as such, yet 
at the same time never really there. Any criticism of film noir, such as, say, a historical examination 
of noir, that does not utilise or refer to psychoanalysis feels incomplete because something is 
literally being overlooked. 
The way in which noir is conceived follows the same retroactive logic as the point de 
capiton. This is highlighted in the way that early noir critics attempted to define noir. For example, 
Raymond Durgnat’s main error in his exhaustive categorisation of the characteristics of noir can 
be said to be the same as the problem of the reversal of cause and effect in Freudian trauma. 
Durgnat’s guiding principle, one that is shared by many early noir critics,60 is that if one conjures 
up a cluster of details and signifiers (comprised of narrative and aesthetic tropes) then one can 
articulate the ‘essence’ of noir in order to determine which films can be categorised as film noir. 
Borde and Chaumeton also extol the virtues of an approach like Durgnat’s. They argue the method 
for analysing or identifying noir is ‘obvious.’ They write, 
While remaining as scientifically and objectively grounded as possible, one must examine 
the most prominent characteristic of the films which critics have classified as noir. From 
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these characteristics one may then derive the common denominator and define that unique 
expressive attitude which all these works put into play.61 
Borde and Chaumeton’s hope is that by relentlessly categorising the constituent components of 
noir, then finally noir can be ‘put into play’, that noir can only make sense upon the completion of 
such a project. As I will explore later, in Chapter Three, an apparently ‘scientific’ approach is 
perhaps one of the least illuminating approaches a critic can take precisely because it is ‘obvious’.  
One problem with a project which intends to set out all the possible configurations of noir 
is that it is destined to defeat itself in one way or another: the list will either be so exhaustive that 
most films will tenuously fit into the schema somehow, or it will be too restrictive and prohibit the 
inclusion of films which do not arbitrarily tick the correct number of boxes. Indeed, as James 
Damico comments, such a project would necessarily have ‘an entirely open structure,’62 which 
seems to be the opposite of that which Dugan wishes to accomplish. The project is thus entirely 
paradoxical. It posits the need for a restrictive categorisation of the elements of noir to define it as 
such and thus to create a ‘canon’ for noir, a body of work which can be pointed to and understood 
as separate from other genres and styles of cinema. Yet to do so, the category must be so broad as 
to allow already established films to be inducted into its annals. What, for instance, connects films 
such as The Lost Weekend (1945),63 Mildred Pierce (1945),64 The Big Sleep (1946), Gilda (1946), 
and The Postman Always Rings Twice (1947)? Aside from the historical period, the answer is 
relatively little. Durgnat’s project — which I take to be representative of a more general desire to 
categorise noir as a genre — is counterproductive. For Marc Vernet, in categorising noir, the 
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addition of elements only reveals the need for more precision.65 Film noir as an object of study is 
something which defies appearances. As Derrida observes in his essay ‘The Law of Genre’, there 
is an impurity at the heart of genre: ‘…As soon as genre announces itself, one must respect a norm, 
one must not cross a line of demarcation, one must not risk impurity, anomaly, or monstrosity.’66 
Derrida adds: ‘As soon as the word “genre” is sounded…as soon as one attempts to conceive it, a 
limit is drawn...And when a limit is established, norms and interdictions are not far behind: "Do," 
"Do not" says "genre," the word "genre," the figure, the voice, or the law of genre.’67 Every genre, 
then, is impure in some capacity: no film is simply a Western, no novel is simply Gothic, no film 
is simply noir. This is, of course, a more general problem pertaining to genre itself, but in noir the 
problem is made more acute because the relationship between the critical apparatuses and the affect 
of the films themselves is crucial in understanding noir. 
Film noir is deceptive in form and content; the problem of defining noir is inherent in the 
content of the noir films themselves because of the corollary between noir’s problematised 
categorisation and the epistemological concerns of the films themselves. This problem arises partly 
because noir cannot be thought of as a homogenous category. For example, noir films may indeed 
be linked to other individual films (the concept of, say, the femme fatale is found in many noir 
films, though even that contains many configurations of the femme fatale) but never to all films 
within the chain. The question of ‘is it noir?’ is strangely both perfunctory and integral. What is of 
interest is how the categorisation of noir is problematised specifically by its retroactivity. The 
underlying assumption that noir, as a concrete category, consists of some or all the details which 
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Durgnat formalised is incorrect. It is wrong to assume that noir existed in films before the creation 
of ‘film noir’ as a signifier. As modern observers, our conception of noir is problematised by the 
fact that we see noir in something which noir does not see in itself. ‘In the context of Lacan's point 
de capiton’, Tyrer concludes, ‘there is nothing that links [the films] except in the signifier 'noir'‘68; 
noir itself is the signifier which links the films together instead of a cluster of features as proposed 
by Durgnat. Moreover, the point de capiton, Žižek continues, is a word which ‘on the level of the 
signifier itself, unifies a given field, constitutes its identity.’69 For film noir, it is the signifier ‘noir’ 
which constitutes and unifies ‘noir identity’, so the ending of Stranger on the Third Floor is an 
attempt to unify the film’s identity, to formalise what the film is ultimately about. 
To return to Stranger on the Third Floor, the Stranger’s death should encourage us to 
question the frankly absurd unfolding of events. On the contrary, the film wants us, like Michael, 
to forget what we have seen. Indeed, it seems as if the film itself forgets to show us the scene we 
previously imagined which would contain the necessary resolution. There are two reasons why the 
film would ‘forget’ to show such a scene (aside from the obvious logistical one: perhaps Ingster 
wanted the film to end with the Stranger’s death and intentionally leave the narrative questions 
unanswered but was obliged by Hollywood’s conventions to add a satisfactory ending). Firstly, a 
‘proper’ resolution might have been too traumatic because it would have laid bare the inadequacies 
of its legal system as well as their bias towards believing Michael’s faulty testimony; in short, this 
scene would have revealed too much. Secondly, perhaps this imaginary scene was not shown 
because it would not have revealed anything at all because the court is working as intended, not as 
an objective purveyor of the social world which ‘corrects’ its errors, but more as a managerial tool. 
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The court operates like a machine for doom, not an entity which is guided by a strict code of ethics, 
but something which transforms corpses into bodies of evidence. More pointedly, in the context 
of America’s entry into World War Two and its subsequent reception of European Jewish refugees, 
the court’s role and symbolic significance is heightened in relation to the treatment of the Other.  
As the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum website states, ‘Although Germany had 
the second highest quota allotment under the act, the number of Jews trying to flee to the United 
States meant that immigrants had to wait, often for years, on a list.’70 Prior to President Truman’s 
‘Truman Directive’ in December 1945, America’s immigration policy was stringent because of 
‘security concerns’ over potential German spies hidden amongst the refugees.71 In film noir, these 
anxieties can be seen in Hitchcock’s Saboteur (1942), but the Stranger himself can be read, as 
Jonathan Auerbach observes, as a Nazi spy masquerading as a ‘Wandering Jew.’72 The Stranger 
himself is an Othered figure who does not regard his actions as immoral. Thus, the motivations of 
the Nazis are reduced to pure chaos seeking only to disrupt the American way of life rather than 
possessing any sort of ideological conviction, a sort of ‘anti-ideology.’ Symbolically, the court 
represents law, order, and stability in a tumultuous time, a mechanism which can restore and 
maintain ideology. Yet instead of protecting its citizens, the focus of the courts, as they are depicted 
in the film, is to maintain an exclusive idea and image of America. If we consider the Stranger as 
a symbol for Jewish refugees because of his European Otherness, then we are given a glimpse into 
America’s response to immigrants. The answers that we seek regarding this imaginary courtroom 
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scene would in fact contradict what the film has suggested up to this point. The imagined scene 
which I proposed would serve to absolve the court itself from guilt. Such a symbolic redemption 
for the court does not appear. The film’s actual ending feels more like a joke played simultaneously 
on both filmgoer and Hollywood: the demand for resolution provides us with an absence of a 
resolution which is more revealing than what was initially asked. We expect resolution, any kind 
of resolution, but are actively denied it by the film. Or, more precisely, although we are given the 
ending we want, it is given to us in a way we cannot accept. It is in this precise sense that the 
Stranger represents the noirness within the film. As I explained earlier, the signifier ‘noir’ attempts 
to unify ‘noir identity,’ yet the concept of noir is inherently unstable. In a similar way, the Stranger 
attempts to unify the meaning of the film, yet he himself is an epistemologically unstable figure. 
The precise nature of the jarring ending is that the final scene signifies resolution — primarily 
through the formation of the couple (as in they become married and move into their home) — 
without offering a substantive resolution, insofar as the resolution has unified around the demise 
of the Stranger. For example, none of the underlying legal and social problems have been 
addressed.  
Briggs would have been wrongfully murdered (which itself implies that the Stranger was 
‘rightfully’ murdered) because the court believed in Michael’s faulty and unreliable testimony. 
The real problem is not the Stranger, but the potent combination of the gullibility (as seen in the 
lethargy of the judges) and violence of the legal system. Yet Hollywood implicitly dictates a need 
for narrative closure and resolution. As Auerbach argues, ‘the machinery of law is the 
nightmare.’73 There is a sense of déjà vu, of historical repetition, of circularity, which undermines 
the scene’s attempts at closure. The repetition of the image of the busy downtown diner implies a 
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narrative looping and puts the film in a state where resolution is a structural impossibility. As 
Vernet writes, the act of speaking or writing about film noir itself ‘consists…in being installed in 
repetition.’74 The narrative looping implies that if, and indeed when, this should happen again, 
then nothing will change. In this context, hermeneutic activity is more or less useless, an empty 
attempt to impose order in a disorderly world. The various investigations (Briggs' court case, 
Michael's dream, Jane's investigation) throughout the film do not reveal what they are supposed to 
do. On the contrary, they each produce an unintentional excess. On a critical level, our 
interpretation of the film as film noir follows a similar pattern. Identifying it as either the first film 
noir or one of the first film noirs fixes its position as the point de caption, the ‘final point.’ It 
‘confers meaning retroactively on the elements that preceded it.’75 Here, what precedes the film 
(at least in a critical sense) is the rest of the film noir canon. The film, therefore, is perhaps 
paradoxically, both noir’s first and final point. This circular pattern is reflected in the film’s 
narrative structure. If Hollywood narratives are intended to culminate in the protagonists 
‘reaching’ reality through the Hollywood narrative, often through an investigation, then the film 
can be recognised as disrupting that process through its narrative looping. There is a sense of 
eternal recurrence, of Freud’s ‘fate neurosis’, which hermetically seals the film. 
Film noir is thus a retroactive category since it is determined after the fact. This 
retroactivity has several effects on the films and depictions of home. Most important of all, is that 
since the essence of noir is always obscured through its retroactivity, then the films themselves 
embody a kind of obscurity. There is always something being obscured: visually (the high contrast 
lighting on the Stranger makes him difficult to see), narratively (the Stranger’s narrative 
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significance is difficult to understand), and structurally (the spectrality of the Stranger retroactively 
alters the meaning of the film). Noirness is akin to a pervasive strangeness throughout a film; a 
feeling that something uncanny hangs, waiting in the air. It is perforating ambiguity: from the 
ambiguity over the film being the ‘first’ film noir, to what noirness is, to the objects of desire 
which it obscures, to the ambiguous meaning of home. Home’s meaning is ambiguous in noir 
because of noir. If film noir is retroactive to the extent to which I assert, then its construction 
resembles a nostalgic affect. As I have already demonstrated, noir’s retroactivity and relation to 
the point-de-caption is key to defining or understanding its mode of operation. As Boym argues, 
nostalgia is a ‘a mourning for the impossibility of mythical return.’76 Next, I will focus more on 
the role of myth in noir’s nostalgic and retroactive construction. I will use Roland Barthes’ 
conception of myth and how noir’s gestures towards coherence only serve to show and highlight 
its instability. 
 
Noir, Myth, and Genre: The Problem of Coherence 
Noir’s endings often create an appearance of naturalism, a naturalism that is mirrored by the spatial 
‘safety’ of the image in Hollywood cinema. In Hollywood cinema narrative, accessibility is made 
possible via continuity editing. I argue that this mythmaking, rather than covering up noir’s 
inconsistencies, is the mechanism by which we see its inconsistencies. Richard Maltby, for 
instance, writes that we ‘look through’ the camera instead of viewing it as part of the action it is 
capturing.77 In this sense, the Hollywood camera is one that purports to be an objective viewer of 
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the action, merely providing us with the facts. It gives us, in Maltby’s words, ‘the best view.’78 
The production and subsequent organisation of space in Hollywood cinema is meant to give the 
appearance of naturalism. However, Hollywood cinema operates on the assumption that we accept 
its form of naturalism as naturalism itself. This extends, too, to Hollywood’s ‘narrative naturalism.’ 
The reason Hollywood narratives invariably end happily is to imply, through the resolution of 
narrative tension, a ‘return’ to a state of ‘normalcy’. Again, what constitutes ‘normal’ is 
ideologically constructed by and through Hollywood. 





In film noir, this sense of naturalism is often subverted. When Cora is first revealed to us 
in The Postman Always Rings Twice (1946), for example, it is through an extravagant and highly 
sexually charged series of shots (Figures 1.5 and 1.6).79 Cora is objectified from the beginning as 
we initially only see her bare legs, after which the camera cuts back to Frank and then finally back 
to Cora, who we now see in profile, and can recognise that there is a person attached to those legs. 
The reversal and cutting up of Cora’s body here invites speculation: we only see her legs and 
therefore wonder where the rest of her is. Cora is aesthetically introduced as a conundrum, a 
subversion of expectation. Yet, this conundrum frames her as a fantasy screen for the (assumed) 
straight, male gaze. When she is fully revealed Cora stands framed by the doorway as if she were 
a painting. These shots are of note because of their departure from what is considered normal and 
‘natural’, that is, most medium shots in Hollywood focus on the waist up in order to emphasis the 
actor’s face (which in itself acts as a kind of marketing currency).  
 
79 The Postman Always Rings Twice, dir. by Tay Garnett (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1946). 
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Figure 1.6, The Postman Always Rings Twice (1946) 
However, the shots ultimately serve to highlight the weirdness of what is ‘normal’. Cora's 
introduction draws attention to itself and to Cora as sexual spectacle for Frank. The ideological 
argument made by the film’s cutting up of Cora’s spatial completeness is that Cora is not a whole 
person; because she cannot be seen, she cannot also be controlled. Conversely, for example, when 
we see a medium shot of someone from the waist up, we are not invited to speculate whether they 
have been horrifically mutilated from the waist down. We instead accept that this is simply the 
natural way in which Hollywood presents its actors. Only when something abnormal happens do 
we begin to question the unreality of Hollywood naturalism and the camera’s goal within it. 
[65] 
 
The goal for the Hollywood camera, then, is to disentangle itself from the image it 
produces, and to present the image as unmediated. Hollywood proposes its images as un-
ideological yet the overwhelming historical conditions (the end of the Great Depression, America’s 
entrance into the Second World War, the dropping of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, the Cold War and so forth) serve to charge any cultural production with political and 
ideological energy. In this way, Hollywood’s mode of production, particularly its use of the camera 
to construct space, and therefore ideology, follows Roland Barthes’ theorisation of myths. Myths, 
Barthes writes, have ‘the task of giving an historical intention a natural justification, and making 
contingency appear eternal’, and therefore they assert their own eternality, that it is simply the way 
things are.80 Hollywood’s narratives function as myths because they make ‘contingency’, in the 
form of narrative coincidence, ‘appear eternal.’ That is, the messages they relay, and the form they 
are presented in, are intended to be read as ‘eternal’. For example, if Hollywood is supposed to 
function via linear and logical narrative progression, then Stranger on the Third Floor’s ending 
presents an objection to such logic. The ‘historical intention’ of the Stranger’s death and the 
narrative resolution is given a ‘natural justification’; the Stranger’s death is presented as a natural 
and logical conclusion even though it is purely accidental.81 
The purpose of myth is to appear as an underlying societal narrative whose meaning is not 
subject to ‘historical intention’ or circumstance, but rather ‘eternal’ insofar as it tells a kind of 
grand truth. Culture is thus tautologically justified by its own myths. As Barthes argues, myth is 
‘not read as a motive, but as a reason.’82 Myth, for Barthes, is something (an object, a story, a 
person) which at one point had a historical (or subjective) contingency. This contingency is ignored 
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and forgotten by the myth which instead claims to be the product of ‘natural’ and ‘eternal’ 
processes. In this way, the Hollywood camera can be read as myth or myth maker. Although 
Hollywood attempts to present its films in a quasi-realistic manner, the effect can often expose 
such mechanisms of realism. Hollywood’s mythological operations serve to insist that their 
practices are merely representative of a certain reality. In Hollywood, and noir, history disappears 
and is replaced by myth. ‘Myth’, Barthes writes, ‘is constituted by the loss of the historical quality 
of things: in it, things lose the memory that they once were made.’83 It is history that dies in myth, 
and with it, all the elements that create the social world itself.  
This remains doubly true for film noir, which is often read as being realistic in comparison 
to the glamour of Hollywood cinema, film noir being the ‘nightmare’84 that accompanies 
Hollywood’s ‘dream factory’ and is, somehow, more realistic. For instance, early noir critics 
Raymond Borde and Étienne Chaumeton write in their 1955 essay ‘Towards a Definition of Film 
Noir’ that ‘as a general rule, the perspective of film noir is realistic and each scene in isolation 
could pass for an excerpt from a documentary.’85 Film noir is, I would argue, not realistic, nor 
could it be mistaken for being a documentary, at least by modern viewers. That which gives film 
noir a sense of reality is also that which undermines it. For instance, noir’s focus on the 
unconscious desires and drives of its characters leads to its characters becoming complex and 
difficult to understand through their actions and words alone, yet these unconscious desires are 
exaggerated for cinematic effect. Film noir’s mythic construction is thus also felt metatextually. 
Stranger on the Third Floor’s ending illustrates how noir’s construction is characterised by a 
traumatic instability which leaves behind excess. In fact, this excess is the only way in which we 
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can make sense of the film’s ending, and of noir’s construction. The ending also shows home to 
be similarly created. It is forgotten through the mythologization of the present in noir. 
History, too, is suspiciously absent from noir. References to the war are relatively 
infrequent and are rarely the subject of film noir. Even The Blue Dahlia (1946),86 which focuses 
on returning veterans, does not address the conditions of the war itself. The film begins as the war 
ends. Borde and Chaumeton’s proclamation that noir ‘could pass for an excerpt from a 
documentary’87 is therefore extremely dubious since documentaries are explicitly historicisations 
of certain past events. They ‘document’ the past. As Holt argues, film noir’s realism can be 
identified neither by its ‘sense of reality’ nor distorted reality, but rather as ‘conveyed by 
expressionist techniques and convoluted plotlines.’88 Holt continues to write that these techniques 
capture a ‘psychological realism, if nothing else, a sense of the world as it can be and often 
seems.’89 The exact definition of what the “senses of the world’ are is left glaringly ambiguous.  
More convincingly, Elizabeth Cowie argues that although noir distances itself from 
melodrama, a similar narrative logic underpins them both. ‘In film noir,’ she writes, ‘a narrative 
of an external enigma, a murder or a theft, replaces the melodrama’s plot of an external event of 
war, poverty or social circumstance.’90 Here, noir seems to exorcise history; it is, strangely, the 
price paid for realism. Moreover, if a documentary is factual insofar as it builds and presents 
evidence to construct an argument, then noir is therefore deemed by Borde and Chaumeton to 
follow the same logic. Cowie, on the other hand, highlights the similarities between noir and 
melodrama’s narrative logic. Both use fate and coincidence to propel their narratives. Fate and 
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coincidence produce the ‘characteristic under-motivation of events in melodrama,’ yet, this is also 
‘central’ to noir.91 Cowie considers the way in which popular culture imagines and understands 
the noir protagonist’s motivation as compulsion ‘by forces and passions beyond their reason.’92 
The difference between melodrama and noir, then, according to Cowie, is that the narrative 
obstacles, predominately for the heterosexual couple, in melodrama are ‘external forces of family 
and circumstances, wars or illness.’93 Contrastingly, in noir, the obstacles ‘derive from the 
characters’ psychology or even pathology as they encounter external events.’94 It is not that 
external events are not present, but that their significance is diluted in favour of the psychological 
turmoil the protagonist must undergo. 
Hollywood’s brand of realism, then, is highly questionable. Another obstacle faced by 
Hollywood on the road to realism is its aesthetic and narrative conventions. One such convention 
is the insistence on the formation of the couple. I use the phrase ‘formation of the couple’ to 
emphasise the mechanical way in which the Hollywood couple is produced, and indeed exists as 
a marketable product. One needs only to examine the posters and advertising which place the 
couple at the epicentre of the drama. For example, the trailer for Dark Passage (1947)95 emphasises 
the star power and marketability of Humphrey Bogart and Lauren Bacall and proclaims that they 
are ‘the stars who were meant for a kiss like this.’ Thus the implicit promise of the marketing for 
Dark Passage is that, despite the drama, Bogart and Bacall will successfully form a couple.96 
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Bogart and Bacall in their previous films, To Have and Have Not (1944)97 and The Big Sleep 
(1946).98 It is exactly the repeated insistence on the formation of the couple, in this case Bogart 
and Bacall, which is the advertising hook: come and see what you have already seen. There is a 
comfort, a homeliness even, in repeating certain narrative tropes. The production of a couple is not 
so much a natural phenomenon (which it wishes to be) but rather one that is actively manufactured 
to reinforce bourgeois values (patriarchal, heteronormative, capitalist, etc.); in short, these 
conventions, like the Hollywood camera and the Hollywood ending, function as myth.  
Initially, Stranger on the Third Floor’s ending appears to conform to Hollywood traditions 
of heteronormative conformity and the ‘safeness’ of space for the ‘family.’ Here, we can see why 
the contradistinction between noir and melodrama breaks. On one level, the film presents the 
obstacle to the formation of the heterosexual couple as being an external factor: The Stranger. 
However, the proper obstacles are psychological and are located within Michael. It is largely the 
case that characters in Hollywood cinema who exhibit non-traditional masculine or heterosexual 
traits are coded as homosexual and subsequently their homosexuality becomes a signifier for their 
evilness, deviancy, and general untrustworthiness. They are contrasted with the protagonist who 
possesses all the masculine traits they do not. One common trait among the majority of noir 
protagonists is desire for the main female figure in the film. The heterosexual protagonist desires 
the woman and is ultimately rewarded, whereas the coded homosexual (or asexual) character does 
not desire the woman and is punished. Men are encouraged to be attracted to ‘the right women’. 
Desiring a femme fatale usually ends in death for the male protagonist, for instance Walter Neff 
in Double Indemnity (1944) and Ole Anderson in The Killers (1946) The femme fatale is also 
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punished for having and acting on desires of her own (Phyllis Dietrichson and Kitty Collins 
respectively in the aforementioned films). The Stranger does not desire Jane, as opposed to 
Michael. Once his lack of interest in her is revealed, he is swiftly killed, whereupon Michael can 
marry Jane and they can become not just a married couple but the married couple, the cinematically 
sanctioned blueprint for what a ‘normal’ married couple looks like. A so-called ‘normal’ married 
couple should own, or wish to own, their own home. Stranger on the Third Floor’s narrative is 
fundamentally one which charts how a couple can get married and purchase a home through the 
normalisation and codification of heterosexual norms.  
The ‘family’ is additionally catered for at the end of Stranger on the Third Floor by way 
of the formation of the heterosexual couple. Michael and Jane’s unification is not only intended to 
signify narrative cohesion and resolution, but also to signal social cohesion. In Hollywood cinema 
more generally, the unification of the man and the woman is meant to represent social and personal 
cohesion and the happy heterosexual couple is supposed to be a blueprint for the continual 
functioning of American society. Narratively, this is accomplished by making women the object 
of male desire and thus engaging and promoting a phallocentric viewpoint. Janey Place argues, for 
instance, that in such a system ‘women are defined in relation to men’;99 they are wives, love 
interests, and ultimately objects to be used to support the male’s fantasy or adventure. The family 
can be understood in this context as a social mechanism which not only objectifies women but 
places them in a specific, homely context. Under capitalism, home and family are constituted as a 
patriarchal force. The assertion of men as labourers and providers of wealth and women as 
caregivers necessitates that the family unit be constructed in this way. As Sylvia Harvey writes, it 
is ‘the representation of the institution of the family, which in so many films serves as the 
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mechanism whereby desire is fulfilled.’100 Family is thus the safest place to experience desire. The 
internal hierarchical structure of families (father, mother, and child) offers us, Harvey writes, ‘a 
legitimating model…for a hierarchical or authoritarian society’101, a mirror image of the relations 
between social classes. The father acts as the head of family/society, exerting authoritarian control, 
the mother is subservient to his wishes and thus maintains a semblance of domestic equilibrium 
and the child is dependent on its parents. Stranger on the Third Floor adopts this phallocentric 
position: Michael’s successful quest to prove himself innocent ultimately results in his being able 
to marry Jane and establish himself as head of the family and Jane as care-giver, thereby providing 
a social blueprint for the rest of society. This is predicated on the assumption that the ending of 
the film leaves no trace of doubt. This is not the case because of the ways in which the 
incompleteness of the film’s ending precludes any notion of narrative closure. Its relationship with 
signification and with fantasy collide to question the conclusions that the ending draws. 
Throughout the film there is also evidence of the (perhaps ironic) strangeness of Michael and 
Jane’s relationship and how it differs from what Hollywood expects as the norm. 
In this chapter, although I have begun by outlining the definitional complexities of film 
noir, I have approached the problem by arguing that its instability should be reckoned with, rather 
than simply acknowledged. It is precisely in the relationship between film noir’s critical 
retroactivity and formal retroactivity that we can begin to understand noir’s affect, and therefore 
its nostalgic construction of home. Film noir was only identified decades after the informal ‘end’ 
of the period, as evidenced with the work of critics such as Paul Schrader. In this sense, noir is 
critically retroactive. Its formal retroactivity stems from noir’s temporal inversion of narrative 
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structure,102 the way in which time is experienced non-linearly, and the way in which knowledge 
is only produced and understood ex post facto. This approach is not without its issues since it risks 
overidentifying noir with its criticism; the point is that the line between criticism and text is not so 
clear. Considering this, I took Boris Ingster’s Stranger on the Third Floor as a case study. I took 
the film to be the ‘first film noir’ in an ironic sense and used it to illuminate how noir (and our 
reception of it) functions with respect to retroactivity and home. I illustrated how the muddied 
distinction between criticism and text allows us to read Stranger on the Third Floor as, in a sense, 
a text which speaks about noir as much as it represents noir. This is important in how it shows that 
the connections drawn between film noirs are not only comparative but in dialogue with each other. 
It is one thing to say that Stranger on the Third Floor is like, say, Out of the Past, but entirely 
another to suggest that they both inform each other. It is easier to identify the noir elements of Out 
of the Past, or to see how their edges are sharpened, through Stranger on the Third Floor. Likewise, 
there are elements in Stranger on the Third Floor which are illuminated by Out of the Past. For 
example, the position that the Stranger takes up in the film is similar to the spectre of Jeff’s criminal 
past. Jeff’s past is understood as traumatic, as dream-like. As I do, I read the Stranger in a similar 
way: he is not just the antagonist of the film, he is a manifestation of Michael’s innermost desires, 
the desire he dare not (and the film dare not) admit to himself. In addition, I argued that the film 
represents the point-de-caption, and how it can not only shed light on later noirs, but that, 
paradoxically, later noirs have an influence on how we under the film. In the next chapter, I will 
build on these arguments and focus more on the ways in which noir’s relation to vision (and 
blindness) impact on its retroactive, nostalgic construction of home, as well as the more 
fundamental question of how noir constructs and organises knowledge. 
 




The Metaphor of Blindness 
The world is all-seeing, but it is not exhibitionistic — it does not provoke our gaze. When it 
begins to provoke it, the feeling of strangeness begins too. 
Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis.1 
Figure 2.1, Stranger on the Third Floor (1940) 
 
1 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamentals of Psychoanalysis, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. by Alan Sheridan 
(London: Vintage, 1998), p. 75. 
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 ‘Wait ‘til you see it…’ — The spectre of home and formation of the couple 
This chapter examines how the notion of blindness is integral to understanding the production of 
meaning in film noir. In noir, visions and seeing do not correlate with either producing or 
understanding knowledge. As in the previous chapter, I will focus here on Stranger on the Third 
Floor and examine the way in which the pursuit of home is predicated on blindness. Home offers 
a cure for vision, at the same time as obscuring the home from us. Connected to home, too, is the 
expectation of the formation of the couple. Their formation supposedly signals the release of 
narrative tension through the acquisition of a home. This chapter will consider, in this context, 
how knowledge is produced in the film, and thus noir in general. Although the gaze of the camera 
is aligned with Michael, the masculine figure in the film, it is through Jane’s affective gaze that 
the investigation reaches a conclusion. She can see things which Michael cannot. I then move on 
to discuss the political implications of noir’s blindness: how the film’s structural staging of private 
fantasy and public politics foregrounds a rupturing of the boundaries between the two. 
Michael, Jane, and Briggs all continue as if nothing — that is, that Michael was eager to 
wrongfully accuse Briggs of murder — had happened. According to Jane, Briggs' voice would be 
with her forever, yet this is not the case. This final scene could be mistaken for the first. In the 
opening scene, Michael gleefully describes his ‘dream home’: ‘wait ‘til you see it’, he tells Jane, 
‘black stove, fridge, everything…A table…A real table on four legs, so that two people can really 
see each other.’2 The diner’s lack of homeliness is contrasted to the ideal of home. Whilst the urban 
diner is busy, the home is private. Whilst Michael and Jane sit adjacent to each other and can only 
see each other by looking in a mirror and thus seeing a mirror image of each other, home offers a 
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chance for ‘two people to really see each other.’3 Additionally, the mirror acts as another barrier 
to vision. When Michael tries to look at Jane, he still sees himself. There is a doubling inherent to 
his vision, already foreshadowing the Stranger’s intrusion. The central conundrum is in fact not 
the acquisition of a home, but a failure of vision: Michael admits he did not see Briggs murder 
Nick, but nonetheless insists otherwise. Michael's arrest also relies on the fact that nobody believes 
that he saw the Stranger.  





The final scene attempts to realise Michael’s dream of a home by providing him with what 
he desires: the house with Jane in it. Yet there is a final irony to Michael’s realised dream. The 
foreshadowed dream is not only a home and a wife, but more accurately a setting in which vision 
is unobscured, a chance to really see. Michael wants a table where he and Jane can ‘really see each 
other’.4 The ending gives us verbal confirmation that Michael and Jane have purchased their new 
home but never shows the home; it obscures it from our view. The film ends at the precise moment 
when we, and Michael and Jane, should be rewarded and finally see the house which Michael so 
desired. Encoded within Michael remark, ‘wait ‘til you see [the home],’ is a delay of desire. 
Michael knows what he and Jane want, what the film wants, but they must wait to attain it, to see 
it. In this respect, desire is constituted by waiting, by delay. Here, Stranger on the Third Floor 
reverses the scopophilic logic of Hollywood. Instead of rewarding our look, as Maltby claims, the 
film actively denies us what we want to see. The home is spectral in the sense that, by all accounts, 
it must exist, but does not. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that the film does not show us Michael 
and Jane’s home because it cannot, because the home, the object of desire, does not exist. On a 
formal level, then, the home itself is blindness; not only an obscured or imaginary object, but the 
very mechanism which drives blindness. This is because of how Michael’s failure to see Jane in 
an emotional sense, as evidenced by his total failure to comprehend her response to the guilty 
verdict. There is a failure, a blindness, within vision. 
The formation of the couple is the primary mechanism by which the film attempts to signify 
a complete ending. Nevertheless, even this is atypical with regard to Hollywood cinema. Instead 
of being disparate and separate, the couple is already formed at the beginning of the film. If they 
are already formed it suggests, in Hollywood’s own terms, that the world is already cohesive, and 
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that therefore, the Stranger acts as a destabilising force on an otherwise stable world. This, 
however, is not the case at the beginning of the film. Although Michael and Jane are romantically 
involved, they lack the supposedly crucial legal adhesive to bind them together: marriage. The 
formation of the couple, which is typically signified in Hollywood cinema through a final 
triumphant kiss or romantic embrace, is here instead reframed as a legal procedure which relies on 
the acquisition of a home. Marriage here becomes managerial and inevitable, where it is usually 
portrayed as exciting and vibrant. Just as their relationship is not recognised in legal terms, neither 
is it recognised by Hollywood’s standards because the couple has not been through the rigours of 
the Hollywood narrative. Being subjected to such an ordeal entails passage through several 
ideological strictures. Consequently, their impending marriage reveals the gendered expectations 
and fissures between them. Before the resolution of the narrative they are unable to marry because 
neither of them earns enough to live together in their own home. However, it is Michael, the 
successful journalist, who appears to have the better chance of doing so. Success for Michael is 
securing a promotion (and to do so he must apprehend the Stranger) whereas success for Jane is 
purely getting married to Michael. The Stranger, if he is understood as a personification of 
Michael’s murderous desires, must be confronted and exorcised by Michael. Yet in the end the 
murderous excess of the Stranger lingers. 
Michael sees Jane purely in relation to him. Owning a home means also, as he puts it, 
‘owning’ a wife who will cook him eggs. Jane’s primary role, at least in the way Michael portrays 
her, emphasises her spectral motherhood. Once they acquire their home, then Jane can become a 
mother to Michael. This, of course, disregards the fact that Jane currently has a job and provides 
for herself. Her supposed dependency on Michael is his fantasy. Michael is anxious to move in 
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and eat his eggs whereas Jane remarks that she can ‘wait for marriage’.5 Michael’s anxiety, and all 
the events that transpire because of it, to domesticate Jane can be read in the context of the increase 
in the number of women entering the labour market during the 1940s and thus becoming able to 
define themselves not in relation to men. It is crucial that Jane assumes control over Michael’s 
labour after his incarceration. After Jane takes over the investigation, it is resolved relatively 
quickly, albeit in inauspicious circumstances. Michael’s desire for home and for a family ignores 
Jane’s economic, personal, and investigative agency, instead choosing to focus on her as a 
domestic object. A desire for family, and for home, is thus a desire to domesticate women and to 
return them home. It is a repressive process that attempts to reinstate a firmer social hierarchy. 
Family, Sylvia Harvey writes, ‘has served to legitimate and naturalise these values’ of patriarchy 
and gendered hierarchy.6 This is because, she argues, ‘the value of women on the market of social 
exchange has been to a large extent determined by the position of women within the structure of 
the family.’7 Women are exchanged as commodities on the marketplace. This can be seen in 
Michael’s vision of home. Included in the family home, a part of the American dream, is a wife: 
the home, the commodity, is incomplete without a woman to accompany it. Jane, therefore, is 
reduced to the level of a commodity. Michael’s imagined home is only desirable in its relation to 
Jane’s position within it. Within this context, this insistence on having a home where they can 
‘really see’ each other begins to suggest a sinister overtone: that of a prison.8 The home is desirable 
insofar as it allows Michael to keep his eye on Jane, and therefore to contain and fix her within his 
gaze. Yet, the film — and film noir — destabilises the notion of seeing and knowing.  Family and 
home are closely linked by the ideological insistence on their adherence. If a woman/mother leaves 
 
5 Stranger on the Third Floor (1940). 
6 Harvey, ‘Woman’s Place: The Absent Family of Film Noir,’ p. 36. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Stranger on the Third Floor (1940). 
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home to work then she is said to be neglecting her domestic duties, whereas the same imperative 
is not applied to men. The home could be considered an embodiment of patriarchal authority: a 
confinement within literal walls, with no possibility of escape. 
 
The Deafness of the Male Gaze 
The formation of the couple and the construction of home, therefore, imply one another. When a 
couple is formed— as is the case with Stranger on the Third Floor — it implies that through their 
successful formation, a familial home is constructed. However, the fact that this is merely an 
implication allows us to ask from which perspective is the causal relationship between couple and 
home formed? Invariably, film noir is told from a masculine perspective.9 In this way, then, the 
perception of women and their supposed roles are constructed from the male gaze. In terms of 
early attempts to categorise the types of female characters and the way in which they relate to the 
central male characters’ perspectives, Janey Place identifies two main types of female characters 
in noir: the ‘spider’10 and the ‘nurturing’ woman.11 For Place, the spider woman is ‘explicitly 
sexual’ and is the woman who controls the man’s sexuality through wielding ‘“unnatural” phallic 
power.’12 The ‘spider woman’ is both narratively and visually active, often dominating the mise-
en-scène: ‘they control camera movement, seeming to direct the camera (and the hero’s gaze, with 
our own) irresistibly with them as they move.’13 Place’s assertion seemingly contradicts Maltby’s 
account of how the Hollywood camera operates. Maltby suggests that the Hollywood camera 
 
9 There are, of course, exceptions: Mildred Pierce in Mildred Pierce tells her story to a couple of detectives, and 
Celia Lamphere in The Secret Beyond the Door. 
10 Some examples that Harvey provides are Norma Desmond in Sunset Boulevard, Phyllis Dietrichson in Double 
Indemnity (1944), and Gilda in Gilda (1946). 
11 A quintessential example is Ann in Out of the Past (1946). 
12 Place, ‘Women in Film Noir’, p. 54. 
13 Ibid, p. 56. 
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possesses an objective gaze, or that we are to view the Hollywood camera as such. That is, it is not 
affected by anybody’s subjectivity, but exists independently of the action. Conversely, Place’s 
argument proposes that the introduction of the ‘spider woman’ — perhaps more commonly known 
as a femme fatale — signals her manipulation of the camera by imbuing it with her own 
subjectivity. In noir, the motivation for the camera’s placement and movement is a key factor in 
its visual ambiguity. The precise nature of the relationship between the male gaze and the femme 
fatale will be explored in more detail in Chapter Six, but for now, Place’s assertion holds a great 
deal of truth. 
The camera, far from being objective, is primarily motivated by male desire. This does not 
mean, however, that the possessor of this male gaze — in this case, Michael — is responsible for 
the motivation of the camera. In fact, it is more the case that the desire inherent in the male gaze 
is controlled by external forces — typically the femme fatale — which reveals the externality of 
desire itself. The male figures are rarely in possession or control of their desires. Michael 
comprehends neither what he wants, nor why he wants it, yet is compelled to follow the desires 
regardless. The Stranger is, as I shall argue, understood as being beyond desire insofar as he 
assumes and carries out Michael’s desires while at the same time remaining inscrutable. Briggs’ 
desires are dismissed as a base, working class libido. 
For some noir critics, such as Frank Krutnik, a common reading of the femme fatale, or 
‘spider woman’ as Place calls them, is that they are a response to male agitation towards women 
demanding more social and political power.14 Under these conditions, women in Hollywood were 
presented as figures who appropriate male desire, or as taking something vital from men. As 
 
14 Krutnik, In a Lonely Street, p. 75. 
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Michael Renov notes, in a wartime context the ‘internal memoranda of government agencies show 
that the female work force was being termed excess labour.’15 There was an effort to limit the 
capabilities of women — the latent surplus population — particularly with regard to the workforce. 
Although Renov is discussing 1944 and the impending victory of the Allied Forces in the Second 
World War, his observations can be traced back through depictions of women in cinema. The 
feeling heightened around 1944, as Sylvia Harvey argues, because ‘the ideology of national unity 
which was characteristic of the war period, and which tended to gloss over and conceal class 
divisions, began to falter and decay, to lose its credibility once the war was over’.16 In Jane, we 
perceive a contrast in the portrayal of women’s movement into the workforce. Whereas the films 
which Renov and Harvey identify (Murder My Sweet (1944) and Double Indemnity (1944)) present 
their women as volatile and dangerous, Jane is more explicitly a virtuous heroine. She takes over 
from Michael in investigating the Stranger but is not overtly punished for it. This is because after 
she has assumed the masculine role of Michael she duly retreats, or is coerced into retreating, back 
into the role of a feminine housewife. At the same time, though, Jane is not overtly sexualised, nor 
does she use her sexuality to control the camera. Although Stranger on the Third Floor was 
released in 1940, before America's entry into the Second World War, many of the anxieties 
surrounding women in the workplace were already becoming apparent. 
Place’s ‘spider woman’ further upsets this masculine logic as women’s knowledge does 
not come from the objective camera. Feminine knowledge is always other to the masculine 
experience in noir; there is an extrasensory, almost supernatural dimension to the way in which 
women in noir accumulate their knowledge. For example, Jane, instead of helping Michael regain 
 
15 Michael Renov, Hollywood’s Wartime Women: Representation and Ideology (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 
1988), p. 47. 
16 Harvey, ‘The Absent Family of Film Noir’, p. 25. 
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or reassert his masculinity, contradicts and undermines his masculinity and confidence. After the 
prosecution of Briggs, a prosecution which occurred solely due to Michael’s masculine, and 
supposedly objective viewpoint, Jane says Briggs will ‘be with us for the rest of our lives, I'll 
always hear his voice.’17 Jane’s protestations are initially dismissed as feminine hysterics, not 
belonging in Michael’s ‘sane’ masculine world, of journalism, and the legal system; yet as the 
narrative unfolds it becomes clear that Jane is correct in her distrust of the verdict, Michael’s 
testimony, and the masculine (and cinematic) logic upon which they rest. Although the narrative 
is neatly resolved, it fails to answer the question of where Jane’s knowledge originates. There is 
not simply an aesthetic logic that Jane defies, but rather a social and legal logic. She does not just 
question the logic of Hollywood cinema and its insistence on masculine and patriarchal supremacy; 
she questions the entire masculine basis of the legal system itself. Jane, paradoxically, sees that 
which cannot be seen. 
Exactly what inspires Jane’s reaction is Briggs’ terrified voice in the courtroom. In his 
book, The Voice in Cinema, Michel Chion outlines the significance of the scream in cinema. 
Firstly, Chion identifies something which he calls ‘the screaming point’, that is, a point which 
films are essentially structured around.18 The ‘screaming point’ is not simply a scream in a vocal 
sense, but rather a more general explosion of tension. As Chion indicates, the screaming point can 
just as easily be an absence of a scream as a scream itself. The placement of the screaming point 
is key for Chion. It must ‘explode at a precise moment, at the crossroads of converging plot lines, 
at the end of an often-convoluted trajectory, but calculated to give this point a maximum impact.’19 
 
17 Stranger on the Third Floor (1940). 
18 Michel Chion, The Voice in Cinema, ed., and trans., by Claudia Gorbman, (New York: Colombia University Press. 




This seems to imply that the screaming point must arrive towards the end of the film, which is not 
the case. An example cited by Chion is Jo’s scream at the orchestra in Hitchcock’s The Man Who 
Knew Too Much (1956), however the screaming point in Stranger on the Third Floor, Briggs’ 
scream, is at the beginning.20 Briggs’ scream is, here, just like David Kentley’s opening scream in 
Rope (1948), another Hitchcock film. It acts as the catalyst for Jane’s feminine, and therefore 
Othered, knowledge. Briggs’ scream can be said to express something otherwise inexpressible.  
Figure 2.3, Stranger on the Third Floor (1940) 
 
20 The Man Who Knew Too Much, dir. by Alfred Hitchcock, (Paramount Pictures, 1956). 
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Chion argues that ‘the screaming point is a point of the unthinkable inside the thought…of 
unrepresentability inside representation.’21 The scream draws attention to itself, as well as denoting 
that to signify something. For Chion, the scream demands to be understood. Although it brings 
together converging affectations and plot lines, its demand for comprehension only highlights the 
unthinkable nature of the scream. For Chion, the screaming point is ultimately feminine. Briggs’ 
scream is feminised insofar as it is not a shout of power, of dominance, one that marks a territory, 
a ‘structuring shout’, but instead ‘the shout of a human subject of language in the face of death’.22 
Chion writes: ‘The man's shout delimits territory, the woman's scream has to do with 
limitlessness’.23 In Briggs’ scream Jane appears to discover something, the truth, and sees 
something which Michael cannot. Jane’s knowledge is left unexplained, mostly ascribed to 
intuition, but the point from which it originates, Briggs’ scream, remains an enigma. There is 
something supernatural embedded within Briggs’ scream which, by its very unrepresentability, 
uncovers some truth which was previously unavailable to the bureaucratic and reasonable 
discourse of the court. The truth is that there is something which Michael’s language dare not 
speak: his unconscious desire to kill Meng as well as for Briggs to be a murderer so that he, 
Michael, can be promoted and move into a home with Jane. His unconscious is unable to express 
itself in the same way in which conscious thoughts can be articulated, hence they require some 
non-linguistic or perhaps even, extra-linguistic trigger to reveal that truth. He cannot articulate his 
desires because Briggs’ scream frames and controls Michael’s desires and gaze. 
From this point onwards, then, Jane has access to some knowledge which Michael is 
structurally incapable of receiving. Immediately after Briggs’s sentencing, Jane protests at and 
 
21 Chion, The Voice in Cinema, p. 77. 




questions Michael’s masculine knowledge. The lighting behind them is reminiscent of the bars 
behind which Briggs was dragged, as well as the shadowy bars that reappear in Michael’s guilty 
dream. Jane’s protestations change the surroundings. Jane successfully resolves the case in 
comparison to Michael’s miserable failure. She had solved the case before Michael, and she does 
so without having vivid guilty nightmares. Indeed, after Michael is arrested on suspicion of 
murdering Meng, it is left to Jane to finish much of the detective works in order to clear Michael’s 
name. In doing so, her task is doubled in that she is not only seeking to clear Michael’s name, but 
Briggs’s too. Jane is enveloped in the masculine world of the detective genre and profession by 
the sheer ineptitude of the men. Michael utterly panics after his dream, threatens to leave town and 
then unwittingly hands himself in; the police only offer to go to the District Attorney on the 
condition that they can get him ‘out of bed’.24 The unfortunate reward for Jane’s labour undertaken 
on Michael’s incarcerated behalf is to be removed from the workplace so that Michael can take 
over the duty of labour. The gendered roles of Hollywood and American culture at large are here 
reversed: Jane is the active subject, and Michael becomes passive and subservient to Jane’s 
investigative expertise after his own powers of sight have been nullified. This puts Michael in a 
similar position to Briggs, who was powerless during Michael’s testimony against him. 
 
Public Politics & Private Fantasy 
Michael and Jane nonetheless rely upon the legal procedure of marriage to legitimise their 
relationship. The court is established to be part of the ‘masculine order’ of the world, that is, one 
which assumes its point of view is truth itself and that its words always have clarity of meaning. 
 
24 Stranger on the Third Floor (1940). 
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The masculine system closes itself off and as such it is unable to comprehend the significance of 
the Stranger and thus, the fallibility of its position. Yet through Briggs’ scream, the Stranger’s 
resistance and indeed Jane’s scream after the Stranger’s death, this masculine system is questioned. 
There is an overlap between how the state, or the law, legitimises marriage and how the state 
wrongly incarcerates the innocent Briggs. Inadvertently, Michael and Jane become embroiled in a 
quest to rectify the ineffective judicial system and the state, so that the latter can properly 
acknowledge their marriage. They are not only attempting to clear Michael’s name and catch the 
real culprit but trying to reassert the symbolic truth of the courts.  
For Michael, his dream, his private fantasy, can no longer be considered as such. Instead 
it, too, becomes part of the world it mimics or reflects. In fantasy, symbols are more real than the 
objects they signify. So although the Stranger himself may be superficially read as an 
indiscriminate murderer, a mental hospital escapee, in the context of Michael’s dream and blurring 
of the boundaries between private and political, the Stranger should instead be regarded as an 
instance of the enemy within. Jonathan Auerbach writes about how the film identifies a crossover 
between ‘public politics and private fantasy’ in the wake of wartime — and impending wartime 
— paranoia.25  Politics is nominally considered to be a public activity, conducted by politicians or 
by people in the public sphere. Home, by contrast, attempts to protect the family unit from politics, 
though one might equally consider how home fosters and kindles ideology and politics as opposed 
to nullifying their effect. As Sally Bayley states, home is a ‘lived manifesto of the everyday.’26 For 
Michael, this crossover of the public and private forms the core of his dramatic troubles. Michael 
and Jane’s potential marriage is predicated upon Michael receiving a raise as a journalist so that 
 
25 Auerbach, ‘Gestapo in America’, p. 28. 
26 Sally Bayley, Home on the Horizon: America’s Search for Space, From Emily Dickinson to Bob Dylan (Oxford: 
Peter Land Ltd, 2010), p. 2. 
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they can afford a house together. Michael’s raise is additionally reliant on his witnessing of 
Briggs’s murder of Nick: ‘no story, no raise, we wouldn't be getting married’.27 The personal, 
political, and professional spheres are intertwined. If Briggs is convicted it will be because of 
Michael’s expert testimony and will thus allow Michael to write a significant piece in the 
newspaper. In addition to the legal sphere becoming compromised by Michael’s agenda, his 
professional vocation — journalism — is called into question. In relation to wartime paranoia, this 
web of interwoven biases is troubling because it redraws the boundaries of journalism and 
surveillance. Legal matters, such as Briggs’ conviction, should be predicated upon objective fact, 
yet the case is resolved because of Michael’s active desire for Briggs to be found guilty. Further, 
Michael’s private dream, his fantasy, is later presented as evidence against his (and Briggs’) 
innocence. Whereas once they may have been thought of as distinct and separate, dreams now 
seemingly combine to satisfy reality. 
Michael and Jane’s relationship is structured around the fantasy of home. At the beginning 
of the film Michael lives alone in a flat with merely a picture of Jane on his dresser because his 
landlady (and the spying Meng) do not allow women in the flat with him. The compactness of 
Michael’s apartment and the prevalence of Meng’s spying raise a number of issues. Firstly, the 
depiction of the compactness of Michael’s apartment demonstrates the potential incompatibility 
between inner city living and the American ideal of domesticity insofar as it suggests that Meng’s 
spying is produced by the compactness. The idea of the American home is intimately tied to 
notions of space and spatial expansion. Open space can be understood as something that must be 
parcelled up into private property. ShaunAnne Tangney writes that ‘open space breeds an 
American character who works hard, plays fair, and achieves much so that s/he can then claim a 
 
27 Stranger on the Third Floor (1940). 
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large amount of open space in which to build a house, a home, that describes his/her character.’28 
The home is thus not only an expression of one’s character or one’s identity, but also a 
representation of one’s work ethic and adherence to American values; it is a crystallisation and 
affirmation of those cultural values. Stranger on the Third Floor is about the condition of living in 
the city during a time when spying on your neighbour was encouraged as a patriotic act. It is also 
about living in a city of immigrants and the myth of a white Anglo-Saxon America. Jane talks to 
many immigrants living and working in the city in her search for the Stranger. The Stranger is not 
the only character who is coded as foreign. Meng, as Auerbach notes, ‘functions as an assimilated 
combination of two Axis enemies (Germany and Japan).’29 First, his accent is a slight caricature 
of a German speaking English, and second, his appearance, with his thin moustache and name, 
resembles Ming the Merciless. 
Throughout the film, Michael sees Meng predominantly as a castrating figure. Meng 
continually interrupts Michael’s privacy, both in terms of his professional career and his sexual 
desires. The first instance of Meng interrupting Michael takes place when he complains about 
Michael typing too loudly on his typewriter and therefore impinging on the freedom of the press. 
Alternatively, this could be read in a meta-cinematic way as representing the Hollywood 
screenwriter. Meng’s intrusion can therefore be read as representing the Hollywood restrictions, 
specifically the Motion Picture Production code, or Hays code, which came into effect in 1930. 
The surveillance extends its reach to Hollywood screenwriters who work in their own home. Later, 
Meng disrupts a potential sexual encounter between Michael and Jane, which Michael recalls as 
 
28 ShaunAnne Tangey, ‘The Dream Abides: The Big Lebowski, Film Noir, and the American Dream’, Rocky Mountain 
Review, Vol. 66, No. 2 (Fall 2012), p. 183. 
29 Auerbach, ‘Gestapo in America’, p. 45. 
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‘the night in the rain.’30 Both infringements are of Michael’s position as a member of the press and 
as a private citizen and fiancée to Jane. Meng’s spying, then, is not merely limited to the private, 
whereby the private becomes communal, but is extended to the professional and public spheres.  
Figure 2.4, Stranger on the Third Floor (1940) 
Meng is thus both personally castrating toward Michael, as he interrupts sexual intercourse 
with Jane, and professionally castrating because he stops Michael doing his job. For Michael, 
crucially, it is the same panoptic force which prevents him from attaining his sexual desire and 
which similarly prevents him from performing his job adequately. Moreover, the central root of 
 
30 Stranger on the Third Floor (1940). 
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Michael’s problems with regard to Briggs is that a successful resolution of his professional worries 
will lead to a resolution of his sexual frustrations surrounding Jane, who, it must be noted, is 
reluctant to return Michael’s sexual advances. When they are in his apartment she continually 
defers sexual contact in favour of small talk. Michael’s frustrations cannot solely be attributed to 
Meng’s intrusions, but rather a fault in himself because he does not understand why Jane does not 
reciprocate his sexual desire.  
Michael’s conception of Meng as the singular blockade of his desire shows us the extent 
to which Meng is a projection of Michael’s own frustrated desire. The Stranger, in this context, is 
an externalisation of Michael’s desire to kill Meng, and thus fulfil his sexual desire. Aside from 
the film’s Orientalism and othering of Meng, there is an additional relation he bears towards 
Michael. Rather than being just an Other, Meng is a projection of Michael in the future if he does 
not marry Jane, an ominous future to avoid. Michael would live alone in a state of permanent 
infancy, purchasing and drinking milk before he goes to sleep, always under the rule of a mother-
figure landlady, abstaining from sexual intercourse and desire and withdrawing his position in 
civic life as a journalist. In this form, Meng is a manifestation of the ideology of surveillance, 
stripped of all other properties that Hollywood deems necessary for civic life. Much like L. B. 
Jefferies in Hitchcock’s Rear Window (1954), all Meng can do is conduct neighbourly 
surveillance. There is a disavowal of public political duty because politics becomes an activity 
which can (and is encouraged to be) carried out privately within the context of one’s home. Indeed, 
because of our assumed identification with Michael, it is the future which is prophesied for us all 
unless we obey the laws of the Hollywood narrative and experience its ending. That is, if we are 
not explicitly part of a successful heterosexual couple, then our fates are an infantilised Meng, a 
murderous Stranger, or a destitute Briggs. 
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Michael’s Brooklyn apartment appears to be the antithesis to Frontierism: instead of 
expanding outward, the city space collapses in on itself. Rather than being spaces of expanse and 
expression, apartments are confined and repressive places. Michael’s apartment is also rather 
disorderly, and such messiness may go some way in explaining why Michael has his paranoid 
flashbacks and nightmares at his apartment: ‘A cluttered living space will clutter the mind, and 
with it, the ability to maintain a proportionate sense of reality.’31 Despite the ever-increasing 
proximity created by inner city living, people often become more alienated from each other. There 
is a loss of community and, subsequently a loss of self as people become alienated from each other. 
Michael decries Meng’s invasion of privacy as immoral, but it seems more the case that voyeurism 
is a truism of living in New York apartments. Just as Meng is a constant surveying presence for 
Michael, Michael also unconsciously spies on Meng by unwittingly hearing his snoring. 
 
31 Bayley, Homes on the Horizon, p. 43. 
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Figure 2.5, Stranger on the Third Floor (1940) 
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Figure 2.6, Stranger on the Third Floor (1940) 
We commit the same act on Michael during the opening credits as we watch his silhouetted 
figure smoke a cigarette, write using his typewriter, and talk on the phone (Figures 2.5 and 2.6). 
Like Meng, we do not know what we are looking at or for, but nevertheless view him with 
suspicion. We are seeing Michael without context, without knowing anything about him. 
Confusingly, imposed over his smoking silhouette, the title card appears and seemingly suggests 
that Michael is the ‘Stranger on the Third Floor’. Such a description seems appropriate because of 
how disconnected Michael is from the people with whom he shares his apartment, namely Meng 
and his landlady. Indeed, of the residents on the eponymous third floor, Michael is the stranger, 
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the one who does not quite fit. As the revelations about Michael’s attitude to Meng in his dream 
reveal, Michael is also a stranger to himself, unable to exert control — or even be aware — of his 
internal desires. The paranoia surrounding the enemy within is therefore criticised: the enemy 
within is not ‘out there’ participating in public life, not a part of politics, but within oneself. One 
ideological message from ‘the enemy within’ is the suggestion that it could be anyone, but the 
question the film asks is: could it in fact be you, who does not realise who the enemy is? Moreover, 
the name of the film’s screenwriter, Frank Partos, is overlaid when we see Michael typing at his 
typewriter, which is suggestive of the meta-cinematic dimension to Meng stopping Michael from 
typing: it implies that Michael is the screenwriter of the film , or that we are watching Frank Partos. 
Stranger on the Third Floor marks a turning point in the conception of home in American 
culture insofar as the home becomes a place of suspicion and paranoia.32 While it may be tempting 
to attribute this phenomenon to the post war and the Cold War era, Auerbach contends that the 
epoch of suspicion begins in 1939. During this period, home becomes the ‘chief site of cultural 
anxiety.’33 Auerbach writes that ‘Franklin D. Roosevelt's declaration of emergency in September 
1939 marks the start of Cold War, understood as a state of exception and exceptionalism pre-
occupied with national security that, some would argue, is still in effect today.’34 Although one 
might expect such a discussion on the enforcement of political beliefs by the state to be centred 
around McCarthyism in the fifties, we can see how Stranger on the Third Flood sets a precedent 
(and is retroactively determined by the ‘Red Scare’) in the way in which it blends fantasy and 
reality, conflating what people really desire and what actually transpires. 
 
32 Auerbach, ‘Gestapo in America’, p. 35. 
33 Bayley, Homes on the Horizon, p. 9. 
34 Auerbach, ‘Gestapo in America’, p. 35. 
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Auerbach examines how the establishment of the Special Committee on Un-American 
Activities in 1934 helped contribute to feelings of paranoia and ideas of the enemy within. The 
blurring of the line ‘between thought and action’ that characterises most of the paranoid period is 
central as Michael questions whether they can convict him on ‘just talk’.35 Such probing questions 
have real world relevance because of the Smith Act which ‘worked to blur the line between words 
and deeds.’36 Briefly, the Smith Act, or Alien Registration Act of 1940, made it a criminal offence 
to ‘wilfully’ advocate the ‘overthrowing or destroying of the government of the United States’.37 
To accomplish such a task it became sufficient for one to ‘just talk’ to arouse suspicion and 
therefore risk arrest. Thought and actions begin to function similarly. Michael is worried that he 
will be convicted by talking. What Auerbach misses is that it is not merely Michael’s remarks 
(originally understood to be flippant, and therefore ‘just talk’) about his desire to murder Meng 
that lead to his arrest but moreover his wilful and deliberate silence when faced with Meng’s 
murder. It is precisely the addition of Michael’s initial hesitation to his incriminating talk which 
marks him as guilty.  
Auerbach’s political and social argument is that innocent people were unduly arrested 
because of the Smith Act. While true, such a simple comparison does not fit with the film because 
the implication made throughout the film, and in Auerbach’s own piece, is that Michael is guilty, 
if not on a legal and social level then on a psychological one. It is, after all, Michael who justifies 
this, saying it would be a ‘real pleasure to cut [Meng’s] throat by claiming it was simply “just 
talk”’.38 Michael’s graphic imagery and specificity reveals his speech to be more than ‘just talk’ 
 
35 Ibid. 
36 Auerbach, ‘Gestapo in America’, p. 46 
37 Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School, <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2385> [Accessed 
25/11/2017]. 
38 Auerbach, ‘Gestapo in America’, p. 46 
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and in fact something more sinister: cutting Meng’s throat is an act that, besides killing him, serves 
to violently deny his speech. Michael does not simply want to kill Meng but eliminate him in such 
a way as to ensure that Meng cannot speak. Such a symbolically precise action thus elevates 
Michael’s declaration from being ‘just talk’.39 The twin poles of thought and action can be 
additionally read in another way: as something that is verifiable either internally or externally. 
Both journalism and the legal system rely on Michael’s accuracy in his reportage as well as his 
ability to remove his own interests from his interpretation of what he saw. Supposedly, the case 
rests on what Michael saw. His testimony is the crucial piece of evidence in convicting Briggs. 
However, it is later revealed that Briggs’ conviction relies upon precisely what Michael did not or 
was unable to see. Michael did not actually see the crime take place; instead, the damning evidence 
is produced from Michael’s words, his verbal and imaginative capacity, as opposed to what he 
saw. Michael defends his position as key witness when he says that ‘it’s not my word against his, 
but it's what I saw with my own eyes.’40 We do not share Michael’s absolute belief in his vision 
because we have not seen what he has supposedly seen — we, like the court, must take his word 
for it. In Hollywood’s cinematic language, the visual never lies, predominately because it is 
captured by the all-seeing, omnipotent camera. The central discrepancy which upsets the idea of 
an all-seeing camera is between visuals and language. Language is never a completed project and 
its relationship to reality is sometimes tenuous.  
 
39 Ibid. 




‘Some Mysterious Force’ 
The primacy of the visual emphasises that what we see is true by virtue of it being visual instead 
of verbal; in other words, seeing is believing. Hollywood’s continuity style is designed to minimise 
the visual and logical gap between two images, or cuts. If we view Briggs’s testimony 
cinematically, we see an incongruity between the two images presented to the court. That is, when 
faced with the two images of Briggs angrily shouting at Nick and Nick’s slashed throat with Briggs 
nearby, the logical and cinematic conclusion would be that, in his anger, Briggs murdered Nick. 
In this way, the logic of the court’s fallacious and retroactive gaze mirrors our own, showing us 
that noir’s images, as well as the way in which meaning is constructed out of them, constitute a 
kind of blindness. Not only do we not know by looking, but it is by looking that we are inclined to 
believe we know. To complicate the issue further, we never see these two images of Briggs, unlike 
the court. Moreover, Briggs returned to Nick’s shop to repay Michael for a coffee he bought him, 
further implicating Michael in the case. He is not an objective observer but the very reason that 
Briggs is initially accused. 
The problem is one of hermeneutics. The investigative process reveals that the conclusion 
is determined by Michael’s desire; the solution is his desired answer. He saw two separate images 
— two separate scenes — drew a connection based on circumstance and reframed it as the only 
logical conclusion. However, in another sense, we can see how film noir embodies the logic of the 
investigation. Narratively, we understand Michael’s assumption as a misinterpretation because our 
distance as spectators allows us not to be caught up in Michael’s desire. Yet, in cinematic terms, 
this is best expressed through the Kuleshov effect, the idea that meaning is established between 
shots and through editing. It explains our psychological tendency to ascribe meaning to two 
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separate images and thus incorporate them into the same network of meaning. Here, this has 
occurred beyond even our vision. It is easy to criticise Michael, yet we make the same error in our 
spectatorship; what is more, it is one of the foundational structures of how meaning is constructed 
in cinema. As Maltby contends, in Hollywood cinema ‘we repeatedly see what we want to see.’41 
Although we assume a position of spectatorship insofar as we can recognise the way in which 
Michael’s desire shapes the text (that is, the investigation of Briggs), it is this very assumption 
which leaves us susceptible to the same process. As I described earlier, film noir criticism involves 
reconstructing noir after the fact, taking individual films — often with similar themes — and 
attempting to group together under some unifying banner. As the ‘first’ noir, Stranger on the Third 
Floor indicates that such a list, or ‘investigation,’ is always contextual. Approaching noir as a 
puzzle to be solved assumes that there is a solution always available to us, that the solution lies 
within the puzzle object itself. Instead, I understand noir as a category which invariably shifts 
wherever our gaze is fixed. In some contexts, seeing noir as predominately a subset of the crime 
film, or of hard-boiled detective fiction, is useful. Equally, using noir to examine gender politics, 
racial politics, or historical contexts can yield fruitful results. Ultimately, though, any view which 
understands noir as a fixed object, where all the sides of the puzzle can remain visible at once, 
reduces noir to such a puzzle and misses both its intricacies and, fundamentally, its inconsistencies. 
Its inconsistencies are not, in my view, problems to be solved, but integral to understanding. 
We never simply look at noir through a detached, objective lens — as Michael believes 
himself able of doing. Instead, our gaze always involves another force looking at us, what Lacan 
calls the big Other. In film noir, this extra gaze is noirness itself. For example, in Edgar G. Ulmer’s 
Detour (1945), Al, the film’s protagonist, bemoans his situation by saying to us in a voiceover: 
 
41 Maltby, Hollywood Cinema, p. 312. 
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‘That's life. Whichever way you turn, Fate sticks out a foot to trip you. Yes. Fate, or some 
mysterious force, can put the finger on you or me for no good reason at all.’42 What happens in 
Detour is told as a flashback, as Al sits in a roadside diner, recounting how his chance meeting 
with Vera, instead of his fiancée Sue, led to him murdering Vera. Al’s confession clearly shows 
how noir’s retroactivity is complicated by the hermeneutic desire of the narrator or critic. Al 
believes that he was wronged by ‘some mysterious force’, a force which demands something from 
him — it ‘puts the finger’ on him. This force is therefore understood as external. The implication, 
therefore, is that Al’s intentions were good, but he was forced to take a moral ‘detour’, which he 
seeks to correct in his flashback narration. However, it is through the narration that we see that 
this ‘mysterious force’ is internal, rather than external. The force is Al’s desire. Specifically, it is 
a desire to see his past clearly, to see without the interference of his perspective, which will 
therefore allow him to see his own desire clearly.  
In the film, Al hitches a ride with a rich man named Haskell. During their journey on the 
empty desert roads, Haskell mysteriously dies. Al, because of his paranoia that will be blamed — 
he is guilty of a crime he did not commit — leaves Haskell’s body at the side of the road and 
assumes his identity. The death may have been accidental (this event is recounted in Al’s 
untrustworthy narration after all), but because Haskell’s death benefits Al, it implies that Al wanted 
to kill Haskell. Al’s desire is revealed through his reaction to Haskell’s death. In his effort to ‘stay’ 
innocent he removes the distinction between guilt and innocence. This is similar to Michael in 
Stranger on the Third Floor. Through Meng’s death, we see that Michael is guilty because of his 
desires, rather than any action he undertook. Moreover, the revelation that the Stranger acts out 
 
42 Detour (1945). 
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Michael’s unconscious and murderous desires retroactively reveals the same guilty desires at work 
in Michael’s faulty testimony regarding Briggs. 
What Michael ‘saw’ was not external and verifiable, but internal, a realisation of his 
desires. Michael wants Briggs to be guilty in order to further both his career and his personal life; 
thus, he convinced himself that he saw it happen. In the cross-examination, Briggs’s lawyer asks 
Michael whether he saw the murder occur or not. Briggs’s lawyer is mocked for this — Michael’s 
boss jovially says that he ‘wouldn’t let him defend me if I stole an apple’ — but this is the correct 
question to ask as it draws attention to what Michael did not see. Whilst it may seem that the 
purpose of this scene is to highlight the role inefficient lawyers play in the ineffectual American 
court system, what is central here is exactly the throw-away remark made by Michael’s boss: the 
court is so inept that one would get put to death for stealing an apple; after all, Briggs is being 
condemned despite being innocent. 
Michael’s blindness persists uninterrogated through the film; Michael’s mistake during 
Briggs’ conviction is that he extrapolates from what he saw and then ascribes to his imaginings 
the same level of authenticity and validity as to what he actually did see. This logic is repeated 
with Meng’s murder by the Stranger. Again, Michael does not see the murder but assumes that 
because he saw a mysterious man lurking about his apartment floor and then sees a murdered Meng 
that the two events must be connected. Unlike other noir protagonists, notably Philip Marlowe in 
The Big Sleep (1946) and Sam Spade in The Maltese Falcon (1944) (both played by Humphrey 
Bogart), it is not Michael’s superior powers of observation that allow him to successfully resolve 
the narrative but rather luck. Solving the crime and marrying Jane are two intensely connected 
events that result in Michael earning more money and owning his own home.  
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The twin poles of internal subjectivity and external objectivity are kept solidly apart prior 
to Briggs’s verdict. Briggs’s guilty conviction, however, signals a rupturing of the boundaries 
between the internal and external spaces. Immediately afterwards, the music reaches a loud 
crescendo and the camera zooms frenetically in on the scales of justice. Stylistically, this does not 
fit the realism that the continuity system seeks to recreate because the camera draws attention to 
itself. We no longer simply look through the camera but become acutely aware that the camera 
exists between the screen and us. The camera mediates the image and is separate from it. In this 
context, the camera’s ‘noticeable’ movements impel us to concentrate on the abstract idea of 
'justice' in relation to Briggs' conviction. Briggs’ conviction has disrupted the normative standards 
of the film and removed any pretence of objectivity from the camera, thereby suggesting that the 
law does not act objectively. This mirrors Michael’s own subjectivity. Briggs’s manic shouting 
and protestations of his innocence instil in Michael a profound sense of guilt, provoking his 
paranoid internal monologue. The law is supposed to reinstate order, yet here the process of the 
law unsettles order. Additionally, the law attempts to establish fact by ‘extracting’ it from multiple, 
and often competing subjectivities, and then organising such facts into a linear and coherent 
narrative. Michael doubts his own innocence, as if unintentionally he could be the enemy within. 
The enemy really is within, that is, within us as opposed to out there. 
One problem which the ‘enemy within’ conjures up is that the enemy is not who it is 
expected it to be; it is, as with many other problems in the film, inherently a problem of vision. 
Initially, Michael considers Briggs to be a villain, a criminal who murders out of spite, whereas 
the murderer is the Stranger, someone whose intentions are less clear. For Michael, the case is 
relatively simple, it is ‘not my word against his, but it’s what I saw with own eyes’, as if vision 
were more connected to language than reality. Even if that were true, the articulation of one’s 
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vision can only be accomplished through language and meaning may be lost in translation. Yet the 
insistence on the veracity of his vision is problematised by the film’s focus on the problem of 
vision and of blindness. For example, there is a series of doublings within the film which blurs the 
lines between who each character is, particularly with regard to Michael. Meng and the Stranger 
are both, in some capacity, projections by Michael: Meng is what Michael may become, and the 
Stranger is what Michael dare not admit to himself. Later, he is doubled with Briggs because they 
are both innocent men who are suspected as guilty. With this doubling, there is a duplicity of the 
images we see. When gazed upon, objects have multiple visible and non-visible points, their image 
is refracted through the observer. Such a duplicity is only highlighted by Michael’s insistence that 
what he saw with his ‘own eyes’ is analogous with an objective truth. 
In the film, there is a rupture between the internal and the external, a rupture which 
continues throughout film noir and which can be seen through the splitting and doubling of the 
image. Michael believes his position as an observer is objective, implying that the relationship 
between observer and object is one way. Yet this doubling shows to us that the object can look 
back. Todd McGowan argues that because the object looks back at us — ‘the gaze becomes 
something the subject encounters in the object’— the gaze should be conceived of as objective, 
rather than subjective.43 He writes: ‘the gaze is not the look of the subject at the object, but the 
point at which the object looks back.’44 The externality of the object, its physical place, lies 
separate to the subject, is reconstituted as an internal presence within the gazing subject; the gaze 
is something internal to the subject instead of something which exists between subject and object. 
The splitting of the image results in a concurrent split between the internal and external boundaries 
 
43 Todd McGowan, ‘Looking for the Gaze: Lacanian Film Theory and Its Vicissitudes’, Cinema Journal 42, No.3 




of subjectivity: the world no longer exists ‘out there’, at a safe distance, but is something inside 
ourselves and the object of our gaze exists in two capacities, both as external object, as itself, and 
inside us, as fantasy. The problem can be understood precisely as a problem of vision. Michael 
desires a home where he can ‘really see’ Jane, implying there is something which prevents him 
from doing so. Jane, too, only connects the Stranger to Michael’s predicament when she sees him, 
not just in a visual sense, but by speaking to him, and therefore understanding him. The problem 
at the heart Michael and noir’s blindness is not what object interposes itself between subject and 
the intended object of the gaze, but rather what desire inherent in the subject diverts their gaze.45 
The clearest example of the rupture of internal and external boundaries occurs after 
Briggs’s conviction as Michael walks home alone from the courtroom and mentally recounts his 
concerns. It is important to distinguish the technique in this scene from voice-over narration. 
Voice-over usually denotes a character speaking directly to us, but Michael is unaware of our 
presence and speaks to himself. The inherent strangeness of this scene should not be understated. 
The external world of the film, the world which we are watching, disintegrates as a distinct 
category as we enter Michael’s internal psychological space and hear his thoughts. In the same 
way the gaze splits the object, we, and Michael, become split too. Michael, as merely a projection 
on a screen, exists for us as a distant object to be looked at. As we hear his thoughts, we become 
enveloped in his subjectivity. Similarly, if we reverse the situation, we cease to be an object of the 
film’s gaze, something distinct from it, and become part of its internal structure. There is a sense 
of invasion here, that we are hearing something we should not be able to; we occupy an impossible 
 
45 At a stretch, the meeting of the Stranger in a butcher’s shop allows Jane to see — evoking the Cockney rhyming 
slang ‘have a butcher’s’, which means ‘to have a look’. Nevertheless, it is the invitation to see the Stranger, which 
allows Jane to apprehend him. 
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auditory and visual point. Consequently, the external and the internal boundaries are redrawn; 
there is a collapse of space, similar to Michael’s privacy concerns surrounding Meng. 
Figure 2.7, Stranger on the Third Floor (1940) 
In this monologue, we hear Michael question his motivations and the completeness of his 
vision. The tone of Michael’s self-interrogation is one of paranoia. After the boundaries between 
internal and external are blurred, we follow Michael from the ‘external’ space (the streets of 
Brooklyn, as well as the scene of the crime) to the ‘internal’ space of his home which is mirrored 
by our movement to the ‘internal’ psychological space of Michael’s thoughts, from the ‘external’ 
space. The streets are made an intensely private place because despite their social and busy aspect, 
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we hear Michael’s private thoughts. Conversely, Michael’s home is transformed into a public 
space, not only through Meng’s intrusions, but through ours. Hearing Michael’s inner thoughts has 
this effect, making the public private, and the private public. Following Michael to his home, 
supposedly a place of privacy, makes the home seem uncanny. Its homely, or heimlich quality, is 
exaggerated through the rupturing of internal and external boundaries. 
This rupturing of boundaries, Frank Krutnik argues, ‘opens up space for the uncanny.’46 In 
talking to himself, Michael doubles and alienates himself, as he is both the originator and recipient 
of his speech, indicating the presence of the uncanny. For Auerbach: ‘Michael’s inner voice serves 
to bind and fold together discrete shots within a tightly focused subjectivity at once persistent (it 
will not go away) and unstable (it does not understand itself)’.47 Michael’s interior monologue 
blurs the distinction between inside and outside as it creates an effect of there now being two 
Michaels with which to contend: the confident one who is sure of what he saw and the paranoid 
one who is persistent and unstable. Both versions of Michael seem to contradict one another. In 
his thoughts, Michael admits that he ‘didn’t see Briggs kill Nick’, whereas previously he was 
adamant that he did see the murder. Michael’s inner monologue largely functions as a kind of self-
interrogation, a realignment of the self in relation to the external world. Michael moves from a 
court of law (legal), to the street (public), to his apartment (private). His self-interrogation and 
questioning of his own mind are mirrored by his spatial relocation to his own home. In this way, 
Michael’s mind and home become almost interchangeable terms: his home is an externalisation of 
his mind. Or, perhaps more accurately, there is a process of internalisation of the home within 
Michael’s mind. 
 
46 Krutnik, In a Lonely Street, p. 49. 
47 Auerbach, ‘Gestapo in America’, p. 43. 
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Figure 2.8, Stranger on the Third Floor (1940) 
The blurring of internal and external boundaries intensifies Michael’s internal, unconscious 
desires and manifests them in the external world. The answer to Michael’s problems, both 
conscious (his sudden inability to find closure with Briggs’s case) and unconscious (his desire to 
marry Jane and to rid himself of Meng), sits on the threshold of his home — the point between 
public and private, or between internal subjectivity and the external social world. What is needed, 
for Michael, is an outlet which exists in the external world and allows him to vicariously act out 
his desires. For Sigmund Freud, to protect itself, the ego projects maleficent ‘content outward as 
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something foreign to itself’48, which is how Michael perceives the Stranger: an essentially blank 
slate, an object who invites overdetermination. The Stranger’s overdetermination leads him to be 
many things at once, yet nothing at all. When the Stranger emerges into the hallway, the room he 
comes from is enveloped in complete darkness (Figure 2.9). Similarly, Michael stands in the 
darkness in the hallway to conceal himself. As Auerbach argues, he is an ‘evil intruder’, a ‘cinema 
director’ as far as his scarf and general outfit resembles the archetypical Hollywood director when 
he climbs over the seats (which appear to be theatre seats instead of the seats in a courtroom) in 
Michael’s dream. The courtroom, the site of Michael’s trauma, is reimagined as a theatre and a 
place of spectacle. When the Stranger climbs towards Michael, he disrupts the two-dimensional 
space implied by the metaphor of the theatre. This splits our perspective. In the shot, we assume 
Michael’s viewpoint, though spatially we occupy the theatre seats (assuming, of course, we are 
watching the film at the theatre). The Stranger comes from the audience: he is one of us. Here we 
are confronted by the artificiality of Michael’s dream and how easy it is to disrupt. We see its 
director and thus we simultaneously recognise our own presence. Even in his own dream, Michael 
is not alone. The Stranger’s coding as a cinema director serves to further complicate the central 
problem of Michael’s desire because he cannot grasp what his desire is. Auerbach further identifies 
the Stranger’s depiction as a ‘Gestapo silencer’ and ‘Wandering Jew’.49 Although the Stranger 
embodies these identities, he remains a void within the film, an unexplainable nothingness because 
of his position as outsider. 
 
48 Sigmund Freud, ‘The Uncanny’ in Literary Theory: An Anthology, ed. by Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan, (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2004), p. 426. 
49 Auerbach, ‘Gestapo in America’, p. 53 
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Figure 2.9, Stranger on the Third Floor (1940) 
The Stranger’s function in the film has less to do with narrative logic (his introduction is 
not caused by logical events but based on luck) and more to do with his effect on certain characters, 
namely Michael. For Michael, the Stranger is his dark repressed desires made flesh, helping him 
realise his desires.50 Freud remarks on the uncanniness of doubles and doppelgängers as he writes 
that they are a ‘vision of terror’51 and that ‘the double was originally an insurance against 
destruction to the ego’.52 Michael’s guilt surrounding Briggs’s case is revealed, through his 
 
50 Auerbach, ‘Gestapo in America’, p. 52. 




interaction with the Stranger, to instead be a manifestation of his ill feelings towards Meng. 
Briggs’s case mirrors his own potential case. In turn, his antagonism toward Meng is propagated 
by Meng ‘always spying’ on him and intruding on his sexual desires for Jane. For Freud, the 
uncanny is the return of the repressed. What the Stranger represents, then, is a ‘return’ of Michael’s 
forgotten desires to kill Meng; seeing the Stranger re-energises those desires and thus Michael is 
able and indeed willing to remember those feelings, with the benefit of retrospection. 
Figure 2.10, Stranger on the Third Floor (1940) 
In this sense, the Stranger can be read as a doppelgänger for Michael, an unseemly criminal 
externalisation of his internal desires, committing all the acts he would and would not dream of 
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doing. Before chasing the Stranger downstairs, Michael aggressively confronts him with three 
questions. He asks: ‘Looking for somebody?’, then, ‘What do you want?’, and ‘Who are you?’, 
none of which receive an answer. These are all questions that Michael could be asking himself. He 
is the one who is looking for somebody, emerging from his apartment, seeking anybody besides 
Meng. Michael is looking for Meng, or an excuse for Meng to be dead and thus have his suspicions 
confirmed. He is looking for something external to himself to balance his own intense internal 
interrogation. What Michael finds is only himself reflected back at him. When he looks down the 
stairs at the Stranger, Michael’s face registers horror. For him, it is an uncanny moment because 
he has seen himself. What makes the Stranger appear ‘strange’ is Michael’s paranoid interior 
monologue. Without his paranoia, the Stranger would simply be a vagabond (that is, someone 
without a home) instead of something more. Moreover, when Michael says, ‘Looking for 
somebody?’ this could be a question for us. Perhaps we are looking for the Stranger, something 
internal to ourselves. If this question does have meta-cinematic content, then once again it 
collapses the boundaries between us and the film. Such a collapse can be seen in the very first 
instant of the film, as if this distinction was an illusion to begin with. Again, the opening credits 
show us Michael in his apartment but superimpose the title, ‘Stranger on the Third Floor’, on top 
of him, thereby suggesting that Michael is the Stranger. If we understand the Stranger as Michael’s 
doppelgänger and therefore grant them equivalence, then Michael’s incessant questioning of the 
Stranger suggests that he is alienated from himself: a process potentially arising from his urban 
living arrangement and the opening of psychological and external spaces. His cramped apartment 
and its proximity to other people’s private places do not grant him a space of his own; his space is 
always the Other’s. The answer to the final question is also indicative of the collapse between self 
and Other which is true of the film as a whole. 
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To return to Michael’s questions to the Stranger, when mirrored back at Michael, the 
question of ‘What do you want?’ becomes a question of interrogating desire. Fantasy, as Žižek 
argues, is a ‘screen for the desire of the Other.’53 When re-framed in psychoanalytic terminology, 
the question is ‘Che Vuoi?’. Usually, in Italian, this translates exactly to ‘what do you want?’ But 
its meaning exceeds a simple conversational meaning in psychoanalysis. ‘Che Vuoi?’ is a question 
posed to the Other. It is a question of one’s own desire. Žižek claims that fantasy helps provide the 
answer. 
Fantasy appears, then, as an answer to 'Che Vuoi?', to the unbearable enigma of the desire 
of the Other, of the lack in the Other, but it is at the same time fantasy itself which, so to 
speak, provides the co-ordinates of our desire — which constructs the frame enabling us to 
desire something.54 
Michael’s nightmare can be understood in these terms. The enigma posed by the Stranger, that is, 
his desire, is ‘unbearable’. It torments Michael that he saw but did not understand and it is only 
through the construction of a fantasy, a nightmare, whereby his distress can be resolved, and the 
enigma answered. Žižek continues: ‘in the fantasy-scene the desire is not fulfilled, “satisfied”, but 
constituted — through fantasy, we learn “how to desire”.’55 This is why Michael cannot catch the 
Stranger and never encounters him again. The Stranger is not the antagonist because he voraciously 
achieves his desires, but rather because he functions as a void for desire itself. The Stranger is 
Michael without the capacity for desire, as indicated by his lack of speech when Michael confronts 
him. What Michael secretly wants and what is revealed to him through the Stranger, is for Meng 
 





to be dead and for himself to receive a raise and marry Jane. The same question is put to him 
rhetorically earlier. After Briggs’ conviction, Michael sits in the press office and stares solemnly 
into space, wondering if he has made the correct (both moral and legal) decision with regard to 
Briggs. Another reporter notices Michael’s sulking and asks him: ‘Didn't you like the verdict? It's 
what you wanted, wasn't it?’ The initial implication is that the verdict makes Michael feel guilty 
and thus it is not what he wanted after all. With the introduction of the Stranger, the implication 
changes: it is what he wanted but did not realise. Therefore, Michael struggles to get closure: he 
achieved his desire yet remains unsatisfied. 
The male gaze dictates the production and dissemination of knowledge in film noir. Yet, it 
frequently fails to deliver what it promises. The male gaze’s relation to history is highly nostalgic, 
it constructs both home and women as fantasies. We can recall Boym, as she argues that nostalgia 
is a ‘mourning…for the loss of an enchanted world with clear borders and values.’56 Indeed, noir’s 
male gazes reveal to us their very inadequacy and the hole at the centre of noir. Noir, in a sense, is 
only constituted through attempts to impose borders. In the first chapter, I examined how this is 
performed by critics, often to disappointing results. In this chapter, however, I have shown how it 
is also performed by noir’s protagonists too, which demonstrates how noir’s constitutive elements 
are inherently unstable. It is not only the gaze which originates from a point of blindness, but so 
too is the sound of noir. The interplay between sound and image in noir tends to prioritise the latter 
over the former, but what is curious is that while sound is generally distrusted (hearing is secondary 
to seeing in terms of constructing knowledge), the same scepticism is not extended to vision. 
Meng’s watchful eye over Michael, Michael’s blindness in relation to Briggs’s case, and the 
Stranger’s seemingly omnipotent position (insofar as he ‘sees’ Michael’s desire for what it really 
 
56 Svetlana Boym, The Future of Nostalgia (New York: Basic Books, 2001), p. 8. 
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is) are all intrusive forms of vision. The gaze, in noir, is something which constituted largely 
through how it is returned. It asks something of its protagonists, and us. Most importantly, the 
ambiguity of the gaze alters our perception of home. If the home is a border which seeks to contain 
certain ideological excesses, then we can see how noir’s lack of internal consistency or substance 
subverts these attempts. The home, like the gaze, is something which cannot be fully grasped, but 
nonetheless makes demands of noir’s protagonists, and us as we look at noir.  
The next chapter questions the apparent unbearable nature of desire in noir and how it 
relates to home, as well as what precisely is the substance being contained by its borders. As we 
have seen, noir often dramatises the interior struggles of its characters, yet it rarely gives them 
what they want — or think they want. As I have explored here, in relation to home, part of the 
answer is concerned with the object itself. The object’s impossibility renders the process of its 
attainment blinding in some respect. The home, here, is ambiguous because it so clearly signifies 
something, but noir finds it difficult to articulate why home is desirable. The subsequent chapters 
will address this problem of why the desired object is impossible. Rather than solely focusing on 
home itself, the next chapter turns its attention to underlying mechanisms of looking, desire, and 




Film Noir & Fascination 
‘The truth is I’m not really an antique dealer. I’m sort of a…detective’ 
Mr. Wilson, The Stranger (1946) 
Figure 3.1, Kiss of Death, dir. By Henry Hathaway (20th Century Fox, 1947) 
The Greatest Trick Noir Ever Pulled… 
In this chapter I discuss how Lacan’s concept of fascination and its relationship to fantasy informs 
our understanding of film noir. Fascination is crucial in deciphering the noir mode by complicating 
the very process and assumptions of critical work. It is, in part, the mechanism which creates and 
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defines noir’s affect. In the first section of this chapter, I examine how fascination enhances our 
understanding of noir as structurally traumatic and how such a trauma affects the portrayal of home 
in noir. The following section focuses on how fascination changes noir’s historicity, especially in 
relation to the World War Two. In the subsequent section, I consider how fascination informs 
noir’s depiction of investigative desire and how the detective gets caught up in fascination’s gaze 
and becomes implicated in the circuits of desires he is employed to untangle. In addition, I focus 
on how the Lacanian objet petit a functions as an already lost object and how noir, in some sense, 
can be understood as this already lost object. 
The way to access the ‘impossibility’1 of desire, the objet petit a, is, for Lacan, through 
fantasy. Fantasy is the setting of desire, not an object itself: it is a screen on to which a subject’s 
desires are projected. The home’s hierarchical familial structure — as well as how its position as 
a desirable commodity positioning the subject within the framework of capitalist desire — creates 
the conditions for a ‘safe’ experience of desire. A ‘safe’ experience here means a blindness in 
relation to the bottomless pit of desire. Desire itself has no content and no object. Home thus places 
desire within a specific fantasy framework. Film noir, as we shall see, exploits and disrupts this 
framework to expose the ideological function of home, and, moreover, the way in which the 
‘ideology of home’ constitutes itself through the same circularity and contentless form as desire. 
As Sylvia Harvey puts it, homes are ‘the representation of the institution of the family, which in 
so many films serve as the mechanism whereby desire is fulfilled.’2 It is a place in which a subject 
knows its own position within the symbolic circuit. Home and family enable desire to be 
experienced. However, as Elizabeth Cowie argues, ‘it is the fantasy itself that demands the 
 
1 Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, p. 208. 
2 Harvey, ‘The Absent Family of Film Noir’, p. 36. 
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punishment’3 because through fantasy, ‘the subject attempts to sustain the illusion of unity with 
the Other and ignore his or her own division’4 and it ‘defines a subject’s “impossible” relation to 
the objet a.’5 The objet petit a is thus implicated in fantasy because it represents the lack in the 
Other. As I showed in the previous chapters, the illusion of unity in Stranger on the Third Floor 
is the very mechanism which, in Cowie’s words, defines Michael’s impossible relation to the objet 
a. Fantasy’s main function is to stage, or screen, desire rather than fulfilling it. The cinematic 
fantasy for Cowie ‘is not produced by the spectator but by the filmic text itself, which must “move” 
the spectator to occupy his or her place within it.’6 In this sense, cinema does not so much screen 
our desires but rather presents a framework in which we are told what to desire (or even how to 
desire). Fantasy works insofar as it actively denies and punishes us our desired satisfaction. Film 
noir, for instance, involves denying our enjoyment, directly contrapuntal to Hollywood cinema 
which offers satisfaction.  
In Double Indemnity (1944), one example is Walter Neff’s insistence on reaching the ‘end 
of the line’7 with respect to the convoluted plan that he concocts with Phyllis. On a structural level, 
such a process involves continually delaying enjoyment to the point where punishment supersedes 
enjoyment. We can notice the structure of desire within Neff’s plan: part of Neff’s ‘perfectly 
perfect’ plan is to elude Keyes and the police, to reverse engineer a crime which takes the 
investigative process into account.8 Thus, the criminal plan is radically transformed so that it 
incorporates a mechanism for its own failure. It is through his strained attempts to exclude his own 
 
3 Elizabeth Cowie, ‘Film Noir and Women’ in Shades of Noir: A Reader, ed. by Joan Copjec (London: Verso, 1993), 
p. 137. 
4 Sean Homer, Jacques Lacan, Loc. 1556. 
5 Ibid., Loc. 1592. 
6 Elizabeth Cowie, ‘Film Noir and Women’, p. 137. 




desire from the plan that he, inadvertently, identifies himself as a suspect. Neff’s incorporation of 
double indemnity, the actuarial term for doubling the amount of insurance money paid out in the 
case of accidental death, involves using the statistical anomaly of accidental death whilst on a train: 
Listen, baby. There's a clause in every accident policy, a little thing called double 
indemnity. The insurance companies put it in as sort of a come-on for the customers. It 
means they pay double on certain accidents. The kind that almost never happen. Like for 
instance if a guy is killed on a train, they'd pay a hundred thousand instead of fifty thousand. 
We're hitting it for the limit, baby. That's why it's got to be the train.9 
Neff’s rationale is that the insurance company will not suspect wrongdoing because it is so 
unlikely. Keyes, however, reverses Neff’s logic. He argues that since the odds of the accident are 
so low, it is essentially impossible and is therefore likely to be a fraudulent claim. Strangely, then, 
failure becomes built in because its avoidance is central to the plan, so that all components of the 
plan encounter failure until eventually such failure is not only inevitable, but the point of the plan 
in the first case: the curious incident was the absence of an incident. Indeed, the very 
meticulousness of his plan structures its own impossibility. As Hugh Manon observes: ‘the focus 
on the obstacle becomes so intense as to eclipse the ostensible goal of the pursuit’.10  
 
9 Double Indemnity (1944). 
10 Hugh Manon, ‘Some Like It Cold: Fetishism in Billy Wilder's Double Indemnity’, Cinema Journal. 44.4 (Summer, 




Figure 3.2, Double Indemnity, dir. by Billy Wilder (Paramount Pictures, 1944) 
In relation to this, the film’s retroactive narrative structure allows the spectator in a sense 
to side with Neff. The point at which we feel enjoyment for Neff’s apparent success is 
simultaneously punctured by our retroactive knowledge of Neff’s eventual demise. We are both 
rewarded and punished for our desire. Here, we can identify another level of impossibility in Neff’s 
plan. It is not only impossible because of its ‘perfectly perfect’ construction but also because on a 
structural and formal level, we know the plan cannot succeed.11 Investigation in noir, too, revolves 
around an impossible nexus of desire. The detective must solve the crime, but the central problem 
 
11 Double Indemnity (1944). 
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is not the criminal act per se but the detective’s failure to uncover his or the perpetrator’s desire. 
In Indemnity, this plays out through the narrative structure and our alignment with Neff. The 
central tension of the film is shifted from ‘will Neff get caught?’ to ‘how will he get caught?’ That 
is, which of Neff’s desires will be exposed and what excesses will be produced? Where Keyes’ 
investigation does indeed yield the correct result, he is nonetheless too late; Neff and Phyllis have 
already had their fatal altercation. As I will show, there is always some excess in the investigative 
process which has further implications for our critical approach to noir. What is required to ‘solve’ 
the mysteries of noir, in short, is less the adoption and assumption of an objective gaze and more 
an integration into the libidinal circuit of desire— on the part of the protagonist/investigator and 
the spectator. 
Neff attempts to anticipate Keyes’ investigation, yet this is precisely how Keyes is able to 
see the criminal intent. As Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari argue in Anti-Oedipus, desire is a 
productive force. It is productive insofar as it does something; there is no absence of desire, but 
only a desire of absence. Neff’s goal of reaching the ‘end of the line’ is never met because the line 
only ever extends.12 Desire and enjoyment are thus constantly deferred, replaced by punishment 
through the expectation of enjoyment. Indeed, film noir itself suffers the same ailment. As explored 
with Stranger on the Third Floor, there is always the possibility of one more noir: the set of films 
is never complete. The logic of film noir’s construction is thus replicated on the level of desire, 
which largely reveals itself as the logic of an investigation. 
Beyond individual examples, film noir embodies the eternal cycle of desire on a structural 
level, inherent in both the narrative structures and the visual structures that define it. The objet a 
 
12 Double Indemnity (1944). 
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features in noir narratives insofar as the narratives are usually structured around something 
impossible — for example, as we will later see, the falcon statuette in The Maltese Falcon (1941). 
The nature of this impossibility might range from the impossibility of investigative desire, to an 
impossible object, or the impossibility of reconstructing the past. Additionally, the objet a figures 
in the visual structure through a similar impossibility of the objects within noir’s visual field: noir’s 
dimly lit sets and obfuscated narratives intertwine to create scenarios in which knowledge cannot 
be gained simply through looking because there is always something missing or obscured. Or, 
perhaps more drastically, the object is in full view, but we cannot comprehend it. It is, in addition, 
precisely our position as spectators which motivates this obfuscation since film noir is instilled 
with a certain nostalgia. This nostalgia ultimately splits the film into our interpretation of it now 
and a simultaneous desire to reconstruct the film as it would have been seen by 1940s audiences. 
Žižek makes the point that what ‘fascinates us is…the gaze of the “other”’13, which he classifies 
as a ‘mythic spectator from the 1940s’ who identifies with the noir universe. He concludes: ‘our 
relation to a film noir is always divided, split between fascination and ironic distance: ironic 
distance toward its diegetic reality, fascination with the gaze.’14 Hence, there is a focus in noir 
criticism on its appearance because noir (and our nostalgic interpretation of it) is so focused on a 
‘fascination with the gaze.’15 Noir then, is on some level a fantasy onto which our desire for 
nostalgia is projected and this projection ultimately alters the film itself; film noir, because of our 
fascination with it, lacks an ‘objective’ existence insofar as we imbue the films with ‘noirness’ 
and, in so doing, obscure or destroy the ‘real’ object underneath.16 
 
13 Slavoj Žižek, Looking Awry: Jacques Lacan in Popular Culture (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1992), p. 112 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 The ‘real’ object of noir is not objectifiable, but rather a nostalgic critical construction. 
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Fascination, in psychoanalytic terms, is the compulsion to pursue the objet petit a. 
However, this compulsion will always fail to yield the intended result because of the subject’s 
relation to the objet petit a — it is the Other’s lack or lack itself. The subject conceives of the objet 
petit a as something which is attainable because it is considered to be something which was once 
held by the subject but is now lost. As Todd McGowan writes, ‘the subject posits the objet petit a 
as the point of the Other's secret jouissance.’17 In psychoanalysis jouissance is sometimes 
translated as to a transgressive kind of pleasure: ‘pleasure in pain’18, a similar formulation as to 
when Žižek writes of a symbolic structure embodying its ‘own impossibility.’19 In Indemnity, our 
jouissance mirrors Neff’s: there is a pleasure in constructing a plan which ostensibly is to obscure 
Neff’s desire, only for it to become the very means by which he and the spectator are punished. 
For McGowan, the objet petit a is a point of impossibility since it is a remnant of the Real, the 
limit of symbolization, ‘an internal point of failure.’20 The objet petit a is like the Real insofar as 
it is paradoxical. It is ‘an impossible object. To exist, it would have to be simultaneously part of 
the subject and completely alien.’21. The Real, as Žižek writes in response to Judith Butler, is 
paradoxical because it  
is in fact internal/inherent to the Symbolic, not its external limit, but for that very reason, 
it cannot be symbolized. In other words, the paradox is that the Real as external, excluded 
 
17 Todd McGowan, ‘Looking for the Gaze: Lacanian Film Theory and Its Vicissitudes’, in Cinema Journal 42.3 
(Spring 2003), p. 32. 
18 Homer, Loc. 1592. 
19 Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, p. 208. 
20 Glyn Daly, Slavoj Žižek: Risking the Impossible, 2004, available at: http://www.lacan.com/zizek-primer.htm 
[Accessed 20/10/2017]. 
21 McGowan, p. 32. 
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from the Symbolic, is in fact a symbolic determination — what eludes symbolization is 
precisely the Real as the inherent point of failure of symbolization.22 
An object can be fascinating in itself; it can possess some impossible point of perception. Or 
fascination might be relational and therefore a fantasmatic projection from the subject. As Oliver 
Harris formulates it, fascination thus involves a certain ‘staging’ of a secret which replicates the 
structure of secrets rather than being solvable in itself. In the process of finding,’ the original image 
is ‘always lost.’23 
Lacan uses the example of Hans Holbein’s painting The Ambassadors (1533). What at first 
appears to be a relatively straightforward portrait of two men — ostensibly in command — 
contains an anamorphosis of a skull, a distorted skull that does not fit the realist aesthetic and, 
crucially, the established viewpoint of the painting. Lacan calls The Ambassadors (Fig. 3.1) ‘a trap 
for the gaze.’24 McGowan, similarly, says the skull is a ‘blank spot in the image’ since the skewed 
perspective forces the spectator to tilt their head in order to see the image properly, at which point 
the two figures become equally distorted; the spectator loses their ‘distance from the painting’25, 
thus becoming involved in what they see. The spectator is involved in the image and thus we lose 
our objective distance. In fact, it is only through involving ourselves in the image that we can 
comprehend it.  
 
 
22 Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Žižek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues 
On The Left (London and New York: Verso, 2000), p. 121, [original emphasis]. 
23 Oliver Harris, William Burroughs: The Secret of Fascination (USA: Southern Illinois University), p. 10. 
24 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamentals of Psychoanalysis, ed. By Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. by Alan Sheridan 
(London: Vintage, 1998), p. 89. 




Figure 3.3, Hans Holbein, The Ambassadors, 1533. Oil on oak, 207 x 209.5 cm, The National 
Gallery, London.26 
Lacan continues: ‘In any picture, it is precisely in seeking the gaze in each of its points that 
you will see it disappear.’27 For Lacan, then, this skull represents the Other’s jouissance, the objet 
petit a. What seemed like a position of mastery — looking safely at the image — has been reversed 
 
26 Hans Holbein, The Ambassadors, 1533. Oil on oak, 207 x 209.5 cm, The National Gallery, UK. 
27 Lacan, The Four Fundamentals of Psychoanalysis, p. 89. 
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since the image sees us, and therefore we experience ourselves as the object of the desiring gaze. 
Concurrently, McGowan argues that this is how we should understand the gaze, not as ‘an 
experience of imaginary mastery’, but instead as a ‘site of a traumatic encounter with the Real.’28 
What is fascinating about The Ambassadors is the lost objectivity of perspective; it feels as if our 
viewpoint is lost through our encounter with the skull, but what is revealed by the skull’s presence 
is that our identification with the image was always already configured within the image itself. 
The painting stages this dilemma. Moreover the presence of the skull alerts us to the presence of 
the artist. Although the Ambassadors depicted in the painting project confidence and power, it is 
the artist who possess control over their representation. The painting thus stages the excessive 
capacity of images. The image outlasts the Ambassadors, but it will also outlast us; the skull is 
paradoxically, an afterimage, a representation of what happens to humans after we die, but also a 
symbol of life, specifically the life of the painting. In noir, however, there is no authoritative artist 
in control of the text. The retroactive application of noir onto film as the film’s primary signifier 
disintegrates authorship. Perhaps we might say that we are granted the power of authorship over 
the text, able to override the ‘real’ author, but I would contend the opposite. In being granted this 
power, we quickly realise that noir resists our attempts to reshape it. The film, and its author, are 
not empowered, but noir, like The Ambassadors stages our powerlessness. 
Usefully, Lacan poses the question of fascination like this: ‘If one wishes to deceive a man, 
what one presents to him is the painting of a veil, that is to say, something that incites him to ask 
what is behind it.’29 The question that persists in noir criticism is what lies behind the fantasy 
screen of film noir, and what is its essence? The answer, of course, is nothing at all. Nevertheless, 
 
28 McGowan, p. 28. 
29 Lacan, The Four Fundamentals of Psychoanalysis, p. 112 
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noir critics have long since been fascinated with noir’s fascination — fascinated by fascination 
itself — often without acknowledging that this is the case. The word fascination appears frequently 
in noir criticism as cinematic fascination rose to prominence within film theory more generally. 
As Harris observes:  
For while noir's critical history began effectively at the same moment that cinematic fascination 
became central to psychoanalytic film theory — the mid-1970s — when noir was called 
“fascinating,” the term itself passed with no more theoretical definition than in its empty, 
everyday use. Equally, there was no effort within the noir field to rethink fascination, either by 
expanding its range of cultural and philosophical references or by giving it historical 
specificity. As a result, fascination in noir has been at once massively overexposed and almost 
completely overlooked, as if playing out the very blindness at the heart of vision that defines 
its effect.30 
Harris’ final point links the psychoanalytic definition of fascination to noir criticism itself, as well 
as something in the films themselves. He speculates about critics being bound by the same 
blindness that they seek to uncover in noir. If we turn to the critics themselves, it seems that, at 
best, the critical use of the word fascination simply gestures towards a vague sense of the identity 
and character of film noir. It acts as a rhetorical device, an empty one at that, which allows the 
author to focus on another aspect of film noir. This is the ‘empty, everyday use’31 to which Harris 
refers. Most books writing on film noir, especially introductory texts, follow the same structural 
pattern insofar as they highlight the definitional complexity of noir (its retroactivity, its loose 
definition etc.), then conclude that it is indeed a fascinating field of study. At worst, the use of 
 




fascination indicates an over-reliance on shorthand where depth is required, and a hesitancy to 
properly engage with fascination in its proper psychoanalytic and historical contexts. Critical 
shorthand is, of course, necessary in some scenarios. However, what piques my interest is that it 
seems that many critics use the word fascination to describe something vague and inherent in film 
noir. Most critics seem to stress, accidentally or not, that fascination is important to understanding 
film noir, but rarely attempt to define precisely what they mean when they claim that noir is 
fascinating. 
If we take a few examples from some of the most famous works on noir, we can see this 
ambivalent use of fascination in action. In Hollywood in the Forties, first published in 1967, 
Charles Higham and Joel Greenberg attempt to describe the typical noir scene in a section 
problematically called ‘Black cinema’: ‘Cocktail bars, too, exercise a special fascination: mirrors, 
stretching to the ceiling, reflect the stew of the faces.’32 While this style of affective writing is 
meant to evoke the loosely defined noir mood, it falls into fascination’s trap. In trying to write 
suggestively, their description of a typical noir scene obfuscates any definition of noir. Fascination 
is, as Harris points out, ‘massively overexposed and almost completely overlooked’33 — used as 
a synonym for ‘interesting’ but intended to express something more. Again, writing about Lewis 
Allen's So Evil My Love (1948)34, Higham and Greenberg argue that ‘the chief fascination of this 
film, full of fog, ferns and plush, drawn from a novel by Joseph Shearing, lies in its portrait of 
will.’35 A few pages later, they discuss noir directors, notably Robert Siodmak, remarking that his 
‘Germanic pessimism and fascination with cruelty and violence are not in doubt.’36 Whereas in the 
 
32 Charles Higham and Joel Greenberg, Hollywood in the Forties (United States: The Tantivy Press. 1967), p. 20. 
33 Harris, ‘Film Noir Fascination: Outside History, but Historically so’, p. 3. 
34 So Evil My Love, dir. by Lewis Allen, (Paramount British Pictures, 1948). 
35 Higham and Greenberg, p. 34. 
36 Ibid. p. 22. 
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first two examples, fascination is somehow connected to mirrors, doubling and an obscurity of 
vision (‘full of fog’)37, in the latter example their employment of the term lapses into a non-point 
about European stereotypes being merely interested (for that is what ‘fascination’ means here) in 
violence and cruelty. In this way, fascination is stripped of its historical and theoretical context. 
Additionally, the definitional ambiguity of film noir is highlighted in this short section because 
Higham and Greenberg, strangely, do not consider The Maltese Falcon (1941) or The Lost 
Weekend (1945) film noirs, but rather ‘melodrama’.  
In 1972 Paul Schrader published ‘Notes on Film Noir’, one of the most influential essays 
on film noir and one which energized critics to examine noir more closely. In it, Schrader writes 
rather emptily of ‘the fascination [that] film noir holds for today's youth’38 and that film noir is 
‘equally interesting to critics.’39 Edward Dimendberg employs fascination to emphasise the 
historical position of film noir in relation to the war in his 2004 book, Film Noir and the Spaces of 
Modernity. Film noir, Dimendberg writes, ‘conveys a palpable fascination for a transitional period 
in American society whose seemingly transparent social structure — a world in which power 
relations could still be traced with relative ease by a morally irreproachable detective figure —  
would shortly vanish.’40  
In the twenty-first century, fascination begins to take on, as Harris argues, a more 
‘introspective turn’ which grapples with the ‘enduring appeal’ of noir, its ‘power to fascinate.’41 
In 2008 James Naremore suggests that ‘our contemporary fascination with noir may entail a sort 
 
37 Ibid. 
38 Paul Schrader, ‘Notes on Film Noir’, p. 53. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Dimendberg, Spaces of Modernity, p. 4. 
41 Harris, ‘Film Noir Fascination: Outside History, but Historically so’, p. 4. 
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of Nachträglichkeit, or method of dealing with the present by imagining a primal scene.’42 
Naremore’s use of fascination in conjunction with Freud’s Nachträglichkeit (or afterwardness) 
hints at a relationship between the two: that it is exactly the impossibility of imaging the primal 
scene which is affected by the blindness involved in fascination. Žižek, for instance, makes this 
connection explicit when he discusses the ‘the gaze of other’, of the hypothetical, mythic 
spectator.’43  Naremore cleverly shifts the focus of fascination away from the films themselves and 
onto the spectator and critic. In the 2013 book, A Companion to Film Noir, Yvonne Tasker opens 
her essay by asserting that film noir ‘has proven to be a fascinating site of inquiry for feminist film 
criticism.’44 Finally, Elizabeth Cowie states: ‘What must be explained is the continuing fascination 
with this fantasy long after the historical period that is supposed to justify it’.45 She concludes that 
‘the pleasure and fascination of the fantasy of the duplicitous woman in film noir are, no doubt, as 
varied — or limited — as the different forms the fantasy takes. ‘46 Cowie initially deploys 
fascination to mean an academic interest in noir as a film genre. Yet, here, there is an admission 
of a more complex definition of fascination. 
Unfortunately, few critics follow Cowie’s more circumspect use of the term. Fascination 
as the default go-to term to describe noir can be found in almost every book with noir as its main 
focus. In Ian Brookes’ 2017 book, Film Noir: A Critical Introduction, for example, Brookes begins 
his introduction by stating that his book is ‘designed to provide an introduction to one of the most 
 
42 Naremore, More Than Night, p. 4. 
43 Žižek. Looking Awry, p. 112. 
44 Yvonne Tasker, ‘Women in Film Noir’, A Companion to Film Noir, first edn. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing) p. 
353. 
45 Cowie, ‘Film Noir and Women’, p. 123. 
46 Ibid. p. 124. 
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fascinating, complex, and problematic categories of film,’47 repeating the empty definition of 
fascination that appears in earlier critics’ work.  
More than anything else, there is, as Krutnik writes, a kind of ‘noir mystique’48, something 
imperceptible and deceitful about noir that noir criticism can often obfuscate rather than illuminate. 
Harris triangulates this concern of fascination precisely between ‘cinematic fascination and 
hermeneutic or historical activity’, in which, he claims ‘interpretive criticism is forced to confront 
the noir paradox that blindness within vision itself makes possible a kind of vision in blindness.’49 
Since we understand film noir through the lens of critics, how do we contend with critics’ ongoing 
fascination with fascination itself in film noir? It is not enough simply to define fascination and 
apply this definition to the films themselves, since, in some part, film noir is a critical construction 
as well as a textual and filmic one. As Vernet observes, ‘speaking about film noir consists, from 
the beginning, in being installed in repetition.’50 Here, Vernet is suggesting (if only implicitly) the 
possibility that the films themselves will dissolve away to be wholly replaced with a critical 
simulacrum, as if to mirror the effect of fascination itself. Perhaps this is why critics feel compelled 
to gesture towards noir’s complex definitional history and equally eager to move on from it as 
quickly as possible. To write about film noir is to always write about writing about film noir 
because criticism cannot be easily distinguished as secondary to the films themselves.  
When Lacan asks us what lies behinds a veil, how much attention should we pay to the veil 
itself, or the stage upon which the veil stands? The secret posed by fascination is that there is no 
secret, no wizard behind the curtain, but that fascination merely recreates the structure of secrets. 
 
47 Ian Brookes, Film Noir: A Critical Introduction (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017), p. 1. 
48 Krutnik, p. 28. 
49 Harris, ‘Film Noir Fascination: Outside History, but Historically so’, p. 4. 
50 Marc Vernet, ‘Film Noir on the Edge of Doom’, p. 2. 
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Like the curtain in Fritz Lang’s The Testament of Dr Mabuse (1933)51, fascination does not so 
much conceal, but rather stages the illusion that there is something to conceal; it acts a kind of 
meta-secret, one which never satisfies once revealed. Since fascination revolves around the objet 
petit a, the Other’s jouissance, and therefore not around any specific object, we can say that 
fascination is a structural relation because it describes the relationship between the subject and 
Other’s jouissance. In this way, we can see how the supposedly ‘special’ object (for example, the 
Maltese Falcon) is not special at all because it can be replaced by anything else. The staging of the 
illusions is the illusion itself. 
If we take an example from a neo-noir film, Bryan Singer’s The Usual Suspects (1995),52 we 
can see how fascination is central to noir’s narratives. The film’s pivotal line, spoken by Verbal 
Kint, ‘The greatest trick the devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn't exist’, seems to 
suggest that Keyser Soze, the film’s mystical antagonist, does exist but that he operates at the level 
of myth. Although he is a mythical figure, he can be caught. However, the film’s twist ending, 
where Kint is revealed to be faking his injury and timidity, suggests that, perhaps, Kint is Soze. 
Soze’s strategy to avoid the police is to hide in plain sight: the investigators cannot see what is 
right in front of them. What is important here, though, is the implication that Kint makes up (or at 
least gives different names to) certain details of the story from the cork board behind Kujan, the 
investigating detective, thereby introducing doubt into his whole story. Did Kint simply change 
the nouns in his story, or did the names on the cork board function as the skeletal structure for his 
fabricated story? By answering these questions, we are already caught in fascination’s trap.  
 
51 The Testament of Dr. Mabuse, dir. by Fritz Lang (Nero-Film, 1933). 
52 The Usual Suspects, dir. by Bryan Singer (Gramercy Pictures, 1995). 
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‘The secret’, Harris writes, ‘disappears when its meaning outside or behind the work is 
discovered.’53 To complicate matters further there is a repetition of names beginning with the letter 
‘K’ (Kint, Kujan, Kobayashi, Keyser Soze) which serves to confuse the relationship between 
signifier and signified so that it becomes ambiguous which ‘K’ refers to what or to whom. Part of 
the audience’s experience is to be confused over what we imagine we have heard. The central 
question ‘what/who does Keyser Soze refer to?’ is complicated by these other competing names. 
Instead of considering who Keyser Soze ‘empirically’ is (perhaps the central trick of the film as a 
whole), we are encouraged to read Kint’s rhetorical question in the opposite way: what if the 
greatest trick the devil ever pulled was convincing the world he did exist? In this formulation, the 
law chasing Soze are chasing a myth that does not exist and since they are convinced Soze is the 
culprit, they will only uncover ‘the next clue’ to Soze; the answer is always deferred. Soze is not 
someone (or something) who can be physically apprehended because he is criminality itself. His 
symbolic texture is reduced to the level of fascinating secret, one that simply recreates the structure 
of a secret. As a myth that purports to exist, Keyser Soze functions as the objet petit a for the 
police, and for the audience. Soze is an object that came into being as lost and can thus never be 
recovered, yet nonetheless is endlessly pursued. He is the object-cause of investigative desire. The 
secret of Keyser Soze is that there is no secret and there is no Soze, only Verbal Kint (whose names 
resemble a verbal hint), who, through the police’s blind search for Soze, has already disappeared. 
This reversal of Kint’s original quote is a distillation of the mechanics of fascination, drawing us 
in, to ask: what is behind the veil? As Harris writes, ‘the fascination of the secret is itself the secret 
of fascination.’54  
 
53 Harris, William Burroughs: The Secret of Fascination, p. 10. 
54 Harris, William Burroughs: The Secret of Fascination. p. 9. 
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Fascination marks a visual territory in which we both see too much and too little. I will look at 
a few key points of overlap in Dark Passage (1947) and Shadow of a Doubt to show how 
fascination marks a visual and narrative territory in which we both see too much and too little. In 
Dark Passage, the strange first-person perspective promises us a perfect replica of Vincent Parry’s 
vision, but it only serves to reinforce our blindness, and indeed make us acutely aware that we 
cannot see. These concerns, moreover, bleed into the film’s construction of the home through the 
couple of Bogart and Bacall. In Shadow of a Doubt, the focus on visual and narrative relates to the 
way in which Uncle Charles hides in plain sight. More specifically he hides within the home. The 
family home in the film is an example of home being completely central (it is the space which 
must be seen and understood) but also completely absent (the characters go to great lengths so as 
to not admit that the problems originate from within the home and the smalltown community). 
In Dark Passage, Vincent Parry, a recently escaped convict from San Quentin who was 
(wrongfully) imprisoned for murdering his wife, encounters Irene Jansen during his escape. Irene, 
strangely, has a peculiar interest in his case and believes him to be innocent. To evade the police, 
Vincent visits a plastic surgeon who performs an operation to change his appearance. Vincent then 
becomes framed for another murder, this time of his friend George. After this, he proceeds to find 
out who set him up for both the murder of George and his wife, Madge. When he confronts Madge, 
she dies as she falls through her apartment window. Vincent is forced to leave America and retire 
to Peru in order to evade his arrest and after a short time, Irene joins him. The film’s plot therefore 
concerns itself with marriage and the production of the familial home. Vincent is accused of 
murdering his wife and therefore breaking up a family; Irene’s father was similarly falsely 
convicted and died in prison. When confronting a detective, Vincent says that he is hiding from 
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his ‘wife’, ‘friends’, ‘family’, ‘everybody.’55 Vincent must live as a stowaway in Irene’s apartment 
before they end up together, forming the Hollywood couple. This formation seems fairly typical 
(especially so considering that the stars are Humphrey Bogart and Lauren Bacall), yet in the 
context of Irene’s deceased father, this construction of the couple could indicate Irene’s desire to 
replace the father, or that the death of her father somehow prevented her from assuming the social 
role of a mother. After removing the bandages from his surgery, Vincent remarks: ‘I sure look 
older. That's all right, I'm not. If it’s all right with me, it ought to be all right with you.’56 Here, 
Vincent takes on the appearance of Irene’s older father. Indeed, one of the notable aspects of 
Bogart and Bacall’s celebrity relationship was the age gap between them — Bogart was 48 and 
Bacall was 23. The casting of Bogart and Bacall, too, means that there is no ‘formation’ to do 
because of the pairs real-life and high-profile marriage. By proving Vincent innocent, Irene hopes 
to similarly exonerate her father. Vincent and Irene’s father are therefore doubles for each other. 
Such a connection is implied after Vincent’s surgery when he cannot look after himself — and is 
reduced to the level of a pre-Oedipal child — and Irene adopts the role of a mother feeding him 
soup.  
Much like Double Indemnity, Dark Passage can be understood as principally a familial drama. 
Both films end with an irrevocable separation and the destruction of the family. Although Irene 
and Vincent do form a couple at the end of the film — unlike Neff and Phyllis in Double Indemnity 
— they can do so only in Peru, away from home. Their exile from America undercuts the social 
importance and ideological function of the formation of the couple because it is primarily a 
metaphor for the social cohesion of American society. In the context of wartime and the 
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reconciliation of veterans during the immediate postwar period, Vincent’s conviction for wrongful 
incarceration can be read in terms of his rehabilitation as a ‘war veteran’. In this way, the film 
distinguishes between American soldiers killing enemy combatants and murder within society, 
with the former being seen as ‘accidental’ and morally permissible. Dark Passage’s symbolic goal 
of attempting to reconstruct the ruined families and homes of postwar America is thwarted. As 
Kelly Oliver and Benigno Trigo argue, the disintegration of patriarchal authority is ‘the source of 
the anxieties and fatalism in noir.’57 In Dark Passage, patriarchal authority continually struggles 
to assert its dominance. Irene’s father, for instance, is wrongfully convicted, as is Vincent. After 
his escape, Vincent cannot marry Irene in America. Vincent’s anxiety and paranoia stem from his 
inability to restore his patriarchal power in a postwar setting. The process of returning is difficult 
since there is an expectation that the place, which is returned to, and the person who returns, are 
the same as when they ‘left.’ Vincent returns from ‘war’ (or prison) literally looking like a different 
person and in some sense, is a different person. Indeed, for us, Vincent is a new person because 
we are only introduced to him after his escape. While Irene and Vincent resolve their respective 
traumas, it is American society that rejects this new formulation of family and refuses to grant 
them a home. The home, or rather Irene’s home, is primarily a place of concealment, a place in 
which the law is fooled and undermined.  
What is particularly peculiar and noteworthy, however, is the form of Dark Passage, which, 
up until Vincent has his appearance altering surgery, mostly follows Vincent’s point of view — 
similar, in this respect, to Robert Montgomery’s Lady in the Lake (1947).58 The formal oddity of 
restricting the audience’s visual field helps the film explore the relationship between visual and 
 
57 Oliver Trigo, Noir Anxiety, xiii. 
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narrative blind space. The first-person perspective makes us aware of how the camera and editing 
constantly restricts our view and therefore, actively denies us what we — and Vincent — want to 
see. Fascination is here rendered visually. The staging of Vincent’s blindness (through our — 
almost — total alignment with his vision) is achieved through the obvious blind spots such 
techniques foreground. Combined with Vincent’s paranoia over being caught by the police and the 
plot’s main mystery, there are two seemingly paradoxical visual fears. First, there is an incessant 
sense of danger beyond the frame of the cinematic image, that the view is restrictive. Second, there 
is the fear that nothing exists beyond the frame since it is so highly controlled and centred around 
Parry’s first-person perspective. The narrative and visual spaces are inherently perilous since we 
lose our objective distance. This is the central visual and narrative paradox: by showing us 
precisely what a character sees, we are inevitably irritated by what we cannot see and ultimately, 
by what is limiting about vision itself. As J. P. Telotte says, the subjective camera in Dark Passage 
produces ‘a distancing effect’ which is ‘compounded by another resulting awareness, that of an 
unaccounted for blind spot or absence, something that remains frustratingly just outside our field 
of view — the character and the space he occupied.’59 By offering us a privileged position — the 
secret of Vincent’s vision — we are further alienated from Vincent because we rely entirely on 
what he sees.  
The gaze is established at the point at which the object looks back, the objet petit a. For Todd 
McGowan, the ‘the subject posits the objet petit a as the point of the Other's secret jouissance.’60 
In Dark Passage, we are forced to confront this impossible problem of the Other’s secret 
jouissance, what Telotte calls the ‘blind spot of absence.’61 What is questioned on both a filmic 
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and psychoanalytical level are the ways in which we see and are seen.62 Telotte’s designation of 
the visual ‘absence’ relates to an understanding of the film’s visual form as innately traumatic, 
since trauma, in psychoanalysis, is usually defined precisely as absence. The objet petit a, as 
‘leftover of the Real,’63 serves as an example of this idea because it is an impossible object and is 
defined, by the subject, by its absence, hence the continuing search for it. Similarly, Lacan’s order 
of the Real is understood as an absence which continually repeats itself. As Žižek argues, quoting 
Lacan, ‘unconscious trauma repeats itself by means of some small, contingent bit of reality.’64 In 
absence, then, as with trauma, there is repetition. This understanding of the film’s visual field and 
of noir’s more generally, casts Irene and Vincent’s formation as a couple in a much less favourable 
light. Rather than being two traumatised individuals overcoming their respective traumas in a 
symbolic move to restore the national trauma, it is instead simply a traumatic repetition borne from 
an inability in Vincent’s vision.  
In Dark Passage, Irene, in Vincent’s eyes, takes on this fascinating, traumatic absence at the 
heart of his vision because she becomes the traumatic Thing. The Thing, or das Ding in Lacanian 
thought, is ‘the beyond of the signified — that which is unknowable in itself […] a lost object that 
must be continually refound.’65 Like the objet petit a, ‘it is the desire to fill the emptiness or void 
at the core of subjectivity and the symbolic that creates the Thing, as opposed to the loss of some 
original Thing creating the desire to find it.’66 For Vincent, Irene represents an unknowable 
enigma. There is, first and foremost, the question of why she is helping him. The threat of betrayal 
is always there, always mediated by her gaze at us. Ostensibly, she is helping him because of a 
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shared trauma, an injustice, but the core reason is to replace the father figure. In Žižek’s reading, 
which I agree with, ‘The failure of the paternal metaphor’67 is both the death of her father and 
Vincent’s failure as a husband which precludes their successful ideological formation.  
Žižek makes the connection between women in noir, fascination, and trauma explicit: ‘The 
femme fatale is nothing but a lure whose fascinating presence masks the true traumatic axis of the 
noir universe, the relationship to the obscene father, i.e., the default of the paternal metaphor — 
all the usual babble about “latent homosexuality” misses completely the primordial dimension of 
this relationship.’68 Such ‘babble’ about homosexuality can be seen in Highham and Greenberg’s 
work, where they write of Uncle Charles in Shadow of a Doubt, ‘[Charlie]…shows himself a 
genuine occupant of film noir: in a café, he tells his niece that the universe is a "foul sty", and over 
dinner he discloses something of his neurotic, perhaps basically homosexual loathing of women.’69 
In addition to the small error about meeting in a café (it is in fact a late night bar called ‘Til-Two’) 
their argument that homosexuality involves ‘basically’ a loathing of women marks out Hollywood 
in the Forties as a work which should not be taken entirely seriously. As Paul Gordon claims, 
Charles’ pathology is better described as a repressed incestual desire towards Charlie. He writes 
that Charles’ ‘modus operandi does make sense, however, if his real desire is not money but murder 
and if his hatred is really a repressed form of sexual desire.’70  
The bar scene which Highham and Greenberg refer to is more complex than simply revealing 
Uncle Charles to be a ‘genuine occupant of film noir.’71 Immediately after Charles refers to the 
universe as a ‘sty’, he asks: ‘Do you know if you ripped the fronts off houses you'd find swine?’ 
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Charles, here, indicates the ideological façade of home.72 For Charles, home has no coherent 
internal consistency, it is just a screen, a projection of safety instead of safety itself. Indeed, this 
speaks to one of the principal concerns of Shadow of a Doubt, that the idyllic suburban American 
life produces or fosters evil. In The Stranger, too, the home’s idyllic surroundings are what allow 
Franz Kindler to evade arrest. When meeting his old Nazi friend, Kindler says,  
Well, guess what I’ll be doing at six o’clock tonight? Standing before a minister of the gospel 
with a woman’s hand in mine, a daughter of a Justice of the United States Supreme Court, a 
famous liberal. The girl’s even good to look at. Yes, the camouflage is perfect. Who would 
think to look for the notorious Franz Kindler in the sacred precincts of the Harper School 
surrounded by the sons of America’s first families? And I’ll stay hidden, until the day when 
we strike again.73 
Kindler’s speech is perhaps the clearest crystallisation of the fears surrounding the ‘enemy 
within’ during the postwar period, and the home acts the ‘perfect camouflage’. The home in these 
two instances is idyllic in the sense that it is held up as the template of American ideology working 
in its purest form. The detectives hunting Charles in Shadow of a Doubt even pose as 
photographers to capture a quintessential American household, only for Emma (Young Charlie’s 
mother) to insist on using the proper recipe for a cake which takes much longer to make than the 
detectives would like. It is the relationship between details and the larger image, the ‘concrete and 
the specific’, which the film concentrates on. 74 
 
72 Shadow of a Doubt (1943). 
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As Donna Kornhaber argues in her essay on the diegetic objects in Shadow of a Doubt, 
Hitchcock’s obsession over the specificity of objects ‘exceeds the immediate needs of the story 
and thereby anchors the film in the world it depicts.’75 The specificities of the objects76 are not 
there in place of the general, but rather stand on their own. As Kornhaber concludes: 
As in much of Hitchcock’s work, objects resonate on a number of symbolic registers, 
embodying in miniature, for example, the exchanges of power and authority, the imposed 
nostalgia, or the ruptures to established routines that Uncle Charlie’s homecoming brings 
about. [...] These objects are part of the physical fabric of their world […] And so it is all 
the more troubling when many of these rich physical details become implicated in Uncle 
Charlie’s sinister purposes.77 
Hitchcock’s treatment of objects defamiliarises them and empties them of meaning, only to fill 
them back with meaning in the context of the narrative. As Charles says: ‘Ah, details, they’re most 
important to me. Most important. All the little details.’78 The most sinister application of this, as 
Kornhaber notes, occurs when Charles locks Charlie in the garage with the car’s engine running 
in order to murder them.79 Charles uses the house and the car as weapons against the family; homes 
and suburban communities are no longer safe, idyllic places, but places of irreconcilable danger. 
The ending of the film, for example, involves the communal mourning of Charles as Charlie and 
Graham (the police detective) signal their romantic involvement. The production of Charlie and 
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Graham as a couple is intended to, as R. Barton Palmer argues, ‘preserve the illusions of smalltown 
life.’80 Graham’s position as detective limits what conclusion he (and thus the film) is able to come 
to. ‘He can assist’, Palmer continues, ‘in the containment of Charlie’s madness, but he cannot re-
order the society which views the criminal as saviour.’81 Home may be a façade — in Charles’s 
view a veil — but the surface is important because that is all there is. Home is therefore the objet 
petit a because the fascinating object is nothing but surface: there is no contingent reality beneath 
it. Nothing lies behind the veil. In noir, home is fantasy precisely because it is understood through 
the prism of fascination as an objet petit a, not an object unto itself but a screen on to which the 
objet petit a is projected. The rest, as Charles says, is just ‘peaceful, stupid dreams.’82 
 
‘Historical…but not dated’ — The Fascinating Nexus of Noir’s History 
In noir, homes themselves are lacunae, unconscious gaps in memory, or, in psychoanalytic terms, 
an objet petit a, that long-lost object of nostalgia that was never even owned in the first place. As 
Charlies mother, Emma Newton, says in Shadow of a Doubt, the house ‘owns us’.83 Theorising 
home in this way allows us to understand and interpret instances of homes in noir and their 
symbolic significance, but also sheds light on the ‘homelessness’ of noir. In the opening chapter, 
I discussed the conceptual and definitional problems faced by noir. There is an overriding, critical 
homelessness in relation to noir: it is decentred, an object with no core. Noir is homeless in two 
senses. First, as a kind of genre scavenger, noir acquires and adapts details from other genres and 
styles. Even chiaroscuro lighting, one of noir’s most recognisable stylistic characteristics, can be 
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traced back to European gothic cinema in the twenties and thirties. It is only noir’s prolonged usage 
of such techniques which cements them as ‘characteristics of film noir’. Second, home, which 
serves as a symbolic metaphor for safety and certainty, is unusually absent. Like the absence of 
history itself, this points towards a certain traumatic dimension of noir; the question is not so much 
what is being repressed, but why. Perhaps one reason film noir is considered thematically ‘dark’ is 
the absent home, which brings with it a certain precarity, a lack of safety and moral certainty. 
The way film noir frequently deals with historical traumas and mysteries often clashes with 
the consistent historical setting of film noir. That is, the films are overwhelmingly set in an 
approximation of their present moment, the forties and fifties, with the intent of creating 
verisimilitude. It seems there is a near totalising desire to excavate the past, to bring it back from 
mere memory and to thus combat immobilisation in the present, a blockage which prevents a 
habitation of the past and traversal into the future. No matter how long narrators spend in the past, 
trying to discover every last detail, they are always forced to return to the static, homeless present. 
Film noir is thus traumatically present: the past is only memory, and the future an inaccessible 
dream.  
In The Architectural Uncanny, Anthony Vidler characterises this temporal uneasiness as 
the ‘anxiety of time’84. ‘This anxiety of time,’ Vidler argues, ‘as expressed in the intellectual 
attempts to imagine impossible futures or return to equally impossible pasts, was accompanied by 
a fascination with the consequence of time's errors.’85 Although there is another unfortunate use 
of ‘fascination’ here, it does not pertain to film noir specifically. Film noir is, then, imprisoned 
 





between impossible pasts and futures and this condition is imagined as an error of time, something 
which necessitates a solution. As Jacques Derrida writes in Spectres of Marx, a ‘haunting is 
historical, to be sure, but it is not dated.’86 Time moves in all directions, but with nothing to mark 
its passage, except a simulacrum of the present. Trauma can only be represented negatively, as 
opposed to desire, which is a positive and productive force. 
The experience of the Second World War brought about rapid changes in the conception 
of the American home and this is reflected in film noir’s particular approach to historicity. 
Principally, the dropping of the Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki changed how the 
Second World War was perceived. In twentieth and twenty-first century culture and media, the 
Second World War, in comparison with the First World War, is understood in starkly moralistic 
terms: in narrative or cinematic terms, America and the Allies were the protagonists and the Nazis 
and the Japanese the antagonists. Such an easy and readily available distinction is unbalanced by 
America’s usage of nuclear weapons. This is obviously not to suggest a moralistic inversion, but 
rather a questioning of whether ‘good’ can include nuclear obliteration. Moral dilemmas are 
frequently framed as accidental or circumstantial: Al’s murder of Vera in Detour (1945); Vincent’s 
incarceration in Dark Passage (1947); the Swede meeting Kitty Collins in The Killers (1946) as a 
result of Swede not wanting to go the movies; in The Woman in The Window (1944) Wanley’s 
chance meeting with Alice ignites the plot and similarly, Chris in Scarlet Street (1945) saves Kitty 
as he wanders the streets at night. In these and countless other noirs, ‘good’ is only understood as 
an absence. ‘Good’ is what is not portrayed in film noir. In the absence of a primal ‘good’ object, 
it therefore became imperative to create one to maintain the social cohesion during the war, hence 
why home’s necessity is heightened. Amongst the moral uncertainty of American supremacy, 
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home is elevated to an ideal state to which America must return. Home is romanticised as the 
necessary building block of American character, which is why the desire to create the family unit 
is so overwhelmingly strong in Hollywood cinema, and why the punishment for attempting to 
disrupt the family and the home is equally so overwhelming.  
One of the reasons for the various antagonisms during the postwar period in relation to 
home was the ‘communalising promise’87 of the war, that any socio-economic divisions 
(particularly after the Great Depression) might be healed if the country’s communal ideology all 
pointed in one direction. As Frank Krutnik argues, there was a sense that this ‘communalising 
promise’ was ‘betrayed’ and was instead replaced by an increased focus on consumerism.88 
Immediately following the war, the US experienced a massive increase in both the 
production and consumption of consumer durables, and one of the effects of this was an 
intensifying pressure for people to define themselves in relation to (the ownership of) mass-
produced objects. The idealised home, stacked with consumer goods, separated and 
protected from the social space of the town or the city, became a new 'temple' of aspiration 
and conformity. The suburbs defined the horizons of the new America, and they were 
testimony simultaneously to material wealth and to cultural alienation.89 
For Krutnik the home becomes the principal site of this renewed relationship with capitalist 
consumerism. The home, which once represented a respite from the social space, represents 
consumerist ideology more strongly. The home is somehow illustrative of a person’s character — 
as Sally Bayley writes, the home is ‘a lived manifesto of the everyday’90 — and such character is 
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built, as Krutnik argues, around a relation to consumer objects. Home, which was once seen as a 
respite from the speed and intensity of modern life, is no longer such a place. Instead, it is precisely 
because home is marketed as a kind of domestic rebellion against modern life that it supports 
consumer capitalism. Home is an inculcator for ideology, but also, more immediately, for the 
general temperament of an individual. Bayley writes that the American home precipitates a 
‘proportionate sense of reality.’91 Political reality is thus, in some sense, contingent on the semantic 
and symbolic stability of home. 
Home is transformed into something different, that of ‘a new “temple” of aspiration and 
conformity’.92 The American home is something unique which fosters a similarly unique American 
character. It is via this new configuration of home that an idealised form is also produced. Noir is 
sceptical of this revisionism and tackles the simultaneous production of the ‘new’ and ‘old’ by 
muddling the temporal distinction between the two. Home is a place which represents a new form 
of consumer culture, but the selling point of this ‘new’ culture is that it draws from the same well 
as the ‘old’ culture. The old can be found in the new, but noir’s inside out narratives question 
whether we can find the new in the old because the ‘old’ (past or history) in noir is largely a product 
of the new; the old is reconstituted in the retelling of history. Invariably, noir’s flashbacks involve 
a guilty protagonist recounting their sins — or having them recounted for them — to exorcise the 
past and forget it but in doing so they become trapped by their own history. The confessional tone 
of noir is rarely accompanied with a cathartic release. Although the films often give us the 
‘criminal’s side of the story’, we are nearly always encouraged not to take their side. 
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One counter example is Robert Siodmak’s The Killers (1946) which, partly, stages home 
specifically during a postwar context. Reardon, the insurance investigator assigned to the 
mysterious murder of Ole ‘Swede’ Anderson, carefully reconstructs Swede’s story after the fact 
through talking to various of Swede’s acquaintances. In this sense, Swede acts as the central, 
structuring, epistemological hole in the film; we hear people talk about Swede, but we never hear 
from Swede himself, only accounts of him by those who knew him and are willing to speak to 
Reardon. This difference is crucial. The ten ‘flashback’ sequences of the film are not the memories 
of those who share them to Reardon, but rather Reardon’s imagination of them. Memory is 
therefore contextualised as an excess, not as the process by which history is historicised, but that 
which prevents history from being understood. The structure of the film, then, is not necessarily 
marked by flashbacks, but more by imagination, an imagination which is filled by Reardon’s 
fascination.93 
Swede is mysteriously murdered at the beginning of the film, leaving behind only the 
cryptic phrase, ‘I did something wrong — once’,94 which is misinterpreted by Reardon as ‘Once, 
I did something wrong.’95 After Kitty dies and the secret of Swede dies with her, Reardon thinks 
that he has solved the case. Yet afterwards he is told by his boss that the result of his work is an 
extra ‘one tenth of a cent’ to the basic rate for his insurance company.96 Following this, Reardon 
turns and grins to the camera, as if delivering the final punchline to a comedy film. Structurally, 
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detective narratives transport the audience or reader from a state of ignorance to one of knowledge. 
Yet the concluding message of The Killers, at least according to Harris, is to resist the production 
of this ‘knowledge’ in favour of Swede’s unexplained knowledge. We are encouraged to disavow 
Reardon’s conclusion and activity in favour of Swede’s passivity. For Harris, The Killers forces 
the audience ‘to contemplate an extraordinary reversal: that it is Swede, the homme fasciné, blinded 
by faith, who can see a truth that Reardon, the detached viewer, cannot.’97 We are situated 
somewhere in between: we do not identify with Reardon insofar as we find his detached view 
inappropriate, unable to properly see. Swede’s final words remain fascinating for Reardon. His 
mistake in misinterpreting Swede’s final words is not, I would argue, an honest and negligible one, 
but one which highlights the problem with Reardon as an investigator and as such, the process of 
investigation. It is not simply a question of discovering what objective thing Swede did wrong, but 
rather understanding the guilt that wracks Swede and the affective reasons for his actions. Reardon 
asks the wrong question. By emphasising ‘wrong’ (‘once I did something wrong’ instead of ‘I did 
something wrong — once’), the focus of his investigation is on the fracture that Swede’s misdeeds 
caused.98 Swede’s original statement, however, stresses ‘once’; the problem for Swede, is, as 
Vidler writes, ‘a fascination with the consequence of time's errors.’99 As Harris concludes: 
‘memory ought to make mistakes.’100 
Yet our position differs from Reardon’s. Where he mishears the Swede, we hear exactly 
what he said. What compounds and motivates our fascination, however, is the way in which 
Swede’s final words are coupled with the empty stare he gives moments before his death: what 
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did Swede see that caused such passivity in the face of death? For, as Hugh Manon writes, film 
noir ‘is nothing if not paradoxical: as viewers, we look in only so as to recognize the impossibility 
of looking in.’101 Manon makes the important point that the structure of film noir’s detective 
narratives approaches the enigma as an unknowable, fascinating nexus which, when ‘resolved’, 
only reveals its status as enigma. He writes that noir ‘does not hermeneutically deploy the enigma 
as a narrative strategy; instead, it forces the issue of enigma itself, confronting the viewer with 
what Jack Shadoian has aptly described as ‘the paradox that one can look and look and not see 
what's happening’ in real life.’102 It is in The Killers where the noir audience is most directly 
confronted with a paradoxical image of our failure to see and understand. Swede’s look condemns 
him not only to death — since he is murdered by the hitmen — but ensures his story is forgotten 
and is subtly reshaped in every telling. Our look at Swede’s look enforces the powerlessness of 
our gaze: Swede looks past us, not at us.   
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Figure 3.4, The Killers, Dir. Robert Siodmak, (Universal Pictures, 1946) 
According to Žižek, one problem for hard-boiled detectives is that they are ‘involved’ in 
the libidinal circuit of desire ‘from the very beginning’103; they undergo a loss of reality and thus 
fail to really solve the crime. However, the problem in this film is precisely the opposite: it is 
Reardon’s insistence on his ‘objective’ investigative position which undermines his conclusion. 
His assertion of distance makes him an unsuitable candidate for the investigation. He does not 
declare distance when there is proximity, but his distance precludes a satisfactory conclusion, 
hence why the film has a comedic ending. Indeed, if the film is really Reardon’s story, a story 
about telling a story, then the film’s focus is wrong from the very beginning. The title, and therefore 
focus, of the film — the ‘killers’ — might, we assume, refer to the hitmen who murder Swede at 
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the beginning of the film. Since the film is adapted from the Hemingway short story of the same 
name, the way that the film is, in a sense, an imagining of what might have happened after the 
short story is important to consider. The film’s project is to answer the question of what the hitmen 
wanted, to fill in their desire left by Hemingway’s terse style. The historical problem faced by 
Reardon is reflected on a metacinematic level. 
What we see is a cinematic, a fantasmatic projection, or simulation of events rather than 
the events proper. ‘Talk mediates vision,’ Harris writes, and ‘interpretation is kept apart from 
spectating, and meaning is divorced from affect.’104 It is thus not only Reardon’s method of 
investigation that is incompetent but the very medium of cinema, especially its reliance on sight 
and vision, that is the problem. Reproducing the images of the past on the cinema screen obscures 
the past, diminishing its affect. However, noir’s error of time causes this effect, most notably 
Swede’s function as the temporal and epistemological black hole, the film’s — and Reardon’s — 
objet petit a, the lost object. In The Killers, the lost object, what Reardon misses, is not simply 
Swede, but in fact loss itself. History, too, is condemned to be forgotten through Reardon’s 
resistance to memory. As Tom Conley argues in his book, Film Hieroglyphs: Ruptures in Classical 
Cinema, the dialogue’s continual use of homonyms and the way in which it disconnects the sound 
and the image force spectators to ‘believe they must “catch up” with the narrative machine that is 
moving ahead of them.’105 I would argue this sense of narrative inertia, of always being one step 
behind, wanders into the realm of the historical. As an example, Conley focuses on the film’s 
opening scene, where the two eponymous killers harass a small-town diner. First, Nick Adams, 
the bartender, ‘blurts out, “Catch up.”’ For Conley, this is a homonym of ‘ketchup’, which makes 
 
104 Harris, ‘Film Noir Fascination: Outside History, but Historically so’, p. 12. 




‘an implicit sign telling viewers that we must now, in the identity and the gap of sight and sound, 
“catch up” in the narrative where feedback or relay is no longer possible. ‘106 I would argue, 
following up Conley’s observation, that the narrative ‘catching up’ is really a sign of the film’s 
temporally inverted narrativization; the past is always exceeding our grasp, and by trying to come 
to terms with it we already miss the latest revisionary detail. 
Even in film noirs without such flashback structures the same temporal inversion — and 
the loss it represents — can be noticed in the way that their narratives hinge on a single climatic 
revelation which serves to reconfigure the facts of the story in real time. To illustrate this, one 
might note the ending of The Woman in the Window (1944) which reveals that the events of the 
film have all been Wanley’s dream. This first dispels the narrative tension built up by the film. 
Before the revelation, it seemed as if Wanley’s deadly fate was sealed, that he will be killed, only 
for the film to reveal suddenly — almost too suddenly — that such tensions were merely illusory. 
However, by pulling back the curtain of cinematic realism — our so-called willing suspension of 
disbelief — the film highlights our spectatorial position in relation to Wanley’s fantasy scenario. 
After all, does the same, all too sudden, dispersal of tension exist once the film ends and we exit 
the auditorium? How can a narrative have ‘stakes’, and thus have meaning at all, if a film’s 
meaning dissipates once we leave our seats? 
The real purpose of the reveal is the opposite. Rather than suggesting that Wanley’s dream 
is simply a dream with no bearing on reality, the film suggests that the dream is symptomatic of 
the Real of Wanley’s desires, that impossible kernel of desire that only reveals itself in a dream. 





am a normal man like others and not a murderer!” but rather: in our unconscious, in the Real of 
our desire, we are all murderers.”’107 Wanley is at once rather pathetic (once his wife and children 
leave to go on holiday he immediately begins to fantasise openly about marital infidelity and being 
involved in a scandalous plot) and disturbing (what he really wants is murder and punishment). 
The film, through the twist in its ending, bizarrely enacts Wanley’s punishment on us; the movies 
are fantasies not in the sense of wish fulfilment but of continual deferral which punishes us for 
what we really want. 
The Woman in the Window’s ending thus re-contextualises its own history (and its notion 
of historicity) because although we thought we were watching a relatively straightforward 
mystery; the true mystery is something else entirely. Certainly, the reason the twist ending is 
difficult to predict is that there is no discernible difference between dream and reality in terms of 
cinematic style. It is as if cinema has trained us not to see this difference. The same can be said 
about ideology. A cognitive conception of ideology posits that ideology is a veil which conceals 
the ‘true’ identity of subjects, an illusion to be dispelled. However, this view of ideology assumes 
that a ‘real’ identity exists beneath the one that ideology constructs for us and as such, this identity 
is quiescent and somehow exists outside of power relations. In addition, it assumes that images are 
an imaginary dupe, an instrument of power to coerce us. As Claire Colebrook writes: ‘images are 
not pale replicas or second-rate versions of a real world. Images are fully real’108, a point which 
echoes Žižek’s reading of the film. 
What is unique about The Woman in the Window is the way it eschews any kind of 
recognisable ‘dream logic’, that is, broadly, a rejection of linear cause and effect, instead 
 
107 Žižek, Looking Awry, p. 16. 
108 Claire Colebrook, Deleuze (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 15. 
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embracing a more relational and symbolic approach to meaning and structure. The Woman in the 
Window, on the other hand, appears just like any other Hollywood film. In the world of film noir, 
there is no difference between dreams and reality and moreover, there are rarely differences 
between the way past and present are filmed. On a formal level, they are the same. The Woman in 
the Window rejects a linear narrative of history — of history being easy to recount — through 
subverting our expectations about the place of dreams in cinema. The inability to recognise the 
difference is emphasised further by Wanley’s profession as a psychology professor, who, at the 
beginning, gives a lecture in front of a blackboard which reads ‘Sigmund Freud’. Even expert 
knowledge is rendered useless. As argued earlier, Stranger on the Third Floor (1940) creates a 
similar effect. The dream contains the ‘true’ substance of the film, raising moral questions which 
hang over the film even after its unsatisfactory ending.  
Equally, The Woman in the Window uses the juxtaposition of Wanley’s comfortable home 
life (and by extension the gentleman’s club he attends) and the ‘noir universe’ that inhabits his 
dreams. On the one hand, the murderous consequences of Wanley’s dream are not accidental but 
a consequence of his stable, yet enervated home life; the tedium of married life in some sense 
creates the conditions for murderers. On the other, we must consider the inverse: that Wanley’s 
home life is the fantasy screen which hides the Real of his desire. Home, here, is not a place of 
comfort but a fantasmatic construction, a diversion for something else. For Lacan, fantasy is the 
mechanism by which we can safely approach the Real of our desire. Therefore, if home is a fantasy, 
then what is the desire being concealed? 
It is not necessary to claim that home is a fantasmatic construction solely using film noir 
because this proposition is also historically accurate. For example, it is false to claim that before 
the war home was a perfect ideological and psychological construction somehow corrupted by the 
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war. Rather, the war revealed home to be a construction. It is in this way — the trauma of the 
Second World War, the unspeakable horror suffered by its combatants and the effects on the 
civilian population — that home is transformed into a fantasy by necessity, as a coping mechanism 
and as a tool for ideological interpellation. Home, therefore, is a product of trauma. Kolk and 
McFarlane explore the affiliation between trauma and memory. They speak of trauma as a ‘black 
hole’, a central impassable nexus which makes memory traumatic, refusing to let it fade away. In 
Freudian terms, this is the difference between ‘mourning’ — a perfectly acceptable response to 
loss — and ‘melancholia’, where what is mourned has been ‘lost as an object of love.’109 Kolk and 
McFarlane further discuss Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and its effects on memory. 
‘Paradoxically,’ they write, ‘the ability to transform memory is the norm, whereas in PTSD the 
full brunt of an experience does not fade with time.’110 In film noir’s numerous flashback narratives 
the past similarly does not fade away. As Al says in Detour (1945): ‘Did you ever want to cut 
away a piece of your memory and blot it out? You can't, you know!’111 It is the imperative to forget 
colliding so strongly with this stubborn immutability of the past that imbues noir with its traumatic 
elements. History in noir — as told through flashbacks and through the detective reconstruction of 
the crime — is simply a story, yet this ‘simple’ story is difficult to resist and therefore the past 
becomes, oddly, both changeable and malleable (since it exists by virtue of the speaker) and 
unchangeable (since it is transformed into history). 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the ideological concept of home offers itself as 
an antidote to this disruption to the linearity of history because of the way that home can be held 
 
109 Sigmund Freud, ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
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110 Bessel A. van der Kolk and Alexander C. McFarlane, ‘The Black Hole of Trauma’, Literary Theory: An Anthology, 
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to be an idea which exists outside of time, and is thus immutable. In 1946 Frederick C. Crawford, 
the board chairman of the National Association of Manufacturers, said that ‘the home is the basic 
American unit.’ Home finds itself, then, at the centre of a promise of togetherness which would 
follow the end of the war. This, Krutnik asserts, is partly responsible for the cynicism prevalent in 
noir. It is certainly true that the vast majority of ‘classic’ film noirs were released after the war, as 
if, after the war’s end the acrid nihilism of film noir resonated more with the American public, or 
simply perhaps the end of the war created a greater appetite for cinema and allowed greater 
investment in the production of such films. Indeed, in 1946 alone some of the most important film 
noirs were released, namely The Big Sleep, The Blue Dahlia, The Dark Mirror,112 Gilda, The 
Killers, Notorious,113 The Postman Always Rings Twice, to name a few. In the following years the 
same trend continued. Clearly, the war had a catalysing effect on the substance of film noirs, which 
inevitably increased the volume of film noirs which were released. An additional factor to consider 
is the recognition, or designation, of film noir by Nino Frank in 1946 which undoubtedly 
accelerated the desire for such films because of the critical recognition of their artistic merit. This 
is not to say that postwar film noirs are always entirely distinct from earlier noirs. The Maltese 
Falcon (1941), for example, does not feel too dissimilar in tone and theme from The Big Sleep 
(1946) — both, of course, star Humphrey Bogart — yet the sheer volume and complexity of 
postwar noir films is worthy of consideration. The final factor to consider is not just Frank’s critical 
interest, but our own. Perhaps we are simply more willing to see noir in postwar films, since our 
interventions, as I have argued earlier, to some extent create or modify the category of noir. Here, 
encapsulated in this discussion of film noir’s popularity in relation to the war, we have a 
microcosm of the problem of historicity and trauma marked out by the Second World War itself. 
 
112 The Dark Mirror, dir. Robert Siodmak, (Universal Pictures, 1946). 
113 Notorious, dir. by Alfred Hitchcock, (RKO Radio Pictures, 1946). 
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That is, the concept of history as an unbroken continuum is questioned. To describe this 
phenomenon, Oliver Harris uses the phrase ‘outside history, but historically so’, borrowed from 
Maurice Blanchot’s The Writing of the Disaster, a phrase which he acknowledges bears some 
similarity to Walter Benjamin’s notion of historicity, ‘in which there always remains a traumatic, 
unhistorical gap or stasis that resists the false narrative continuum of History.’114 At the centre of 
film noir there lies an impenetrable, or unspeakable core. In noir, strangely, the causes of 
fascination with history and historical recovery are the trauma of the Second World War and noir’s 
own retroactivity. Both the war and noir’s own conception involve this impenetrable core that 
undermines their understanding. Through noir, the war cannot be looked at directly in order to be 
understood, we only see its fleeting borders. Next, I will consider how the very investigative 
structures of noir (both textually and critically) inform the problem of historicity. Moreover, I will 
examine how home, notably in Double Indemnity, functions in relation to investigative desire and 
noir’s historicity. 
 
The Impossibility of Investigative Desire 
Film noir’s impenetrable core should be understood structurally. One example of a structurally 
impossible object is the MacGuffin, a concept popularised by Hitchcock. In Lacanian terms, the 
MacGuffin is an example of the objet petit a, since it is supposedly the plot’s central object of 
concern, yet the specific properties of the object are of little concern and are often rarely discussed 
in the film — it is less the object of desire than the cause of desire. Swede’s final cryptic confession 
could be read as the MacGuffin in The Killers, since it motivates the action and desires of the plot 
 
114 Harris, ‘Film Noir Fascination: Outside History, but Historically so’, p. 6. 
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and characters but is not attainable because we can never know what Swede really meant by it, or 
if there is even a ‘real’ meaning to it. It does not matter which object finds itself as the MacGuffin, 
because the object could feasibly be replaced by anything else. The same is true of the objet petit 
a itself. The MacGuffin is a useful and simple device to conceive of the objet petit a: an empty 
point around which the narrative (or desire) revolves. The objet petit a has no ‘external’ 
consistency which is independent of the subject. It is therefore a relational object, not something 
that the subject ever possessed. Swede, too, is relational insofar as the narrative structure is a series 
of flashbacks told about the Swede, and not by him; we can only understand Swede vicariously. 
His story (that is, the one told by him) is the film’s objet petit a because it is precisely its absence 
which motivates the action and prompts the stories about him — they are only there because he 
cannot tell them himself. The story itself, constructed in its entirety by Swede, is an impossible 
object. 
In a famous exchange between Alfred Hitchcock and François Truffaut, Hitchcock 
explains the importance of the MacGuffin in his films: 
You may be wondering where the term originated. It might be a Scottish name taken from 
a story about two men in a train. One man says, ‘What’s that package up there in the 
baggage rack?’ And the other answers, ‘Oh, that’s a MacGuffin.’ The first one asks, 
‘What’s a MacGuffin?’ ‘Well,’ the other man says, ‘it’s an apparatus for trapping lions in 
the Scottish Highlands.’ The first man says, ‘But there are no lions in the Scottish 
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Highlands,’ and the other answers, ‘Well, then, that’s no MacGuffin!’ So, you see that a 
MacGuffin is actually nothing at all.115 
It is not terribly important what the object is (though it can be important depending on the 
relevance to the rest of the film) but rather what its position is within the film itself. Indeed, 
as Hitchcock says, it is ‘nothing at all.’116  
Figure 3.5, The Maltese Falcon (1941) 
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One example from film noir is the Maltese Falcon statue from the 1941 film. The statue is 
the central object of the film and motivates the plot, yet it quickly becomes largely irrelevant. What 
supersedes the Falcon is the competing desires of the criminals, the police, Brigid O'Shaughnessy, 
and Sam Spade himself. An important detail here is that we are never told why the Falcon is valued 
so much because it does not matter. As specified in the opening crawl, the Falcon itself is subject 
to myth insofar as its very material existence is in doubt. 117 This indicates the irrelevance of the 
Falcon’s materiality because the hunt for the object has superseded the object itself. Indeed, the 
Falcon that finds its way into Spade’s hands is deemed to be a fake by Gutman, yet how are we to 
determine whether or not it is in fact a fake?  The effect of this doubt is that the object’s symbolic 
efficacy is detached from the object. Without a material presence to regulate it, its meaning 
becomes overwhelming: it embodies desire itself. However, as Lacan claims, desire is never 
fulfilled. In Écrits, for instance, he notes that ‘man's desire is alienated in the other's desire,’118 and 
so, attaining this object will never result in the subject obtaining desire itself, since the Other’s 
desire is a point of impossibility. ‘Fulfilment’ of desire is always met with disappointment. It is 
exactly this absence, this lack of meaning, which gives the Falcon its fascinating properties. 
As Brigid O'Shaughnessy is taken away by the police, Sam Spade ends the film by saying 
that the Falcon is ‘the stuff dreams are made of’.119 The Falcon by this point is of little importance 
because, for Spade, it represents unattainability itself.120 The implication, since he has the Falcon 
in his hands, is that the Falcon’s fascinating grip has prompted his forgetfulness. The film, then, 
 
117 Additionally, the opening crawl implies a larger mythology and history for the film, as well as likening the film to 
serials such as Flash Gordon (1936) of 1930s. 
118 Jacques Lacan, ‘Variations on the Standard Treatment’, in Écrits, trans. by Bruce Fink (New York: W. W. Norton, 
2002), p. 285. 
119 The Maltese Falcon (1941). 
120 Spade is subtly misquoting Prospero in Shakespeare’s The Tempest (‘We are such stuff / As dreams are made 
on’), as if Spade can only half-remember the real quote. 
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expresses the traumatic condition of noir as outlined earlier. The objet petit a here may refer to the 
Falcon statue, but in other noirs which utilise non-linear narrative structures, the objet petit a could 
instead refer to the narrative impossibility of reconstructing a fragmented narrative into a linear 
and ‘coherent’ one. Non-linearity is not strictly necessary to argue that film noir is traumatic. 
Figure 3.6, The Maltese Falcon, Dir. by John Huston, (Warner Bros., 1941) 
In Falcon this is the statue; in Double Indemnity (1944) it is, in part, the retroactive 
narrative structure; in The Killers (1946) it is Swede’s fatal and fascinating look and his mysterious 
words. In the context of The Maltese Falcon’s investigative structure, the falcon represents the 
point of detective impossibility. As Spade says to O'Shaughnessy: ‘I don’t know what you want 
[159] 
 
done, I don't even know if you know what you want done.’121 The investigation hinges on Spade 
understanding the femme fatale’s desire and internalizing it as his own. As Spencer Selby argues, 
Spade ‘pretends to share the evil’122 of Gutman, Wilmer and Cairo over their obsession with the 
Falcon in order to outwit them. However, this pretence is cast in doubt as it is not clear whether 
Spade is acting or not. ‘Hammett’s detective hero,’ Selby continues, ‘is motivated by the same 
basic selfishness that leads the criminals he captures into evil.’ So there is a double lacuna at the 
centre of film: first, the Falcon, and second, Spade’s moral character. 
 
121 The Maltese Falcon (1941). 
122 Spencer Selby, Dark City: The Film Noir (London: St James Press, 1984), p. 9. 
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Figure 3.7, Double Indemnity (1944) 
Investigative desire in Falcon and Indemnity is focused around impossibility. In Indemnity 
in particular, home is the object in which this impossibility is felt most strongly, through its 
connection to Phyllis’s deception and Neff’s retroactive story. The home, through Neff’s 
retroactivity is always lost. One example of this ‘always lost’ property in Double Indemnity occurs 
when Neff first meets Phyllis. Both begin to engage in various conversational double entendres — 
which is no doubt a pun on the title of the film. On an immediate level, the double entendres are 
intended to evade the Hollywood censors, so that it can be established that there is a mutual sexual 
attraction between Neff and Phyllis without overtly alerting the Production Code. The most 
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obvious instance is when Phyllis says, ‘There's a speed limit in this state, Mr. Neff. Forty-five 
miles an hour’, to which Neff replies, ‘How fast was I going, officer?’ The use of double entendres 
act as a kind of neutered parapraxis.123 They assume the basic form of parapraxis but lack the truly 
unconscious dimension which gives it its power. The Production Code prohibited adultery which 
is ‘never a fit subject for comedy.’124 To be sure, Double Indemnity is not a comedy, but this 
badinage is clearly intended to be humorous. However, it is not simply adultery which is the 
problem in itself, but rather that adultery risks damaging the ‘sanctity of the institution of marriage 
and the home.’125 In Double Indemnity, both are threatened by Neff and Phyllis’ relationship as 
Neff instigates his advances within the family home. This is further highlighted by Neff noticing 
Phyllis’ ankle bracelet, a small sign of promiscuity. 
However, their initial interaction, when Neff first sees Phyllis standing above him (Fig 3.7), is 
more illuminating because of the many levels of misrecognition present in the script and how the 
film plays with the central conceit of double entendres, the effectiveness of which derives not only 
from recognising their double meanings but also from the idea that some people do not catch them 
as double entendres. The misrecognitions show that the home is lost through the film’s retroactive 
structure. While it is true, for instance, that Phyllis could not have had clairvoyance regarding Neff 
— she did not know that Neff would turn up at her door — the retroactive structure implicitly 
suggests that this is the case. Details are presented and understood in the context that Phyllis was 
manipulating Neff from the beginning. The opening exchange between Neff and Phyllis is 
particularly illuminating: 
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Walter Neff: How do you do Mrs. Dietrichson, I'm Walter Neff, Pacific All Risk. 
Phyllis Dietrichson: Pacific All what? 
Neff: The Pacific All Risk Insurance Company. It's about some renewals on the automobiles. 
I've been trying to contact your husband for the past two weeks but he's never in his office. 
Phyllis: Is there anything I can do? 
Neff: The insurance ran out on the fifteenth, I'd hate to think of you having a smashed Fender 
or something while you're not…fully covered. 
Phyllis: Perhaps I know what you mean Mr. Neff. I've just been taking a sunbath. 
Neff: No pigeons around I hope…Now about those policies Mrs. Dietrichson, I hate to take up 
your time, but… 
When Neff initially states that he is from ‘Pacific All Risk’, Phyllis quickly responds by 
mirroring and mimicking Neff: ‘Pacific All what?’ Through its absence, ‘risk’ hangs over the 
conversation. It saturates their entire relationship because of the flashback structure of the film 
reveals the effect of Neff’s actions and desires before we see the cause. Indeed, Phyllis’s phantom 
‘risk’ recontextualises the flashback structure itself. The flashback structure, Neff and Phyllis’s 
fractured relationship, and the loss of home are all intimately connected. If the intent Neff’s 
confession is to tell the story of why, not just how, he broke the law, then part of his narrative 
strategy is to contextualise his and Phyllis’s relationship as one which degraded due to their violent 
desire rather than one which was doomed from the start. But what Neff’s fails to mention, or fails 
to deem important, is that his and Phyllis’s relationship is predicated on this missing ‘risk’. 
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Phyllis’s missing risk centres the question of what is missing in Neff—what desire remains 
unfulfilled—and therefore what is missing from his version of events. 
Phyllis’s subversion continues when Neff misunderstands her and gives the full name of 
his company (‘The Pacific All Risk Insurance Company’). His correction here is done so under 
the guise that Neff is guiding the conversation, that he has the authority, that he is ‘insured’. Later, 
as we shall see, Neff himself is not ‘full covered’ by his own insurance; his own narrative 
reconstruction undermines his own position. And here, in the scene, the attempt to wrest control 
of the situation by insisting on his metaphorical ‘insurance’ is what undermines him. He tells 
Phyllis that he’s ‘been trying to contact your husband for the past two weeks’ only to find that he’s 
‘never in his office.’ To which Phyllis responds, ‘is there anything I can do?’126 If Mr. Dietrichson 
is ‘never in his office’, then he can only be at home instead. Yet, when Neff arrives, he does not 
find Mr. Dietrichson at his home. This prefigures Mr. Dietrichson’s spectral position in the film, 
as well as the way in which such spectrality informs Neff’s doomed plan. It is Mr. Dietrichson’s 
murder which must remain undetectable, yet he himself is a non-entity at the centre of the plan. 
Just as with Neff’s fascination with Phyllis, and our fascination with Neff’s fascination, there lies 
a void, an abyss, at the centre of desire.  
 
126 Double Indemnity (1944) 
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Figure 3.8, Double Indemnity (1944). Neff’s worried look after he says: ‘No pigeons around I 
hope… 
Yet, as the scene continues, we see that Neff is not in possession of the knowledge of desire 
Phyllis responds, ‘Perhaps I know what you mean Mr. Neff. I’ve just been taking a sunbath.’ To 
which Neff quickly and nervously responds with, ‘No pigeons around I hope…Now about those 
policies Mrs. Dietrichson, I hate to take up your time, but…’ At first, Phyllis acknowledges Neff’s 
innuendo—thus assuring him of his masculine authority—only to undercut him. Neff stumbles 
and trails off (‘I hate to take up your time, but…’), which undermines the sense of mastery that 
Neff (and implicitly, us, since we are aligned with him) thinks he has over Phyllis, and over 
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language itself.127 Their relationship is predicated on misrecognition because although Neff 
believes that he has caught Phyllis in a state of vulnerability — of ‘nakedness’ — in reality the 
power dynamic is actually reversed: it is Neff who is caught in Phyllis’ gaze, and therefore, her 
plan.  
This scene depicts, in fact, Neff recounting the first time he met Phyllis, and as such Neff 
frames it as him having power over her. Consequently, Neff presents his and Phyllis’ relationship 
as one in which he possessed and then lost her. Neff’s narrative revisionism is a way of repeating 
the past to make it real. However, with respect to repetition, Lacan emphasises the importance of 
the ‘ever avoided encounter, of the missed opportunity.’128 Neff’s verbal slippage — ‘no pigeons’ 
— does not so much signify the missed opportunity, where Neff excluded himself from Phyllis’ 
desire, but the point at which Phyllis saw Neff as a suitable vehicle for her plan. A re-examination 
of this scene highlights that Phyllis emerges as an ‘already lost’ object of desire. Attention must 
be paid to Neff’s perspective, a perspective which the audience assumes. The reverse-shot does 
not inhabit Phyllis’ viewpoint, since it is slightly zoomed in on Neff’s face, suggesting that he is 
being interrogated. We are watching him closely, and there is nowhere to hide, whereas our view 
of Phyllis is obscured. Neff mistakenly believes that he has caught Phyllis off-guard, that she is in 
a state of vulnerability, of nakedness, an object held within his desiring male gaze. Neff’s desire, 
here, is not simply for Phyllis, but a desire to have his masculine authority (as expressed through, 
amongst other things, his charming confidence, his gaze, and his professional ability to assist 
Phyllis) recognized. His veneer of power is initially supported by his confident joke, indicative of 
the professional and sexual power Neff has over Phyllis.  
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This assumption, however, is untrue. Phyllis is merely using Neff and intended to do so 
from the beginning and so Neff’s assumption of Phyllis sexual and romantic availability is 
misguided; Phyllis, as a sexual object, emerges as already lost and fundamentally impossible to 
attain. It is precisely through her staged ‘nakedness’ that Neff is fooled. Paradoxically, it is when 
the object is presented as most vulnerable, most attainable, that it slips further out of our grasp. 
Phyllis acts as both a screen for desires and controller of desires. Moreover, Phyllis’ staging re-
presents the home as a kind of trap for Neff. Whereas at first Phyllis’ sexuality and near-nakedness 
in the context of her home seems to imply vulnerability and homeliness, it is later revealed to have 
been an attempt to coerce Neff into committing murder. The home itself is duplicitous, enticing 
Neff. As he approaches the house his voiceover says: ‘it was one of those California Spanish 
houses everyone was nuts about 10 or 15 years ago, must'a cost 30,000 bucks.’129 Neff does not 
desire the home as such, but rather, he desires the symbolic hierarchy of the family which is 
implied by the home. His plan to murder Mr. Dietrichson is really one in which he installs himself 
as the patriarch of the ‘Dietrichson’ home. As a preface to his voiceover, he claims, ‘I killed [Mr. 
Dietrichson] ‘for money - and a woman - and I didn't get the money and I didn't get the woman.’130 
Yet, the phrasing of this apparently upfront statement of his desire puts money first, with Phyllis 
as an afterthought. Even Keyes recognises that the money is not the central conundrum of the 
investigation, it is a clue which directs the investigative eye towards wrongdoing. ‘Getting’ the 
woman implies getting the home, but, more importantly, the home is left out of his statement of 
desire. Neff cannot admit that he wants to become the head of the home; despite all the nefarious 
 




and criminal acts committed throughout the film, the one which cannot be admitted is that it was 
done in service of consummating the family home.  
Neff’s blindness is further deepened by the architecture of the Dietrichson home. His 
fascination for Phyllis and home is thus mirrored by the film’s retroactive structure and the 
investigative mode. The retroactivity of the narrative renders Neff’s investigative distance 
structurally impossible. We already know that Neff became caught up in the libidinal circuit of the 
investigation — showcased by his ‘perfectly perfect’ plan and his wound which we see from the 
opening scene — and that he lost his objective distance. The home, however, remains fascinating. 
It is the objet petit a in the sense that Neff desires it (and the status that comes with it), yet when 
he enters it his desire is not satisfied. For Bruce Fink, a psychoanalyst and translator of Lacan, 
desire is repetitious insofar as the function of desire is not to reach its goal, but to reproduce itself 
as desire. Desire, Fink writes, has ‘no object’. 131 It can be thought of as duplicitous and in some 
ways working against the subject. The way Fink defines it — ‘it does not seek satisfaction, but its 
own continuation’ — makes desire sound like a kind of parasitic infestation of the subject.132 
Instead, in the film, Neff’s desire is continually deferred, as he is hopelessly trapped by Phyllis’ 
gaze, and by his fascination for home.  
The fascination with noir, therefore, is with fascination itself. Many critics, especially 
earlier critics who help define and develop the category of noir, seemingly fell into fascination’s 
trap. As such, their endless descriptions of noir as ‘fascinating’ are both empty and incredibly 
instructive since they reproduce the fascination found in noir. In noir, therefore, history becomes 
 
131 Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 




a troublesome issue. The investigative structures of noir mirror that of the critical approaches to 
noir. Investigative structures seek to retroactively organise chaotic past into a coherent present. 
Moreover, it is through this process by which meaning, and coherence is generated in noir. Yet, 
the process of reconstructing the past is what makes it so inaccessible to noir. We might recall, Mr 
Wilson in The Stranger, when he reveals himself to be an agent of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. ‘The truth is I’m not really an antique dealer’, he says, ‘I’m sort of a…detective.’133 
Here, the profession of ‘antique dealer’ relates directly to Wilson’s role as a detective — a 
detective who seeks retribution on a former Nazi. An antique dealer is not only someone who 
examines the fine details of old pieces of art, crockery, and so forth, in order to identify their 
authenticity, but they are someone who uses their position to designate the worth of each antique. 
The second function of the antique dealer is crucial in understanding the methods of the noir 
investigator: they are not objectively understanding and defining events, they are determining their 
value to the investigation, to history itself. They are not illuminating history; they are creating it. 
In noir, what is ignored or what goes unspoken is often the key understanding the films. As I 
argued in The Killers, for instance, the fact that the one story we do not hear is Swede’s tells us 
that there is something ungraspable, something fascinating, in his story; and Reardon’s role as 
‘antique dealer’ results in him assigning value to all the wrong pieces. In Double Indemnity, too, 
Neff’s role as investigator forces him to ignore his desire for home. Home becomes a desire which 
the film cannot admit to itself; the home is not only desire, but cause. Home fits into this nexus of 
desire and history as an object of fascination. Home is central to many noir films, and thus crucial 
in interpretating their meaning, but it is both maligned in a majority of noir criticism and rarely 
acknowledged in the films themselves. The next chapter will examine the pathological 
 
133 The Stranger (1946) 
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implications of the fascinating desire for home in noir. Desire, as we shall see, results in various 





A Stranger in Someone Else’s House: Homesickness in Film Noir 
Like all other moments of crisis, of course, the incident had never ended. It sent its reverberations 
down to this very second, this very place, and all but shook the glass from his hand. Was the 
incident finally closed? But in a sense, it was only happening now, for the first time. 
Charles Jackson, The Lost Weekend.1 
Fig. 4.1, The Lost Weekend, dir. By Billy Wilder, (Paramount Pictures: USA, 1945) 
 
1 Charles Jackson, The Lost Weekend (New York: Vintage Books, 2013 [1944]), p 89. 
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‘Let me work it out my way’ — Homesickness and Rehabilitation 
Although home is often the central desire in film noir, it is rarely explicitly recognised as such. Its 
position is contradictory: it is the object of desire, yet at the same time it is displaced in other 
desires. Hence, it is a fascinating object in noir; the more we, and noir’s protagonists, try to locate 
its nexus, the more its meaning becomes displaced and fractured. In this chapter, I will examine 
how addiction can illuminate how desire works in relation to home in noir through Billy Wilder’s 
film adaptation of The Lost Weekend (1945). Don’s alcohol addiction in the film can help us 
understand the metaphorical sickness and anxiety produced by an ideology of home. The first 
section, therefore, will look at homesickness more broadly and the strategies employed in and by 
the film to rehabilitate Don. In the next section, there will be a focus on the ways in which drug 
addiction interacts with desire and fascination from a psychoanalytic perspective. I will examine 
the ways in which drug addiction reveals the Real of desire to the subject, and thus allows them to 
circumvent the cycle of desire. I will argue that Don’s desire for alcohol should be read as a desire 
for nothingness itself. The subsequent sections will explore the roles that ideology and nostalgia 
play in addiction, desire, and home. I will differentiate between knowledge and belief in relation 
to ideology. Specifically, the way in which desire is constituted through suppression and 
maintained through guilt is correlative to how noir’s narrative involves a level of punishment. 
Fascination produces a certain anxiety surrounding the home due to how fascination 
foregrounds the objet petit a. This anxiety manifests itself in noir as a feeling of homesickness. 
Homesickness, as I employ the term, embodies the contradictory conceptualisation of home. It 
describes a longing for home in its absence — what Anthony Vidler calls a ‘nostalgia for the true, 
natal, home.’2 Homesickness’s definition alters depending on the definition of home and its 
 
2 Vidler, The Architectural Uncanny, p. 7. 
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position within a film. For instance, the difference between what home is believed to be and its 
actual nature both informs and induces homesickness. Noir’s protagonists are sick for the home, 
which implies a certain longing for home, and therefore an absence of it. Some examples include 
Stranger on the Third Floor, where, as I have already discussed, Michael’s paranoia and 
murderous desires are borne out of his desire for home; Detour, where Al’s homelessness amplifies 
his desire for a real home; and The Blue Dahlia, where, upon returning from the war, Johnny finds 
his home in disarray and subsequently seeks to rebuild it. The implication, therefore, is that an 
absence of home results in a sickness. This sickness, as I will argue, is a realisation of the 
impossibility of desire. In one sense, the absence of home and the ensuing sickness signals the 
film’s entrance into the noir universe. As Oliver Harris writes, in The Killers ‘Swede's seduction 
into the world of crime and desire, his rendezvous with fate and fascination, takes place in Colfax's 
hotel suite, all because he breaks a date to go to the cinema.’3 Swede is supposed to go the cinema 
with Lily, but instead goes to Colfax’s hotel suite and meets Kitty. The implication, therefore, is 
that Swede’s involvement and desire for Kitty, the femme fatale, denies the acquisition of home 
(and of peace and security). Through the retroactive narrative structure, Lily, by contrast, is 
portrayed as a housewife. Swede’s decision to reject a visit to the cinema stops him from going or 
acquiring home. Homesickness could also describe another cause for sickness. In addition to being 
sick for the home, noir’s protagonists could be sick of the home. Instead of an absence of home, it 
could describe the intrusive presence of home. For instance, the family home in Shadow of a 
Doubt, which at first seems to offer solace to Young Charlie, becomes the primary location of 
antagonism. She is forbidden to make any accusation against Uncle Charles lest it desecrate the 
 
3 Harris, ‘Outside History, but Historically So’, p. 16. 
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sanctity and imagined unity of the home. The two broad types of homesickness, it should be noted, 
are often interlinked. 
The Lost Weekend (1945) shows us how home can inspire these seemingly contradictory 
types of homesickness. Don is both sick for the home (insofar as he wishes to live with and marry 
Helen) and sick of the home (insofar as the home isolates him by sealing him inside). In the film, 
Don’s apartment is an antagonising and claustrophobic space. It antagonises him as far as he is 
trapped within it by his brother — Wick — and fiancée — Helen, both of whom deny him alcohol 
and the necessary funds to leave his apartment and find a bar. He is trapped in his apartment in the 
hope that he will be cured by the apparent medicinal — and spiritual — properties attributed to 
the home. The home is prescribed as the necessary treatment to cure Don’s alcohol addiction, a 
cure for his perceived sickness. In fact, the central rewriting of Charles Jackson’s novel is making 
Don and Helen the basis for the formation of the couple. The formation of the couple is the anchor 
upon which the metaphors of alcoholism, addiction, and desire all rest. Simultaneously, however, 
Don hides alcohol in his apartment to evade the suspicious eye of his brother and fiancée. His 
home, therefore, is both the cure for the sickness and the sickness itself. In its veneer of safety, 
Don’s apartment gives him what he wants while also presenting itself as something to desire. The 
next chapter will address how the different configurations of home (detached homes, apartments, 
and so on) differ from one another, but for now, it is enough to say that apartments are more 
alienating and claustrophobic insofar as they imitate a detached home — a ‘real’ home — as well 
as blurring the boundaries between public and private space — as I argued was the case in Stranger 
on the Third Floor.  
In Weekend, Don Birnam, a recovering alcoholic, is asked by Wick to spend the weekend 
away from New York in a countryside retreat. In order to delay his and Wick’s train journey, Don 
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concocts an excuse for Helen and Wick to go and see a theatre show so that he can resume his 
consumption in secret. Don believes that he has cleverly hidden bottles of alcohol in various 
locations in his apartment: in the vacuum cleaner, under his mattress, hanging outside the window. 
Shortly after reeling in this hanging bottle and hiding it in Wick’s suitcase, instead of his own, 
Wick discovers the bottle and discards it. Don’s plan shares a comparable logic to Neff’s plan in 
Indemnity. There is, of course, the similarity of the catching of a train, but the similarity relates 
more to their anticipation of investigative desire. Neff and Don’s investigators are their friends 
(for Neff it is Keyes, for Don it is Helen and Wick) who, to an extent, know their desire or will 
recognise its traces. 
Helen and Wicks’ strategy for rehabilitating Don is to let him pursue his desire — after he 
pleads with Helen to let him recover ‘his way’4 — and thus be disappointed when he realises it 
was for nothing. They hope that his desire intensifies and reveals his guilt. This can be seen by 
their lack of resistance to Don’s suggestion that they leave him for the evening. They are either 
duped by his plan, or they are indulging him. Don is supposed to discover that his desire, as Fink 
writes, ‘has no object,’5 in the sense that the glass is always refilled. This is because, Fink argues, 
desire is ‘diametrically opposed to fixation’ because it moves from signifier to signifier.6 Desire, 
and thus alcohol, ‘merely wish to go on desiring.’7 For Don, however, he already knows what he 
desires: alcohol and intoxication. Desire, for Don, has an object. It is in this way that Don 
experiences the Real of desire, the impossibility that structures desire as such. The next section 
 
4 The Lost Weekend, dir. By Billy Wilder, (Paramount Pictures: USA, 1945). 





will discuss the ways in which his alcohol addiction — and drug use more general — allow access 
to the Real, and how this interacts with Don’s desire for home. 
 
The Rational Case for Drugs — Drug Use and the Real 
In this section, I will explore the literature and critical work surrounding the use of ‘hard’ drugs, 
such as heroin, and compare its uses in literature and theory to alcohol, so as to show a more 
complete picture of how drug addiction can be conceived in a psychoanalytic context. Then I will 
examine the ways in which Don’s ritualised recovery process shows how his guilt facilitates and 
fuels his desire. Although The Lost Weekend might seem an odd choice of film, I have chosen it 
because it does not precisely fit the model of more classic, established film noirs. As I argued in 
previous chapters, noir is best thought of as a mode, something which moves in and out of the 
films rather than being a constant point of identification. The fact that The Lost Weekend is not 
‘fully’ a noir is the reason why it makes a good object for a case study, because the ambiguity 
around its definition (and therefore the meaning of addiction, desire, and the home in the film) is 
centred. In the film, understanding the nature of Don’s addiction is the central problem. There are 
three interrelated problems surround addiction. The first is why Don is addicted in the first place, 
the second is what is he really addicted to, and the third is what historical contexts is addiction a 
response to. The missing referent in the film, the source of fascination, is history, specifically the 
Second World War. One significant reason Don is addicted, and why his addiction persists 
throughout the film, is the claustrophobia of his apartment and how it intensifies his addiction. He 




Fig. 4.2, The Lost Weekend (1945) 
In Weekend’s opening scene, when Wick tries to sell the idea of a retreat to Don, he is 
offering a similar proposition to Renton’s ritualised recovery. The retreat is supposed to act as a 
substitute for Don’s desire for alcohol, replacing alcohol with the ‘real’ thing. Wick’s proposal 
intends to disrupt Don’s plans, to interject between Don and his desire for alcohol. As with 
Trainspotting, Wick tries to replace the desire for alcohol with more acceptable substances. In 
trying to convince Don, he says there will be ‘trees, and grass, and sweet cider, and buttermilk, 
and water from that well that’s colder than any other.’8 Don immediately sees through Wick’s 
 
8 The Lost Weekend (1945). 
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performatively cheerful demeanour, observing Wick’s emphasis on ‘very dull liquids.’9 The 
central question here is one of authenticity. Wick misidentifies the problem because instead of 
trying to understand how Don’s addiction exposes the Real of desire, he simply attempts to move 
Don’s desire from alcohol to the countryside and other ‘dull’ and unsatisfying liquids. For Don, 
alcohol offers the chance to experience desire authentically.  
Likewise, Renton’s ritualistic recovery process — the use of ‘vitamins, mouthwash, and 
pornography’10 — shows how empty these supposedly desirable objects are in comparison to 
heroin. Renton’s ritual reveals his desire to stay addicted to heroin. For Renton, becoming sober 
is merely a performance. He must be seen to want to become sober. Don cannot be seen to desire 
alcohol, but instead to actively pursue sobriety. In Fig 4.2, as Don retrieves some clothes from the 
dresser, Wick turns to address him about the ‘trees’ and ‘grass’ of their weekend retreat. Wick 
addresses Don while his back is turned — like their initial location in the room (Fig 4.3) — yet in 
this configuration Don can see Wick speaking to him in the mirror. In this moment, the architecture 
of the home is used to show how desire has no hiding place in the home. The weekend retreat, 
moreover, offers a distinct counterpoint to the interior trappings of the home and of inner city 
living. The retreat is open and unaccusatory, unlike the home. The purpose of the retreat, in these 
terms, is to bury desire so it cannot be seen, to dissipate it. This strategy is unpalatable for Don 
because his desire is constituted through his guilt. His desire must be seen and condemned. 
 
9 Ibid. 
10 Harold, p. 871. 
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Fig. 4.3, The Lost Weekend (1945)  
To speak of desire in the home, to tell Don what he should want, involves an assumption 
of blindness, that Wick can speak to Don without being seen. The room in which this scene takes 
place is Don’s bedroom. The camera views the room predominately from a corner, with the 
window to the outside on the left of the frame. Behind Don hangs a painting of an outdoors 
meadow, a window to an imaginary space. Wick stands in the doorway to the kitchen and living 
room, and to the right (beyond the frame in figure 4.3) is another door, presumably to a bathroom, 
the dresser with mirrors sat on top of it. Don’s apartment is compact, but its compactness makes 
hiding difficult in the home. Rooms can see into each other, and the apartment is situated in a New 
York borough, further intensifying the sense of claustrophobia. In the film, therefore, blindness is 
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derived from the omnipresence of the Other’s gaze. The dresser mirrors allow Don to see himself 
being seen by Wick. Don can therefore see that Wick is merely offering a substitute for alcohol, 
one where his desire will never be met. In seeing Wick’s reflection in the mirror, Don is really 
seeing himself and his own desire through Wick. Don’s home is a place where it is impossible to 
desire safely. The significance of any utterance is intensified in the home. The novel highlights 
Don’s anxiety when seeing his own desire as the perspective shift from first to third person: 
‘Control was gradually slipping away…I’ve got to watch myself, I’ve certainly got to watch 
myself; no telling what undreamed-of fantastic thing [he] might catch himself doing next.’11 Wick 
assumes he can see Don and tell him what he should want without being seen. Similarly, Don 
believes he can hide his bottle of whiskey without being discovered. It is through Wick’s desire to 
cure Don that Don’s desire is perpetuated: Wick is trapped in Don’s desire. There are parallels 
with Stranger on the Third Floor in relation to the way vision is understood in the home. Michael’s 
declaration of desire is that he wants a home because it is a place where ‘two people can really see 
each other.’12 This wholly imagined promise of openness in relation to desire is realised in 
Weekend. The implication of ‘really’ seeing is that home is not a place of safety, but one where 
desire is constantly interrogated. The notion of ‘really’ seeing has two competing dimensions. 
Firstly, it is where desire is invisible, where, supposedly, the object of desire has been attained. 
Secondly, it is where desire is constantly interrogated, which can be seen in this scene in Weekend. 
Home, therefore, is not a place to desire safely, because the Other is always looking. 
The Other’s gaze, the imperative to enjoy from the superego, engenders a sense of guilt in 
Don. To enjoy, for Don, entails also being guilty. His guilt is that he is experiencing enjoyment, 
 
11 Jackson, The Lost Weekend, p. 60. 
12 Stranger on the Third Floor (1940). 
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that alcohol does indeed give him what he wants. He does not need to desire any other object. 
Don’s addiction, therefore, questions the supposed authenticity of desire. In Jackson’s novel, while 
Don is at a bar, the narration remarks, ‘but he’d finish this drink and maybe one more and then go 
back to the flat where he could really enjoy himself.’13 Home, the apartment, is a place where Don 
can really enjoy himself, and where two people can ‘really see each other.’ There is an emphasis 
on real enjoyment, on experiencing the real thing. Home is presented as a cure, but instead it 
should be read as the sickness itself. Or, it is at least actively facilitating Don’s addiction — even 
when removed from his apartment. Although the home contains nothing, it is that very nothingness 
which is so sickening to Don. He is confronted by his desire for nothing; the so-called ‘real’ thing 
is indistinguishable from a fake thing. The cycle of consumption is always repeated with no 
change. He consumes nothing, but that is desire’s exact demand. His home, which should offer a 
place of solace and, ideologically speaking, meaning, gives him nothing. What is horrifying for 
Don is that home’s complete absence of desire is ostensibly what he wants. It is a scenario in which 
he does not have to desire. The expectation laid on him by Helen and Wick is that he does not 
desire and should simply exist in the home. So, the home’s layout in Weekend is representative of 
Don’s perspective. It should be a place where he has mastery, but that mastery is consistently 
undermined. In this way, the home’s authority is challenged by his addiction. 
 
13 Jackson, The Lost Weekend, p. 76. 
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Fig. 4.6, The Lost Weekend (1945) 
The presence of alcohol (and desire) therefore defines and contextualises our fascination 
to home. Since Don’s fascination with alcohol is itself fascinating, the home is reconfigured to be 
fascinating. The hermetic space of the home — as distinct from public space — is disrupted from 
the beginning of the film because of the open windows and doors. The home is linked with Don’s 
addiction to alcohol because of the way in which his addiction redefines his body’s relationship to 
desire. As Harold writes, drugs and addiction underscore the body as ‘rhetorical site’ which is 
transformed through engagement.14 Just as alcohol provides Don with a way to experience the 
 
14 Harold, ‘Transgressive Corporeality in Trainspotting’, pp. 866-7. 
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Real of desire without the need to engage in its ‘symbolic loop’15, it also opens up the home as a 
‘rhetorical site’.16 Bjerg notes how heroin in particular is ingested through abnormal bodily orifices 
(a needle punctures the skin and thus heroin is directed ingested into the bloodstream) rather than 
through the mouth or the nose. In Weekend alcohol similarly creates new ‘orifices’ in the home. It 
creates new entryways and exits, new places to hide. 
In Weekend’s opening scene, Don attempts to hide various bottles of alcohol around his 
apartment, like pieces of fascination to be hidden from Wick. The film opens with Don and Wick 
packing their suitcases, with the camera moving from the Manhattan skyline to the open window 
of Don’s apartment (Fig 4.6). As the camera pans past two windows, we see beneath the third a 
bottle of liquor tied to a piece of string (Fig 4.7). Don’s window is flung open, his curtains dance 
in the breeze, and the camera looks in, as if we were spying on him as he packs his suitcase. Here, 
the window acts as an improper orifice to the home. We do not enter through the door, nor do we 
simply begin inside. Instead, we intrude from the position of the alcohol. Our gaze is fascinated 
and voyeuristic. The bottle further functions in a similar way to the anamorphotic skull in The 
Ambassadors, since it requires the viewer, Wick in this case, to change his view of the home in 
order to see it. It is a distortion in the image of home, but a distortion which is written into the 
essence of the image.  
 




Fig. 4.7, The Lost Weekend (1945) 
The camera panning across the skyline to Don’s apartment is mirrored at the end of the 
film. This emphasises the film’s moral assertation that alcohol addiction is often invisible in 
compact urban space. The retroactive resolution of the ending is driven by nostalgia, the 
impression that the home was always safely sealed. The place of alcohol and fascination is made 
ambiguous by the opening up of the home. The bottle on the string calls into question its proper 
place. Although alcohol is a socially acceptable substance, its position on the boundary renders it 
an antagonising force on Don and the home. The interior of the home is supposedly an abstract 
fantasy space; when the windows and doors are shut, the space becomes hermeneutically sealed. 
Ideology is not exogenous to the home; it was always present. The open window breaks down the 
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barriers between exterior and interior space, between public and private space. It suggests the 
transgressive pleasures of voyeurism and of addiction. The bottle of alcohol, suspended outside 
the apartment, transgresses the boundaries between inside and outside of the home. The bottle 
hangs outside the apartment, but the string is tied to the window latch on the inside. It is on the 
boundary itself, and, in a sense, is the boundary.  
When Don reels in the bottle from the window, bringing it into the home, he tries to hide 
it in Wick’s suitcase, which Wick quickly discovers. The discovery of the bottle is a reminder to 
Wick and Helen that Don’s persistent alcohol abuse is not simply a personal, moral, or ethical 
failure on Don’s part, but is indicative of a familial problem. Alcohol is the primary antagonist — 
if Don could simply extricate himself from this unholy liquid, all the film’s problems would be 
resolved — and a metonym for the other problems in the film (the frayed relationship between 
Don and Helen, between Don and Wick, the inadequacy of the home, and Don’s writer’s block). 
The familial guilt suffered by Wick is disavowed. It is not only Don who forms a fetishistic 
relationship with alcohol, but Helen and Wick too. They know that alcohol is not any other problem 
but act if it were the case regardless. For Helen specifically, her guilt is a phantom guilt. She 
experiences the loss of the potential and spectral family that she and Don are intended, and indeed 
compelled, to form. Wick finding Don’s stashed bottle demonstrates the way in which the home 
has become a place of secrets, a hiding place for jouissance. The home is intended to be a safe 
place for Don, an antidote for his ‘sickness,’ yet because of this assumption, Don attempts to use 
the home as a cover for his addiction. The narrative trajectory, of Don rejecting his alcoholism in 
order to form a ‘real’ couple with Helen, presumes that Don must be placed under a quasi-house 
arrest to be cured: the home is supposed to cure Don. In this sense, the home facilities his 
alcoholism, rather than curing it. However, as the film’s moralising reveals — perhaps 
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inadvertently — it is not the home which must cure Don, but Don who must cure the home of its 
unsuitability for fostering the heterosexual family unit. The home, too — at least the detached 
home — is a place for families, yet Don’s city apartment prohibits the family due its small and 
claustrophobic layout. There is an absence of a family in Weekend and noir. A home without a 
family, according to the ideological implications of Weekend, is no home at all.  
Fig. 4.4, Notorious, dir. By Alfred Hitchcock, (RKO Radio Pictures: USA, 1946) 
The place of consumption and its relationship to production is important in understanding 
how alcohol interacts with home. Don’s alcohol addiction is categorised largely as an addiction to 
‘hard’ liquor — whiskey, brandy and so forth — as opposed to, say, beer, wine, or gin. Although 
beer, wine, and gin are addictive alcoholic drinks, there is nonetheless an association with beer, 
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wine, or gin being social drinks. They are drinks which are to be consumed casually, and in a 
comfortable, homely setting. Consider, for example, an early scene (Fig. 4.4) in Hitchcock’s 
Notorious (1946) where Alicia (Ingrid Bergman) is hosting a house party where she meets Devlin 
(Cary Grant). As the music plays and the night stretches on, Alicia fills up her friend’s glass with 
a small dark bottle. Despite the man’s protestations, Alicia remarks: ‘Don’t be silly, the important 
drinking hasn’t started yet.’17 There exists a clear delineation between different types of drinking, 
different methods, and contexts for consumption. The man’s unwillingness to consume more 
represents the limit that home places on alcoholic consumption and desire. That is, drinking in the 
home is seen as a social activity, not one in which becoming intoxicated is the primary objective. 
On the other hand, Alicia regards this drinking as unimportant or improper. Alcohol here is not 
drunk for its taste, but rather because it gets Alicia intoxicated, a release of libidinal energy.  
For Don, in Weekend, the function of drinking to the point of intoxication is to help in 
accessing the object petit a which he (mistakenly) thinks will finally satisfy his desire. In the novel, 
Don remarks that, ‘Thirst — there was a misnomer. […] It wasn’t because he was thirsty that he 
drank, and he didn’t drink because he liked the taste […]: he drank for what it did to him. As for 
quenching his thirst, liquor did exactly the opposite to him.’18 Alicia and Don’s drinking 
undermine the home since, in noir, home promises to be the end of the line for desire. Home is 
where its inhabitants can desire safely. Don does not drink alcohol for satisfaction or refreshment 
since it does not ‘quench his thirst’.19 Don does not therefore consume alcohol for its perceptual 
qualities but because its effects (that is, the consequences of attaining the object of his desire) are 
predictable. The typical cycle of desire only confronts him with the Real, the abyss, of desire, thus 
 
17 Notorious (1946). 
18 Jackson, The Lost Weekend, p. 41. 
19 Ibid.  
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leaving him empty. Alcohol gives him something in return. It is this transaction which renders his 
addiction perverse, in Helen and Wick’s eyes. In this context, therefore, Alicia and Don’s crime is 
to bring the bar, with its seemingly endless alcohol, back home. This undermines the home as it 
makes desire visible in the home. Desire’s ‘reintroduction’ in the home reveals that home is not 
the ‘final’ and satisfying object of desire. This is why the rupturing of the boundaries between 
private and public space act as traumatic punctures in noir; the ground beneath such apparent 
certainties is taken away, revealing only an abyss below. For Alicia, her drunkenness leads to her 
being pulled over while driving erratically. Thus, her disrespect for homely drinking predicates 
her subsequent involvement with Devlin in Rio de Janeiro — the punishment for disobedience, 
again, is finding oneself in a film noir. Her erratic driving is a metaphor for her erratic, unhomely 
drinking.  
Next I will explore how, through a psychoanalytic lens, drug use exposes the pursuit of the 
real thing by giving the user a direct line to the Real of enjoyment. The ‘real’ thing in The Lost 
Weekend is the ‘authentic’ home, a home which allows privacy and is a space in which one can 
cease to desire. Ole Bjerg, in his essay ‘Drug Addiction and Capitalism: Too Close to the Body’,  
argues that one of the transgressive elements of drug use is the way in which it allows the user to 
desire in ways which circumvent the cycle of desire, specifically the mode of capitalist desire.20 
The cycle of desire involves the subject moving from one object to another while remaining 
unsatisfied which, as Fink describes, occurs because ‘desire has no object.’21 Desire circles around 
the Real and the objet petit a. The Real is experienced as a rupture in the symbolic order, a 
breakdown of signification. Traumatic circumstances defy signification and thus create, as Sean 
 
20 Ole Bjerg, ‘Drug Addiction and Capitalism: Too Close to the Body’ Body & Society 14.2 (2008), pp. 1-22. 
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Homer argues, ‘a permanent dislocation at the very heart of the subject.’22 Trauma and desire 
produce an excess, something which cannot be articulated. This excess ‘is the Real.’23 The paradox 
of desire is that desire is a process which promises access to the Real, a pre-linguistic state of pure 
need, which was severed via our entrance into language through the symbolic order. Drugs offer 
to elude the cycle of desire and directly access the impossibility. Bjerg highlights, for instance that 
drugs are not typically consumed for their ‘perceptual taste, smell, sound, colour, etc,’ but instead 
for their ‘psychoactive properties.’24  
Drugs are consumed not to be ‘enjoyed’ in a normative sense; hence, the social 
condemnation of addiction is also related to how it changes the subject’s relation to desire. Both 
Renton and Don’s ritualization of their imagined recovery mocks this social condemnation as it 
simultaneously insulates them from censure (they are seen to desire to overcome their addiction) 
while also allowing them to continue to use heroin and drink alcohol respectively. Desire posits 
that something real exists at the centre of its repetitious circuit, that the next object of desire is the 
authentic one which will finally fulfil it. Drug use, for Bjerg, is a ‘radical way of fulfilling the 
imperative of enjoyment constantly thrown at us by the contemporary ideology of consuming.’25 
This, I believe, helps explain the transgressive nature of drug use and of Don’s addiction. His 
addiction is transgressive because it is enjoyable. To return to Trainspotting, Renton understands 
that heroin gives him what he desires instantly and continuously. He does not have to partake in 
the ideology of consumption, of always having his desire move to something else and therefore 
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disavow what he previously thought he desired. His — and Don’s — declaration and articulation 
of desire is profoundly simple. Unlike any other desire, it goes straight into the bloodstream. 
In Weekend, Don espouses the virtue of being intoxicated because it benefits his writing 
process. He acknowledges that alcohol ‘shrinks his liver’, yet he says that intoxicated he is ‘above 
the ordinary.’26 Then, he compares his output to famous artists and people: Michelangelo, Vincent 
Van Gogh, Vladimir Horowitz, John Barrymore, Jesse James and ‘his two brothers, all three of 
them’, and Shakespeare.27 For Don, at least alcohol enables creativity. I would argue, however, 
that the question of whether alcohol expands or restricts perception is the wrong question. The 
question assigns a moral quality to any possible expansion or restriction; it assumes a normative 
form of desire. Helen and Wick, as well as the film, understand addiction’s solution as one 
concerning rationality and choice. Don’s alcoholism may be irrational, in certain contexts, but that 
does not logically imply that the solution is a turn to rationality. I will now turn to discuss the 
relationship between addiction and the discourses of rationality.  
Invoking rationality as a factor external to subjectivity requires an interrogation about what 
rationality means in the context of desire. Criticism which is grounded in the discourse of 
rationality assumes that the text is simply a series of gestures which hide or obscure a single, stable 
truth. An argument in this vein might contend that Don’s drinking in Weekend merely gestures 
towards an unhappy and unfulfilled personal life. As I have already argued, however, film noir has 
no such interior stability. There is an inherent ambiguity to Don’s desire. It is the void at the heart 
of the film, both fascinating and unknowable. The secret is, again, that there is no rational 
 




explanation for his addiction, and indeed any explanation will necessarily overlook some important 
dimension. 
As Gerda Reith argues in her essay on consumption in late modernity, the aberration of 
‘abnormal’ consumption is the perception of an increased risk. Within the ‘rational-medical 
discourse of modernity,’ this risk, Reith writes, is ‘something that poses a threat to self and which 
is also calculable and predictable, since it implies some knowledge, however partial, of potential 
future danger.’28 For Reith, there is a contradiction here with regards to consumer culture’s 
response to risk. On the one hand, consumerist capitalism requires ‘sober’ and ‘rational’ consumers 
who ‘keep themselves informed about potential dangers and regulate their behaviour accordingly’, 
the logic being that the market works insofar as consumers consume ‘rationally.’29 On the other, 
as Reith argues, consumerism relies on excessive and irrational consumption in order to sustain 
itself: consumption is not a finite endeavour. In other words, consumption itself has no limit. For 
Ole Bjerg, in a similar vein, the labelling of an addiction as pathological is itself ideological: 
You can become addicted to almost anything and addiction in itself is not pathological. 
You can for instance be addicted to cigarettes or coffee without our entire subjectivity 
being pathological for that reason. When drug addiction may be qualified as pathology it 
is because it is connected to a fundamental collapse in the subject’s general economy of 
desire.30 
 
28 Gerda Reith, ‘On the Edge: Drugs and Consumption of Risk in Late Modernity’, in Lyng S., Edgework: The 
Sociology of Risk Taking (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 230. 
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Although it may appear to be the case that alcohol is the cause of the collapse of Don’s ‘general 
economy of desire,’31 it is worth considering the extent to which home, in noir, could be considered 
a pathological addiction. Bjerg uses the particular examples of drug use and addiction to help 
illuminate the cycles and channels of desire within capitalism. Although he focuses on drugs such 
as heroin and cocaine, we can see similarities between these ‘hard’ drugs and alcohol, at least in 
how alcohol in Weekend demonstrates the ‘general economy of desire.’32 The consumption of 
drugs, Bjerg writes, is a ‘distinct form of consumption.’ One major difference between the 
consumption of heroin and, say, coffee or any other addictive substance, is the method of 
consumption. To trigger enjoyment, coffee is ingested through the mouth and digested by the body, 
whereas heroin is consumed by injecting it ‘directly into the blood.’33 The drug thus circumvents 
the ‘normative’ cycles of enjoyment.. In this context, ‘normal’ enjoyment is permitted. This is not 
to say that ‘normal’ is used as a value judgement, or that there is something ethically or morally 
suspect in so-called ‘abnormal’ enjoyment, but rather an admission that ‘normal’ is a fabricated 
category. For Bjerg, it is a category which is specifically designed to exclude the ways in which 
the consumption of drugs bypasses and disrupts capitalist cycles of desire. 
Moreover, for Bjerg, addiction reveals the symbolic castration which governs desire. Since 
desire, he writes, is ‘constituted only through prohibition’, and prohibition is ‘conditioned by its 
transgression,’ desire only begins when lack, the objet petit a, is produced.34 We can only desire 
once we realise that we lack something. Addiction, as Bjerg understands it, reveals to us that 
nothing lies beneath desire. Desire thus creates a paradox in the symbolic order — the discourse 
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of the Other — since, on one level, the symbolic order allows subjects to articulate their own 
desires and lack; on another, it ‘founds the subject’s constitutive lack of Being, which is the very 
precondition for desire at all.’35 Hence, the prohibition of Don’s drinking is the way in which he 
experiences desire.  
Don’s addiction is clearly seen as irrational by the film, but it is not attributed to any 
sociological or environmental factors. Instead, it is depicted as an unexplainable (hence 
pathological and illogical) condition, an all-consuming natural disaster. However, home is neither 
the reward nor the cure for Don. Since home itself is the addiction, it is the impossible object of 
Don’s desire. Don must cure the home, ridding it of its addictive qualities, not the other way 
around. Nevertheless, the home looks back at Don, affirming his guilt. Being in the home renders 
him unproductive: he is unable to work, nor is he able to consummate his relationship with Helen. 
Although his addiction seemingly immobilises him it reveals the abyss beneath the desire for 
home. In other noir films, the consecration of the home often occurs at the end of the film, for 
instance, Michael and Jane in Stranger on the Third Floor; Don and Helen’s reunion in the home 
in Weekend; and Johnny and Joyce at the end of The Blue Dahlia. The importance of home begins 
as the film ends. Or, the home is presented not as a source of strength, a positive desire, but 
something which requires reconstituting. There is always some guilty excess in this process of 
reconstitution: the way in which the Stranger reveals Michael’s guilt over his murderous desire in 
Stranger on the Third Floor; Johnny and Joyce’s union which is uncelebrated and built upon the 
death of Helen in The Blue Dahlia; and in Weekend, Don giving up access to the Real of desire so 
as to pursue a perceived authenticity in his writing, his relationship, and in his home. Home is that 





and signifiers depend on for meaning and desire to exist — yet, upon its creation, a certain abyssal 
lack is produced in order to facilitate desire for the home. 
Helen and Wick’s mistake is in assuming that Don’s addiction, his desire, is fuelled by 
choice; if only he were to take the ‘rational’ choice not to drink, then his problem would be 
resolved. Yet desire itself is not rational since it is unconsciously driven. If it were the case that 
Don must simply act rationally, then the weekend retreat would not be necessary, and indeed, the 
retreat is never fully taken seriously as a treatment. The retreat is only every spectral, a vague and 
easily avoidable threat. The pertinent question with regards to Don is not ‘why does he make the 
choice to drink?’ but rather, ‘what desire does alcohol represent for Don, and why is it never 
seemingly satisfied?’ In a psychoanalytic context, addiction can be understood as an extreme form 
of desire. Weekend’s depiction of alcohol helps illuminate the inner workings of both addiction 
and desire. For example, the film highlights the lengths Don is willing to go to in order to keep 
drinking. Once he discovers the cleaner’s money he goes outside and purchases two bottles of 
liquor. When he arrives at the bar, he proudly boasts that he bought two bottles so that Wick would 
find one, believe his search to be over, and thus Don would still be left with one bottle.36 The 
presence of alcohol and addiction questions the nature of satisfaction itself. Satisfaction here being 
an imagined state whereby desire is fulfilled. If desire is never fulfilled, then the cultural perception 
of satisfaction is imaginary. For Don, satisfaction is a recognition of the real of desire, that desire’s 
imperative can be ignored or circumvented. Satisfaction seems impossible if desire ‘has no 
object’37 and always replicates itself. Don seemingly desires nothing, and has nothing, yet he is 
still satisfied. One answer — which might possess an overly moralising tone — to the question 
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over alcohol and addiction’s relationship to desire and satisfaction is that although Don believes 
himself to be satisfied, he is instead deeply troubled, unable to even understand what satisfaction 
is. In other words, Don must learn how to desire ‘properly,’ or, at least, learn to desire the ‘proper’ 
objects: a relationship with Helen and restoring the sanctity of the home. However, the moralistic 
answer assumes that we are aware and in control of our desires, that desire arises through choice. 
In this sense, Don’s addiction cannot be understood from a moralistic or literal standpoint, but 
instead it should be read as symptomatic, especially in its relation to home. Considering this, the 
next section will examine the ideological dimensions of realist discourse and its relation to desire 
for the home in noir. 
 
Capitalist Realism and Desire 
In his seminal book Capitalist Realism, Mark Fisher outlines the way in which late-capitalist 
societies understand and treat mental health as if it were a solely a private affair; that an issue such 
as depression is the result of a chemical imbalance in the brain.38 For Fisher, the work of theorists 
such as Michel Foucault, Giles Deleuze, and Felix Guattari emphasise the need for the political 
categorisation of ‘extreme mental conditions such as schizophrenia.’39 Fisher similarly calls for a 
‘politicisation of much more common disorders,’40 such as addiction and depression. Viewing 
mental health as a chemical imbalance in need of correcting implies that the source of the condition 
lies within the subject. Mental illnesses, Fisher stresses, are of course ‘neurological instantiated,’ 
yet capitalist realism ‘says nothing about their causation.’41 Fisher invites us to consider the role 
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of external environmental factors and the extent to which they may be responsible for any ‘mental 
health crisis.’ Fisher’s analysis is useful because it emphasises the need to understand the political 
dimension of addiction.  
Returning to Weekend, viewing Don’s addiction solely in terms of a personal failing 
reduces any analysis to overt moralising. This moralisation, or, as Fisher might put it, ‘the 
privatisation’ of addiction, risks simply stating the blindingly obvious: Don should not be an 
alcoholic.42 A realistic discourse assumes that a ‘real’ text lies underneath, and similarly realistic 
discourses around mental health assume that a biological prognosis will indefinitely ‘cure’ the 
subject. Yet the ‘real’ text underneath Weekend is not one in which Don’s addiction is completely 
resolved, but one where the conditions of his addiction are brought to light. The narrative of the 
film is viewed as the treatment for Don’s sickness, and cinema itself acts as a vaccine against 
aberrative behaviour. This is not the case, however, since the cinema serves to intensify Don’s 
addiction. A similar example can be seen in Out of the Past. When Jeff waits to meet Kathie in 
Mexico, his voiceover says that the café they are supposed to meet in is ‘next to a movie house.’43 
‘I used to sit there half asleep with a beer in the darkness,’ Jeff says, ‘only the music from the 
movie next door kept jarring me awake. And then I saw [Kathie] — coming out of the sun. And I 
knew why White didn’t care about that forty grand.’44 The sound of the cinema puts Jeff in a 
somewhat lucid state, making him more receptive to the fascinating femme fatale. It creates the 
right atmosphere for Jeff to become entangled in the noir universe.  
 
42 Ibid, p. 19. 




Capitalist realism is Fisher’s term for the ‘pervasive atmosphere’ which conditions the 
production of culture, as well as the ‘regulation of work and education.’45 It is the way in which 
capitalist (and, for Fisher, particularly neoliberal late capitalist) ideology asserts itself as reality. 
Capitalist ideology is not thought of as a value, but a fact. This is similar to the way in which 
Barthes describes myths as not being read as ‘a motive, but as a reason’.46 Presenting a moral 
critique of capitalism, quite paradoxically, ‘only reinforces capitalist realism’.47 According to 
Fisher a moral critique can take issues such as famine, poverty, the ecological crisis, mental health, 
and present them as ‘inevitable parts of reality.’ In this sense producing a moral critique of Don’s 
alcoholism risks assuming that such an addiction is inevitable. The ‘real’ Don — ‘Don the writer’, 
as Helen says — exists beneath the addict — ‘Don the drunk’.48 Moreover it also risks treating 
alcoholism as only alcoholism. Instead, if we read Don’s alcoholism as symptomatic, it reveals 
that it is a symptom of the fascinating and traumatic dimension of home. Don’s desire (alcohol) is 
analogous to a desire for nothing. The ‘nothingness’ of alcohol is symptomatic of the nothingness 
of the fascinating home. The home, to a certain extent, inspires Don’s addiction, and his addiction 
replaces the need for home. 
In relation to mental health, the ‘privatisation’ of addiction, the insistence on its eradication 
being dependent on the subject, relies on invocation of science as an external and objective source 
of verification.49 This invocation on the objective investigator is analogous to the role of the 
detective in the face of fascination discussed in the previous chapter. Science, in this context, 
functions both as itself and as a representation of rationality. The invocation of ‘rationality’ further 
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implies an interjection of ‘reality’ into the discourse. Weekend’s marketing emphasised the film’s 
‘realistic’ depiction of alcohol addiction, largely through association with Jackson’s novel. The 
voiceover in the trailer states that Charles Jackson’s novel is ‘the most startling novel of the decade, 
brought to the screen with uncompromising frankness.’50 However, just because the film — and 
specifically the marketing material surrounding the film — pledges to depict alcoholism in a 
‘realistic’ manner, it does not do it so. In fact, because this claim must be explicitly expressed, it 
reveals the very artificiality of cinema. The film’s marketing, and its subject matter, does not 
invoke reality itself; instead it demands we approach it as if it were real: the ‘reality’ of the film is 
provided by us. As Fisher writes, ‘the Real is that which any “reality” must suppress; indeed, 
reality constitutes itself through just this repression.’51 The Real of the film is therefore that which 
it must supress in order to constitute itself. It must prohibit Don’s desire (thereby establishing it52) 
and deny that Don enjoys his addiction as well as softening the difference between Don’s addiction 
to alcohol and the sickness induced by the home. To achieve this, the production of ‘reality’ in the 
film is dependent on our engagement with the film’s alcoholism qua a fragment of reality. One 
way this is visible is through the film’s engagement with its source text. 
 
50 YouTube Movies, The Lost Weekend — Trailer, online video, YouTube, 14 March 2016 < 
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Fig. 4.5, The Lost Weekend (1945) 
The novel’s preoccupation with the author being an addict in some capacity, that addiction 
is somehow ‘necessary’ to produce a great work of art, is repeated in the film. In the novel, Don 
believes there is something virtuous in his drinking since it allows him to write, a view legitimised 
as he rifles through F. Scott Fitzgerald’s Tender is the Night. Don recounts Fitzgerald saying: 
‘Don’t write about anything you don’t know anything about.’53 The film, at least on the level of 
its marketing, accepts the logic that the efficacy of its message is dependent on its acquiescence 
to, and the veracity of, the novel’s depiction of alcohol addiction. However, the film over-identifies 
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its realism with the alcoholism present in Jackson’s novel. Jackson’s novel is concerned, at least 
in part, with the notion that addiction helps produce great works of art. In the film, on the other 
hand, the ‘reality’ of the novel is the addiction. Addiction in this sense is both Real (it must be 
suppressed) and real (it is the guarantor of reality). The film can only ever produce a ‘reality 
principle’ rather than reality; some things must be suppressed in order to depict reality. 
The film’s depiction of alcohol as realistic is contingent with how the film views Jackson’s 
novel as autobiographical and, moreover, as non-fictional source. Take Don’s monologue at the 
end of the film: 
I’m gonna put this whole weekend down, minute by minute. The way I stood in there 
packing my suitcase, only my mind wasn’t on the suitcase […] My mind was hanging 
outside the window; it was suspended, just about eighteen inches below. I wonder how 
many others there are like me. Poor bedevilled guys on fire with thirst, such comical figures 
to the rest of the world as they stagger towards another binge, another spree.54 
This monologue demonstrates how the film treats writing as a process which encodes truth. Don 
must detail every ‘minute’, the ‘whole weekend’, for his recovery to be complete, verifiable, and 
legitimate. He must also do so triumphantly, in recognition of his epiphany. This the strongest 
example of the film’s moralising — like Stranger on the Third Floor, too, its ending seems 
incongruous with the rest of the film — because it reworks the novel’s bleaker ending into 
something more palatable. In the novel, Don pours himself another drink and thinks to himself 
‘This [weekend] was over and nothing had happened at all.’55 However, the film ends with Don 
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recounting and acknowledging how he has overcome his addiction — thus performing his 
recovery. Noir’s hard edges have some limits after all. Yet we can see the traumatic dimension of 
the film through this omission. Don’s emotional disaffection in the novel is embodied by the film’s 
amnesia in relation to the novel. In the novel, Don can admit that his addiction and the events of 
the narrative are insubstantial inasmuch as they do not mean anything to him. The film, however, 
unsatisfactorily attempts to fill in this epistemological abyss. The weekend, both literal and 
metaphorical, is thus lost in numerous ways. Alcohol’s effect on memory renders it impossible to 
retroactively construct meaning. Over the weekend, too, work and labour are lost, as are any 
pursuits of family and home. What is lost is not just a recollection of events during the adaptation 
of the novel, but the very meaning of loss. Loss itself is lost. It is, moreover, in the very process of 
remembrance that time and meaning are lost; what is lost is not simply time, but a sense of 
historicity itself. Historicity is lost because of the way noir insists on a certain conception of 
realism while at the same time supressing ways of understanding the world. Through the metaphor 
alcohol provides in Lost Weekend, we can see that although alcohol is offered as a way of clarifying 
the world — it promises to show Don what is ‘real’ — it obscures the objects of his desire. It 
obscures the home, and the formation of the couple. The next section will investigate the role of 
alcohol and desire, and how the spectre of nostalgia hangs over the film. I will examine this 
proposition in relation to home and how it is an already lost object. Then, I will consider the extent 
to which film noir’s relationship to its own history is reflected in the disavowal of historical 




Ideology and Nostalgia 
Understanding Don’s alcoholism helps clarify the rationale behind his desires. In the film, alcohol 
should not, I believe, simply be understood as a substance which releases Don’s social inhibitions 
and allows an ‘authentic’ expression of the self, or that he is able to desire ‘properly’. In fact, the 
alcohol instead questions how desire is produced and how a desire is deemed ‘abnormal’ or 
addictive. This question, therefore, is explicitly ideological. The film supposes two abstract and 
distinct states in relation to Don’s addiction: being sober or intoxicated. The abstract categories of 
‘sober’ and ‘intoxicated’ can be understood as metaphors for ideological interpellation. In Marxist 
thought, ideology broadly is a series of (false) discourses borne out of cultural products, economic 
structures, and so forth. The Marxist concept of ‘false consciousness’ presupposes that a ‘true’ 
normative subject exists beneath a socially acceptable façade, and that ideology has obscured the 
real self, that the self has been ‘intoxicated’ by ideology. The ‘real’ self simply waits to be liberated 
from its own delusion. Alcohol promises to release the self from its shackles, allowing real 
expression. According to this theory, being intoxicated allows the subject to act and desire 
authentically. Yet for Don, intoxication entails a disarticulation; any expression is made more 
difficult. His speech becomes slurred and he becomes forgetful — as evidenced when Don forgets 
that he bought an extra bottle of liquor which he brought to the bar. Conversely, Helen and Wick 
believe that alcohol is what is masking Don’s ‘real’ capacity for desire. Their response is that Don 
should act unideologically, that he should dispel his intoxicated self in order to become 
ideologically sober. For Louis Althusser, there is a strong unconscious dimension to ideology:  
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Those who are in ideology believe themselves by definition outside ideology: one of the 
effects of ideology is the practical denegation of the ideological character of ideology by 
ideology: ideology never says, “I am ideological”.56 
In everyday parlance, ideology is used as a pejorative: to act or think ‘ideologically’ is to mask 
reality with an imaginary (and therefore supposedly delusory) dimension. Again, however, this 
conception of ideology must presuppose that reality both exists independently from our 
subjectivity and that we can engage or consume it as such.57  
There is a strong sense of disavowal necessary in ideological interpellation — the process 
by which a subject is installed in ideological systems. Ideology only sustains itself through the 
Real, through the suppression of its inconsistencies. Slavoj Žižek, on the other hand, argues that 
the ideological ‘mask’ is not ‘simply hiding the real state of things; the ideological distortion is 
written into its very essence.’58 Don’s addiction and intoxication cannot just be taken away in order 
to reveal the ‘real state of things’. His addiction, the way he desires, is the real state of things. 
Moreover, the addiction’s adjustment of the sanctity of home is not a perversion of the ‘true’ 
meaning and function of home — that is, to provide moral stability for the family — but rather 
that addiction is ‘written into’ the essence of home. 
The political subject, Žižek contends, knows full well they are acting and thinking 
ideologically, that they are installed within its system. Don knows that. This lies in opposition to 
a traditional Marxist approach which asserts that subjects act in ignorance. Žižek writes, 
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What [the subjects] “do not know”, what they misrecognise is the fact that in their social 
reality itself, in their social activity […] they are guided by the fetishistic illusion.59 
When Žižek says ‘fetishistic’, he is describing a relationship between ideology and desire. The 
fetishist knows that a certain ordinary object does not possess any fantastical properties, but 
nonetheless they pretend otherwise for their own enjoyment. In noir, the protagonists know that 
home does not possess some fantastical qualities, but they proceed to desire home anyway. They 
act as if home is fantastical, and thus the noir’s protagonist’s desire is rendered perverse or 
destructive.  
 Don’s relationship to alcohol follows this pattern of fetishistic illusion. His addiction to 
alcohol may seem paradoxical at first glance. He drinks so that he can access his ‘real’ self, to free 
himself from ideology’s spell, and thus to act and desire authentically. Alcohol, though, leads to a 
disarticulation of his desires, yet it may seem as if this is no different from a capitalist subject’s 
disarticulation. The difference lies in Don’s knowledge and belief. He knows that alcohol does not 
fulfil his desire, but he nonetheless persists. As Bjerg argues, ‘The capitalist subject never accepts 
that the actual enjoyment of the consumption of a given commodity marks the limitation of the 
possible satisfaction of his desire.’60 The capitalist subject — which Bjerg differentiates from the 
drug user — misidentifies their desire inasmuch as the object of their desire always shifts to 
something else; desire is always located elsewhere, it is never something which a subject 
possesses. For Bjerg, the drug user, the addict, does not have the same problem since the drug user 
and the drug become ‘fully identical’, collapsing the boundaries between subject and object.61 The 
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collapsing of subject and object is visible on a formal level. Since Don’s desire for alcohol is so 
total and all-consuming, it moves beyond enjoyment and into obsession: it consumes the film. 
Formally, therefore, the relationship between subject and object relative to desire is reversed. It is 
not Don that desires alcohol, but alcohol which desires him. Mitchell argues that images should be 
thought of as subjects, and as such, the question of what they desire is raised.62 I contend that 
alcohol’s desire is rendered an enigma, an idea of the abyss, rather than nothingness itself since 
alcohol, as a liquid, is itself rather unassuming. Alcohol’s mastery over Don, and of the film, serves 
to cover Don’s lack inasmuch as curing Don of his addiction does not address the central issue of 
desire. The necessary political critique, therefore, is to understand how Don is enjoying, and is 
enjoyed by, alcohol. Moreover, the question of what alcohol is inevitably leads to questions 
surrounding the nature of desire and addiction. Nothing lies at the centre of the enjoyment that 
alcohol offers for Don.  
For Don, alcohol is not replaced by any other object, any other commodity, it is only 
replaced by itself: ‘[t]he starting and end point of the drug addict’s craving is the Real, and it is 
not mediated by that symbolic loop which constitutes the subject.’63 Don’s addiction is treated 
with hostility because it closes the circuit of desire. He no longer has a need to desire home or 
marriage because his desire is always satisfied. His desire, unlike other desires, is predictable. 
Desire typically reproduces itself through unpredictability, through a continual disruption of 
expectation. On the other hand, Bjerg cedes the destructive effects of heroin; he writes that ‘the 
experience of absolute enjoyment leads to a radical de-stabilization, and perhaps even implosion, 
of the subject’s entire economy of desire.’64 In the film, alcohol is the substance which must be 
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expelled in order for normal life to resume. Its position, however, allows us to see the ideological 
inconsistencies, particularly surrounding the problem of how home produces many of the same 
effects on the economy of desire. 
Alcohol promises the opportunity to access our ‘true’ selves because it supposedly 
transgresses the normative cycle of desire, the ‘symbolic loop which constitutes the subject’65: it 
is a chance to desire authentically. Yet Don’s alcoholism questions the way in which an addiction 
is labelled as such or considered ‘abnormal.’ Desire in noir is cyclical, never achieving its stated 
aims, and always reproduces itself as desire. One example of this, which I have already argued, is 
the way that alcohol functions as a metaphor for desire in The Lost Weekend: alcohol does not gift 
a kind of enlightenment or realisation of desire or need, it only serves to ensure its own 
consumption. However, more generally, desire in noir is cyclical in part due to the way in which 
investigative logic is embedded within the logic of noir itself. Many noir films (The Maltese 
Falcon, Double Indemnity, The Big Sleep, The Killers, and so on) explicitly involve a criminal 
investigation. What demarcates the territory of noir, however, is that central to the investigation is 
the connection between the desire and motivation of the culprit, and the desires and involvement 
of the investigator. As I argued in the previous chapter, the space of contestation in Double 
Indemnity is in Neff’s anticipation of Keyes’ perspective and desire. In both Double Indemnity and 
The Lost Weekend the tension between desire of the culprit (in the latter’s case, the culprit is 
alcohol, or desire itself) and desire of the investigator are borne out over a similar contestation 
over the home. In Double Indemnity, Neff not only seeks to gain control of the Dietrichson house, 
but also to undermine and outsmart his father figure, Keyes, to live out of his long shadow. In 
Weekend, the reward for breaking free of alcohol (of desire) is forming a couple with Helen and 
 
65 Bjerg, ‘Drug Addiction and Capitalism’, p. 19. 
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living in their home. Desire’s purpose is not to lie within a specific object, but instead to act as a 
metonymy: intricately linked to an object, but not defined as that object. Desire’s relation to 
ideology in Weekend can be understood in terms of how the object of desire is continually deferred. 
In relation to his artistic pursuits, Don is required to desire authentically.  
The ending of the film implies that Don, strangely, needs to be sober in order to produce 
his novel, yet his novel’s success is dependent on his alcoholism as subject matter. The novel must 
be written ‘authentically’ — that is, by a sober writer — but at the same time can only be effective 
if its subject matter is similarly ‘authentic’. Don’s drinking, however, serves a counter-factual 
purpose. Addiction is alluring because it allows Don to experience the Real of desire without 
having to continuously repeat its ‘symbolic loop’.66  His drinking allows him not to remember to 
desire ‘properly’. He can disavow the fetishistic illusion regarding desire and home. The term 
‘authentic desire’, too, is an oxymoronic one. Desire itself is inauthentic since its promise for 
satisfaction is structurally impossible. Don wishes to find something which completely satisfies 
his desire to desire; to desire authentically is to not desire at all. I will now consider why alcohol’s 
position in the film allows Don to carry out the imperative to desire, arguing that desire for alcohol 
is a desire for nothingness itself. 
Don’s pursuit of alcohol shows that alcohol is a kind of nothingness. Alcohol’s ideological 
position in the film is as nothingness itself; Don’s desire for alcohol is a desire for the absence of 
desire. In terms of desire, Don’s intoxication can be understood not as an object, but a state, or 
mood. The defining characteristic of this intoxication is its empty promises: it offers a liberation 
of the ego, of identity, but once you reach its oasis, another promise appears on the horizon. This 
 
66 Bjerg, ‘Drug Addiction and Capitalism’, p. 19. 
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mood of intoxication, moreover, is the Real of desire because it signals that desire is nothing 
without impossibility. However, crucially, desire is always a positive and productive force: there 
is no ‘I not-desire,’ but instead ‘I desire not to.’ Mitchell writes that ‘Desire not to show desire is 
[…] still a form of desire.’67 The only conceivable path for Don to not desire is therefore to desire 
nothingness itself.  
In some sense, therefore, Don’s desire for alcohol is a manifestation of his death drive; a 
desire not to desire. Desire can be conceptualised as a singular force because there is, ultimately, 
only one object of desire: the objet petit a. A drive is more a manifestation of desire. It is an attempt 
to access jouissance, to experience joy as suffering.68 The concept of the death drive does not 
merely imply a destruction of the self, an untying of symbolic connections. Lacan places the death 
drive in the symbolic order, not the imaginary. The death drive is an impulse to return to a 
preoedipal state, to a time before the infant was inducted into the symbolic order, in other words, 
to be free from desire. We are severed from the Real during our entrance into language, into the 
symbolic order. Thus, the Real cannot only be experienced through traumatic ruptures in the 
symbolic order. The impulse present in the death drive involves a certain level of nostalgia. For 
Don, drinking is a way to experience this nostalgia, perhaps even a way for him to return to a 
preoedipal state, to be beyond desire, to be able to truly desire nothingness. It is, however, a 
nostalgia for something which never existed. A past which, through time, has been distorted into 
an imagined past, much in the same way that home is thought of, in film noir, in nostalgic terms.  
 
67 Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want?, p. 44. 
68 Philip Dravers, ‘The Drive as a Fundamental Concept of Psychoanalysis’, <http://londonsociety-
nls.org.uk/LibraryLS/Texts-from-the-the-PN/Philip-Dravers-Drive.pdf>, p. 10. 
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Noir itself is a nostalgic category since understanding noir involves a nostalgic 
reconstruction of its historical and spectatorial contexts, as described by Žižek’s ‘mythic 
spectator’.69 Edward Dimendberg, in his book Film Noir and the Spaces of Modernity, argues that 
because film noir is an ‘amalgam of diverse historical and cultural elements […] a work of 
bricolage’; its invocations of the past, and its imaginings of the future, are rendered anxious 
through nostalgia.70 This anxiety, in Weekend, manifests itself through the film’s desire to 
reconstruct the home as fetishistic object, since it is a (lacklustre) reward for Don for recovering 
from his addiction. Dimendberg argues that the ‘nonsynchronous character of film noir’ resides in 
the various tensions brought about by the transition between the 1920s and 1930s.71 Furthermore, 
Dimendberg observes how noir conveys a ‘palpable fascination’72 — another unfortunate use of 
the term — for the transitional period from the 1940s to the 1950s, ‘whose seemingly transparent 
social structure — a world in which power relations could still be traced with relative ease by a 
morally irreproachable detective figure — would shortly vanish.’73 Nostalgia is therefore 
conveyed in part through the fascination with the ‘morally irreproachable detective figure’. What 
Dimendberg misses is the extent to which we are fascinated by the detective figure’s fascination, 
and that the detective need not even be a detective. The epistemological mystery in Weekend is not 
only to do with Don’s drinking, but the home itself. In Weekend, our fascination lies with Don’s 
fascination with alcohol and its effect on the home. His desire for alcohol is really a nothingness, 
an absence of desire which reveals the fetishistic and fantasmatic construction of home. The next 
chapter will define the different types of home present in noir and how the space and architecture 
 
69 Žižek, Looking Awry, p. 112. 
70 Dimmendberg, Spaces of Modernity, p. 4. 
71 Ibid. 




of these different types, largely inner-city apartments or detached homes, particularly alter the 




‘People Stopped Buying Houses’ — Inside and Outside the Family Home 
‘By wandering aimlessly, all places became equal and it no longer mattered where he was. On his 
best walks he was able to feel that he was nowhere. And this, finally was all he ever asked of 
things: to be nowhere.’ 
Paul Auster, City of Glass1 
Figure 5.1, Mildred Pierce, dir. by Michael Curtiz (Warner Bros., USA, 1945) 
 
1 Paul Auster, ‘City of Glass’, in The New York Trilogy (London: Faber & Faber, 2011 [1987], p. 4. 
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The Weird, the Eerie, and the Home 
In this chapter, I will consider how the different types of home depicted in film noir are integral to 
the drama and conflict of noir. The focus will be on how a sense of eeriness, a term used by Mark 
Fisher, is generated by these fscinating domestic spaces. In the first section, I will discuss how the 
family home is constructed in film noir, principally using Mildred Pierce (1945) as a case study. I 
will focus on how noir’s structural retroactivity is replicated in the (re)construction of home 
through devices such as the flashback and the voiceover, and how fascination affects the 
investigation narratives of noir in relation to home, as well as the different ways in which labour 
and work is conceived in noir. The subsequent section will be a broader discussion of how the 
inner-city apartment differs from the familial home, using Double Indemnity, The Big Sleep, and 
The Maltese Falcon. There will be an emphasis on how urbanisation after the Depression alters 
the construction of public and private space in relation to home in noir, specifically how the 
compression of space intensifies the traumatic dimension of home in relation to the absence of 
history in noir and its spaces. The final section will consider how looking and desire are affected 
by the urbanisation of home, drawing parallels between Edward Hopper’s Nighthawks and Fritz 
Lang’s The Woman in the Window. 
Film noir operates largely at an unconscious level. As Élisabeth Roudinesco writes, in the 
unconscious symbols are ‘more real than what they symbolise’.2 Readings of film noir that solely 
focus on a literal, surface level — such as a moral critique of Don’s drinking in The Lost Weekend 
— always miss something, some unexplained, fascinating obscurity which acts as the driving force 
for the narrative. In these circumstances, home can be read unconsciously, not just as a physical 
 
2 Élisabeth Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan: An Outline of a Life and a History of a System of Thought, trans. by Barbara 
Bray (Cambridge: Pity Press, 1999), p. 211. 
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place but as a centralised obscurity. This chapter will examine the ways in which the physical 
space of home interacts with noir’s fascination. I will use Mark Fisher’s concepts of the weird and 
the eerie to help understand the notions of presence and absence with regards to home. The 
psychological motivation of noir’s characters is crucial in its narratives. For Elizabeth Cowie, these 
motivations are ‘often in some way perverse or acknowledged as psychotic.’3 I would contend that 
the character’s desire for home is rendered ‘perverse’ because of the ambiguities and tensions in 
the home. For example, as I previously showed in The Lost Weekend, Don’s alcohol addiction is 
‘psychotic’ inasmuch it makes the home no longer desirable. It is not only the motivations of noir’s 
characters that are ‘perverse’ but home itself. An effect of noir’s mode of fascination is that it 
reveals that home is not something which one can return to as it was (or how one imagined it to 
be), since home’s meaning is altered in the process of returning. Home in noir exists as fragments 
of the lost object — the objet petit a — which are to be reconstituted. Home’s meaning is altered 
through the relation between the imagined home and the specificity of its physical spaces. 
This uncertain meaning is characteristic of the way the home functions in noir. There is not 
simply one archetype of home. Instead, I would identify two broad categories of home: the 
detached home and the apartment. The detached home, which will be the focus for the first section 
of this chapter, is typically the domain of the family. It is primarily a place for the construction 
and continuation of the family. The detached home is more likely to be depicted as a lost paradise, 
a relic, something to be rescued and excavated from noir. The apartment’s meaning is, on the other 
hand, much more starkly ambiguous. Both are integral to noir’s narratives, despite being decentred 
in various ways, such as by the gendered division of labour which emphasises the ‘woman’s place’ 
 
3 Cowie, ‘Film Noir and Women’, p. 126. 
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in the home; retroactive narratives of noir; the retroactive conception of noir; and by noir’s 
fascination with home.  
One example of an important familial home in noir is the Dietrichson house in Double 
Indemnity. The home is Neff’s object of desire because it contains the family hierarchy, but it 
becomes secondary to evading and outthinking Keyes’ investigation. Neff’s fascination with 
Phyllis in Indemnity is structured by the architectural hierarchy granted to Phyllis during their 
meeting. Moreover, Phyllis’ criminality is seen as an indictment of Mr. Dietrichson, an effect of 
his ineffectual patriarchal power. The home in Mildred Pierce — which I will discuss in greater 
length shortly — is an object which requires retroactive reconstruction through Mildred’s 
testimony. Mildred assumes Veda’s guilt because the murder of Monte is framed as a failure of 
the familial structure by way of the unholy disruption of the patriarch’s apex position. In The Big 
Sleep, Geiger’s home is continually returned to in the hope of discovering the secret of the 
fascination it inspires. The family home in Shadow of a Doubt, which I have already discussed, is 
central because it houses the murderous Uncle Charles who cannot be swiftly caught because of 
his position in the family home. In The Secret Beyond the Door (1947), the home itself is the 
fascinating mystery. Mark Lamphere’s home is a labyrinth of locked doors and rooms. As I will 
argue in the next chapter, a central concern of Gilda is the location of Gilda, specifically where 
she is inside Ballin’s home. These types of homes typically denote a hierarchal power structure 
through the imposition of the family and the films’ narratives involve a struggle for dominion over 
the home. This section will now examine the ways in which home is a present and central concern 
of noir while is at the same time absent. 
The theorist Mark Fisher identifies two distinct yet interrelated affects which aim to 
encapsulate a profound strangeness and ambivalence in contemporary culture. Fisher calls these 
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two concepts the ‘weird’ and the ‘eerie’. On the one hand, ‘the weird’, Fisher writes, ‘is constituted 
by a presence — the presence of that which does not belong’, and the ‘eerie by contrast, is 
constituted by a failure of absence or by a failure of presence.’4 The weird and the eerie, therefore, 
concern questions of existence and non-existence: the weird asks why something is present when 
it should not be, and the eerie asks why there is an absence when something should be there. 
Although Fisher’s examples primarily include horror science fiction and gothic fiction (his primary 
examples include H.P. Lovecraft, Daphne du Maurier, H.G. Wells, and Andrei Tarkovsky), I 
would like to propose that these concepts can also help explain the peculiar position that home 
occupies in film noir. Fisher does not directly engage with noir, but his ideas can be used to 
illuminate noir from a gothic perspective. To understand the incongruity of home in noir, we need 
to emphasise the gothic, the horrific dimension of noir. 
 Fisher uses Freud’s notion of the uncanny as a point of origin for his concept of the weird 
and the eerie. Fisher stresses Freud’s native German term — unheimlich —over the anglicised 
‘uncanny’. Unheimlich roughly translates as ‘unhomely’; it is a familiar object within which the 
strange is found, and indeed the strangeness is only heighted by its familiarity. As Freud writes, 
‘what is “uncanny” is frightening precisely because it is not known and familiar.’5 What concerns 
Fisher, and myself, is not so much Freud’s clinical diagnosis of the unheimlich, but rather the way 
in which his influential 1919 essay —‘The Uncanny’ — is marked by a series of ‘hesitations, 
conjectures and rejected theses’.6 Freud’s final conclusion — that the unheimlich is characterised 
by castration anxiety — is less pointed as the continual circling and doubling inherent in both 
Freud’s essay and the unheimlich itself. One famous example is the uncanny appearance of the 
 
4 Mark Fisher, The Weird and The Eerie (London: Repeater Books, 2016) [epub ebook], 14.2. 
5 Sigmund Freud, ‘The Uncanny’ 
6 Fisher, The Weird and the Eerie, 5.6. 
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Burns sisters in Stanley Kubrick’s The Shining: they are encountered together as Danny circles 
round the labyrinthian corridors of the Overlook Hotel. It is as if they appear where Danny has 
already been. There is a slippage in historical time; they have already been there, and they are 
there again. Likewise, Jack Torrance has ‘always’ been the caretaker. The unheimlich in noir is 
predominantly expressed through fascination. The circling of the unheimlich relates to a narrative 
circularity in relation to knowledge and truth. The flashback narratives give a sense that we have 
been here before, not just that we have already visited the same spaces, but rather that we have 
arrived too late. Doubling, in noir, is more of an aesthetic and visual concern, though it of course 
relates to narrative as well. There is the doubling of characters in the Stranger and Michael in 
Stranger on the Third Floor, and Uncle Charles and Young Charlie in Shadow of a Doubt, for 
example. The femme fatale, which I will address in the subsequent chapter, functions as a double 
too. Even when we look back at noir in retrospect, we notice certain similarities across disparate 
films: the doomed hero, the femme fatale, the foreboding sense of fate, the lack of home, and so 
forth.  
The central ambivalence at the centre of the unheimlich (and in Freud’s psychoanalysis) is, 
as Fisher argues, whether the unheimlich is ‘about making the familiar — and the familial — 
strange’ or is ‘about returning the strange to the familiar, the familial’.7 This tension exists in noir 
insofar as the introduction of noir poses the question of whether the home is made strange by noir, 
or whether noir signals a return of the strange to home. Although Fisher claims that a ‘sense of the 
eerie seldom clings to enclosed and inhabited domestic spaces’, and that the eerie is ‘more readily’ 
found ‘in landscapes partially emptied of the human’, I would contend that homes in film noir are, 
 
7 Fisher, The Weird and The Eerie, 5.9. 
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in a sense, ruins, made so by virtue of their domestic habitation.8 As I demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, Don’s apartment in The Lost Weekend only serves to intensify his condition. In noir, the 
combination of the domestic habitation of home and the emptiness felt towards it opens the 
question of who the home is for, if it even is for anyone.  
 
‘Reason backwards’ — The Case of the Missing Agency in Mildred Pierce 
Figure 5.2, Mildred Pierce (1945) 
 
8 Ibid. 5.11. 
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I will now examine Michael Curtiz’s Mildred Pierce in relation to the eerie and the 
unheimlich. Specifically, I will emphasise the structural composition of the film and how it frames 
the eeriness of the home. This section will examine how the narrative of Mildred Pierce alters the 
meaning of the home and shows us the semiotics of the family home more broadly in noir. In film 
noir, the objet petit a is often suggested through the point de capiton. Flashback narrative structures 
purposely obfuscate details only to retroactively recontextualise them, to ‘effect a metaleptic 
reversal’ as Tyrer argues.9 In short, the method by which meaning is constructed is altered and this 
affects the construction of home’s meaning. While the film might seem like a strange choice 
because the question over how representative it is of noir — it is typically understood as a kind of 
hybrid of noir and women’s melodrama — I have chosen to look at Mildred Pierce in greater detail 
precisely because it highlights how noir operates in ‘hybrid’ films. Noir’s rough edges and the 
ambiguity it inspires intensify because it is assumed to be marginal. Noir’s effect is not limited to 
films which are considered strictly ‘canonical’. Exactly what elements make up, say, a women’s 
melodrama are questioned by the introduction of noir. As I will examine, two major and pertinent 
elements of a women’s melodrama are the prominence of the female perspective via the voiceover 
and the importance of the home, family, and domestic work. As I will argue, the female voiceover 
subverts our expectations for a male voiceover, but in the context of the film the narration is 
conducted under the investigation of two male detectives. The ‘noir influence’ on Mildred’s 
voiceover manifests itself through her self-censorship. The home, too, is a deeply disturbing place. 
It is not only made into the scene of a crime, but the crime itself disrupts the very order that the 
heteronormative family hierarchy is intended to impose. In fact, the unconscious and incestuous 
nature of Monte’s murder by Veda undermines the logic of the family. Noir, then, permeates the 
 
9 Tyrer, ‘Film Noir as Point de Capiton’, p. 109. 
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film to the point where it is impossible to identify where melodrama begins and noir ends, or vice 
versa. 
One such noir element which confuses definitional (and therefore symbolic) meaning is 
the flashback structure. The flashback narrative structure in Mildred Pierce to reconstruct the 
murder of Monte Beragon — Mildred’s second husband. The moment which acts as the 
investigative catalyst for the film — the cause — in Mildred Pierce is when Mildred meets Monte 
during the flashback.10 Marc Vernet calls ‘the mise-en-place […] a foretaste of what will be the 
truth: the final pleasure, the solution of the intrigue.’11 The concealed corpse of Monte at the 
beginning of the film is the enigma, the ‘pot au noir’ (Figure 5.2). More precisely, the central 
enigma of the film occurs when Veda shoots Monte, but we cannot see Veda. We see Monte’s 
reflection in the mirror as he whispers his final word: ‘Mildred.’12 The film’s structure reverses 
the set-up and enigma. The beginning of the film implies that the flashback structure is going to 
reveal how and why Mildred murdered Monte. As she invites Wally Fay — an old business partner 
of Bert Pierce, Mildred’s first husband — back to her home for an illicit affair, we see that the 
body of Monte is close-by, but hidden from Wally (Figures 5.2, and 5.3). The suggestion is that 
Mildred murdered Monte and is trying to frame the oblivious Wally. This implication of this image 
is established as the central conundrum of the film: why did Mildred murder Monte? Yet the 
solution to the set-up is based on our misrecognition of where the set-up and enigma occur. This 
is a common formulation in noir: we are encouraged to believe that we can see (and therefore 
know) more than the characters on screen, but our sense of mastery is always undermined. 
 
10 Marc Vernet, ‘The Filmic Transaction’ in Film Noir Reader 2, ed. Alain Silver and James Ursini (New York: 
Limelight, 1999 [1983]), p. 59. 
11 Vernet, ‘The Filmic Transition’, p. 61. 
12 Mildred Pierce, dir. by Michael Curtiz (Warner Bros., USA, 1945). 
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Figure 5.3, Mildred Pierce (1945) 
Other noirs with flashback structures often offer the spectator a somewhat privileged 
position in relation to the guilt of the protagonist. We know, for instance, that the conclusion of 
Neff’s tale in Indemnity ends with him being severely wounded. We know that Swede is killed by 
the two hitmen in The Killers. The flashbacks used in these two films are, moreover, explicitly 
confessional, whereby we learn how events turned sour. They are explanations, and often 
rationalisations, of guilt. In Mildred Pierce, however, although the flashback is staged as a guilty 
confessional (Mildred recounts her story to two anonymous police investigators), it is revealed that 
she is confessing — albeit unknowingly — her innocence. The detectives reveal not only that they 
knew all along that Veda murdered Monte, but also that she confessed, thus absolving Mildred 
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from her guilt. The purpose of Mildred’s confessional flashback is to cleanse the home of any clues 
pertaining to the crime, to exonerate the home itself. The revelation of Veda’s arrest and confession 
concurrently undermine Mildred’s feminine perspective by showing it to be one step behind the 
male investigators, what Delphine Letort calls ‘the patriarchal metadiscourse’.13 This is the central 
paradox in the film: it requires Mildred’s confession in order to render the home innocent, but it 
needs to undermine her perspective. This undermining is in service of showing that the error lies 
in the dissolution of her first marriage with Bert and pursuit of a career over her motherhood. 
 At first, Mildred draws Wally into the home under false pretences — replicating the role 
of the femme fatale — and attempts to frame him for Monte’s death. The narrative structure, 
therefore, serves to reverse the typical narrative trajectory of the femme fatale whereby the once 
innocent woman betrays the male protagonist. She is the guilty woman shown to be innocent. Her 
innocence, however, is only partial: Veda’s crime is recast because of Mildred’s perceived failure 
as a mother. Joyce Nelson, in her influential 1985 essay ‘Mildred Pierce Reconsidered’, calls this 
reversal a false suture.14 Specifically, she identifies the way the film withholds the reverse shot 
when Monte is shot. As Delphine Letort writes, this denial ‘creates an enigma that frames the 
viewer’s response to the film and subjects its female protagonist to the dominance of a patriarchal 
metadiscourse, signified by the search for truth driving the male detectives.’15 The false suture 
serves to undermine the control of the narrative Mildred has through her voiceover. Male 
voiceovers, by contrast, involve the male protagonist recontextualising events by subjecting them 
to the ‘patriarchal metadiscourse’, rather than being subjected by it.16 The eerie is here suggested 
 
13 Delphine Letort, ‘First Glances at Mildred Pierce: Adapting Hardboiled Melodrama’, Screen, 56.2 (Summer 2015), 
p. 264. 
14 Joyce Nelson, ‘Mildred Pierce Reconsidered’, Movies and Methods: An Anthology, Volume II, ed. by Bill Nichols 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985). 




by Mildred’s apparent hesitations and deliberations. If the eerie is characterised by ‘a failure of 
absence or by a failure of presence’17 then there is, here, a failure of desire insofar as its 
incongruities are exposed. In noir, what Mildred should want as the femme fatale is central to the 
film’s narrative. To put it crudely, what she apparently wants is the destruction of the male 
protagonists. Yet she does not show the familiar signs of the femme fatale. The absence of her 
desire can be understood as evidence of her position as the femme fatale, but it should be read as 
the film’s failure to understand Mildred herself. Joan Crawford’s performance is rigid throughout 
the whole scene, as if she is possessed by some other force, or that her agency has been taken 
away. Her lack of performativity is evidence that something is missing. Although this occurs 
before the flashback, her emotional blankness suggests that she is already anticipating our 
accusations of guilt. She cannot show that she wants to punish Wally (whether she genuinely wants 
to or not). Indeed, she cannot show that she wants anything at all, lest she is accused of being a 
femme fatale. For Fisher, the eerie is characterised by lack or ambiguity of agency. Mildred’s 
presence in the home is eerie because, as Fisher writes, ‘the central enigma at its core is the problem 
of agency.’18 The problem of agency is perhaps best understood as a resistance to narrativisation 
and narrative structure. On a cultural level, the organisation of discreet pieces of information into 
cohesive narratives is a strategy to help us make sense of the world. Conceiving of the home as 
eerie helps illuminate why its meaning is so difficult to pin down. 
There is, of course, the additional question of Mildred’s agency — what does she want 
with us? —which is connected to the problem of the agency of the home. What Mildred wants 
with Wally is equivalent to what the home wants with Wally. His, and our, desire to know is turned 
 
17 Mark Fisher, The Weird and The Eerie, 14.2. 
18 Ibid, 14.6. 
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against us. Home is a structure in which desire has been abandoned: we look, but we do not see.19 
In this sense, the function of the voiceover and the flashback later in the film is to ‘reintroduce’ 
desire to the film. As I will explore later, the purpose Mildred’s voiceover is a site of severe 
contestation in the film. It is a key debate in critical work surrounding the film as to whether 
Mildred’s voiceover is confessional (and therefore deferential to patriarchal forces) or whether she 
is assuming authorial control over the narrative. Comparatively, in Double Indemnity, Phyllis is 
first shown through the narrative retrospection as inherently villainous. It is clear through the 
double entendres that Phyllis’ sexual desire will lead to (and has already led to) destruction. 
However, since we see her through Neff’s eyes, she is understood, mistakenly, as once innocent. 
Neff’s narration moves to convince us that the reason he did not recognise Phyllis’ deception was 
because she was innocent from the beginning, rather than her always being villainous. The 
flashback structure and subsequent retroactive historical and epistemological reconstruction 
dislocates our identification with Neff and allows us to see Phyllis as always already antagonistic. 
 
19 Fisher’s book emphasises that the eerie can easily be seen in ruins and abandoned structures, such as those depicted 
in post-apocalyptic literature and film (for example, I Am Legend), and in historical mysteries like the Marie Celeste. 
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Figure 5.4, Mildred Pierce (1945) 
In Mildred Pierce, the formulation of guilt and the femme fatale seems to happen in 
reverse. Whichever way we look at the home, it always contains the possibility that it is something 
else. Mildred is first shown, by way of implication, to be murderous and later revealed to be 
innocent. Mildred was not guilty of Veda’s crime but acted as if she was. Instead of displacing her 
guilt in misrecognition, as Neff does, Mildred assumes Veda’s guilt over Monte’s murder. At first, 
the supposed set-up implies the murderous capacity of the home, that the home has been defiled 
by criminal activity. The retroactive structure reveals the central enigma surrounding home — how 
it was constructed without the ‘patriarchal metadiscourse’ — because in trying to reconstitute the 
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home into a place of safety, its meaning is changed. In this way, the home resists simple 
categorisation.  
Figure 5.5, Mildred Pierce (1945) 
The home is fascinating, too, because of the way in which it is inviting and perilous. Its 
danger arises from the enigma of Monte’s corpse. When Mildred opens the front door to invite 
Wally inside, the light from the lighthouse initially cloaks them in shadow before in the next 
moment lighting them up (Figures. 5.4 and 5.5). Although noir’s chiaroscuro lighting is often used 
to conceal, here it is being used to highlight Mildred and the home. The visual discomfort is due 
to the rhythmic pattern of showing and concealing which prevents our gaze from adjusting totally. 
Although fascination always renders us ‘in the dark’ in relation to knowledge, it is here staged 
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through showing; we are made fully aware that we cannot see, and therefore that we cannot know. 
We are invited to interpret and speculate on the meaning of the corpse and its effect on the home. 
Compounding the problem of vision is the way in which Mildred stands at the threshold of the 
home, the place between the outside and the inside. Epistemologically speaking, the home is 
positioned as a site of knowledge, where meaning is stitched together through the point de capiton. 
As Fisher remarks, ‘the notion of the between is crucial to the weird’.20 The ‘weird’ in this image 
is Mildred; she is the element that does not belong, even though, as a mother and a wife, she 
‘should’. Mildred does not belong because of her hesitations. Her hesitations countervail Wally’s 
confident presentation of his desires; Mildred shows that desire is marked by hesitations, that 
indecision or a lack of control constitutes desire. But the weird might also constitute the home. By 
standing on (or in) the threshold of the home, the site of knowledge, Mildred acts as Lacan’s 
fascinating veil. Wally is concerned with what lies behind Mildred, and how his desire might be 
attained by the home. But the home here is a space of negation, of death itself. It is not, again, what 
lies behind the veil, but the veil — Mildred —itself which is fascinating. Standing in the doorway 
temporarily halts desire, a hesitation which reveals the circular, and thus fascinating, staging of 
desire in the home. Moreover, this hesitation is marked by the stoppage and stillness of the camera. 
It is as if the home changes when we look because it does not exist outside of our gaze. The 
cinematic screen acts as a threshold. The enigma being shown to us is therefore not what lies in 
the home but our relation to it and to its construction. The threshold can therefore be conceived as 
a narrative hole within the film. They are emblematic of the various enigmas of what Monte saw, 
what Mildred wants, and, crucially, what the home wants.  
 
20 Fisher, The Weird and The Eerie, 8.10. 
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W.J.T. Mitchell, in his book What Do Pictures Want?, argues that it is not a question of 
what images ‘do, but instead what they “want”’.21 He shifts the focus from ‘power to desire’.22 
Our relation to images is not one of power, of mastery over the image inasmuch as we do not learn 
about images through exercising power over them. Instead, for Mitchell, our relation lies within 
reckoning with their desire. The relation between subject and object, between viewer and observer, 
is reversed when considering the desire of images, Mitchell writes, 
The painting's desire, in short, is to change places with the beholder, to transfix or paralyze 
the beholder, turning him into an image for the gaze. […] The power they want is 
manifested as lack, not as possession.23 
Moreover, Mitchell argues, mirroring Freud’s question of what women want, that the ‘“default” 
position of images is feminine’24 because of the way in which spectatorship is constructed. As 
Norman Bryson writes, ‘around an opposition between woman as image and man as the bearer of 
look.’25 For Mitchell, the question of what images want is ‘inseparable’ from the question of what 
women want.26  
In noir, then, what women want is what noir wants. As I will explore later, the spectre of 
the femme fatale is central to navigating the desire of noir yet is largely defined by its absence. 
The home, too, follows Mitchell’s logic. Here, in Mildred Pierce, Wally, the bearer of the male 
gaze, is drawn into the proposition of what power he can exert with his gaze over the ‘image’ of 
 
21 W.J.T. Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want?: The Lives and Loves of Images (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2005), p. 32. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Mitchell, p. 36. 
24 Ibid, p. 35. 
25 Norman Bryson, ‘Introduction’, in Visual Culture: Images and Interpretations, ed. by Norman Bryson, Michael 
Ann Holly, and Keith Moxey (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1994), p. xxv. 
26 Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want?, p. 35. 
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home. It is his gaze which obscures what the home (and Mildred) want from him. In relation to the 
investigative narratives of noir, the reversal of the relation between viewer and image disrupts the 
assumption of a logical narrative progression. When Slavoj Žižek writes about the difference 
between the ‘classical’ and ‘hardboiled’ detectives, he argues that the ‘the greatest charm of the 
classical detective narrative lies in the fascinating, uncanny, dreamlike quality of the story the 
client tells the detective at the very beginning.’27 The explanation of the problem, Žižek contends, 
holds a spell over us (insofar as we are swept up in ‘libidinal’ forces of the story) and the role of 
the detective is to offer a corrective and ‘rational’ explanation.28 However, I would instead 
highlight how the ending of classical detective narratives retell and thus attempt to narrativize their 
stories. At the end of A Study in Scarlet, for example, Sherlock Holmes, in recounting the neat 
narrativized version of the story, says to Watson that ‘in solving a problem of this sort, the grand 
thing is to be able to reason backwards.’29 Although Holmes is referring to his investigative 
process, it is the process of retelling the story which encodes meaning.  
In terms of the investigative structure of film noir, however, the noir detective must always 
remain open to one more clue. As Žižek argues, ‘the hard-boiled detective is […] “involved” from 
the beginning.’30 The noir detective cannot narrativize the story because of how their ‘involvement 
defines [their] very subjective position.’31 In noir, because of the centrality of home, there is no 
external agency, no authority to which the detective can rely on in order to ‘tell the story straight.’ 
Noir’s detective narratives, and the mode of detection itself, do not presuppose that the 
investigation is an external framework through which the details of the investigation can be 
 
27 Žižek, Looking Awry, p. 60. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Arthur Conan Doyle, A Study in Scarlet, (Project Gutenburg, 2008), [ebook], 5.65. 
30 Žižek, Looking Awry, p. 61. 
31 Ibid, p. 61. 
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illuminated and observed, but rather that it is the investigation (and the investigator/spectator’s 
involvement with) which produces the crime; it would not exist without the desire of the 
investigation. Clues, therefore, are always excessive. The excess clue in Mildred Pierce is the 
enigma of who shot Monte, who Monte saw in the mirror as well as the ambiguous lighting — 
what did the image see? And what did it desire? The mirror acts as a reflection insofar as we see 
Monte, but also as a screen for our investigative desire. The mirror positions the culprit not behind 
the mirror, but behind us; we, and our desire, become the very veil which obscures the answer, the 
narrative hole at the centre of the film. 
 
‘I was wrong’ — Constructing Mildred’s Voiceover 
This section explores how the guilt in Mildred’s voiceover reconstructs the home as ambiguous. 
Although the voiceover begins a few scenes into the film, we can see how the visual ambiguity 
surrounding home prefaces Mildred’s guilt and her subsequent restoration of the ‘accepted’ 
familial composition of her and Bert. The light from the lighthouse, crashing against the home like 
waves from the shoreline, gives the illusion of depth in the home. It represents the excess of 
signifiers. Since the evidence of Mildred’s guilt is her assumption of Veda’s guilt rather than 
Monte’s corpse, Mildred cannot totally hide her guilt in shadow. At the same time she cannot be 
open about her desires. The desire to know is contrasted with Mildred’s guilt, which is manifested 
as an instance of the weird. She is guilty even when we expect her not to be since she is coded as 
a femme fatale by the way in which she seemingly lures the unsuspecting Wally into her home. 
Wally is not a noir hero, however. He is slightly too lecherous, too eager. He is no Walter Neff, 
Sam Spade, or Philip Marlowe. The guilt is a familial guilt, as Mildred takes on the burden of 
Veda’s crimes, in part as a punishment for her failure as the maternal figure. Yet this perceived 
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failure is only spectral, always threatening to be realised. It is only true, supposedly, if Veda’s 
crime comes to light. Veda’s criminality and deviancy are therefore partially explained by the film 
through the lack of a paternal figure in her life, a lack which arises through Mildred’s pursuit of a 
career over her family. Veda’s crime, in a sense, is the home’s fault since all members of the family 
must share the guilt. Paradoxically, then, Mildred must act as if she is guilty in order to avoid guilt.  
On one level, noir’s lighting is supposed to imply a level of depth in the image which thus 
suggests that the surfaces of noir are deceptive, and that something lies beneath them. This 
replication of visual depth, however, is itself a deception. As Copjec concludes, noir’s visual 
techniques — particularly its deep-focus photograph and chiaroscuro lighting — ‘are placed in the 
service of creating an artificial replication of depth in the image in order to make up for, to 
compensate for, the absence of depth in narrative spaces.’32 Copjec argues that the images in noir 
do not hide and conceal hidden meanings, but rather that those hidden meanings lie on the surface. 
Christine Gledhill, for instance, argues that the image of women in film noir is ‘an artifice’ which 
‘suggests another place behind the image where the woman might be.’33 The image of the woman 
is therefore semiotically excessive; she always contains the possibility of meaning more than she 
appears. Gledhill is largely concerned with the femme fatale. She therefore presupposes that this 
artifice is constructed by the male control of the narrative.34 This is a useful prism through which 
to analyse Mildred Pierce and the construction of home within it, although I do not think it is 
necessary to only focus on the femme fatale, which itself is constructed by the male control of the 
narrative. 
 
32 Copjec, ‘Private Space in Film Noir’, p. 192. 
33 Christine Gledhill, ‘Kluge: A contemporary Film Noir’, in Women in Film Noir, ed. by E. Ann Kaplan (London: 
BFI, 1978), p. 17. 
34 Consider, for example, the way in which Kathie in Out of the Past, Phyllis in Double Indemnity, and Cora in The 
Postman Always Rings Twice are all constructed through the male flashback. 
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Mildred’s voiceover is only made possible through the male investigator’s control over the 
metadiscourse of the film; it is not her confession. She can tell her story on the condition that she 
relinquishes control of the discourse and reconstruct home in accordance with the patriarchal 
demands, thereby absolving Bert. She must then reconnect with Bert, to bring unity to her 
discordance. The home ‘suggests another place behind the image’ with the image being the open 
and inviting home.35 It is in this way that, as Fred Pfeil argues, film noir is centred on ‘home and 
family, even as it decentres and problematises both’36 because of its ‘visibly artificial existence’ 
within the film.37 The home visualises our fascination with Mildred’s guilt and thus primarily 
becomes a psychological space, a place in which psychology is projected onto and into. In addition 
to the visible perception of home, there is the concern of how the home is constructed narratively.  
As Wally and Mildred enter the home, the bright and illuminated interior invites inspection 
and thus gives the false impression that the home has nothing to hide. Although the light comes 
from outside the home, it matches the intensity from the interior lights. The boundaries between 
the two are blurred and it is left ambiguous whether Mildred’s framing is to save Veda or because 
Mildred ‘really’ wants to frame Wally specifically. Wally is invited to see and inspect the home 
by the rhythmically pulsing light of the lighthouse. The lighthouse’s gaze is partially blocked by 
the window shades, projecting prison-like bars of shadow across the interior walls. Wally rightly 
questions Mildred’s behaviour and motivation, but all he sees is obscured, only visible in glimpses. 
Like us, he misrecognises Mildred’s desire and fantasy. When Mildred leaves, excusing herself to 
change her clothes after she causes Wally’s glass to shatter on the ground, she locks the door and 
 
35 Gledhill, ‘Kluge: A contemporary Film Noir’, p. 17. 
36 Fred Pfeil, ‘Home Fires Burning: Family Noir in Blue Velvet and Terminator 2’ in Shades of Noir: A Reader, ed. 
by Joan Copjec (London: Verso, 1993), p. 231. 
37 Copjec, ‘Private Space in Film Noir’, p. 193. 
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escapes, trapping Wally in the home. Thus, Vernet’s ‘enigma’38 is provided by the home. The 
perplexing questions (why Monte’s body is in the home, why Wally is being invited inside, and 
why he is being invited downstairs) are all centred around the home. Home is the central lack of 
the film. Our misrecognition is due to way in which the retroactive structure highlights the 
impossibility of the objet petit a —the objet petit a is a structural relation. As Lacan writes, history 
is only ‘the past insofar as it is historicised in the present.’39 Cause and effect are reversed, the 
answer of fantasy comes before the posing of the question. 
The home is central to noir but is consistently undermined and problematised, principally 
by or for women. Its symbolic position in noir is tightly bound with noir’s depiction of gender. For 
example, Mildred is initially coded and mistook as a femme fatale because her solicitation of Wally 
is performed in the absence of her husband, Monte. Her imagined and implied adultery is made 
possible (and worse) by the disruption to the hierarchy. It is an affair which takes place in the home 
while the spectral husband sees the infidelity beyond his death. Symbolically, then, Monte is kept 
alive, in stasis, through the home. The position of women in the home is crucial to the stabilisation 
of home. Victoria Straughn, writing about Mildred Pierce and the role of women in Cold War 
America, notes that prominent readings of the film centre around the film being used as a piece of 
postwar propaganda for viewing audiences who had their own concerns about ‘marriage, family 
life, and employment’.40 For Straughn, all the ‘nascent strains of foreign aggression and 
communism as cultural, moral, and familial threats’ in the film serve to ‘underscore the point that 
a woman's proper role is in the home, under the protective and watchful eye of her 
 
38 Vernet, ‘The Filmic Transition’, p. 62. 
39 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I: Freud’s Papers on Technique 1953-1954, ed. by Jacques-
Alain Miller, trans. by John Forrester (London: Norton, 1991), p. 12. 
40 Victoria Straughn, ‘Hollywood “Takes” on Domestic Subversion: The Role of Women in Cold War America’, OAH 
Magazine of History 17.2 (January 2003), p. 31. 
[229] 
 
husband/patriarch.’41 Mildred is the obvious example, but the same logic can be extended to Monte 
and Veda. Monte’s desire for Veda, for instance, is a way for him to obtain Mildred’s wealth, 
wealth that is gained at the expense of the family. Straughn points to Veda’s sexual promiscuity as 
a response to her being ‘fatherless’. The lack of a father, that is, the lack of masculine law, causes 
her destructive behaviour.  
On the other hand, C. M. Gill argues that Veda’s pursuit of Monte can be read in two 
obverse ways: first, as an ‘attempt by Veda to survive outside the family system’42, second, as a 
mechanism which (perhaps inadvertently) reunites the family. ‘Monte’s murder’, Gill writes, 
‘ultimately leads to […] the reunion of formerly estranged spouses Mildred and Bert.’43 The family 
is therefore constituted on violent and destructive grounds and a tribute must be paid in order to 
sustain it. As Straughn compellingly concludes: ‘In the final scene of the film, with one daughter 
dead and the other hopelessly misguided and ruined, Mildred rejoins her husband, finally accepting 
her “rightful place.” Her subversion has cost her the lives of her children.’44 Her ‘rightful place’, 
as Gill observes, is with Bert, the man who gives her ‘Pierce’, Mildred’s ‘rightful’ last name. For 
Gill and Straughn, then, the reconstitution of the ‘proper’ family is central to the film. Before 
Mildred is interrogated by the police she gives her name as ‘Mildred Pierce-Beragon’, signifying 
the unresolved familial tension.45 In addition, I would add, it is the reconstitution of the ‘proper’ 
family within the ‘proper’ home that is central to the film since it is through the duplicity of the 
home that the hierarchal structure of the family is desecrated. 
 
41 Ibid. 
42 C. M. Gill, ‘Martyring Veda: Mildred Pierce and Family Systems Theory’, Style, 44.1&2 (Spring/Summer 2010), 
p. 95. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid, p. 32. 
45 Mildred Pierce (1945). 
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To understand this distinction, I will now analyse the gendered assumptions of labour in 
the film, as well as how the film interprets labour more generally. Under the patriarchal structure 
of the home and the family there is a clear delineation between male and female labour: the 
husband goes away to work while the wife stays to maintain the home. Instead, Mildred’s home 
collapses the boundaries between these two distinct and gendered types of labour. The home itself 
becomes a threshold for labour. The two competing discourses in the film are whether or not 
Mildred’s acquiescence to Bert at the end of the film is a result of her perceived abandonment of 
her family in favour of work, or a result of the demands of the patriarchal familial structure itself. 
A historical reading is thus problematised by this ambiguity raised by the film. Mildred’s voiceover 
can help illuminate the problem.  
From the beginning, as Catherine Jurca observes, Mildred works and cooks in the kitchen: 
she is ‘the picture of the dedicated suburban housewife.’46 Yet the voiceover undermines the image 
and the home. Mildred begins by saying that Bert and Wally were once business partners, both 
owners of a real estate company. ‘They built a lot of houses,’ Mildred boasts, but ‘suddenly, 
everybody stopped buying’, resulting in Bert losing his job.47 Stopping buying, in this context, 
refers at once to the historical reasoning behind buying houses and the breakdown of the family. 
Mildred’s framing of Wally for Monte’s murder can thus be seen another way. Wally’s punishment 
by Mildred is principally moral: he is prepared to have an affair with Mildred in the knowledge 
that she is married. But the moral edge to his punishment is here rendered historical. The film 
aligns his moral willingness to desecrate the sanctity of marriage with a historical intention to 
desecrate the sanctity of home. The lessening demand in the housing market (expressed 
 
46 Catherine Jurca, ‘Mildred Pierce, Warner Bros., and the Corporate Family’, Representations 77 (Winter 2002), p. 
33. 
47 Mildred Pierce (1945). 
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metaphorically in the film as ‘stopping buying houses’) is a result of the economic upheaval caused 
by the changes in production and labour ingrained by World War Two. The breakdown of the 
family can equally be read as a consequence of the war insofar as men who left the home to fight 
in the war returned as traumatised citizens. In addition, women leaving home to reinforce the 
labour market compounded the problem. With respect to returning soldiers, John Huston’s 
documentary Let There Be Light (1946) — which was unreleased until 1980 — provides an insight 
into the medical misunderstanding of post-traumatic stress disorder.48 It details the medical and 
psychiatric attempts at reintegrating soldiers back into society. The end of the documentary, 
though, involves depicting the soldiers’ successful reintegration through being discharged from 
the various hospitals and military clinics and from military service itself. Noir’s response to these 
real psychological traumas is a cultural one, which represents them as moral traumas. However, 
given noir’s traumatic formal retroactivity and subject matter, such simple translations are rarely 
possible or wholly convincing. 
For Bert, his familial failure is replicated in his economic destitution since ‘returning home 
from work’ fulfils the same symbolic function as returning from war. Bert, for example, does not 
see the value in Mildred earning money for herself. When a dress for Veda arrives, he asks where 
Mildred got the money from, to which she replies, ‘making cakes and pies for the neighbours. I 
earned it.’49 Mildred’s income deriving from baked goods is inseparable from her position as a 
housewife. Mildred’s home and her business are managed from the same space. Mildred thus 
occupies the masculine and feminine roles of the home by herself: both mother and worker. In this 
context, the task of the flashback is to exorcise this initial image of the ‘dysfunctional’ family. For 
 
48 Let There Be Light, dir. by John Huston (USA: U.S. Army, 1946). 
49 Mildred Pierce (1945). 
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Bert, the reason people ‘stopped buying houses’ is that women such as Mildred were occupying 
the roles of mother and worker.  
The confessional flashback reframes Mildred’s domestic baking as criminal. Mildred’s 
profitable baking is understood as a direct replacement of Bert’s work. If only Mildred had stuck 
to her domestic ‘duties’, or so the moral imperative goes, then people would have kept ‘buying 
houses.’ The flashback therefore stages the collapse between the domestic and commercial spaces, 
structuring it as Mildred’s principle crime. As Jurca argues, ‘there is no domestic space in Mildred 
Pierce inhabited outside the realm of the commercial.’50 For Jurca, then, domesticity disappeared 
into the commercial; everything collapses into the logic of the market. In this way, the home as 
domestic space has vanished. Later in the film, Mildred’s flourishing diner empire follows a 
similar logic to the baking of cakes and pies because her diners are supposed to replace the need 
for a housewife to stay home and cook for their husbands and families since it is supposed to 
reproduce Mildred’s ‘homely’ cooking on a commercial scale. We could here reverse Jurca’s 
argument: it is not the domestic space which disappears into the commercial space, but the 
commercial which disappears into the domestic. In the film, there is no work beyond the domestic. 
This is not only visible through Mildred’s business, but through Monte, who does not work in the 
film since he inherited his fortune.  
For Monte, his sexual desire for Mildred is associated with Mildred’s economic desires. 
As Jurca observes, when Monte and Mildred meet in the latter’s restaurant, Mildred fixes a 
chandelier while stood on a ladder and only her legs are visible to the camera (Figure 5.6), a 
moment which bears resemblance to Cora’s introduction in The Postman Always Rings Twice. 
 
50 Jurca, ‘Mildred Pierce’, p. 33. 
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Monte says he has come to ‘check in’ on his ‘investment.’51 Jurca argues that, for Monte, ‘what 
underwrites Mildred’s desirability is her capacity for making money.’52 Equally, too, ‘Mildred’s 
interest in Monte ebbs with his fortune.’53 The domestic nature of Monte and Mildred’s business 
and sexual relationship highlights the centrality of the family metaphor. In the next scene, Monte 
attempts to seduce Mildred by inviting her to his family’s house by the beach for an afternoon 
swim. One notable difference here is that this scene is part of Mildred’s flashback, it is her 
narration, and thus she is framing herself int his way. 
Figure 5.6, Mildred Pierce (1945) 
 
51 Mildred Pierce (1945). 




As Jurca observes, Monte lets Mildred choose from a selection of bathing suits, all 
belonging to an imaginary sister. Jurca writes: ‘At first it is as though only incestuous innuendo 
can arouse [Mildred and Monte], but economic considerations resurface to normalize their 
relationship. A commercial transaction secures a more literal extension of the family’.54 Their 
marriage is only made possible through Monte gaining one-third of her restaurant business, and 
Mildred gaining the ‘respectability’ of the Beragon name. It is a financial transaction which 
restores ‘the family unit.’55 As Jurca concludes, 
Just as the restaurant becomes a way for the mother to treat customers as though they were 
neighbors, to whom she already ministers as though they were family, the corporation 
makes entrepreneurs out of mothers and transforms family members into business partners 
and business partners into family members. 56 
Moreover, Mildred’s commercial activity works as an expansion of her domestic labour. Even in 
its absence, the home and the domestic is central. Mildred’s punishment by the end of the film (her 
destitute family, her failed business, and her humiliation by the detectives) is a consequence of her 
blending of the domestic and commercial spheres. I would argue this is less Mildred’s personal 
failing than a result of the demands imposed on her by Bert, Veda, and the construction of home 
more generally. Bert’s failure as the patriarch is thus replicated in the loss of his labour. Bert’s 
labour, unlike Mildred’s domesticity, has no value. 
In the film, the relationship between Mildred’s domestic labour and her commercial value 
is expressed structurally, through what Pamela Robertson describes as the ‘structural gap’ between 
 





Mildred’s voiceover and the ‘implied filmmaker’s narration’.57 It is this ‘gap’ which remains a 
point of contestation for critics of Mildred Pierce. As Karen Hollinger observes, the voiceover in 
noir is typically male and serves as a counterweight to the dominating visual presence of the femme 
fatale.58 The voiceover in Mildred Pierce, though, according to Robertson, encourages us to ‘adopt 
a patriarchal point of view’ because of the irony and disjunction between the voiceover and the 
images. It acts to deny autonomy, to ‘deny Mildred’s “feminine” discourse’.59 In other words, we 
are encouraged to see Mildred’s narration as unreliable and criminal. However, the narration is 
Mildred’s — she frames herself how she wants to be seen, she is in control of her own image. 
Since the flashback frames Mildred as a criminal confessing her crimes, all her actions are coded 
as potential evidence for her crimes. The meaning, however, is only established at the end of the 
film when the detectives reveal that they knew of Mildred’s innocence all along. We are 
encouraged to conceive of Mildred as guilty, and in so doing, feel the guilt ourselves, despite it 
being predicated on the wrong assumption of her guilt.  
Robertson notes that while male voiceovers in noir are typically tinged with irony, 
Mildred’s is more sincere. Robertson compares Mildred’s narration with Walter Neff’s in 
Indemnity. In the latter, Neff says in his opening confession that he killed Mr. Dietrichson ‘…for 
money, and for a woman’, and that he ‘didn’t get the money,’ or ‘the woman’.60 Neff ‘recognises 
the fatal irony in his story’, but he does so with a ‘mordant humour.’61 Neff’s narration, too, reveals 
the doubling of money and women. His confession aligns money and women — in the same way 
 
57 Pamela Robertson, ‘Structural Irony in Mildred Pierce, or How Mildred Lost Her Tongue’, Cinema Journal 30.1 
(Autumn, 1990), p. 52. 
58 Karen Hollinger, ‘Film Noir, Voice Over, and the Femme Fatale’, in Film Noir Reader, ed. by Alain Silver and 
James Urisini (New York: Limelight Edition. 1996). 
59 Robertson, ‘Structural Irony in Mildred Pierce’, p, 43. 
60 Double Indemnity (1944). 
61 Robertson, ‘Structural Irony in Mildred Pierce’, p. 44. 
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that Pierce aligns the commercial and the domestic spheres — as the two reasons for his desire. 
The reason Neff would want money is the same as why he would want a woman, that is, in order 
to reassert himself at the top of the patriarchal structure, to validate his ‘masculine labour’. 
Mildred’s response, however, to the detective’s question (‘Why did you divorce [Bert]?’) is to 
begin ‘with an admission of error’62: ‘I was wrong.’ Mildred says, ‘It’s taken me four years to find 
that out. Now I know — I was wrong.’63 This shows, Robertson argues, that Mildred ‘views her 
story as […] a lesson in right and wrong’.64 There is a need for Mildred to confess that her actions 
were wrong so that the blame can be shifted away from the home and onto her. The task of the 
detectives, therefore, is to historicise the story and organise it in a linear and causal fashion by 
solving the enigma of Mildred’s feminine perspective. Yet in so doing, the narrative becomes 
fascinated with Mildred’s perspective. A reversal occurs where what she saw (the ‘objective’ truth 
of what happened, why Monte said ‘Mildred’ when he was shot by Veda, why she forwent her 
domestic obligations) is transformed into what she felt. Her feelings must be organised into a causal 
and verifiable timeline, but the construction of meaning through noir’s retroactivity renders the 
problems of guilt historical. History and guilt cannot merely be put back into the film as if they 
were forgotten or suppressed. Just as historical readings of the film risk simply supplanting one 
metaphor for another, Mildred’s voiceover shows the impossibility of replacing affect with 
meaning. 
Robertson’s argument, though, seems generally true regarding the differing gendered 
expectations placed on noir’s male and female protagonists. However, Mildred resists these 
expectations. If we take an example from The Lady From Shanghai (1947), where Michael’s 
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opening narration is characterised by a self-deprecating humour, we can see similarities to 
Mildred’s. At the beginning of the film, Michael says, 
When I start out to make a fool of myself, there's very little that can stop me. If I'd known 
where it would end, I'd never let anything start. If I'd been in my right mind, that is. But 
once I'd seen [Elsa], once I'd seen her, I was not in my right mind for quite some time.65 
The same mordant humour as Neff’s in Indemnity is present here. Yet the humour masks Michael’s 
lack of admission of guilt. His emphasis is not on what he did wrong, but rather the state of mind 
he was in (which was directly influenced by Elsa, the femme fatale) while something went wrong. 
While in the kitchen with Bert in the opening scene of the flashback, Mildred expresses a similar 
disposition. She says, speaking to Bert, ‘you might as well get this straight right once and for all. 
Those kids come first in this house. Before either one of us. Maybe that’s right and maybe it’s 
wrong, but that’s the way it is.’66 Mildred places the blame on the conditions she is in, the spell 
she is under, rather than on what she is doing. This line of dialogue is, crucially, not part of the 
flashback narration but instead diegetic to the flashback. Mildred thus anticipates the criticisms, 
that is, the desire of the investigators, of what she did. Although she frames her flashback in strictly 
moralistic terms — ‘I was wrong’67 — the content of the flashback directly undermines this 
framing. She cannot be wrong because there was no decision to make; there was no autonomy in 
the home. The spell Michael is under is characterised by a mixture of his drunkenness and 
fascinated desire for Elsa, whereas the spell Mildred is under is the ongoing denial of her ‘feminine 
discourse’ which is channelled through the patriarchal and hierarchical logic of home. 
 
65 The Lady From Shanghai (1947). 




Contrary to Robertson’s claims, then, Mildred’s feminine perspective is not wholly denied 
its autonomy in the structural incongruity between the voiceover and the images. Traces of irony 
can be detected in Mildred’s voiceover. While introducing her family home, Mildred also speaks 
about how she feels about her position in the patriarchal hierarchy. First, she says that she ‘lived 
on Corvallis Street, where all the houses look alike.’68 Mildred implies that the assumption of the 
houses’ similarity is the very façade which makes any retrospective interrogation difficult. Their 
consistency is reminiscent of wartime factory production; the endless conveyers containing 
millions of identical bullets, loaded in thousands of identical weapons, which is unremarked upon 
by Mildred. Second, Mildred continues, ‘I was always in the kitchen. I felt as though I’d lived in 
a kitchen all my life…except for the few hours it took to get married.’69 For Mildred, the kitchen 
is akin to a factory, since it is characterised by repetitious work. When Bert is in work (or overseas) 
Mildred working is not a problem for him. It is only when Bert returns home — indeed, in the 
film, the very moment he returns home — does Mildred’s work and income become a problem. 
Although Robertson claims that there is a juxtaposition between Mildred’s feminine discourse and 
the ‘presumably objective, but clearly “masculine,” image track’, here the image and the narration 
coincide.70  
As Mildred says this, Bert returns home, looking dejected (Figure 5.7). In the flashback we 
know that Bert has lost his job, but Mildred is yet to know. The flashback thus has a level of self-
awareness and irony which is so often present in the male voiceover. The crucial structural point 
of divergence occurs during this confluence between voice and image. However, Mildred’s 
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‘melodrama’ and ‘noir’ in the film is not clear cut. For Jurca, the melodramatic aspects of the film 
work to create a ‘coercive structure’ because of the ‘gendered’ way Mildred’s account is 
continually undermined by the male detectives.71  
Figure 5.7, Mildred Pierce (1945) 
It is not the case that the film can be neatly divided into melodrama (Mildred’s narration) 
and noir (the male detective’s interjections), but rather that home is reconfigured through both noir 
and melodrama.72 The melodramatic association between motherhood and commerce ‘seeks to 
naturalize the market economy.’73 For example, Mildred’s home baking at the beginning of the 
 
71 Jurca, ‘Mildred Pierce’, p. 31. 
72 Ibid, p. 33. 
73 Ibid, p. 31. 
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film is a commercial activity, as opposed to a recreational one. Whereas the ‘noirness’ of the 
retroactive structure restricts the film’s attempts at narrativisation. Both, therefore, begin in the 
home, and the noirness, it turns out, was in the melodrama all along.  
While Robertson is correct to identify the ‘structural gap’ as an essential component of the 
melodramatic elements of the film, she does not emphasise the way in which Mildred ‘talks back’ 
to the structuring absence of the film through her self-awareness. For Linda Williams, history is 
the absent cause of the film.74 As Robertson summarises the case, the film does ‘represent the 
specific historical conditions (the return of American GIs and the wartime employment of women) 
that made this representation of the problems of women possible in the first place.’75 Instead, these 
historical conditions are folded into the personal and melodramatic problems of the film. People 
stopped ‘buying houses’ (thus making Bert redundant) in the film not because of the economic 
effects of World War Two, but as an effect of Mildred’s disruption of the hierarchy of the home 
through the combination of the domestic and commercial spheres. A historical reading necessitates 
splitting the narrative into melodramatic sequences and noir sequences. Pam Cook, for instance, 
argues that the melodramatic sequences are in the past, while the present is constituted by 
noirness.76 Such an arrangement, however, is made impossible by the retroactivity of noir. The 
opening of the film, for Letort, does not conform to such neat distinctions. In Letort’s analysis, 
because ‘the new enigma’ created by Monte’s last word — Mildred — ‘points to Mildred’s guilt’, 
it actively ‘undermines the melodramatic appeal of the first flashback.’77 This appeal is centred 
around the idyllic and implied history prior to the breakdown of the marriage. Indeed, the 
 
74 Linda Williams, ‘Feminist Film Theory: Mildred Pierce and the Second World War’ in Female Spectators: Looking 
at Film and Television, ed. by E. Deidre Pribram (New York: Verso, 1988), p. 21. 
75 Robertson, ‘Structural Irony in Mildred Pierce’, p. 52. 
76 Pam Cook, ‘Duplicity in Mildred Pierce’, in Women in Film Noir, ed. by E. Ann Kaplan (London: BFI, 2001), pp. 
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77 Letort, ‘First Glances at Mildred Pierce’, p. 265. 
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breakdown is presented as having a singular cause — specifically, this scene. The retroactive 
structure of the film that results in the breakdown of the marriage happens both before and after 
Monte’s accusation of Mildred. The flashback structure itself, therefore, prohibits a melodramatic 
reconstruction of home, both on the cinematic and critical levels. It is in yearning that home is 
forgotten. While the flashback structure of Mildred Pierce might appear to be consistent with the 
expectations of ‘women’s melodrama’ (insofar as it centres Mildred’s perspective) we can see how 
both the flashback and the narration complicates the strict categorisation of the film, and in so 
doing, complicates the home. Through the flashback structure, the home becomes a site of trauma. 
It depicts various instances of domestic detached homes: Mildred’s home with Monte and her 
home with Bert are contrasted against each other, and neither seemingly provides the stability they 
promise. The next section will examine other types of home in noir, specifically the numerous 
ways apartments are presented. Then, it will discuss the ways in which the compression of space 
intensifies the traumatic dimension of home in relation to the absence of history in noir and its 
spaces. 
 
The Machinery of Night — The Apartment and the City in Film Noir. 
The family home is subject to forces outside of itself because it lacks a stable interiority. In noir, 
the cityscapes and compact urban environments pressure and decentre the home. The prevalence 
of the urban apartment can help to show the differing meanings of home, and how home can be 
understood by its negation. The urban apartment, for one, lies in direct contrast to the detached 
familial home. Where the detached home is open and inviting — at least, on the surface — the 
apartment is claustrophobic and surrounded by danger. It could be said that the distinction, in the 
context of epistemology, is that in the detached home questions are invited, whereas in the 
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apartment questions intrude from the outside. It is, for example, in his cramped apartment where 
Michael succumbs to his paranoid dream in Stranger on the Third Floor. The denouement of The 
Maltese Falcon occurs in Sam Spade’s apartment. These apartments differ from each other: 
Michael’s is more of a rented room than a ‘full’ home, whereas Spade’s is more complete. Their 
function — to intensify paranoia — is similar, however. 
Figure 5.8, Edward Hopper, Night Windows, 1928 
Apartments, generally, do not distinguish themselves as separate and private spaces. These 
apartments, as urban technologies, suggest a divergent relationship to public space in comparison 
to detached homes in the suburbs, not only in their proximity to the epicentres of fast-moving 
urban life, but also in the relationship between apartments and public space. In cities themselves 
the sound of sirens — emissions of othered, indistinct and distant crises — becomes the backdrop 
for privation. Public space is always potentially encroaching on the boundary of private space, as 
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is visible in Edward Hopper’s Night Windows (Figure 5.8). The wind blows on the curtains and 
through the open window as we watch the back of a woman living her, supposedly, private life. 
Noir, with its proclivity for urban centres such as New York and Los Angeles, uses this breakdown 
of boundaries to further intensify its action. As Janey Place observes, the ‘urban landscape of film 
noir’ contrasts with its depiction of a ‘pastoral, idealised, remembered past.’78 Apartments, with 
their transitory nature, resist such nostalgia.  
Unlike the detached home, the apartment rarely contains a family; in fact, the apartment is 
normally characterised by an absence of family. Some examples in noir include Walter Neff’s 
apartment in Double Indemnity, where the affair between Neff and Phyllis begins and the family 
is broken up. The family is similarly broken up in the apartments in both The Woman in the 
Window and Scarlet Street. Michael, in Stranger on the Third Floor, is prohibited from having 
Jane visit him in his apartment. Don’s apartment in The Lost Weekend cannot sustain a family 
because of Don’s addiction. In The Blue Dahlia, Helen’s apartment is the site in which Johnny and 
Helen’s marriage (and therefore a potential family unit) disintegrates, both from her adultery and 
her murder. In the apartment, they are the same thing. Irene’s apartment in Dark Passage (1947) 
and Sam Spade’s apartment in The Maltese Falcon are absent of any family. In The Killers, the 
apartment where the Swede is killed, is a place of negation and death. In truth, Swede’s apartment 
is more of a rooming house, and as such is distinct from Irene’s lavish apartment. For Swede, his 
living space embodies his alienation. The fact that he is not a recognised part of the community — 
the police chief tells Reardon that Swede ‘just lived here is all’79 — emphasises that his rooming 
house functions effectively as his coffin. 
 
78 Janey Place, ‘Women in Film Noir’, p. 51. 
79 The Killers (1946) 
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One of the ways in which we can see the mechanisms of the compression of space in noir 
and apartments is by thinking of apartments as a technology. Historically speaking, the apartment 
could be considered a technological solution to the economic downturn of the Depression in the 
1930s. It is a technological solution because of its spatial efficiency in comparison with larger 
detached homes. Apartments compress time and space as well as lessening the division between 
work and home. Apartments were suitable for the post-depression period because they were 
cheaper and more affordable to build, they took up less space, and were situated close to urban 
work. In a historical sense, ‘people stopped buying houses’ and more people moved into 
apartments because the detached, family homes were unsustainable or unsuitable after the 
depression.80 This ‘unsuitability’ is understood as cultural and psychological in noir.  
The transition between the two types of homes is understood as traumatic in noir. We can 
read film noir as a way for American culture to articulate its trauma over the Great Depression, 
and then over World War Two. As Joel Dinerstein argues, the visual style of noir and narrative 
obliqueness lies in contrast to both the light screwball comedies (such as Howard Hawks’ Bringing 
Up Baby (1938)81 and Frank Capra’s It Happened One Night (1934)82) and moralistic gangster 
films (such as Mervyn LeRoy’s Little Caesar (1931)83 and Howard Hawks’ Scarface (1932)84) of 
the 1930s. Dinerstein argues that the majority of noir criticism ‘presumes a postwar context’ to 
noir despite the fact that noir ‘emerges’ in 1940 and 1941.85 This view fails to account for many 
of the ‘classic’ film noirs from before 1945 which were, according to Dinerstein, already ‘visually 
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and thematically fully realized.’86 Dinerstein’s point of divergence is useful since noir embodies 
many competing historical contexts. It is important not to conceive of noir as simply an outgrowth 
of anxieties over World War Two and the postwar period. What his argument highlights and 
problematises, in my view, is the way in which the critical approach to noir is dependent on a 
retroactive viewpoint. Dinerstein is correct to identify that noir should not be viewed in only a 
postwar context (and that the presumption of such a context in a sense produces noir as a postwar 
category). This thesis seeks to highlight what is present but not seen in noir, while at the same time 
also drawing attention to what is seen but not present.87 Moreover, I argue that the epistemological 
and ontological frustrations in noir are themselves a reflection of corresponding critical anxieties, 
and that these frustrations and anxieties coalesce around the ambiguous object of home. It is 
through centring home that we can understand noir’s anxieties more fully. 
Charting the transition of the construction of home in film noir between two binaries — 
pre-war and postwar — involves a misreading of noir’s history. If the trauma of World War Two 
renders home a lost object — noir’s protagonists cannot ‘look back’ and recover it — then 
Dinerstein helps point toward the previous and unresolved trauma of the Great Depression. What 
draws audiences to noir is, Dinerstein argues, a ‘nostalgia for stable spaces.’88 The primary ‘stable 
space’, I would argue, is home. The noir protagonist’s goal to recover the home involves 
recovering the family home, which is rapidly disappearing through the seismic changes brought 
about by the Depression and World War Two. This is another instance of how home is lost in film 
 
86 Ibid. 
87 As evidenced in critical works such as: Bronfen, ‘Femme Fatale: Negotiations of Tragic Desire’; Cowie, ‘Film Noir 
and Women’; Krutnik, In a Lonely Street; Harris, ‘Outside History, but Historically so’; Oliver and Trigo, Noir 
Anxiety; and others. 
88 Dinerstein, ‘Emergent Noir’, p. 425. 
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noir. Noir refuses to give us these ‘stable spaces’ and instead offers us ‘haunted cityscapes’, which 
consist of claustrophobic and violent urban spaces.89  
Although Dinerstein does not indicate as such, noir’s spaces are haunted because of the 
spectral presence of home. The home is eerie because of what Fisher calls ‘a failure of presence’.90 
The question asked by the eerie character of noir is not ‘what happened and why?’, but rather ‘the 
nature of what disappeared.’91 What disappeared, in noir, is the home qua its symbolic position as 
a stable space. For Fisher, the fascination with the eerie is brought about through the loss of the 
symbolic structures which reveal the Real. He writes, ‘For the symbolic structures which made 
sense of the monuments have rotted away, and in a sense what we witness here is the 
unintelligibility and the inscrutability of the Real itself.’92 For a cultural object to have meaning, 
it must have people to see it in its particular context. In noir, therefore, home is lost partly due to 
its lost context. It is not that the bricks and mortar have eroded away, but that the very street, the 
neighbours which, supposedly, gave home its meaning have vanished entirely. Noir’s ‘haunted 
cityscapes’ therefore reimagine home as a kind of lost relic, stripped of all its semiotic systems.93 
Fisher concludes that in such eerie situations we are ‘compelled to imagine our own world as a set 
of eerie traces.’94  
One example of this is the way in which the complex labyrinthian investigative structure 
of The Big Sleep — the endless sliding of signifiers — is manifested through the labyrinthian 
structure of the city itself. Film noir’s urban spaces, in addition to the breakdown between public 
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and private space, fuel anxiety through their traumatically present setting. The labyrinthian 
structure of the city in The Big Sleep reflects the complexity of Philip Marlowe’s investigation. 
Marlowe must overcome the geography and architecture of the city in order to uncover the crime: 
from Sternwood’s mansion at the beginning of the film where he is offered this impossible 
investigation; to the bookshop he hides in across from Geiger’s store; to Geiger’s home, which 
Marlow stakes out on multiple occasions; to the street he is ambushed on; to the apartment he 
confronts Brody in; to Eddie Mars’ casino; and so on. All of these spaces render home no more 
distinct than any other public space. It is merely a place to be investigated, its symbolic structure 
lost in the web of the investigation. The complexity of the narrative is underpinned by the 
continuous cycle of new and disparate locations. Plot threads are rarely resolved in these new 
locations, and usually only serve to push Marlowe to the next location.  
Noir’s refusal to give us ‘stable spaces’ is derived from its mode of fascination.95 The home 
is intended to function as a locked room, where no more signifiers of desire can be found, but the 
detective (in noir, I would argue that almost every protagonist is a detective of sorts) produces 
more signifiers because of the collapse of home as a locked room through their desire. The spatial 
claustrophobia in noir is mirrored by a narrative claustrophobia, which leads to the prevalence of 
violence in noir. This violence, for Dinerstein, is a ‘cinematic language of resistance,’ a resistance 
focused towards the ‘undignified work, anonymity, and shocks of technological society’ which 
resonated with audiences who had not come to terms with their experience of the Depression.96 
Bert’s job, in Mildred Pierce, is supposed to offer ‘dignified’, or middle-class work, which 
insulates him from the ‘shocks of technological society’.97 However, the anonymity of people 
 





‘stopping buying houses’ obscures the mechanisms by which the family home is lost, making them 
seem coldly impersonal.  
Film noir presents an opposition to new technological and spatial forms which would shift and 
change the American home, particularly new ways of organising urban living. It is critical both of 
the new changes and the idealistic revisionism of the past. The new changes are mechanisms which 
serve to further alienate the home’s inhabitants. Rather than giving more ‘free time’ to noir’s 
characters, the new technologies of home collapse time and intensify the traumatic dimensions of 
home. The rising prevalence of apartments resulted in a more densely packed workforce in the 
city. The vertical (as opposed to horizontal) expansion of work impacted the home’s relation to 
work since the new migrating population to the larger cities (particularly coastal cities such as Los 
Angeles and New York) were invariably doing so in search of work after the Depression. The kind 
of work undertaken in noir is typically that of an investigator, or noir’s protagonists are quickly 
thrust into that role. 
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Figure 5.9, The Maltese Falcon (1941) 
In The Maltese Falcon the confluence between apartments and detectives is most noticeable at 
the end of the film. In his apartment, Spade can see through the forgery of the falcon and the 
deceptive motives of the other characters — Gutman, Cairo, and Wilmer — because of his 
apartment’s spatial ambiguity. The separation between the interiority and safety of Spade’s 
apartment and the outside world is almost non-existent. People can come and go as they please. 
After Spade uncovers Brigid’s involvement in the Archer murder — the inciting incident of the 
film —and her subsequent arrest, he takes the falcon statuette, then stands and watches as Brigid 
is taken away by the police in the apartment lift. As the metal door to the lift closes, the shadows 
cover her eye in the shape of a bird’s talon (Figure 5.7). Brigid’s dreams and desire are thus filtered 
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through the fascinating object of the falcon: it is all she, and Spade, can see. The apartment is 
presented as a trap for desire. It is in the home that Spade’s sexual desire is rendered investigative, 
and is thus what motivates him to turn her in. The shadow of the claw on Brigid’s eye is an eerie 
imprint of the centrality of home, the loss of the symbolic system, inasmuch as the falcon 
represents desire and loss. The shadow, as a metaphor, suggests that all she can see is the falcon, 
while at the same time implying that the falcon has clawed out her eye, leaving her blind. The 
shadow, therefore, visualises the obscurity inherent in the home’s fascination. A shadow, after all, 
is merely a guarantor of some real object which blocks the light. Although confronted with what 
purportedly hides behind the veil (the secret truth that the falcon is a fake and that there is possibly 
no such thing as the ‘real’ falcon), fascination’s grip is still maintained. The presence of the claw-
like shadow suggests something still blocks her gaze from understanding the truth. Home, again, 
is entirely central in the narratives of noir, while at the same time destabilised.98 The apartment 
has many configurations in noir, and each requires differing considerations. However, the 
apartments in noir all serve to accelerate tension. In The Maltese Falcon, it is a site of 
claustrophobia, as well as one where the fascination inspired by the falcon is intensified. Indeed, 
the central debate surrounding the veracity of the falcon is mirrored in the apartment’s own 
legitimacy as a domestic space. In Stranger on the Third Floor, Michael’s apartment leads to his 
paranoid nightmare, which serves as the counterweight to his desire to move into a ‘real’ home 
with Jane. Michael and Jane’s home is borne from the apartment, not the other way around. Next, 
I will consider the apartment’s relation to the city, and how the gaze interacts. 
 
98 Pfeil, ‘Home Fires Burning’, p. 231. 
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‘Both Mirror and Screen’ — Nighthawks (1942) and The Woman in the Window (1944) 
In this section I begin by discussing how the work of New York artist Edward Hopper anticipates 
and reflects noir’s eerie concerns over urban living, technology, and its relation to a decay in the 
American community. In addition, the section moves onto a discussion of the temporal effect of 
the eerie on home. Then, I look at Fritz Lang’s The Woman in the Window and the way in which 
it visualises the mode of fascination inherent in the eerie, and how this interacts with the notions 
of home and public space. Urban living, in both Hopper and noir, encourages paranoia and instils 
a nihilistic, fatalistic despair. Tina Lent, in an essay about Los Angeles in film noir, notes Hopper’s 
influence on noir. She calls Hopper’s work in the late twenties and thirties a ‘tougher, more hard-
boiled approach to the city’, thus attempting to connect his work with the hard-boiled fiction 
writers whose novels were adapted into film noirs, as well as original screenplays.99 Hopper’s 
work parallels film noir’s concern over urban living by anonymising its inhabitants, helping 
demonstrate the difference between the promise laid out by technology and its actual function. 
Nighthawks (1942), Hopper’s most famous painting, shows us a compelling depiction of the 
American city at night, as well as the inhabitants’ fascination with the city and their alienation 
from one another (Figure 5.10). The painting can help illuminate the meaning of the city in noir.  
Nighthawks depicts an almost empty late-night diner on a street corner in New York. Hopper’s 
painting, like noir, is both instantly recognisable (insofar as they are well-known cultural objects) 
and fascinating. At the same time, there is something unknowable (perhaps impossible) at the heart 
of the painting. In relation to the painting’s depiction of urban living, Hopper’s use of light is 
similar to noir. Only the diner releases light onto the street. The night-time streets are empty and 
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there appear to be no streetlamps in sight. The only light is artificial and produced by the interior 
technology of the diner, the light originates from the street. At a basic level, light helps us see, but 
in a metaphorical sense, it allows us to know. As with the light from the lighthouse from Mildred 
Pierce, the light in Nighthawks only gives the illusion of depth to compensate for ‘the absence of 
depth in narrative spaces.’100 Although the light from the lighthouse comes from outside the home, 
the illumination of the interior gives the impression that it originates from the home. The light 
disguises Mildred’s intentions and desires, as well as the desires of the home. 
 
Fig 5.10, Edward Hopper, Nighthawks, 1942, Oil on canvas, 84.1 x 152.4 cm, The Art Institute 
of Chicago, Chicago 
A similar process occurs in Nighthawks. The painting’s ambiguous use of light, and the 
distance of our perspective, strips away the identity of the people in the diner, as well as the 
specificity of the diner itself. It is the very illumination of the diner that reveals the fascination 
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with the diners themselves. Their identity is blurred because of the light. In her essay on 
Nighthawks and film noir, Erica Doss argues that ‘Hopper does not emphasise the human element 
in the painting.’101 Instead, she continues, Hopper chooses to capture the tedium found in the city 
late at night, to substitute identity (hereby understood as community) for a feeling of despair: 
nothing can be learnt by looking. Looking, too, only produces more questions. This feeling of 
despair can be seen in varying degrees in all four of the characters in the painting. The man on the 
left, for example, drinks while facing away from us and has only a row of empty stools for 
company. He looks at something in his hand, but his body obscures the object. The other two, 
presumably a couple, both look despondent. The bright red dress draws attention to the woman, 
yet she idly plays with some money to pass the time. On the right, the bartender looks to be rushed, 
as if caught between two different jobs. His gaze cuts across the scene, but it is not clear where he 
is looking. 
The characters here, Doss argues, appear ‘complex but essentially ambiguous;’102 as a result 
of our distance we cannot accurately ascertain any details about them. Consider, for instance, the 
couple’s apparent apathy. Their disposition raises questions, but ultimately does not yield any 
answers. Their unhappiness might be a result of a number of things (a bad marriage, some terrible 
news, an unexciting first date, and so on), or it might be because Hopper (and by extension us) 
have merely caught them at an inopportune time, a brief lull amidst an electrifying evening. Our 
interpretation of the couple is therefore contingent on the effect of our gaze on the image. What 
we assume to know by looking colours our understanding of the painting. Our conclusion can only 
be speculative. What home desires, too, as Doss argues, is similarly complex but ‘essentially 
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ambiguous.’103 In this respect, our spectatorial position in Nighthawks is ambiguous in the same 
way that our gaze aligns with Vincent Parry’s in Dark Passage. Like the noir investigator, we are 
implicated in the economy of desire, too close to discover anything useful. 
In the painting, the sense of the eerie is located in the ambiguity of the patrons and the lack of 
activity outside the diner. Fisher notes that the sensation of the eerie occurs either ‘when there is 
something present where there should be nothing’, or when there should be something, but nothing 
is present.104 Both sensations are present in Nighthawks. It is possible to read the diner as both the 
‘something’ and the ‘nothing’.105 On the first sensation of the eerie, ‘something present where 
there should be nothing’, what is present is the diner itself.106 Although the empty street might at 
first seem the disconcerting element, it is only made so by the way in which the diner highlights 
the emptiness. This is heightened by the fact that the diner itself is both inhabited and desolate: 
people are inside, but they are ‘essentially ambiguous’.107 The ambiguity of the characters in 
Nighthawks is perhaps the central gap of the painting — all eyes are drawn there — but the 
ambiguity itself produces additional gaps. On the second sensation of the eerie, ‘nothing present 
when there should be something’, what is missing is a sense of community. More precisely, it is a 
sense of coherence, a promise that the painting can and will be explained. In noir, we can 
understand the anxieties over home to be anxieties over coherence. In Nighthawks, like noir, there 
is no satisfactory explanation, no complete ending, and no conclusion. 
A clear parallel in noir to Nighthawks is Fritz Lang’s The Woman in the Window (1944), 
released two years after Hopper’s painting. Window’s principal point of similarity with Nighthawks 
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lies in the acts of looking and being seen, as well as with desire and fantasy. The film concerns 
Richard Wanley, a psychology professor, who, after sending his wife and children away on a 
vacation, becomes entangled in a criminal plot involving Alice’s lover, Claude Mazard, whom 
Wanley accidentally murders. One of the film’s most scopophilic and suggestive scenes occurs 
early in the film. After spending an evening with his friends — a doctor and a district attorney — 
Wanley, himself a psychology professor, strolls outside to look at the fascinating portrait of a 
woman, one which he was caught looking at earlier. Moments later, he sees the reflection of Alice, 
the subject of the painting, materialise in the window. The camera pans to the left, revealing Alice 
stood in the street, present and watching Wanley. Harris notes the comedic element to the film’s 
premise: a doctor, a district attorney, and professor stare at a painting, but ‘only the expert on Freud 
falls for his fantasy.’108 I have already discussed the role of fantasy in Window, namely that the 
fantasy element of the film involves blending the appearance of the dream (the narrative of the 
film) and reality (the moments immediately preceding Wanley looking at the painting). These two 
elements of the film are not clearly differentiated, which causes significant tension relative to the 
‘proper’ way to desire and to look.  
In this scene, Wanley sees himself looking at the image and later sees himself in the image 
itself through Alice’s appearance. The Other’s gaze is made real. Wanley thus loses his objective 
distance from the painting. This loss of objective distance causes the painting, the fantasmatic 
image, to appear on the side of the spectator. Harris notes that this sequence is one in which the 
window becomes both ‘mirror and screen.’109 Wanley sees himself, but at the same time he can 
project his fantasy of having his desire seen. The recognition of Wanley’s desire seems to conjure 
 




Alice, the Other, up in the dead of night. The eeriness here is that desire is made real. Desire should 
be relational and only exist between subject and object. Perhaps we can say that we only desire 
because we believe our desire to be unreal. An encounter with his own desire is deeply traumatic 
for Wanley. In the film’s narrative, it is the very mechanism by which he fantasises over his own 
death as he dreams of swallowing poison to escape his fate.  
Figure 5.11 The Woman in the Window, dir. by Fritz Lang (RKO Pictures, 1944) 
The precise spectatorial fascination for Wanley is when Alice remarks that she likes to ‘watch 
people’s faces’ as they stare at the painting.110 This, too, is the same fascination for the spectators 
in Nighthawks. The objective distance between spectator and image, between subject and object, 
 
110 The Woman in the Window (1944). 
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is collapsed because of the alienating public space of noir’s fascinated landscapes. Alice is the 
embodiment of this collapse. The questions, and desire, are always dispersed and displaced. For 
instance, after their meeting at the painting, Alice and Wanley go to a bar and Wanley excitedly 
says how he is ‘thinking of [his friends’] faces tomorrow when I tell them tomorrow night’ of his 
encounter with the ‘real’ woman in the painting.111   
Despite already having the object of his desire, he is beginning to plan for the historicisation 
of their meeting. Since this meeting is part of his fantasy, we can see how desire is always 
conceived of retroactively. His desire in the present is already rendered nostalgic. In this way, 
nostalgia is the method by which we distance ourselves from our desire. His desire is always 
displaced because he is unable to access it in the present, even in his dream. For Wanley, the 
historicization of his desire is a process which attempts to let his desire be recognised as a real 
force, as something which produces Alice. Their meeting, according to Wanley’s desire, was not 
a chance meeting, but a result of his desire. In the city, desire is always moving from one 
ambiguous place to another. The narrative momentum is carried by misunderstandings and chance 
meetings. Wanley is taken to the crime scene by his district attorney friend, Frank, as a civilian 
observer, and the mixing up of the poisons results in Wanley attempting to take his own life. He 
is always finding himself and his desire in the wrong place at the wrong time, continually having 
to move from one disaster to the next.  
The displacement of desire continues as Alice invites Wanley back to her apartment in order 
to look at more ‘sketches’ of her.112 While it may seem as if the hidden meaning of seeing her 






more symbolic sense, she will let Wanley have the ‘real’ thing, the object of his desire. The 
symbolic ambiguity of image and desires will be taken away by Wanley’s gaze and desire. 
However, the twist ending of the film reveals that Wanley only really desires the illusion. The 
logic of the innuendo is reversed. It is not what lies behind the innuendo, what language covers 
up, but rather that the illusion is desirable itself. Wanley wants to see the sketches in order to 
fantasise because Alice’s apparition makes his desire too real. This reversal implicates the viewer 
in the film’s fantasy, in its desire. The spectatorial pleasure of understanding the hidden meaning 
of innuendos derives from a sense of mastery over the text. The spectator takes pleasure in 
assuming a superior position over Wanley. When the time comes for him to act on his desire, he 
only expresses a wish to continue his passivity, to continue to look at sketches and paintings. I 
would argue, though, that innuendos in noir possess a more fascinating function insofar as they 
not only demand an explanation with their apparent incongruity (Alice is not merely offering a 
chance to see some sketches, just a Phyllis and Neff are not merely discussing automobile 
insurance), but structurally innuendos expose the demand for an explanation. It is because 
innuendos confront us with the inexorable yet incomprehensible demand for an explanation that 
our desire is aligned with Wanley’s inasmuch as we are shown to be as passive and pathetic as he 
is. His retreat into fantasy mirrors our own at the end of the film. The concluding revelation that 
the film was all simply Wanley’s dream serves in this respect to remind the spectator of their own 
passivity; Wanley may have woken up, but we are still dreaming. 
Alice, as is the case with many femme fatales, is therefore posed as an enigma. The question 
of what she wants is bound up where she arrives from, and what space she occupies in the film, 
what desire she fulfils. Harris identifies two versions of fascination in noir, both of which can be 
seen in Window. First, fascination as ‘the inherent property of a certain object […] or as relational 
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and fantasmatic, projected by certain subjects.’113 Alice is conjured up as fantasmatic projection 
by Wanley’s sexual desire (his impotence and innocence is a result of his supposedly cosy family 
life) and by the emptiness of the impersonal streets. Alice looking at Wanley, recognising his 
desire, is surprising because there is no one around. Time is stretched through Wanley gazing into 
the window at the painting. It is important to recognise that Wanley’s dream (and the dream of the 
film) begins when Wanley is left alone to read a book in his gentleman’s club. The camera cuts to 
a clock and shows the passage of time. In the temporal space of the film, time is lost, and the film 
must account for its absence. For Wanley, too, it is in the process ‘losing’ track of time that the 
fantasy is initiated and his initial meeting with Alice is a result of him being lost in the city. The 
lack of historicity involved in noir’s fascination renders time absent. This fascination is, in part, 
borne out of the lost historical context of the compression of public space. 
The anxiety over the disappearance of public space is really an anxiety over the disappearance 
of community, of a certain kind of relating to one another. One major paradox of the ideology of 
home is that, in some sense, increased home ownership (at least a model similar to the construction 
of American suburbia) results in a decrease of community cohesion. In noir during the forties, this 
nascent strain of distrust is not found only in noir’s conception community but in the function of 
narratives to stitch disparate notions of home together. 
The construction of community is facilitated by both racial and class segregationist policies. 
Indeed, the communities which were constructed along these lines necessitated an authoritarian 
style of policing its constituents. Noir, I believe, dramatises these latent struggles, not as a 
precursor to a supposed suburban utopia, but as the central logic upon which they were built. 
 
113 Harris, ‘Outside History, But Historically So’, p. 8. 
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Acquiring a home in noir does not get rid of anxiety, it is its source. The implicit ideological 
questions here: who gets to own a home, and therefore who gets to participate in their community? 
The relation between the two is often implied, but they are separate; owning a home does not 
necessarily entail a participation in community. Next, I will examine the role of women in noir in 
relation to home. In particular, the next chapter examines the role that the femme fatale plays in 
constructing noir’s haunted spaces, and how the meaning of home is intrinsically bound up with 
anxiety that the femme fatale represents. Film noir is, in a sense, defined by the femme fatale, 




Gender and Genre in Film Noir 
‘Sure…I’m decent’ 
Gilda, Gilda (1946) 
Figure 6.1, Gilda, dir. by Charles Vidor (Columbia Pictures, 1946) 
‘The Femme Fatale Does Not Exist’ — The Ambiguity of the Femme Fatale 
In this chapter I examine how the problematic conceptualisation of the femme fatale impacts the 
representation of gender and home in film noir. I also interrogate how a fascination (both formal 
and critical) with the femme fatale amplifies and intensifies its importance in relation to film noir, 
paying attention to the ways in which the femme fatale is over-represented in noir criticism. I will 
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begin by exploring the history of the term and the implications of its deployment in relation to 
home. While in previous chapters I have emphasised how fascination operates in relation to noir’s 
visual style, I will now look at the interplay between image and voice — in short, how the 
insistence on the visual aspect of the femme fatale over the voice acts as a microcosm of film noir 
criticism itself and how critics overwhelmingly refer to noir as a visual style. The main film 
examined will be Charles Vidor’s Gilda (1946), and I will ask whether Gilda can even be 
considered a femme fatale, despite the character’s significance to the field of noir studies. 
Typically, the femme fatale is viewed an object of fear, a threat which often lies out of view, 
presenting a radical and dangerous possibility for the male protagonists of noir. However, I will 
examine the extent to which this threat or fear is imaginary and what this imagination of the 
centrality of the femme fatale tells us about the femme fatale and of the position of home within 
noir. This is because the femme fatale is often placed in opposition to women who assume and 
accept their place in the home. 
The two most influential and problematic critical terms in film noir are the name itself, film 
noir, and its most prominent stylistic and narrative feature, the femme fatale. In the critical history 
of film noir, both terms seem conjoined. For many critics, the defining element of film noir, the 
one which sutures its wounded conceptualisation, is its depiction of gender and sexuality. In Ian 
Brookes’ summary, gender and sexuality underpin film noir’s ‘narrative concerns and 
characterisations.’1 Noir critic Frank Krutnik further argues in his book, In a Lonely Street: Film 
Noir, Genre, Masculinity, that film noir is primarily a ‘masculine’ category because of its 
foregrounding of fragile masculinities. Noir, he writes, is ‘evidence of some kind of crisis of 
 
1 Brookes, Film Noir, p. 57. 
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confidence within the contemporary regimentation of male-dominated culture.’2 In this sense, 
Krutnik shares a similar outlook to Deborah Thomas, who, in an essay on deviant males in noir, 
concludes that noir seems ‘to dramatise a particular crisis in masculinity.’3 According to these 
critics, noir reflects an anxiety surrounding masculinity during the postwar period, whereby both 
masculinity’s definition and purpose are called into question. In the broadest sense, for these 
critics, gender lies at the heart of noir’s anxiety. I would, in part, agree, but what these critics miss 
is how crisis-stricken masculinities are treated by noir’s narratives. For instance, it is rare that 
masculinity is condemned on its own terms in noir, but far more common that it is eroded, 
seemingly, because of an entanglement with ‘dangerous’ women. 
For some critics, the figure of the femme fatale therefore seeks to enhance this masculine 
anxiety. As Mary Anne Doane, for instance, writes, the femme fatale represents a kind of 
‘discursive unease’. Her threat, according to Doane, is not entirely legible, predictable, [or] 
manageable.’4 To an extent, femme fatales are defined by their ambiguity. Like noir itself, they 
have no stable interiority. Yet, as I will argue, the femme fatale is defined as such because of how 
she is constituted primarily through the male gaze. If masculine subjectivity is identified with an 
investigative, ‘objective logic’, then there is an assumption that everything which can be seen can 
be understood. In noir, the femme fatale presents herself as an unsolvable visual enigma. Although 
her looks are understood as central, they cannot be comprehended by the look. In this way, the 
femme fatale is presented in opposition to masculine identity, as she threatens to undermine the 
‘objective logic’ of the masculine position within the film. The femme fatale does so because of 
 
2 Krutnik, In a Lonely Street, p.  91. 
3 Deborah Thomas, ‘How Hollywood Deals with the Deviant Male’, in Movie Book of Film Noir, ed. by Ian Cameron 
(London: Studio Vista, 1992), p. 60. 
4 Mary Anne Doane, Femme Fatales: Feminism, Film Theory, Psychoanalysis (New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 1. 
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the way in which her presence confronts the male protagonists of noir with fascination itself and 
therein exposes the inadequacy of the look. The gaze’s inadequacy, in noir, is represented by its 
traumatic flashback structures and its retroactive construction of knowledge. In short, I argue that 
the problem of the gaze (in its relation to gender) should be understood as a problem with 
historicity and memory. 
The ambiguity surrounding the figure of the femme fatale also finds a corollary in the 
critical work of noir. As I shall go on to discuss, although the femme fatale is considered to be an 
intrinsic component of film noir, she is often assumed to be present, even when she is not. In fact, 
the presence of the femme fatale is vastly overstated in noir. Indeed, films such as Stranger on the 
Third Floor, Shadow of a Doubt, and Mildred Pierce do not contain any trace of a femme fatale 
in their classical definition, yet all are important texts of the noir canon. The problem here is that 
the figure of the femme fatale is being used to form what Steve Neale calls a ‘principal hallmark’ 
of noir. He writes that the various (and often disparate) elements of the femme fatale ‘can be related 
directly to contemporary social and cultural trends and factors’.5 Further, Neale argues that these 
elements ‘help not only to define film noir, but also to account for its existence.’6 I would take my 
argument further than Neale does. He is correct to identify the tautological dimension to the femme 
fatale in relation to noir. However, I would argue that, at least symbolically, the femme fatale 
defines film noir, not in part, but in whole. The anxiety and masculine crises prompted by the 
femme fatale are more related to the femme fatale’s absence. The enigma of what the femme fatale 
(or women in general) want in noir is typically a question of what they are not divulging to noir’s 
male protagonists; their enigma is defined as an absence.  
 




For Brookes, there has been (or was) an assumption that the apparent ubiquity of the femme 
fatale in noir criticism led to any ‘vaguely seductive female character and ultimately...any “bad” 
female character’ being labelled as a femme fatale.7 The femme fatale should therefore be 
understood as an ever-present spectral force. Even in the aforementioned films, the threat of the 
femme fatale still lingers and threatens to make its presence known. The implied existence of the 
femme fatale heightens the anticipation of their arrival. Indeed, they are, as we shall see with Gilda, 
all anticipation; we always expect them to appear, and even if a femme fatale is present, their 
presence suggests a kind of excess. In this way, all women are distrusted in some respect in noir 
because of their capacity to be the femme fatale. In The Killers, for instance, there is a lingering 
sense that the inactivity of Lilly, Swede’s former partner, is partly what led to Swede to fall for 
Kitty Collins; Lilly could not compete with Kitty and thus, the responsibility for Swede’s demise 
is shared between them. This reveals a profound ambivalence to home in noir. Lilly is shown to 
have escaped Swede’s (and noir’s) orbit and participates in an entirely separate world. She and 
Sam are a perfectly happy couple — they happily accommodate the intrusive Reardon atop their 
well-decorated garden roof — but the film (through Reardon) does not care about Lilly’s story, 
but only what Lilly thought of Swede’s attraction to Kitty.  
Such distrust can also be seen in Shadow of a Doubt. Although Uncle Charles is the film’s 
antagonist, he nonetheless evades the investigative eye of the neighbourhood because of his looks. 
His motivation for his violence toward women is that, in his view, the women of the city are 
different because of the way in which they steal their dead husband’s fortunes. ‘The cities are full 
of women,’ Charles says, ‘middle-aged widows, husbands dead. Husbands who have spent lives 
making fortunes, working, and working, then they die and leave their money to their wives, their 
 
7 Brookes, Film Noir, p. 57. 
[265] 
 
silly wives.’ The supposed relationship the femme fatale has with the male figures of noir is that 
they wish to, in a gothic sense, leech desire, power, and wealth from the men in noir. Yet this view 
is the male perspective of noir. In the context of noir, Charles is villainous here only insofar as he 
lays bare the underlying unconscious logic of the femme fatale. 
In a critical context, the centrality of the femme fatale to noir itself is something which has 
been retroactively identified and overrepresented. In the 1970s and 1980s, feminist film critics 
identified the femme fatale as a figure which challenged the patriarchal power structures of 
Hollywood. In the landmark essay collection, Women in Film Noir, published in 1978, for 
example, Chris Straayer argues that femme fatale is ‘the embodiment of both sexual threat and 
sexual difference.’8 A few years before this, Laura Mulvey’s influential essay, ‘Visual Pleasure 
and Narrative Cinema’, first appeared. Mulvey emphasises the role of psychoanalysis in gaze 
theory and how films produce their ideal spectators. She argues that cinema — specifically within 
a psychoanalytic framework — is designed for male pleasure because of the way in which 
voyeurism is the primary mode of looking and that in this mode of looking, women are objectified. 
‘The cinema,’ Mulvey writes, ‘has structures of fascination strong enough to allow temporary loss 
of ego while simultaneously reinforcing the ego.’9 Central to Mulvey’s argument is the dialectic 
between women as an image, a screen for desire, and men as bearers of the all-powerful look; ‘the 
determining male gaze projects its phantasy on to the female form which is stylised accordingly.’10 
Female spectators must engage with Hollywood cinema and film noir through the male gaze. 
 
8 Chris Straayer, ‘Femme Fatale or Lesbian Femme: Bound in Sexual Difference’, Women in Film Noir, ed. by E. 
Ann. Kaplan (London: BFI, 1978), p. 167. 
9 Laura Mulvey, ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’, in Feminist Film Theory: A Reader, ed. by Sue Thornham 




Women in film, according to Mulvey, are primarily ‘exhibitionist’ insofar as their appearance is 
heavily ‘coded for strong visual and erotic impact.’11 
The reception of Mulvey’s essays is as discussed as the essay itself. I do not wish to engage 
with all the critiques of ‘Visual Pleasure’, but I would highlight several, as noted by Clifford T. 
Manlove in his essay ‘Visual “Drive” and Cinematic Narrative: Reading Gaze Theory in Lacan, 
Hitchcock, and Mulvey’. The first of these is that the gaze is not always necessarily male. Noir 
originates from heterosexual and patriarchal perspectives. It is important to distinguish between 
what expectations are potentially laid out by the film and what is experienced by the spectator. It 
is one thing to suggest that, say, Gilda, positions Gilda as an object of desire, another to suggest 
that the spectator therefore desires Gilda. The argument I will make involving Gilda is that her 
position within Johnny and the film’s fantasies is instructive with regards to the spectral symbolic 
position of the femme fatale more generally, as well as the role of desire. Indeed, in Gilda 
specifically, if we accept the film’s demand that we desire Gilda then we necessarily miss the 
centrality of homosexuality in the film. It is in this sense that the gaze (specifically when aligned 
with the femme fatale) enables a kind of blindness. 
The second relevant criticism of Mulvey’s essay involves her misreading of the 
relationship between psychoanalysis and the gaze. As Clifford T. Manlove argues, Mulvey’s use 
of the ‘visual drive in psychoanalysis overemphasizes the role of pleasure’.12 Moreover, as I have 
already discussed, the objet petit a is essential in understanding the gaze. Cowie, for instance, 
 
11 Ibid. 
12 Clifford T. Manlove, ‘Visual “Drive” and Cinematic Narrative: Reading Gaze Theory in Lacan, Hitchcock, and 
Mulvey’, Cinema Journal, 46.3 (Spring, 2007), p. 84. 
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upends the patriarchal implications of Mulvey’s work, arguing the gaze is in fact the ‘inverse of 
the omnipotent look’.13 As Todd McGowan summarises, 
[…] the gaze is a blank spot in the subject's look that threatens the subject's sense of mastery 
in looking because the subject cannot see the spot directly. The subject looks for the gaze 
— it is the objet petit a of the visual drive  — and yet it cannot be integrated into the image 
[…] Even when the subject sees a "complete" image, something remains obscure; the 
subject cannot see the Other at the point at which it sees the subject. The gaze of the object 
gazes back at the subject, but this gaze is not present in the field of the visible.14 
In this sense, therefore, the gaze does not confer mastery. Mulvey’s crucial misunderstanding, for 
McGowan, is that she is unconcerned with ‘the way that fantasy marks a retreat from the gaze’.15 
In contrast, Mulvey views the gaze as fantasy. In fact, we might view the discourse on the femme 
fatale as a negotiation between gaze and fantasy. Since the femme fatale is marked by their 
absence, then the desire to see is better characterised as fantasmatic.  
One of the characteristics of the femme fatale is that she controls who can see her, and who 
she can see. The struggle over the femme fatale involves controlling her image in order to limit 
and stabilise her desire. Moreover, the central fascinating aspect of the femme fatale is the question 
of what she genuinely wants. In Gilda (1946), Gilda’s strip-tease scene operates on a similar logic, 
since it is a strategy which allows Gilda to resume control of her own body and its representations: 
what her audience wants is framed and controlled by Gilda herself. This fascinating enigma, 
according to W.J.T. Mitchell, indicates that the power of images and women is manifested as lack 
 
13 Cowie, Representing the Woman: Cinema and Psychoanalysis, p. 288. 
14 McGowan, ‘Looking for the Gaze’, p. 33. 
15 Ibid, p. 39. 
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not as possession, due to both being, in Mitchell’s words ‘abject, mutilated, and castrated.’16 The 
question of what images (or films) want, is what women want. For film noir, the question of what 
the films ‘want’ is entangled with the question of what its women want. Mulvey argues that the 
female figure (in our case, the femme fatale) is something which the male gaze ‘continually circles 
around but disavows’ because of the woman’s sexual difference: ‘her lack of a penis, implying a 
threat of castration and hence unpleasure.’17 In film noir, women — specifically femme fatales, 
but often by extension all women — are turned into guilty objects, since they evoke the anxiety of 
sexual difference. 
Janey Place, in her essay, ‘Women in Film Noir’, argues that noir possesses a strong 
‘phallocentric cultural viewpoint’ insofar as ‘women are defined in relation to men.’18 In Place’s 
view, noir differs very little from other Hollywood films in its depiction of women. However, she 
asserts that film noir is a rare period in film history where women are ‘active, not static…derive 
power, not weakness, from their sexuality.’19 Noir’s ideal spectator, then, is a paradoxical one. For 
Mulvey, the male ego is ‘reinforced’ as well as temporarily lost, and for Place, ‘men need to control 
women’s sexuality,’ but they do so in order ‘not to be destroyed by it’20. Place’s argument is that 
women — specifically those having ‘access to her own sexuality’21 — are routinely destroyed, 
leaving an irrepressible, almost mythic, impression on the film. I contend that the femme fatale’s 
centrality to noir and noir criticism is emblematic of the fantasmatic construction of the femme 
fatale. She functions, as Harris argues, ‘neither literally nor allegorically but synecdochically 
 
16 Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want?, p. 36. 
17 Mulvey, ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’, p. 64. 
18 Place, ‘Women in Film Noir’, p. 47. 
19 Ibid. 




within noir cinema, as a screen: as both herself and the bearer of the projected image.’22 In this 
way, the femme fatale represents the two modes of fascination, first, ‘as the inherent property of a 
certain object’, and second, ‘as relational and fantasmatic’.23 Because of the femme fatale’s 
relation to fascination, I would argue that she does not just represent a small cluster of historical 
or sexual anxieties in noir — inasmuch as they are, on a cultural level, an embodiment of castration 
anxiety, which in turn can be read as a metaphor for the historical uncertainties surrounding World 
War Two and the following decade. The femme fatale, rather, represents anxiety itself. 
The term femme fatale is problematic insofar as its definition relies on a limited scope of 
sexual desire, namely male heterosexual desire. When I use terms such as ‘we’ or ‘us,’ I intend to 
indicate how the spectator is produced by the film, not to imply a universal viewpoint. In some 
sense, the way in which certain film noirs ‘work’ is predicated on an assumption made about its 
preferred spectator. Greg Forter, for instance, argues that the audience’s desire for Gilda is the 
mechanism by which the film is allowed to produce the heterosexual couple.24 Forter insists that 
our desire should be directed towards Johnny, for he is the ‘femme’ figure of the film. The femme 
fatale, in Forter’s view, need not be a woman at all. Gilda, for Forter, merely offers the illusion of 
a break with normativity, and it is through her that the film expresses its ideological 
heteronormative message. As Elizabeth Cowie writes, ‘“femme” is simply a catchphrase for the 
danger of sexual difference.’25  
One essential component of fantasy is that it demands to be punishable, because ‘in the 
punishment, the reality of the forbidden wish is acknowledged.’26 Although the obvious danger 
 
22 Harris, ‘Outside History, But Historically So’, p. 7. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Greg Forter, ‘Going Straight with Gilda’, Qui Parle,  4.2, Different Subjects (Spring 1991). 
25 Cowie, ‘Film Noir and Women’, p. 125. 
26 Ibid. p. 136. 
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appears to be being completely seduced and destroyed by the femme fatale’s beauty, an additional 
danger — for Hollywood’s heteronormativity — is the male hero becoming the femme fatale, 
crossing over the forbidden valley of sexual difference. For the male hero to become the femme 
fatale is to give up their privileged access to the phallus and thus open themselves up to the 
eroticised gaze. The result is a subversive one. Although the films (by being Hollywood 
productions) assume that desire is directed at the femme fatale from a presumed heterosexual cis-
male audience, men become the object of desire. If, for example, Kathie in Out of the Past (1947) 
is considered a femme fatale and defined by the effect of her beauty on Jeff, then we can consider 
Jeff to be similarly erotic. In popular film criticism, Robert Mitchum’s portrayal of Jeff Bailey is 
spoken about as being a quintessentially ‘cool’ performance, as if Mitchum exudes some 
inexhaustible quality, a fascinating detachment from his own existence.27 I will argue later, in more 
detail, how the femme fatale is, in a sense, the very essence of noir since both are defined by 
ambiguity. The ambiguity of the difference between the homme and femme fatale shows us that 
the (popular) definition of the latter is not so clear. In a similar fashion, noir exists both as a 
conceptual and cultural category.  
One reason for the femme fatale’s critical ambiguity is that both ‘film noir’ and ‘femme 
fatale’ remain untranslated from the original French. Just as with film noir, translating the term 
‘femme fatale’ to English — either as ‘fatal woman’, ‘deadly woman’, or some other synonym — 
seems to result in something which is slightly too earnest, too coldly objective, to capture the 
anxiety they instill in noir’s fascinated male protagonists. Translating the term overlooks the 
anxiety produced by it. The anxiety produced by noir, its paranoia, is defined by a multiplicity of 
 
27 See, for instance, Roger Ebert, ‘Out of the Past’, https://www.rogerebert.com/reviews/great-movie-out-of-the-past-
1947. [Accessed 17/10/2018]. Ebert describes Mitchum’s ‘weary eyes and laconic voice’ as lending him a presence 
of ‘a violent man wrapped in indifference.’ 
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answers, where objects are overloaded with meaning to the point of saturation. The definition of 
femme fatale is always contextual, always dependent on what the femme fatale wants, which 
remains unknown. Elisabeth Bronfen outlines the two views of Mary Ann Doane and Slavoj Žižek 
regarding the femme fatale.28 Both authors interpret the femme fatale as a symptom. Doane writes 
that ‘the femme fatale is an articulation of fears surrounding the loss of stability and centrality of 
the self…these anxieties appear quite explicitly in the process of her representation as castration 
anxiety.’29 For Doane, the femme fatale is a symptom of patriarchal anxiety over feminism. Žižek, 
on the other hand, argues that the femme fatale is a symptom ‘for the ambivalence in feeling on 
the part of the noir hero and his retreat from the death drive.’30 Žižek, in Looking Awry, describes 
the death drive as a ‘striving for a radical self-annihilation.’31 It is not just a physical death, but 
what Lacan calls a ‘second death.’32 The second death halts the ‘regeneration of the dead body’ by 
halting the natural cycle of transformation.33 One such cycle, for Lacan, is a fantasy of inflicting 
‘perpetual pain’.34 In both cases, Doane and Žižek implicitly instruct us to approach the femme 
fatale with a certain ironic distance from its literal meaning — a distance which is lost by explicitly 
stating the intended meaning. An ironic distance is necessary to avoid falling into the eroticised 
trap the films present to us; we are supposed to follow the male protagonists in their desire for the 
femme fatale, believing it to be our own, only for it to be revealed that we were doomed from the 
beginning, that our desire was manufactured and not intended for us. 
 
28 Elisabeth Bronfen, ‘Femme Fatale: Negotiations of Tragic Desire’ in New Literary History, 35.1, Rethinking 
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Even if we take a relatively conservative definition of the femme fatale — a woman who 
intends to destroy men by using her sexuality but has motives that lie beyond male destruction — 
what we find is that the femme fatale, despite figuring heavily in noir criticism, is a marginal and 
overrepresented narrative trope. In her essay on films which prominently feature central female 
characters, Angela Martin makes the case for the femme fatale’s overrepresentation. In a sample 
of eighty film noirs which have central female characters, she argues that there are only eight films 
which actually feature a femme fatale.35 The volume of femme fatales seems vastly overstated, 
since they are often viewed as an integral part of the noir mode. For example, James Damico 
describes what he considers to be a typical noir narrative: ‘a man whose experience of life has left 
him sanguine and often bitter meets a not-innocent woman of similar outlook to whom he is 
sexually and fatally attracted’36 While this is an accurate if loose description of some noir films 
(The Maltese Falcon (1941), The Big Sleep (1946), Out of the Past (1947)), it is inaccurate for a 
vast majority of noir films, even those which supposedly feature a femme fatale, such as, say, Kitty 
Collins in The Killers (1946). Martin’s observation is not merely a statistical problem, an 
observation which highlights the critical overemphasis on the femme fatale, but one which 
demonstrates the connection between noir’s affect and the critical response. The femme fatale is 
overrepresented in noir criticism because of her relation to the films’ fascination. The femme fatale 
is central to noir, while at the same time overrepresented. In a sense, therefore, the femme is film 
noir precisely because she is not really in film noir. Thus, in the scope of film noir, the femme 
fatale is more defined by her absence, always spectrally haunting noir; the question of where the 
femme fatale is (indeed, what she is) is always paramount to the fascinated concerns of noir. 
 
35 Angela Martin, ‘‘Gilda Didn't Do Any of Those Things You've Been Losing Sleep Over!’: The Central Women of 
40s Films Noirs,’ in Women in Film Noir, ed. by E. Ann Kaplan (London: BFI, 1998), pp. 209-10. 
36 Damico, ‘Film Noir: A Modest Proposal’, p. 103. 
[273] 
 
Their ambiguity of the femme fatale is similar to noir’s ambiguity. As Steve Neale writes 
in his book Genre and Hollywood, the concept of film noir ‘seeks to homogenise a set of distinct 
and heterogeneous phenomena; it thus inevitably generates contradictions, exceptions, anomalies 
and is doomed, in the end, to incoherence.’37 The femme fatale is prone to a comparable ambiguity, 
while also perhaps best exemplifying noir’s ‘incoherence.’38 The concept is not only subject to 
ever altering and loose definitions, but also to a confusion in relation to film noir itself. To think 
of film noir is to imagine, in some capacity, the fascinating femme fatale, particularly the moments 
in which they first appear, where their possibilities lie at their most open: from Gilda emerging 
from beneath the frame to theatrically flick her hair in Gilda (1946), to a bath-towel clad Phyllis 
looming over the simpering Neff in Double Indemnity (1944), to Kathie coming ‘out of the sun’ 
in Out of the Past (1947). All these moments serve to be memorable, to be the overriding visual 
impression of the film. If those three films were to be linked together, the central (perhaps the only 
legitimate) connective element would be the eroticised femme fatale. Yet in each of those films 
the femme fatale plays a different role. Their openness (to meaning, to desire) is what renders them 
fascinating. The emphasis on their appearance acts as a way for noir to ‘visualise obscurity.’39 In 
this sense, we can extend Tyrer’s observation that ‘film noir does not exist’ — inasmuch as it is 
constructed retroactively by the point-de-capiton — to say that ‘the femme fatale does not exist’. 
The femme fatale, through her inducing of anxiety stitches together other, disparate anxieties. At 
the same time, however, she is largely absent from film noir as a whole. This seems to be an 
oversight in Tyrer’s otherwise excellent work. He aptly turns Lacan’s dictum ‘the woman does not 
exist’ into a linguistic interpretation of the noir category, but in so doing it requires a 
 
37 Neale, Genre and Hollywood, p. 154. 
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reinterpretation. Moreover, in broader Lacanian terms, the ‘woman does not exist’ because ‘there 
is no generalizable category or signifier within the Symbolic order capable of defining the set of 
woman.’40 I would argue that a femme fatale is only deemed so because she is, like noir, subjected 
to the signifier ‘femme fatale’. The femme fatale, in this way, is noir because of her ambivalence 
and traumatically inflected structure. As a result, the anxiety inspired by home film noir is often 
expressed through the femme fatale, not just through her uncertain motives, but through her 
structural relation to the film (and to noir) itself. 
Figure 6.2, The Killers, dir. Robert Siodmak, (Universal Pictures, 1946) 
 




One prominent example of a femme fatale’s structural ambiguity exists in The Killers, when Kitty 
and Swede meet for the first time at Jim Colfax’s party. Swede arrives with Lilly, his current date, 
but becomes enraptured when he sees Kitty, the film’s femme fatale, singing by the piano. The 
narrative framing of this scene — it is Lilly’s flashback — suggests that this was the moment that 
Swede was ‘lost’, that he was tempted by the femme fatale. There are a few key elements I will 
focus on. Firstly, how two similar but suggestive images of Swede looking at Kitty show the 
function of the femme fatale with respect to noir’s construction. Secondly, how the prominence of 
Kitty’s voice relates to her dominating visual presence. The two images (Figures 6.2 and 6.3) in 
question show Swede looking at Kitty as she sings. Each image creates a series of competing 
gazes: in Figure 6.2, Lilly looks at Swede, Swede looks at a singing Kitty, Kitty looks beyond the 
frame into the distance. Yet although Kitty’s gaze goes beyond the cinematic — a gaze into 
nothingness — it also cuts across the rest of the frame and across Lilly and Swede’s gazes. Kitty’s 
gaze replicates noir’s retroactivity because of the way in which her gaze retroactively modifies the 
other competing gazes in the frame, including our own. Structurally, too, Kitty and Swede are 
connected because they each hold a glass in their hand, while Lilly’s remain empty. For example, 
the power of Swede’s gaze, which is in the centre of the image, is taken from him; he is no longer 
able to look at Kitty from a safe position. Indeed, there is no similar point in time in which Swede 
was able to look safely.  
Through the femme fatale, we can see how Harris’s definition of the negotiation between 
the ‘two versions of fascination’ in noir operates.41 Firstly, fascination can be understood as Kitty’s 
‘inherent property’ because the trail of gazes leads to her, despite her position on the edge of the 
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frame. It is Swede’s fascinated look which inspires Lilly’s. Kitty is the only moving object in the 
frame as Swede stands transfixed by her, as Lilly slowly recognises Swede’s fascination. From 
Lilly’s point of view, there must be something inherent in Kitty which inspires Swede’s desire for 
her, yet even Lilly cannot bear to look; there must be something similarly fascinating in Swede, 
some recently animated force which must be exorcised by the look. Lilly’s look in this image is 
aligned with her historical look — this is her flashback after all — which only serves to again 
show the impossibility of looking in noir. Because of the presence of Reardon, the insurance 
investigator, this image is turned into a crime scene, where, if only by looking, a hitherto unknown 
fact might be unearthed and Swede may yet be saved. The desire for historical continuity is 
disrupted by noir’s fascination, since by displacing the various desires in this flashback (Lilly, 
Swede, Kitty and us) history becomes lost and obscure. Our gaze is drawn towards Kitty, but even 
as we adjust to look at Swede and Lilly, we are still seeing Kitty insofar as we see her effect.  
Secondly, therefore, we can perceive fascination as ‘relational and fantasmatic’ through 
the competing gazes in this scene.42 Our fascination, for one, is complicated by the competing 
gazes and the space between the characters. The image implies a sense of depth (Lilly sits behind 
Swede, who stands some distance of Kitty), but the gazes nonetheless compress the image. The 
loss of home is here represented through Lilly’s forlorn sense of loss; her marriage to Sam 
Lubinsky, the police lieutenant, is seen as a compromise which shows how history did not work 
out as planned. Home is lost, however, through Kitty’s historical gaze, since her gaze ‘looks back’ 
across the image, and across the various gazes. Her gaze cuts through the gazes and retroactively 
reorients them. Lilly’s gaze at Swede is one of loss because of how Kitty’s look fascinates Swede. 
In noir’s narratives, it is the process of ‘looking back’ into history which obscures its meaning. 
 
42 Harris, ‘Outside History, But Historically So’, p. 8. 
[277] 
 
This is the case in The Killers, since the film’s historicity is marked by the absence of Swede’s 
perspective and in the inadequacy of Reardon’s investigative approach which falsely records 
history. It is less the case that Kitty’s look is ambiguous, but rather that it inspires ambiguity; 
fascination is introduced through our look. The matrixes of looks imply a hierarchy of gazes, of 
historical perspectives. Lilly looks at Swede and wonders what has fascinated him, what took him 
away from her. Swede is then fascinated by Kitty. Therefore, there must be something which 
fascinates Kitty. Although we imagine that Kitty must be looking at something off-screen (and is 
fascinated in the same way as Lilly and Swede) the object of her gaze is nothing at all. This is 
precisely what animates noir’s male protagonists’ fascination for the femme fatale: the femme 
fatale desires nothing, at least nothing from the male protagonist. In this sense, Kitty is only 
fascinating because we and Swede deem her so. 
Figure 6.3, The Killers (1946) 
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We can see how fascination is relational in the second image of Kitty and Swede (Figure 
6.3). The differences between the two images help illuminate the role of the femme fatale in noir. 
For one, Lilly has been removed. Her desire is deemed an unnecessary surplus. Since, too, this is 
Lilly’s flashback, it is testament to the impossibility of historical recovery in noir. Moreover, in 
the present Lilly has married the police lieutenant Sam Lubinsky — an old friend of Swede and 
the one who arrested him — and they both live a seemingly content homely life, which lies in 
contrast to Swede’s story. Lilly, unlike Swede, finds the right partner in Lubinsky — even their 
names resemble each other — and, subsequently, the right home. Although Lilly and Lubsinky 
offer a strong opposition to Swede’s path, there is nonetheless a lingering loss which hangs over 
the scene, no matter how sleight. Everything appears to be in its proper place — Lilly’s idyllic 
marriage to Sam, and the criminal Swede has already received his sentence — except history. 
Swede is dislocated from the film’s historical continuity. This has the effect of first rendering Lilly 
and Sam’s home a lost object, or an object that is a reminder of loss and secondly, enables Jim 
Colfax’s home at the end of the film to be the place in which Kitty is condemned. 
In the second image, only Kitty and Swede remain, either side of a burning candle. The 
candle here represents the sexual desire and fascination between Kitty and Swede. On the one 
level, the candle acts as a simple representation of ‘burning desire’, but on the other, since the 
candle separates them, it suggests, paradoxically, that the obstacle between Swede and Kitty was 
their desire for each other. Or, perhaps, that Swede’s desire for Kitty was impossible from the 
beginning. The composition of the frame further intensifies the paradoxical feeling of this critical 
moment in the film. What attracts Swede, what fascinates his gaze and ignites his imagination, is 
the back of Kitty’s head. The frame, however, compresses the three-dimensional space of the 
scene, as if to imply that Swede’s vision impossibly loops around to see Kitty from the front, as if 
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he stands in front of her, in other words, to see what we see. Here, Swede’s fascinated look reveals 
his desire, the impossibility therein: he desires what he cannot see or attain. Our gaze is then 
composed of Swede’s fascination, his fantasy; we are involved in the image from the beginning. 
The second important factor aside from the change in personnel is that the direction of 
looks is reversed. In the first image (Figure 6.2), from left to right, the bearers of the look are Lilly, 
Swede, then Kitty. In the second (Figure 6.3), from right to left, the bearers of the look are Swede, 
the candle, then Kitty. Apart from removing Lilly from the matrixes of looks, one function of this 
reversal is to transform Swede’s fascination into a physical object — the candle. It is ‘relational’ 
because it exists between Kitty and Swede, but it is ‘fantasmatic’ inasmuch as it has been conjured 
in place of Swede from the previous image. The candle, in this respect, is Swede. It both represents 
his desire for Kitty, but also (because of the artificial placement and camera’s flattening of the 
image) blocks his view. However, his view is only blocked from our historical perspective. In this 
respect, Swede’s desire is rendered as historical affect. What prevents Swede from seeing beyond 
the veil of fascination is his very fascinated gaze. The reversal of the images proposed by 
fascination is not resolved through a changing of perspective. Regardless of the position from 
which Swede looks at Kitty, his fascination always distorts his gaze. 
In relation to our identification with Swede, our spectatorial position is somewhat complex. 
On the one hand, we possess a privileged viewpoint in comparison to those present in the scene 
itself. Unlike Swede, however, we can see Kitty’s face, but in turn we sacrifice Swede’s 
perspective. We can also see Swede’s face and are thus able to see both their reactions: first, 
Swede’s melancholic, protracted gaze and second, Kitty’s performance as she realises that she is 
being watched. We can see what Swede cannot see and thus our gaze is a product of his fantasmatic 
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projections. Our gaze sees Kitty’s reaction to Swede’s gaze, an imagining of the Other recognising 
his desire. Where Swede’s gaze is overtly inquisitive and speculative, ours promises the answer. 
Swede’s gaze asks: what lies beyond what I can see? And what does Kitty think of me? We can 
see that Kitty knows that she is being watched — by Swede, by the other people in the room, by 
us. Her eyes glance off to the side, as if to look at Swede behind her and she cryptically sings ‘the 
more I know of love, the less I know.’43  
At the same time, I would argue there is an ambiguity regarding our spectatorial and 
narrative position. The complex matrix of competing gazes serves to make the object of those 
gazes ambiguous. For example, Swede looks at Kitty in the hope that his look will reciprocate his 
desire. However, Kitty functions as Swede’s objet petit a, the object of his desire; it energises him, 
but his look will not be returned in the way he wishes it to. Kitty, conversely, looks at nothing: not 
at Swede, not at us. Nor does she return our gaze. The compressed flatness of the image does not 
direct our gaze to either Kitty or Swede. Nor do we only look at Swede’s reaction, which distances 
us from his perspective. Our spectatorial position’s ambiguity derives, therefore, from a 
simultaneous desire to assume Swede’s perspective and a disavowal of that perspective: we are 
drawn in and pushed away. In this way, our position suddenly resembles Reardon’s, a desire, an 
inability to know.  
The effect of this peculiar image is ambiguous because it gives us the comforting 
impression of distance and of objectivity, that our gaze is not involved in the image. There is, 
however, a danger that we rule out the possibility that we are already involved with the image, that 
it wants something from us. It is Kitty — the film’s fascinating figure — who, with her 
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performative smirk, wants our gaze. We see both Swede and Kitty’s faces and gazes and we are 
given the illusion of objectivity. Kitty’s smirk is an affirmation that she knows that Swede is 
looking at her and that she recognises his desire. Because of the fantasmatic nature of fascination, 
our look is derived from our (or Lilly’s) imagination, which fills in the gaps of the Real as Swede 
does. Like Swede, we want to know what Kitty thinks of Swede and his longing gaze, but even 
with our supposedly privileged position, we are as blind as Swede. By showing us ‘everything’, 
the camera’s gaze obscures the objet petit a — the object from desire supposedly originates — 
from our gaze.  
In The Killers, the gazes begin to refer only to themselves. Lilly’s melancholic gaze looks 
at Swede then Swede’s desirous gaze looks at Kitty. Kitty’s gaze, fascinating and ambiguous as it 
is, looks at nothing. Like Swede’s look of death and resignation, Kitty’s gaze is beyond the frame 
and beyond us. Finally, there is Reardon’s historical gaze. The historical gaze attempts to reorder 
these gazes and desires into a coherent and linear form. Yet such a project is impossible for 
Reardon. He learns this lesson when he talks to Charleston, Swede’s prison cellmate and asks him 
what he assumes to be a straightforward question, one that establishes historical continuity: ‘When 
was the last time you saw the Swede?’ to which Charleston responds ‘Mister, did you say ‘when’?’ 
Charleston emphasises that the past — at least where Swede is concerned — is not a temporal 
distinction; it is not a case of when, but of what was the last time. Time, and the historicisation of 
time, is reimagined as a physical object or a space, similar to how Swede’s handkerchief — which 
he used as a disguise for the bank robbery in the film and which acts as the principal object of 
fascination for Reardon, since it is the object given to Swede by Kitty — is, in Harris’s view, a 
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‘fetish token — the sign of Swede's fascination.’44 Charleston’s response, therefore, indicates the 
futility of Reardon’s mode of historicisation. 
Figure 6.4, The Killers (1946) 
Kitty and Swede’s first meeting is echoed later by Reardon’s meeting with Kitty (Figures 
6.4 and 6.5). This time, instead of at a party, they meet at a busy downtown bar. Reardon, up to 
this point in the film, has been following Swede’s footsteps and slowly reconstructing his life. 
Here, he has a chance to meet Kitty and see her for himself. Their meeting partly resembles Kitty’s 
initial meeting with Swede: the half-burnt candle between them and Reardon, taking the place of 
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Swede, wanting to know the ‘real’ Kitty Collins. Kitty herself distinguishes herself as the ‘real’ 
Kitty Collins when she says, ‘I have a home now…’45 What makes this distinction confusing is 
that there are two ‘real’ Kitty Collins’. The first is the femme fatale, real insofar as she represents 
the Real, she is that which cannot be properly identified; the second as a ‘reformed’ femme fatale, 
no longer defined by excess, but contained within a home. Towards the end of their conversation, 
Rear reminisces about a past he will never have, ‘I’d like to have known the old Kitty Collins,’ he 
says, revealing his fascination for her. Reardon, in this moment, becomes Swede, as he attempts 
to ‘correct’ Kitty. In The Killers, the melancholia — the sense that loss itself is lost — enacts itself 
historically. The act of historical recovery (particularly a personal history such as Swede’s) is 
rendered impossible. As Freud writes, melancholia exceeds mourning as far as ‘it is marked by a 
determinant which is absent in normal mourning or which, if it is present, transforms the latter into 
pathological mourning.’46 The absent determinant here — the lost object — is Kitty, the femme 
fatale. 
Although this scene repeats the earlier scene with Kitty and Swede, there are a few details 
which reveal Kitty’s staging of the meeting. First, the candle. Although in the meeting with Kitty 
and Swede, the candle represents the desire between them, here, it is offset to the left of the frame, 
implying an imbalance of its usage. Desire is not between them, but rather Swede’s fascination 
that lurks on the edges of their conversation. Unlike in the earlier scene, where Swede stands 
behind Kitty and the three-dimensional space is compressed, Kitty and Reardon sit across from 
each other and the camera’s position shifts, sometimes showing one, or the other, or both. The 
large mirror behind Reardon distorts the reflection of the bar, stretching the patrons to absurd 
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degrees. Conversely, from Kitty’s now omniscient viewpoint, she can see Reardon, the rest of the 
bar, and herself, whereas Reardon can only see Kitty. The mirror is aligned with Kitty’s gaze, 
which shows us a representation of the view of the femme fatale. The reason for the shift is, again, 
historical. Although this scene is a repetition of Kitty and Swede’s first meeting, Reardon’s 
assumption of Swede’s identity renders this both Reardon’s first meeting with Kitty and Swede’s 
ghostly ‘final’ meeting, simultaneously the first and last time. Yet what haunts the scene is not 
strictly Swede, but rather his fascination with Kitty. To this effect, I will now discuss ‘haunting’ 
in The Killers and film noir more broadly, using the concept of ‘hauntology’ to examine how the 
spectre of the femme fatale ‘haunts’ noir, what is involved in a ‘haunting’, and its relation to noir. 
Figure 6.5, The Killers (1946) 
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Hauntology and Trauma 
This section explores the concept of hauntology, as described by Mark Fisher and Jacques Derrida, 
and how it interacts with noir’s traumatic narratives and the femme fatale. The introduction of the 
femme fatale (or even the possibility of the femme fatale) into the noir narrative introduces a 
temporal ambiguity in relation to desire. The desire for the femme fatale is predicated by the 
figures themselves: desire is not a spontaneously occurring phenomenon but predicated and 
assumed by the femme fatale. Flashback narratives (such as in The Killers) are often the result of 
a collision with the femme fatale. In these films, the femme fatale, despite having already been 
killed, or fated to be so, still, in some sense, affects the past by destabilising it. In this sense, the 
femme fatale — and by extension film noir as a whole — can be thought of as hauntological. Mark 
Fisher describes the two seemingly paradoxical directions of hauntology, a concept first coined by 
Jacques Derrida in his 1991 book Spectres of Marx. The first direction, Fisher argues, is ‘that 
which is no longer, but which is still effective as a virtuality.’47 The example he gives is the 
‘traumatic “compulsion to repeat” […] a fatal pattern.’48 This Freudian dimension of hauntology 
appears particularly useful for noir, for there is a structure of trauma that dominates film noir. For 
instance, the very reason that home (and the absence of, and paranoia surrounding it) figures so 
heavily in the noir narrative is that it no longer exists (it has been lost or eroded in some way) but 
is still ‘effective as a virtuality’49 insofar as home slowly becomes — through seismic events such 
as the Great Depression, World War Two, the Korean War, and the Cold War — a virtual concept 
less rooted in the actuality of a physical space than in the absence and remnants of those spaces. 
Or, to use Bronfen’s argument, home exceeds the fantasy constructed around it. The second 
 





direction, Fisher writes, ‘refers to that which has not yet happened, but which is already effective 
in the virtual.’50 The two coalescent directions of hauntology, therefore, are a past which has ceased 
to exist and a future which has not yet taken effect. Both the past and the future enact themselves 
on the present through their ‘virtuality.’ For Derrida, hauntology insists ‘without existing.’51 In 
Derrida’s terms, a haunting is ‘repetition and first time, but also repetition and last time;’52 it 
threatens to happen for the first time, while also threatening to happen again: it comprehends, ‘but 
incomprehensibly.’53  
Here, we can see a corollary between hauntology and the femme fatale. Firstly, her 
presence in the film impresses itself on the past and future as a virtuality. Secondly, leaving the 
term femme fatale untranslated leads to an obscurity of meaning. The femme fatale’s meaning is 
made ambiguous by remaining untranslated. When spoken in French, hauntology is a homophone 
of ‘ontology’, the study of being. As Colin Davis writes, ‘Hauntology supplants its near-homonym 
ontology, replacing the priority of being and presence with the figure of the ghost as that which is 
neither present nor absent, neither dead nor alive.’54 Hauntological concepts, therefore, require a 
kind of replacement, a replacement of ontology itself. The stable meaning of ontology is upset by 
the introduction of hauntology. Likewise, there is no ‘inaugural moment’ of the femme fatale, no 
true ‘first appearance’ in which her function is fully formed. For, as Peter Buse and Andrew Stott 
argue, ‘any attempt to isolate the origin of language will find its inaugural moment already 
 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. p. 20. 
52Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International (London: 
Routledge, 2006), p. 10. 
53 Ibid.  
54 Colin Davis, ‘Ét at Présent: Hauntology, Spectres and Phantoms’, French Studies. 59.3 (2005), p. 373. 
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dependent upon a system of linguistic differences that have been installed prior to the ‘originary’ 
moment.’55 The critical concept of the femme fatale, like noir itself, is retroactively determined. 
In film noir, home can be understood as hauntological: something which is ‘no longer’ and 
‘that which has not yet happened.’56 Many noir narratives involve the establishment of the 
authority of home, which serves to emphasise both its historical importance and its future, yet 
untold, significance.57 Film noir itself could be considered hauntological, neither ‘present nor 
absent’; it neither concretely exists in the way that other comparable genres do, but it still enacts 
itself as virtuality, modifying the meaning of all those films that are deemed noir. If noir, to borrow 
a phrase from Fisher, was always spectral, always hauntological, what does it mean now that we 
resurrect it? Noir is resurrected either through our critical retrospection (in a sense, revivifying it) 
or through noir’s ‘resurgence’, ‘rebirth’, as neo-noir. The same applies to home in noir: the 
historical idea of home relies on a concept of historicity which sees history as an unbroken 
continuum, yet film noir frequently confronts this notion of historicity, not only through its après 
coup narrative structures, but through the notion of historicity itself as being traumatic.  
Building upon Freud’s work, Cathy Caruth argues that trauma is a ‘paradoxical 
experience’58 insofar as a traumatic event is at once preserved in a fashion not usually associated 
 
55 Peter Buse and Andrew Stott, ‘Introduction: A Future for Haunting’, Ghosts: Deconstruction, Psychoanalysis, 
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with subjective memory, while at the same time rarely taking up an equal position alongside 
conscious memory and thought. Traumatic memories are both overwhelming in their intrusion into 
the present and difficult to access because often the registering of a memory as traumatic is 
perceived après coup. More generally, the traumatic event alters memory and the subject’s 
understanding of the relationship between their memories and identity. In short, it alters a subject’s 
perception of history and of historicity itself. These moments of trauma are often contradictory 
and aporetic. Derrida, by his own admission, focused on such historical moments of aporia. As 
Roger Luckhurst summarises: ‘Derrida figured the aporia as a blocking of passage, a stalling or 
hesitation, a foot hovering on the threshold, caught between advancing and falling back, between 
the possible and the impossible.’59  
Moments of hesitation, such as Swede’s first meeting with Kitty in The Killers, or Johnny’s 
with Gilda in Gilda, are indicative of a kind of historical trauma: a trauma which is represented by 
woman’s ‘openness’, inasmuch as openness refers to a category of woman constituting an open 
set of signs. In this respect, the femme fatale is hauntological because of the ways in which she is, 
conceptually, a hesitation. Even when present, she is never quite there, and her appearance speaks 
to both possibility and impossibility. For Tyrer, Lacan’s maxim that ‘the woman does not exist’ 
means that there is no generalizable category or signifier within the Symbolic order capable of 
defining the set of woman […] there is no signifier that could totalise it.’60 Throughout Gilda 
Gilda’s absence is constantly remarked upon and becomes an extended mystery. Her absence is 
regarded as presence. Large parts of the film are dedicated to perceiving and seeing her. As both a 
presence and an absence, Gilda and the femininity she represents, can be considered traumatic, or 
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an encounter with her is understood as traumatic. Gilda, too, represents the possible and the 
impossible. She is an impossible object insofar as understanding her desires is an impossible task 
and the formation of the couple requires some fundamental delimiting of her desire. On the other 
hand, she represents a new possibility, a possibility which reopens the space to return home to 
America, to begin anew in the messy aftermath of the war. In this respect, Gilda’s narrative 
resolution requires a disavowal of Gilda’s desire (and therefore subjectivity) to ‘return’ her to the 
role of housewife. In Gilda, the fantasy of home can be restored to actuality, but it necessitates that 
women forego their newfound subjectivity to bring men like Johnny back to the ‘right side of the 
law.’61 Whereas in other film noirs, the principal sin is desiring the femme fatale in Gilda, the 
absence of desire for Gilda is the crime which must be ‘corrected’ through the narrative. 
In relation to other women in film noir, specifically femme fatales who are destroyed by 
the end of the film, they, too, are neither present nor absent. Consider, again, Double Indemnity 
(1944). Both the narrative structure and Neff’s longing tone suspend Phyllis in stasis. Although 
Neff has killed her, he keeps her alive through the narrative retelling of events. What we see (and 
hear) is already determined, but Neff’s tone still implies a desire for events to be changed. Thus, 
it feels as if it could, and perhaps even should, change; for all we know, Phyllis may turn up, 
instead of Keyes, at the end of his story. Neff’s narration includes multiple moments of narrative 
divergence where, in another lifetime, things might have turned out differently. What at first seems 
like a perfectly executed plan soon becomes unstuck through what feels like an almost farcical 
accumulation of loose ends and unimagined consequences. The structure of Neff’s story is 
bookended by similar scenes. Neff and Phyllis’s first and last meetings occur in adjacent rooms: 
Neff meets Phyllis in the hallway, and they continue their conversation in the living room. They 
 
61 Greg Forter, ‘Going Straight with Gilda’, p. 19. 
[290] 
 
end by shooting each other in the living room. They sit in the same seats as Neff pulls the trigger. 
Phyllis is neither dead nor alive; dead, of course, by the end, but alive in Neff’s re-telling, 
constantly haunting him with what might have been. Her presence in the film, as a ghostly figure, 
is a paradoxical formulation. In her first appearance, she is, for Neff, returning, for the first and 
last time, but also making her memorable debut. Her haunting, too, is one which acts as a blockage 
to a coherent sense of historicity: by her deeds, the narrative’s linearity is lost forever, cut up into 
irrational segments. 
Returning to Gilda, Johnny is in Buenos Aires in part due to an implied previous 
relationship with Gilda. Yet trauma is always abrupt and difficult to understand. In relation to 
home, Gilda’s setting, Buenos Aires in 1945, is an important detail. The film takes place towards 
the end of World War Two, and the narrative itself is concerned with going home — the final 
words of the film, spoken by Gilda to Johnny are ‘Johnny, let’s go. Let’s go home.’62 There is a 
curious narrative jolt shortly after Gilda is introduced where Johnny’s voiceover says rather 
nonchalantly, ‘anyway, it was about that time that the war ended.’63 One implication is that Gilda 
somehow ended the war by her presence in the film. The scene of her first appearance is a kind of 
traumatic ‘bombshell’ for Johnny, a rupture in time. Yet, this line shows the way in which 
Hollywood films focus excessively on the personal, rather than the ‘historical’. The only 
explanation in the film for the war ending seems to revolve around Gilda. What comes after is 
evidently the ‘fallout’ of her introduction. The ending of the war in the film is so sudden as to 
catch us unprepared, in a similar way to the resurfacing of traumatic memories. The abrupt ending 
of the war upsets the film’s linear sense of historicity. The temporal, or spatial, placement of 
 




Johnny’s voiceover is never articulated: it comes from no identifiable point in time or space. It 
may not even be a voice from the future giving its explanation for the past.  
Johnny’s voiceover could be his immediate thoughts as we progress through the film, as if 
he were correcting himself in real time. If, as Karen Hollinger argues in her essay on the voiceover 
in film noir, the male voiceover’s function is to ‘pit the femme fatale's dominating visual presence 
against the male voice,’64 then Johnny’s voice is introduced to regulate Gilda’s dominating visual 
presence (or, indeed, absence). If Johnny’s voice is from the future, which seems most plausible, 
then his voice can also be considered hauntological, as taking on the affect of Gilda’s voice. For 
Fisher, for example, ‘the future is always experienced as a haunting’, since the future is that which 
has yet to occur, or the possibility of what might occur, yet it still ‘impinges on the present’65 as a 
virtuality. What is mourned in this historical haunting, Fisher argues, is ‘less the failure of a future 
to transpire —the future as actuality — than the disappearance of [an] effective virtuality.’66 The 
bitterness present in Johnny’s voiceover indicates a sense of a lost future, which implies that the 
future did not transpire the way he truly desired; that the promise of the future, its virtuality, 
disappeared at the sight of Gilda. The next section examines Gilda’s introduction in closer detail, 
in particular how her voice and presence are the central hauntological concern of the film and how 
this impacts the film’s construction of home. 
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The figure of the femme fatale has no corollary in the real history of postwar America insofar as 
the emergence of the femme fatale as a cinematic trope does not correlate with a similar emergence 
of women as deadly manipulators. In fact, despite its prevalence in noir criticism, the femme fatale 
— that is, a woman who uses her beauty to seduce and destroy men — is not an entirely new 
concept. One of the earliest antecedents, for instance, could be the Sirens from Homer’s The 
Odyssey. The crucial difference between noir and the Sirens is that while the femme fatale uses 
her physical appearance as her main fascinating tool, the Sirens use their voices to lure Odysseus’ 
sailors into the ocean. In film noir, the Sirens’ eroticised voice is translated into a male voice, 
which in turn eroticises the female body, as Karen Hollinger argues. Hollinger’s main thesis is that 
the male voiceover’s function is, on the one hand, to ‘pit the femme fatale's dominating visual 
presence against the male voice,’ while on the other, as Doane argues, to embed the ‘figure of the 
femme fatale in the narrative’s metadiegetic level,’67 which thus withholds ‘access to narration’ 
and grants the ‘male narrator control of both her words and image.’68  
The question for film noir, which invariably provides an ambivalent answer, is whether it is the 
femme fatale’s visual presence or the male voiceover which is dominant. The male voiceover can 
mediate and regulate the woman’s body, as is the case with Jeff’s suggestive introduction to Kathie 
in Out of the Past (‘I saw her coming out of the sun,’) which allows him to reframe her in relation 
to fantasy. After all, the voiceover is always performed in some unspecified time in the future 
where the narrator tries to put history back into the past. Furthermore, the femme fatale can control 
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the male voiceover, disrupting and undermining it before it even begins. The additional factor 
involved in this dilemma is the introduction of the female voice itself. 
Figure. 6.6, Gilda (1946) 
In Gilda’s introductory scene, we can see how the femme fatale is marked as a 
hauntological absent presence in the film. Johnny is ‘introduced again’ (though he already has a 
history with her) to Gilda by Ballin, her husband. Initially, Ballin calls Johnny to the top of the 
staircase, remarking that he ‘feels great’ about something.69 Johnny asks, ‘Where’s the canary?’, 
to which Ballin responds, ‘How did you know?’ Johnny replies that he does not understand, and 
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Ballin says, ‘So you don’t know?’ Even before she is introduced, Gilda is shrouded in ambiguity 
and misunderstanding. Ballin mistakenly thinks that Johnny knows what, or who, is he is talking 
about, thereby accidently revealing Johnny and Gilda’s hidden history. Here, the film bears out a 
central tension in the figure of the femme fatale. Her visual (and acoustic) presence is revealing, 
but the nature of what it reveals is unclear. She does not show desire or reveal in the (presumed) 
male observer their own desire, but rather the obscurity of desire. To use Lacan’s analogy, what 
the femme fatale ‘shows’ is the staging of the veil and the abyss it conceals. Gilda’s absence reveals 
the hidden history between her and Johnny as a fascinating and spectral presence. What their 
history amounts to is obscurity itself. She is introduced first as obscurity, then as voice, then in 
person. This is further reinforced through Gilda’s introduction, where her ostentatious and 
performative flick of her hair renders Johnny immobile and uncommunicative (Figure 6.6). Again, 
however, before she is visually introduced, we can hear her singing from the next room. ‘Quite a 
surprise to hear a woman singing in my house, eh Johnny?’ Ballin asks, to which Johnny replies, 
‘Yes, quite a…surprise’ with a protracted pause before he says ‘surprise.’70 
As the camera approaches Gilda, building anticipation for her appearance, we can glimpse 
her inside her bedroom (Figure 6.7). The bright interior contrasts with the dark exterior covering 
Ballin and Johnny. The promise is that Gilda will reveal Johnny’s desire, that there is something 
‘illuminating’ about her. The movement of the camera, therefore, suggests a movement into 
knowledge. Complicating this movement, however, is the mirror and suitcase in the room. The 
mirror doubles the image before it is even shown, promising to show Gilda from ‘all angles.’ It 
also prefigures the visual fascination with Gilda. Our anticipation is mediated by her voice, for 
one, but also by the fact the mirror offers new and impossible angles into the room. The suitcase 
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represents a certain transience surrounding Gilda, implying that she has only just arrived, that we 
are about to capture her from the very beginning, while at the same suggesting she may leave at 
any time.  
Figure 6.7, Gilda (1946) 
This prefigures the film’s scopophilic preoccupation of continually asking ‘Where is 
Gilda?’. The question of Gilda’s location is here bound up with who or what she is. She is, as 
suggested by her voice, a canary in Ballin’s coal mine, his gambling empire and his home. She is 
a wife to Ballin, but a former partner of Johnny’s. She is, perhaps obviously, Rita Hayworth 
herself. She is a disembodied voice which haunts the images before her very arrival. In addition, 
Gilda’s transience, her inability to be caught and regulated by the male gaze, can be read as a 
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metaphor for the home’s transience in the film — and noir more broadly. Gilda’s presence renders 
the home unstable. Johnny, who was previously ‘making himself at home’ by helping himself to 
some alcoholic drinks from Ballin’s downstairs bar, becomes uncommunicative at the sight (and 
sound) of Gilda. The fundamental architectural split in Ballin’s home is thus exaggerated by Gilda: 
the split between the bedroom (the room of comfort; of sleep, of dreams; of family) and the bar 
(representative of a public, and unhomely space). It is not that Gilda introduces ambiguity by 
disrupting the dynamics and architecture of the home, but rather that she reveals Ballin’s home to 
be unhomely and her presence threatens to untie this unheilmich knot. Symbolically, too, Gilda 
challenges Ballin’s own hauntological and uncanny presence throughout the film. Like Gilda, 
Ballin drifts in and out of the frame; both he and Gilda compete for Johnny’s desire. 
In Gilda, the absence of home is principally dramatized by the dichotomy of Gilda’s 
absence or presence. When Ballin and Johnny first enter Gilda’s bedroom — entering the prospect 
of home for the first time — Ballin asks, ‘Gilda are you decent?’ Gilda flicks her hair as her face 
fills the screen.71 We hear Gilda singing before we see her, her voice luring Johnny and Ballin up 
to her room. When Gilda does appear, there is another long pause where Ballin is forced to 
physically usher Johnny in. Gilda’s voice, as indicated by Johnny’s surprise, is a ‘return of the 
repressed’ because of the concealed romantic (and implicitly traumatic) history between them. It 
is a history which Ballin insists on hearing, but never does — a history is unseen as well as unheard, 
which begs the question whether it really happened at all. The suggestive dialogue in the scene 
continually circles around this phantom history between Johnny and Gilda. The purpose confronts 
Johnny with the obscurity of their history. Gilda begins the conversation by remarking that she has 
‘heard a lot about’ Johnny, presumably from Ballin, yet Johnny ‘hasn’t heard a word’ about 
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Gilda.72 The confrontation with Gilda positions her as the source of knowledge, the big Other; she 
knows Johnny’s desire, which cannot be concealed from her, whereas Johnny is positioned as the 
one who ‘must’ know. 
Gilda functions as Johnny’s ‘lost object’. Hence her fascination is, for Johnny, historical. 
Their meeting here is hauntological insofar as it is both a repetition and the first time they meet. 
However, Gilda herself is ‘lost’ in the narrative because she evades the narrative’s gaze by 
undermining the masculine mastery of the film’s images. Her bedroom, for one, is a profoundly 
ambiguous space — evidenced by Johnny’s timid crossing of the threshold. Indeed, it is, as Forter 
points out, the first time Johnny and Ballin are in the bedroom together. Yet a crucial transference 
has taken place: it is no longer Ballin’s room, but Gilda’s. The space of the bedroom, a previously 
private room in the home, is ambiguous. Gilda, at first, interrupts Johnny and Ballin’s relationship, 
as her appearance marks the ‘return’ of a repressed history. Later, however, Ballin interrupts — 
literally walking through the space between Gilda and Johnny disrupting their gazes. If they cannot 
look, they cannot know. In this way, Gilda’s bedroom is rendered an ambiguous metaphorical 
space; Gilda herself functions as the past incarnate.  
As Oliver and Trigo argue, noir is ambiguous, or anxious, because of the way in which the 
process of identity formation is constituted ‘by protecting it from the threats of ambiguous 
borders.’73 They classify these threats as ‘feminine power in men, incomprehensible language in 
foreigners, uncertain identity, racial mixing, and maternal sexuality.’74 They conclude that ‘the 
very process that builds, consolidates, and fortifies identity in film noir also drains identity of 
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meaning, creates holes or vacuums at its center, and produces the anxiety that haunts film noir.’75 
Noir requires its protagonists to maintain forward momentum, to work towards something, but the 
femme fatale’s primary function is to halt this process. Johnny’s predicament is that he is stuck 
historicising, but that this process gets him nowhere. The scene, for one, is centred around the 
alluring properties of Gilda’s voice, which then transitions into the staging of Gilda’s physical 
attractiveness, which is finally staged as a crisis of historicity. Gilda’s haunting voice is therefore 
understood by Johnny as the past. 
Gilda’s voice exemplifies Michel Chion’s concept of the ‘acousmatic presence’ because 
when first heard, she is hidden and afterwards, Ballin and Johnny are plagued by the question 
‘where is Gilda?’76  The acousmatic presence, for Chion, is a vocal source which remains unseen; 
we hear the vocal sources, but their presence is merely a threat, or a lure. They are ‘outside the 
image and at the same time in the image’ because, in the cinema, the sound is located behind the 
screen and in the film itself. 77 Gilda’s response to Ballin’s question about whether she is decent 
— ‘Me?’ — acts as the confirmation of her presence, which up until this point had merely been a 
spectral, sourceless voice. Her confirmation, however, does not dispel her hauntological 
dimensions. Seeing Gilda only heightens her ambiguity. Just when Ballin and Johnny think they 
have found Gilda, her hesitation and elongated pause after answering and seeing Johnny leaves an 
excess. In this sense, her voice is in the image since we can finally see her speaking, but it remains 
outside the image because it lies outside the film’s sense of history. 
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Chion’s term for this threatening auditory and narrative phenomenon is the acousmêtre: 
‘the one who is not-yet seen, but who remains liable to appear in the visual field at any moment.’78 
As such, when the acousmêtre appears in a film, the central goal is to bring it ‘into the light.’79 
Gilda’s restlessness and her absence from the frame indicates her unwillingness to be controlled, 
to have her body organised into the spectacle of male desire, but it also shows that Gilda, far away 
in Buenos Aires, is not in her ‘proper place’ at home in America. To bring her ‘into the light’ is to 
bring Gilda (and Johnny) home, as well as to pacify her image. 80 To do so, her perceived infidelity 
and history with Johnny must first be punished in order for her to be redeemed. As Greg Forter 
puts it, Gilda must turn out to be innocent so that she can be released from her ‘Latin prison into 
the quotidian domestic delights of “home” and heterosexual coupling.’81 By marrying Ballin, she 
is imprisoned within his house and casino; she cannot return home to America. But, Forter 
continues, ‘she must also be guilty’ because the film needs to contain her within the narration; the 
film pretends she is guilty to satisfy a ‘sadistically ocular masculine entertainment.’82 Neither her 
infidelity nor her history with Johnny are ever fully explained, but the anxiety to do so speaks to 
the role of the acousmêtre, which, according to Chion, is to invite the spectator to ‘go see,’ and be 
an ‘invitation to the loss of self, to desire and fascination.’83 The spectacle of Gilda is therefore a 
paradoxical arrangement: the film promises a certain level of pleasure, of seeing and of knowing, 
but at the same time it suspends its ‘desire to know.’84 The ‘where’ of Gilda, as well as her and 
Johnny’s history, is constantly deferred. 
 
78 Ibid, p. 21. 
79 Ibid, p. 23. 
80 Ibid, p. 18. 
81 Forter, ‘Going Straight with Gilda’, p. 11. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Chion, The Voice in Cinema, p. 23. 
84 Forter, ‘Going Straight with Gilda’, p. 11. 
[300] 
 
The same could be said for the ‘striptease’ scene. The pleasure of the scene is similarly 
inherently paradoxical: it is a suspension of our desire to know. The function of the striptease is to 
always promise the possibility of the complete removal of all Gilda’s clothes whilst at the same 
time consistently denying and delaying such attainment of desire. Yet the desire and pleasure only 
persist if the fantasy of what lies beneath Gilda’s clothing is maintained, a fantasy which is lost at 
the moment she hypothetically removes her clothes. We should, however, read this scene as 
metaphorical — since what is important is what lies beneath Gilda’s clothes qua their relation to 
Johnny’s fantasy. As with the introductory scene, the voice and image work to combine the crowd 
and Johnny’s objet petit a, the very notion of historical loss. It is not the case that it is impossible 
to see Gilda’s naked body (though, in the context of the film and the Production Code, we know it 
is impossible), but the impossibility is rather the prospect of seeing Gilda naked and our fantasy 
remaining intact. Our desire stops short of seeing Gilda naked because we do not want to know or 
see. The pleasure is in neither knowing nor seeing.  
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Figure 6.8, Gilda (1946) 
If Gilda is supposed to contain home within herself, then what she offers is impossible. 
The spectator’s ‘desire to know’ is always suspended and the striptease will reach a point where 
nothing more can be revealed or else the fantasy is lost. The striptease, then, offers a scenario in 
which our desire is never satisfied and never disappointed, but is held in suspension. In this sense, 
the metaphorical function of ‘Gilda’s clothes’ is to mask the historical loss and cultural anxiety 
marked by the femme fatale. Her song, ‘Put the Blame on Mame’, refers to the synchronous fears 
that coalesce around Gilda (and women in noir in general).85 More generally, the role of the femme 
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fatale, from the perspective of Hollywood studios, could be said to sustain the fantasy of 
subversion, to maintain desire, but ultimately be stopped. In Gilda, the explicit function of the 
striptease is to undermine Johnny’s masculine authority over her, by presenting herself as a 
spectacle. Her intention is that Johnny disrupt the striptease and cut it short, thus demonstrating 
his lack of control over his desire. For Johnny, the striptease will end with Gilda completely naked.  
One of the central tensions in Gilda is between the regulation and organisation of Gilda’s 
body and image, and her voice. As indicated by her introduction, her singing and her striptease, 
Gilda’s voice plays a prominent role in the production of anxiety in the male characters and 
audience. I now consider the relation between Gilda’s voice, the anxiety she produces, and the 
wider historical and social context of both Gilda and the home. Writing about The Lady From 
Shanghai (1947), again starring Rita Hayworth, Oliver and Trigo note the ‘haunting effect of the 
voice’, specifically Hayworth’s voice and how it represents ‘an acoustic site of unpredictability 
and promise.’86 In both The Lady From Shanghai and Gilda, the eroticisation of Hayworth equally 
involves her voice as well as her body. I would contend that it is the female voice which inspires 
noir’s male anxiety over the female body. The striptease scene is not simply a visual spectacle but 
is accompanied by Gilda singing ‘Put the Blame on Mame.’ Her voice lies outside the organised 
male spectacle because of her literal and narrative invisibility. In her initial introduction, for 
example, and at the beginning of the scene where Johnny hears her sing and play the guitar, she 
begins by being out of sight and Johnny is required to follow the voice to its source. Narratively, 
the question of Gilda’s location is one which seeks to bring her into the male fantasy frame. 
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Thus, the anxiety present in Gilda is due to the inability of the male gaze to subjugate Gilda 
and for her to disavow her place in the male fantasy. The anxiety is produced through the difference 
between the ‘unpredictability’ of her voice and the ‘promise’ of her body.87 Frequently, too, the 
image of women is presented by their voice, as here, in the case of Gilda.88 The same is true for 
Kitty in The Killers, where Swede is drawn to her singing voice. In her haunting auditory 
introduction, Gilda anticipates her multiple and questioned absences throughout the film. She is 
both there (we can hear her, and her male counterparts feel her presence) and not there (she is 
absent from the screen, and she threatens to disrupt Johnny and Ballin’s dominance over the 
narrative). Either the absent women were committing adultery (as is the fear with Gilda), or 
asserting a new economic independence. However, the femme fatale can also be recognised as an 
emergence of a new feminine subjectivity in cinema. The femme fatale, Elisabeth Bronfen argues, 
‘gives voice to a feminine desire that may include [the male hero’s erotic ambivalence] in order to 
attain its aim, but also exceeds his fantasy realm.’89 The perceived absence of the femme fatale 
can be attributed to exceeding the male fantasy and thus resisting symbolisation. The seemingly 
paradoxical movements of the femme fatale’s presence and absence are indicative of trauma, an 
ability to comprehend, a blockage in the process of signification. The next section focuses on 
Gilda’s position in the narrative in relation to the film’s construction of home. Specifically, it asks 
to what extent Gilda, far from being a disruptive femme fatale, acts as a ‘corrective’ to Johnny and 
Ballin’s implied homosexual relationship.  
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Gilda Sets Things Straight 
To return to Gilda’s introduction — the femme fatale is nothing if not a haunting, a continual point 
of return — Gilda asks Johnny whether it was a surprise to see her, to which Ballin replies, 
answering in the place of Johnny, ‘It certainly was. You should have seen his face.’90 This shows 
Johnny’s immobilisation, but also demonstrates that the male voice and therefore male perspective, 
is shared between Ballin and Johnny. Gilda’s introduction places her between Johnny and Ballin, 
disrupting their implied homosexual relationship. Greg Forter suggests that Gilda’s role in the film 
is to act as a corrective wedge between Johnny and Ballin, in order to bring the former to the ‘right 
side’ of his sexuality.91 In this sense, at least, Gilda does not fulfil the role of a femme fatale. 
Instead, her function and intended effect is the opposite: to consummate and maintain the 
heterosexual relationship. The film ends, it should be remembered, not with Gilda’s excruciating 
demise, but her salvation. Forter notes, too, that her introduction aligns with the first time that 
Johnny and Ballin are in a bedroom together — she is introduced at the precise moment where the 
homosexual relationship is no longer merely suggestive but becomes an explicit part of the text. 
Johnny’s hesitancy is a realisation — shared by the audience — that Gilda is not the film’s 
desirable object, but that Johnny is since he crosses the boundaries of sexual difference. What is 
at stake in the film is Johnny’s capacity for reconstituting the home, not through ‘saving’ Gilda, 
but through saving himself. 
The promise offered in Gilda’s introductory scene lies in the answer to Ballin’s question, 
‘Gilda, are you decent?’ The question, as is so often the case in relation to women in film noir, is 
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both physical and moral. It is physical insofar as Ballin is asking if Gilda is wearing an appropriate 
amount of clothes to be shown on screen, not only the cinema screen but appropriate for Johnny 
and Ballin’s fantasies. The moral dimension to the question pertains to what role Gilda will assume 
in relation to Ballin and Johnny’s homosexual relationship: will she destroy it (thereby doing the 
‘decent’ thing and establishing a heterosexual relationship), or will she let it be? The answer to the 
question is rhetorical, yet highly interrogatory, regardless of the answer Gilda herself gives. After 
a brief pause, she responds ‘Me? Sure, I’m decent.’92 The initial ‘Me?’ introduces a level of 
ambiguity when it comes to addressing Gilda, already foreshadowing her disappearances and 
Ballin and Johnny’s reaction to them. Gilda, too, is resisting the male gaze’s attempt to see and 
therefore subjugate her. One of Gilda’s main strategies for autonomy is her ability to control her 
own image and how it is staged. The question, ‘Are you decent?’, and her reply haunt the rest of 
the film. What is more, ‘Are you decent?’ speaks to the homophonic nature of the question that 
follows it: ‘Where is Gilda?’ which not only asks for her location, but also what is she wearing, 
the answer to which sets the boundaries of the male fantasy. 
As emphasised by Johnny’s hesitancy, Gilda is difficult to really see. In her introduction, 
Gilda is very brightly lit, almost impossibly so, in contrast to both the rest of the film and of noir’s 
apparent distinctive style. If film noir is marked, in some cases, by the arrival of the femme fatale 
(or even the vague threat of the femme fatale), then here this is undermined. She is presented in 
perfect conditions — she does not hide beneath bath towels — yet she is still indecipherable. As 
with many other femme fatales in film noir, Gilda’s eroticism is at first embraced by the film as 
her desires are centred, supposedly the central mechanism by which fascination is generated. 
However, the film slowly punishes her for those desires while at the same time, through Johnny’s 
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eroticism, dismissing Gilda’s desires. In this way, the femme fatale (I am here using the term 
advisedly) both stitches meaning together — Johnny’s desire can only be understood through 
Gilda’s — and is only effective in the virtual. She does not exist. As with the striptease scene, then, 
the film does not want to admit, or know, what Gilda wants. The film fetishises Gilda, visible 
through her introduction and her striptease scene. At the same time, the film punishes her for her 
desires.  
Ostensibly, the film wishes to understand Gilda, but is blinded by its censorious nature and 
by her brightly lit introduction. This kind of fetishism, for Laura Mulvey, is ‘born out of a refusal 
to see, a refusal to accept the difference the female body represents for the male.’93 This fetishism, 
moreover, leaves the ‘female body as an enigma and threat.’94 Gilda’s introduction is, as Mulvey 
indicates, both an enigma and a threat. Her presence is a ‘surprise’ to Johnny, but simultaneously 
she is a threat to the homosexual relationship between Johnny and Ballin. If the film’s fetishistic 
gaze toward Gilda is born out of a ‘refusal to accept the difference the female body represents for 
the male,’ then her body is introduced to intervene and set a ‘standard of normality,’ to give Johnny 
an avenue to experience heterosexual desire and set the film’s narrative tension and drama 
‘straight’.95 The homosexual relationship, according to Greg Forter, attempts to block the woman’s 
role as sexual ‘normaliser.’ To admit that Johnny is a passive male figure, one who takes ‘guns 
from behind’, requires the film to disavow that the desirable character is not Gilda, but Johnny. 
‘We want,’ Forter argues, ‘to see and master Gilda, with all the sadism and castration anxiety 
implied, so as not to have to look at this other, this far less gainly, exhibition.’96 As Trigo and 
 
93 Mulvey, ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’, p. 64. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Forter, ‘Going Straight with Gilda’, p. 19. 
96 Ibid, p. 18. 
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Oliver argue in Noir Anxiety, this kind of ‘femininity’ in men — that is, homosexual desire — is 
more ‘dangerous’ than femininity in women because it threatens the ‘very boundaries and borders’ 
of identity. 97  
Figure 6.9, Gilda (1946) 
For Forter, the film’s project, and Gilda’s main function, is to act as a corrective to Ballin 
and Johnny’s ‘ominous aberration,’ their homosexuality.98 Gilda’s function, therefore, is to redraw 
the boundaries of sexual identity. Johnny and Ballin’s homosexuality is only suggested in the film, 
and never becomes an explicit issue, but it is still central to understanding Gilda’s role in the film. 
 
97 Oliver and Trigo, Noir Anxiety, p. 35. 
98 Forter, ‘Going Straight with Gilda’, p. 18. 
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Further, Elizabeth Cowie argues that the repressed homosexuality in the film ‘forms the basis for 
Johnny’s sadistic punishment’.99 Cowie approaches the issue — albeit briefly — from a Freudian 
perspective. Gilda’s punishment is a result of her position in the film’s Oedipus complex. She is, 
as Cowie summarises, the ‘oedipal surrogate’100 because the way in which she ‘must’ be rescued 
from Ballin is aligned with the mother’s apparent need for rescue from the desire of the father. As 
Freud writes, ‘in the rescue-phantasy [the male child] is completely identifying himself with his 
father. All his instincts, those of tenderness, gratitude, lustfulness, defiance and independence, find 
satisfaction in the single wish to be his own father.’101 A Freudian reading, therefore, views the 
film’s narrative as the process by which the family is reinstated. Since Johnny and Gilda do 
(re)unite at the end of the film, we can only conclude that Johnny does not simply wish to be his 
own father, but that he is his own father.  
Johnny and Ballin’s chance meeting at the docks is a curious matter too. It takes place 
shortly after the former gambles with American sailors in Buenos Aires — spending his ‘first night 
in the Argentine.’ Johnny says, in his voiceover, that although he did not know much about the 
local population, he does ‘know about American sailors.’ The euphemistic phrasing, alongside the 
suggestive imagery of Johnny kneeling at waist height, is about as far as Gilda can go. In contrast 
to Gilda’s whereabouts, her position in the male fantasy, Johnny and Ballin’s meeting (and 
subsequent relationship) is left unresolved. Forter notes Johnny’s ‘feminisation’ — as he takes a 
‘gun in the back’102 — is suggestive of his homosexual passivity; a passivity that the film must 
constantly disavow. Gilda, on the other hand, is intended to break apart the homosexual 
 
99 Cowie, ‘Film Noir and Women’, p. 124. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Sigmund Freud, ‘The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis’, in The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XIX (London: Hogarth Press, 1961), p. 173. 
102 Forter, ‘Going Straight with Gilda’, p. 15. 
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relationship and supplant it with the formation of the heterosexual couple. Her role as desirable 
object is amplified by (or perhaps only exists because of) the film’s denial and simultaneous 
suggestion of the homosexual relationship between Ballin and Johnny. On the one hand, the film 
denies that such a relationship is ongoing, while on the other it offers, after eighteen minutes, an 
‘antidote’ to it, after the film deems it necessary. Thus, the assumed desire for Gilda is a desire for 
‘normalisation.’103 In this sense, the question of whether Gilda is ‘decent’ is one which asks 
whether Gilda will intervene in Ballin and Johnny’s relationship. Is she decent enough to bring 
about the ‘correct’ coupling of herself and Johnny? In this respect, Gilda cannot be considered a 
femme fatale if, for instance, we conceive of the femme fatale as a figure who breaks apart the 
family and destabilises the home. Gilda’s function here is precisely the opposite, to restore the 
family, to reunite herself and Johnny, and prise him away from the tempestuous and criminal 
Ballin. The final line of the film, spoken by Gilda, is ‘Johnny, let’s go. Let’s go home.’ By 
assuming her role as obedient housewife (mirroring Ballin’s desire for obedience), she renounces 
her access to her sexual strength. For Hollinger, the ending is unsatisfactory and forced because 
the ‘character’ of Gilda is ‘left unresolved and uncontrolled.’104 Hollinger locates the source of 
ambiguity in Johnny’s voiceover — Gilda is really Johnny’s story — and how the voiceover ‘is 
tied to the conflicts that dominate the text rather than to the attempts at resolution that are made in 
the film's closing segments’, which Hollinger identifies as Gilda’s femininity and Johnny’s 
homoerotic attraction to Ballin.105   
 
103 Ibid, p. 18. 




Figure 6.10, Gilda (1946) 
Part of the film’s method is to ‘de-hystercise’ Gilda’s female body. For, as Forter shows, 
the two central questions of the film are first, ‘Gilda, are you decent?’, and second ‘Where is 
Gilda?’ The second question ‘camouflages and serves as an alibi’ for the first question, which, 
Forter argues, sanctions ‘an interrogation into the whereabouts of the female body only in order to 
fix that body.’106 There is a desire on the part of Johnny (and perhaps Ballin) to relentlessly punish 
Gilda for her imagined indiscretions: first, to find her, to subjugate her in the male gaze, and 
second, to ‘make her decent.’ Yet this role is performed by Gilda on Johnny, not the other way 
around. Gilda, both the film and the character, promise a certain level of scopophilic pleasure, a 
 
106 Forter, ‘Going Straight with Gilda’, p. 10. 
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pleasure which is denied at the point of its satisfaction, and infinitely suspended. Specifically, what 
is suspended is our desire to know the answers to the film’s central questions — ‘Is Gilda decent?’ 
and ‘Where is Gilda?’ With respect to the moral implication of Gilda’s (in)decency, the film 
assumes we want Gilda to be decent for the sole purpose of breaking up the homosexual 
relationship. If Gilda is decent, then the home can be reclaimed by the heterosexual couple instead. 
In this way, the film demands Gilda’s moral ‘purity’ and subservience while at the same time 
attempting to delimit her effect. On the level of our desire, the film teases us and invites us to look 
to see whether Gilda is ‘decent.’ If we look and see Gilda is indecent, then the answer to the moral 
question, the answer we want, is complicated because her flirtation with Johnny (thus giving us 
the ‘correct’ narrative solution) equates to being adulterous. Our desire to see an ‘indecent’ Gilda 
is both rewarding and punishing. It is rewarding in the sense we see what we desire, but punishing 
as far as it makes us, by the film’s own standards, morally culpable. Moreover, for the film to reach 
its intended satisfying conclusion, in some sense Gilda must have been domesticated, sculptured 
into an appropriate wife. Just as she must cede her desire, we must cease to desire both Gilda and 
Johnny. 
The final moments of Gilda attempt to close off desire for the home. The question of 
Gilda’s whereabouts is finally answered, given its ‘proper’ context. Yet it remains unsatisfactory 
because of Gilda’s hauntological dimensions. She can only assume her position if her 
hauntological dimensions are disavowed. Johnny is told moments prior to his near rejection of her 
at the end of the film, ‘Gilda didn't do any of those things you've been losing sleep over, not any 
of them. It was just an act, all of it, and I'll give you credit. You were a great audience, Mr. 
Farrell.’107 The ending is therefore presented as the ‘originary’ moment of Gilda as a ‘proper’ 
 
107 Gilda (1946). 
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woman, exorcised of her fatal affect. However, it is in the exorcism that noir’s hauntological 
demon is revealed. The real purpose of the femme fatale is explicitly hauntology (if hauntology 
can ever be explicit) because in revealing that Gilda was not the femme fatale she was fantasised 
to be, it reveals the femme fatale to be entirely imaginary, not located in women but as a historical 
relation. The appearance of the femme fatale signals a doubling, a repetition, of fantasy, and of 
home. When Gilda says ‘Let’s go home’ to Johnny, home’s hauntological dimension is revealed: 
it the place they are returning to (that is, returning to America after the war) but also as a new, 




We have reached home, or at least the end of the thesis. By centring home within noir discourse 
(in noir itself and critical approaches to noir) we can more fully understand its problematic 
conception and retroactive construction. The absence of home, for one, creates an instance of the 
eerie: a presence which should be felt, but is nonetheless absent. This is only intensified, 
paradoxically, by the inclusion of home in noir’s narrative. For example, the unavailability of the 
Dietrichson home in Double Indemnity, a place frequently returned to in this thesis, is only 
increased by Neff’s proximity to it; the closer he gets to the ‘end of the line’ the further away home 
appears. It is in this sense that home is fascinating. It acts as the centre of meaning (the point-de-
capiton, the mechanism by which meaning is ‘stitched’ together après-coup), yet structurally it 
resists understanding. Indeed, home, like noir at a certain point, cannot be understood. It is a ‘black 
hole’ of meaning, absent and unknowable, that nevertheless pulls meaning toward it. The home is 
often positioned as a place of safety, a retreat from the overbearing presence of desire in noir, but 
it rarely grants such safety. As a result of its fascinating properties, home is a major site of anxiety 
in noir. 
The critical fascination with noir, I assert, is borne out of a desire to (re)insert home in noir. 
Home, here, acts a metaphor for stable meaning, yet critical fascination renders noir fundamentally 
unstable. In this way, noir films reflect their own critical history, and thus a consistent thread in 
this thesis has been an examination of how noir’s retrospection creates a dialogue between itself 
and its critics. Noir, as I have argued, is only sustained by this retroactivity. In noir, history is lost 
to us. Through this loss, however, the mechanisms of historical recovery are revealed to us so that, 
in the aftermath of noir, we are able to recognise how our own critical position changes noir, and 
allows us to resist the temptation to put history and coherence back into noir. By centring home 
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within this discourse, this thesis centres ambiguity rather than ignoring it. In noir, history is lost in 
the past as well as the present. There is no clear chronology of noir as a category, but neither is 
there a clear chronological construction of time in noir. I thus understand noir as a non-temporal 
and non-hierarchal category which can only be engaged retroactively. This approach of centring 
ambiguity does, however, come with its own problems. Principally, the twin tasks of centring the 
films themselves and recognising the critical lacuna at the heart of noir criticism can often be 
contradictory, and the balance is be difficult to maintain. Centring the films constitutes the bulk of 
my readings, but without prominent references to the critical context surrounding the film (as well 
as noir more generally) can potentially lead to unsatisfactory conclusions. On the other hand, 
highlighting the structural ways in which critical approaches fail (or succeed) is be extremely 
illuminating in my readings of the films. Yet it runs the risk of diminishing the films themselves. 
The films, potentially, are only useful insofar as they prove some theory or thesis about them. In 
short, maintaining the proper distance where one can examine the films from a somewhat objective 
position, while at the same time acknowledging the instabilities of the critical position in noir is 
difficult, and sometimes, this balance must be forsaken in the name of clarity. These concerns are 
not exclusive to noir; however, they are heightened in noir criticism. 
I see the notion of blindness, both literal and metaphorical, as central to noir and our 
spectatorship of it. The various mysteries in noir are often predicated on what we cannot see, and 
therefore what we cannot know. In Detour, for example, Al bemoans that ‘fate, or some mysterious 
force, can put the finger on you or me for no good reason at all.’1 Indeed, Detour culminates in Al 
and Vera moving into a hotel room for a short while as Vera manipulates Al into stealing a fortune 
for her. The last act of the film takes place in a pale imitation of home, with Al and Vera pretending 
 
1 Detour (1945). 
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to be husband and wife — Al’s fiancée, Sue, after all wished to move to Hollywood to become an 
actor. What Al cannot see, despite it purportedly being in front of him, is the home he desires with 
Sue, his ‘real’ fiancée. At the centre of noir’s blindness, then, lies home, the ‘mysterious force’ 
which obliges noir’s protagonists to seek it out. 
 This compulsion for home, enabled by desire and fascination, leads to a kind of 
homesickness. It is a sickness both for and of the home. This sickness is seen most acutely in The 
Lost Weekend, but it is a sensation felt throughout noir. Don’s alcoholism in the film acts as a lens 
through which we can see how home function as the ‘abyss’ of desire, or the Real in Lacanian 
terms. Desire posits that there is meaning to be found in completing its circuit, that the Real around 
which it circles will finally be understood and brought into the symbolic order. However, the desire 
for home in noir only reveals the emptiness of home as an ideological and historical concept. Home 
therefore only exists as an imagined and pastoral idea. Noir shows this imagination, this fantasy, 
as nothingness. In this way, desire for home in noir is not simply a desire to return to an imagined 
and nostalgic past, but instead a desire to cease desiring altogether. Noir is a similar kind of 
fantasmatic construction, an imagined genre projected into the past. The addiction in The Lost 
Weekend short circuits this fantasy, and instead gives us direct access to the Real of film noir. To 
adjust Lacan’s maxim, what lies beyond the front door of home, what home’s interiority consists 
of, is, in fact, nothing at all. 
 The home in noir is thus always duplicitous insofar as it never gives noir what it wants. 
What renders home fascinating is the way in which all noir’s other problems are refracted through 
home, as is the case with Mildred Pierce. The merging of the economic and domestic spheres in 
the home express anxieties surrounding the changing nature of work, gender, and home in the 
postwar context. Home is also diffused into noir’s ambiguous spaces. The alienating space of the 
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city and its relation to the home engenders a sense of homelessness in noir. On one level, spaces 
in noir are rarely comforting. There is always some unseen ‘mysterious force’ which gazes at noir’s 
protagonists (and us), some element which remains unaccounted for. There is a combined sense of 
alienation and compulsion in film noir. This sense of alienation can be seen in the work of Edward 
Hopper, whose paintings lie adjacent to noir’s fascination. In noir, these alienating spaces are felt 
narratively in the way they act as a trap for noir’s characters. It is in their promise of openness — 
such as Wanley’s fantasmatic, lustful gaze at the painting of Alice — that we find the paranoid 
atmosphere of noir. 
 Finally, I have analysed the problematic conception of the femme fatale, specifically how 
the femme fatale is always present and at the same time overrepresented in noir discourse. The 
femme fatale, like home, is felt through her absences. Even when she is on screen, she still 
represents the possibility of her non-existence. In this respect, she is both weird and eerie. When 
she is present, she points to her disappearance, the absence she represents. When she is absent, she 
still remains a strong presence of any particular film, and noir more broadly. The originality of my 
thesis is located not only in the centring of home in its various analyses of the films discussed, but 
also in how it takes the problem of centring home metonymically. I view home as a traumatic 
object in noir. The trauma surrounding home opens up its own conundrums, but it also acts as a 
way in which to understand trauma more generally in noir. That is that noir is a traumatic category 
of films. The centring of home acknowledges a key theoretical problem of critical discourses 
surrounding noir. Noir can only be understood if we ignore the impulse to delimit its excesses, to 
solve its inscrutable mysteries.  
There are multiple areas which invite further research, for example the consideration of 
other film noirs from the selected period in relation to the broader discussion of home. An 
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expansion of the period backwards or forwards into either the 1930s or the 1950s could give a 
broader view of the conception of home in noir. Such a project would focus on charting the changes 
of home’s conception through the decades in noir and would inevitably be more historiographical.2 
This, too, would fit into the methodological schema of interpreting noir films non-temporally. 
Aside from a simple expansion of the period, I see two major avenues which I would like to 
consider pursing afterwards. Firstly, an exploration of the effects of the Cold War on noir and 
home, or vice versa, would complement the argument and themes of this thesis. There are many 
worthwhile comparisons to be drawn by situating a response in the context of the Cold War in 
relation to home. In particular, the issues of McCarthyism, the ‘Red Scare’, and explicit anti-
communist propaganda all impact how home is constructed and ultimately rely on a certain 
nostalgic conception of home.  
Secondly, increasing the historical scope would allow a greater consideration of noir’s 
various re-makes and re-imaginings of its narratives and ideas, and how this affects the 
construction of noir more generally. For example, in my earlier discussions of the problem of 
identifying the ‘first film noir’, a comparison might be made between John Huston’s 1941 version 
of The Maltese Falcon and Roy Del Ruth’s 1931 version. The question would revolve around the 
specific difference between the two films but would also situate Del Ruth’s version within the 
context of Huston’s. That is, how is Del Ruth’s version understood in relation to Huston’s? This 
is a stark way in which various film noirs can be read non-temporally. Moreover, it would 
interrogate the theoretical and conceptual concerns of reimagination itself, the various excesses 
 
2 For an example which expands the period to look at the American city more broadly, see: Michael J. Shaprio, The 
Time of the City: Politics, Philosophy and Genre (London: Routledge, 2010), particularly the fourth chapter, ‘Neo-
Noir and Urban Domesticity: The Wachowski brothers’ Bound’, which compares the domestic roles of Phyllis 
Dietrichson in Double Indemnity and Violet in Bound (1996). 
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which are produced, and the relation to the falcon itself. Just as the text questions the authenticity 
of the falcon, and of authenticity itself, we might also wish to consider which version of the film 
is the ‘real’ version. As I have argued, noir is identified through its excesses. Other similar projects 
might include films which share similar plotlines or themes. A particularly pointed example is 
Fritz Lang’s The Woman in the Window and Scarlet Street, which possess nearly identically 
(though crucially different) narratives. Another example is Hitchcock’s Shadow of a Doubt and 
Welles’ The Stranger. The extremity of these films’ narrative resemblance confronts us with the 
problem that, perhaps, contained within a single noir film is the entirety of the noir canon. Since 
noir is an open category, there is always the possibility for ‘one more’ noir, so every film noir must 
allow for this possibility. The conception of the ‘noir canon’, moreover, does not exist 
independently of noir films; the ‘noir canon’ already exists in the films themselves. 
 Another key consideration raised by the thesis is the category of neo-noir and the 
conception of home in contemporary noir. I am referring to films, literature, and television shows 
from 1970 until the present which reflect some of the themes of noir, but recontextualise noir in 
their own disconnected schemas. Through this, we could expand on how the network of meaning 
in noir is formed through connections between films. Within these contemporary contexts, the 
conceptualisation of noir and of home could be broadened to discuss cinematic and cultural 
responses to historical events and periods such as the Cold War, the Vietnam War, and 9/11. Film 
noir, as I have argued, reveals part of America’s cultural response to the disposition of its own 
historical myths. Neo-noir, it should be noted, is as varied as film noir — perhaps more so. There 
are the crime neo-noirs of directors such as Martin Scorsese (Taxi Driver (1976), Raging Bull 
(1980), Cape Fear (1991)), David Fincher (Se7en (1995), Zodiac (2007), Gone Girl (2014)), and 
Michael Mann (Manhunter (1986), Heat (1995)). In addition, there is science fiction noir, which 
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developed into the subcategory of cyberpunk: Blade Runner (1982)3 and its sequel, The 
Terminator and its sequels, Robocop. In the twenty first century, the German television programme 
Dark (2017) represents both the popularity of the noir aesthetic and the complexity of its form 
through the way in which Dark turns the paradoxes of the investigative structure into a 
psychologically inflected time travel narrative —  a world where cause and effect are not only 
reversed, but it is impossible to tell which is which. There are also the psychological neo-noirs of 
David Lynch (Blue Velvet, Mulholland Dr., Twin Peaks, and so on), who consistently uses film 
noir as a reference point within the complex systems of signs and symbols in his work. Modern 
neo-noir perhaps best exhibits Naremore’s claim of noir’s ‘transgeneric’ sensibilities.4 The Batman 
films of Christopher Nolan5, which are themselves heavily influenced by canonical graphic novels 
Batman: Year One, and The Dark Knight Returns,6 occupy a prominent place in the popular 
cultural imagination.7 What is of theoretical interest here is how the role of nostalgia is heightened 
in neo-noir. Film noir is already a nostalgic category, but neo-noir often exhibits a nostalgia for 
noir itself. As Andrew Spicer describes in Historical Dictionary of Film Noir, ‘neo-noirs are films 
that self-consciously allude to classic noir, either implicitly or explicitly, building on what had 
become recognized and accepted as a distinct body of films from a particular period.’8 While 
 
3 The psychoanalytic framework carries over to some neo-noir films. As Alena Zupančič writes: ‘One could even 
say that the story of Oedipus lies at the heart of the “new wave” of film noir  — films such as Angel Heart and Blade 
Runner (the director’s cut), where it emerges at the end that the hero is himself the criminal he is looking for’ (Alena 
Zupančič, Ethics of the Real: Kant, Lacan (London: Verso, 2000), p. 246). 
4 Naremore, More Than Night, p. 6. 
5 Particularly Batman Begins (2005) and The Dark Knight (2008). 
6 Another consideration in the context of Batman’s connection with noir is Batman: The Animated Series, which 
borrows its setting and iconography from an imagined noir past. The city is dominated by high-rise art-deco 
buildings, the advanced technology of Batman is contrasted with the villains as 1930s style gangsters, it is replete 
with fedoras, ‘Tommy’ guns, and ubiquitous Zeppelins. It is evocative of noir, but such works, and others like it, 
would be better understood if approached through a theoretically rigorous understanding of noir. 
7 For a political reading of Batman Begins, see: Mark Fisher, ‘Gothic Oedipus: Subjectivity and Capitalism in 
Christopher Nolan’s Batman Begins’, in k-punk: The Collected and Unpublished Writings of Mark Fisher (2004-
2016), ed. by Darren Ambrose (London: Repeater Books, 2018), pp. 139-146.  
8 Andrew Spicer, Historical Dictionary of Film Noir (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2010), p. 215. 
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Spicer’s definition is a little scarce on detail, it is broadly correct in its assertion that what marks 
out neo-noir, particularly neo-noirs released after Robert Altman’s The Long Goodbye (1973), is 
a formal self-reflexivity. In relation to noir, neo-noir is nostalgically self-reflexive in a way that 
noir often is not. 
 In film noir, home is a lost object. Not only does it represent the lost history of noir itself, 
but it also represents the ideological and historical problems in the aftermath of World War Two. 
Returning to home, in a metaphorical sense, is the process by which history is rendered nostalgic. 
The task of historical recovery falls to us, who watch and write about these films, almost eighty 
years after their release. The fact we are unable to put history back into noir shows us the density 
of noir’s conception of itself and its own fluctuating world. Yet our nostalgia for stability, for 
home, is precisely what sustains noir. Noir requires our nostalgic spectatorship more than it 
requires a coherent sense of its own historicity. In this sense we are, to borrow a phrase from Lacan, 
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